National Memory in Narratives of the Atomic Bomb: Japan and Korea's Differing Approaches

This article presents excerpts from Kwon Heok-Tae's article entitled ‘Rethinking Hiroshima's “Peace”: Restoring the Subject and the Logic of the “Nation Hit by a Single Atomic Bomb”’. The article critically examines representations of the collective memory of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region. The author analyses the chronology of the idea of the “nation struck by a single atomic bomb”, a process of reconstructing Japan's victimhood as a national narrative despite the existence of Korean victims. The discussion examines the relationship between Japan's war responsibility and Korea's colonisation through topics such as the ‘error’ debate at the Atomic Bomb Victims Memorial Cemetery, the construction of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, and the preservation of the Atomic Bomb Dome. Overall, the article questions the contradictions surrounding post-war Japanese pacifism and the concept of peace, centred around the atomic bomb experience.

The cover image shows a building located on the east bank of the Motoyasu River in Hiroshima, Japan, which was reduced to rubble in the 1945 bombing.

This structure is the part known as the Atomic Bomb Dome, located within Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park today. Standing intact since 1945, this structure hosts the park's most emotional and meaningful memories, leaving a deep impression on visitors' minds. Completed in 1915, this three-storey brick building was used as an exhibition hall to boost trade. However, on the morning of 6 August 1945, at 08:15, everything changed. For the first time in the world, an atomic bomb was used in warfare; it detonated 150 metres above this building, almost directly above the exhibition hall, missing its intended target (the T-shaped Aioi Bridge). Everyone inside died instantly. However, the dome of the building remained standing. In the initial phase (immediately and shortly after) of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, approximately 60,000 to 80,000 people lost their lives. By the end of 1945, this number is estimated to have reached 140,000 (due to the effects of radiation and injuries).

1- Shared Trauma, Separate Memories

Although the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki went down in history as one of the most devastating events of the 20th century, this shared trauma gave rise to two fundamentally different collective memories in East Asia. In Japan, this event became the cornerstone of a ‘victim’ narrative that obscured the country's responsibility for the war and positioned it as a defender of universal peace. In contrast, in Korea, the same bombs are etched in memory as a moment of ‘liberation’ that brought an end to decades of brutal Japanese colonialism. These two contrasting narratives of memory are more than just a difference in historical interpretation; they serve as strategic tools that have shaped the post-war national identities of both countries, their relations with the United States (US), and their ongoing diplomatic tensions to this day.

The primary aim of this analysis is to examine in depth, in light of the source texts provided, how these two different narratives of memory emerged, how they were perpetuated through which commemorative, discursive and political mechanisms, and how they permanently shaped post-war identities. Within this framework, the complex dynamics behind Japan's ‘peace’ discourse and the historical origins of Korea's ‘liberation’ perspective will be examined through a comparative approach.

We will begin our analysis by examining the place of the atomic bombs in Korea's collective memory and how this memory fundamentally diverges from the Japanese narrative.

2- The Price of Liberation: Korea's Perspective on the Atomic Bomb

In Korea's collective memory, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are synonymous with the end of Japanese colonial rule, even more so than with the human tragedy. This perspective positions the bombing not as an isolated event, but as the final act of 35 years of occupation, assimilