Why Do Tanks and Armoured Vehicles Inflict Too Many Casualties?

In the wars that have taken place in recent years, tanks and armoured vehicles have been suffering increasing casualties on the battlefields. This situation leads to comments such as "Tanks and armoured vehicles are no longer important". In my opinion, it is too early to confirm these comments because in some wars, tanks and armoured vehicles are still useful and do not cause heavy casualties. 

Moreover, in the Ukraine war, despite heavy casualties, the parties continue to send every tank and armoured vehicle they can find to the battlefield. Tank and armoured vehicle production has also been increasing in recent years. Some innovations are also being made in the design and armour technologies of these new tanks and armoured vehicles. In other words, no one is yet convinced that tanks and armoured vehicles are useless.  

However, the actions taken may not be due to lack of conviction, but to desperation. Because it is a fact that tanks and armoured vehicles are suffering from a major crisis, but despite all the measures taken, no remedy for the crisis has yet been found, nor has anything been developed to replace tanks and armoured vehicles. Therefore, all countries are unable to do anything other than to continue producing/acquiring tanks and armoured vehicles.

The most important reason for this helplessness is the attempt to find a solution to the problem only by improving the design and armour protection of tanks and armoured vehicles. However, the problem is much more complex than inadequate armour protection. The problems faced by tanks and armoured vehicles are similar to the problems faced by infantry and cavalry when they first emerged (in World War I). Since these problems could not be solved, the cavalry class disappeared, replaced by tanks, and the infantry class was equipped with armoured vehicles. 

The reason for this is the developments that have taken place since the mid-19th century. There are two basic elements used by armies in battles. These are manoeuvre and fire support. The Napoleonic wars brought manoeuvre to the forefront as the basic element for victory. Having learnt the necessary lessons from this, Prussia reorganised the troop and headquarters organisation of its army, developed new doctrines and won short-term decisive victories with battles based on the concept of manoeuvre in its wars since the mid-19th century. 

This situation affected the organisation, equipment and doctrines of all European armies. For this reason, before World War I, every army thought of winning the victory with short-term decisive battles by conducting siege manoeuvres. In accordance with this idea, the offensive was accepted as the main mode of operation.

Thus, the second of the two elements of warfare, fire and manoeuvre, came to the fore. However, there was one thing that no one took into account. New weapon technologies that had been emerging for some time had greatly increased the firepower. Because the rate of fire of new technology weapons such as rapid-fire cannons, semi-automatic infantry rifles and machine guns was very high. 

In addition, new doctrines were created for these weapons. These doctrines were mostly intended for defence. For example, barrage fires for cannons and withholding fires for machine guns were included in defence doctrines. In addition, soldiers were buried in the ground and wire barriers were used in front of the defence line. 

The infantry of the attacking side would run across open ground from the attacking position until it reached the objective. Because of the wire barriers, the infantry now had to stand much longer to cover this distance. Thus, the infantry massed in front of the wire obstacles began to suffer more casualties than at any time in history due to barrage fire, enfilading fire, and intense and accurate rifle fire from the soldiers in the positions. 

This made it impossible for the infantry to reach the enemy positions in strength. For this reason, defences were rarely breached. When they were breached, the breach pockets were quickly closed by adjusting the positions, so that reserve forces of infantry could not move forward quickly enough to move in depth before the breaches were closed. 

The cavalry, which could have been used for this purpose, became completely useless in the face of the high intensity of fire to capitalise on success. Moreover, since the positions were extended uninterruptedly to the natural obstacles on both flanks, with no gaps between them, the cavalry had no opportunity to carry out flanking manoeuvres. 

Consequently, cavalry units were rapidly reduced in all armies and were used mainly for non-combat duties. This made offensive operations based on manoeuvre and speed impossible. The so-called positional warfare, based on the concept of attrition, emerged. For this reason, defence became more advantageous. 

When siege manoeuvres could not be carried out, strategy and operative art were pushed to the background and tactics came to the fore. Due to excessive casualties, much more soldiers, supplies, ammunition and equipment were needed for the battle. This necessitated a continuous integration of personnel and logistical support. This brought logistics to the forefront for victory. 

It was not possible for states with limited population and production capacity, or even for all states participating in the war, to sustain this for much longer. For this reason, the parties developed some new doctrines, tools and weapons to overcome the problem. 

One of these was tanks. Tanks and the armoured vehicles developed soon afterwards were invented to overcome wire obstacles and to carry infantry to enemy positions without excessive casualties, in other words, to give manoeuvre units the ability to move again by protecting them from excessive casualties. However, it did not work very well because appropriate doctrines and concepts were not used. 

The Germans, who prepared doctrines and concepts for this, won many victories in a short time in World War II. They evaluated tanks not only in terms of armour protection, but also in terms of firepower and mobility. They developed armoured vehicles for infantry to accompany tanks. Thus, manoeuvre came to the fore again and the offensive became advantageous in terms of achieving a decisive result in a short time. 

After the war, all armies adopted doctrines and concepts based on armour protection, mobility and firepower to create an impact. However, this situation started to change again after the Cold War. Because what happened to the infantry and cavalry, which were the manoeuvring elements of World War I, was now happening to the new manoeuvring elements, tanks and armoured vehicles. 

The most important reason for this was the development of new weapon and vehicle technologies that would eliminate the superiority of tanks and armoured vehicles. In time, doctrines suitable for these weapons and vehicles were also found. Thus, from fire and manoeuvre, fire again became very powerful. This caused tanks and armoured vehicles to suffer a lot of casualties, as happened to infantry and cavalry in the First World War. 

Thus, it became impossible for tanks and armoured vehicles to manoeuvre. Moreover, as wars became hybridised and battles took place in rugged terrains and residential areas, it became difficult to benefit from the mobility and firepower of tanks. Reduced mobility made tanks and armoured vehicles easier targets (like infantry whose speed was reduced by wire obstacles). As a result, the defence became more advantageous. 

The large number of tanks and armoured vehicles destroyed on the battlefields is a clear indication of this. The Russians, for example, lost almost all of their tanks and armoured vehicles on the offensive. Therefore, their offensive was not successful. Ukraine, on the other hand, was more successful than initially hoped because it was on the defensive. 

The situation was reversed when the Russians went on the defensive and Ukraine went on the offensive. In its general offensive, Ukraine lost most of the tanks and armoured vehicles provided by Western countries and could not achieve any results. Both sides then went on the defensive in positions dug into the ground along the line of contact. In front of these positions, there are various tank obstacles and a deep ditch. 

Like the infantry in World War 1, the armoured units in Ukraine were forced to slow down or even stop on the main battle line because of these obstacles. This led to their destruction before they could reach their defensive positions. In other words, the history of infantry repeats itself for tanks and armoured vehicles.

For this reason, neither side is likely to attempt a general offensive at the moment. Because it takes a very long time to cross this obstacle system, there is a risk of losing almost all of the exposed tanks and armoured vehicles. For this reason, manoeuvre units are waiting in their positions except for limited targeted attacks. Since fire assaults are more prominent, tanks and armoured vehicles are used for fire fighting, not for assault.

This situation is not something that emerged in a single day, but is the result of the developments that emerged step by step after the Cold War. Its foundations were laid as early as the first Gulf War, but since the war was short and decisive, no one paid attention to it. 

What was overlooked at the time was that precision guided weapons opened the door to a new process for armoured units. Developments were not limited to this. In Grozny, it was seen that while the superiority of tanks and armoured vehicles in urban areas was neutralised, their weaknesses increased and they became helpless against simple weapons such as RPGs. 

In the Afghanistan war, it was understood that having large armoured units did not always lead to victory even against an armed force without any modern anti-tank weapons or armoured vehicles. Because the terrain made it impossible for armoured troops to operate. 

Most importantly, it was seen that even IEDs made from materials used in daily life and RPGs, which are simple anti-tank weapons, could wear down the enemy in the long term. As a matter of fact, after 20 years of efforts by the Americans, who invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime, their only success was to reach an agreement with the Taliban and leave the country back to them.

This situation led to the widespread use of IEDs by many terrorist organizations and insurgents. As a result, the US-led military force lost many tanks and armored vehicles to insurgents and terrorist organizations using simple weapons such as IEDs and RPGs in Iraq after the 2nd Gulf Operation.

In Lebanon in 2006, with the addition of new generation laser-guided anti-tank weapons, Israel suffered the heaviest casualties in its history. The Turkish army also faced these problems in Syria (Al Bap), but it was the Turkish army that developed a new doctrine for UCAVs in the Idlib region and implemented a new lethal application for tanks and armored vehicles.

UCAVs not only hit ground targets with their guided missiles, but also acted as forward air surveillance and enabled accurate shots at armored units with cannons, MLRAs and mortars. This situation was also tested in Libya. In Karabakh, kamikaze drones joined the anti-tank weapons, and it was seen that the armor protection and maneuverability of the armored units were now a thing of the past.

In Ukraine, planes, attack helicopters, mines, IEDs, tanks, RPGs, classical law weapons, wire and laser-guided anti-tank weapons, UCAVs, kamikaze drones, civilian-purpose drones with explosives attached to their undersides, and even simple and powerful weapons such as molotov cocktails. All cheap weapons were used. The result was complete destruction. Ukraine turned into a tank and armored vehicle scrapyard.

This situation strengthened the claims that the era of tanks and armored vehicles is over. Because tanks and armored vehicles face multi-dimensional and wide-ranging threats, no measures have been developed to counter all of these threats.

Although there are still those who oppose this. They say that tanks and armored vehicles will never become obsolete, and despite the losses, many tanks and armored vehicles were sent to the front. However, they overlook that they cannot be used in accordance with their purpose of existence.

Claims that these are indispensable for the attack are also not true because, like Russia, Ukraine cannot carry out an effective offensive operation with tanks and armored vehicles. They only carry out limited targeted attacks and inflict very heavy losses on tanks and armored vehicles in these attacks. So the problem is too big to be excused or ignored.

Under these conditions, it is clear that improving tank armor and working on new designs that will cause less harm to personnel is not enough to solve the problem. Comprehensive changes must be made by looking at the events holistically. These changes must also include measures to prevent excessive firepower.

In addition, wars in recent years have mostly occurred in residential areas and in terrain that restricts armored unit operations. On the other hand, the hybridization of wars (at least one of the parties consists of many elements such as the regular army, terrorist organizations, insurgents, private companies, etc.) creates asymmetric effects on armored units.

In conclusion, within the framework of all these evaluations, it is possible to say the following: In design and technology to solve the crisis experienced by tanks and armored vehicles; A comprehensive change must be made in the organization, doctrine, concept and tactics. Otherwise, these very expensive vehicles will not only not bring victory in the war but will also harm the country's economy.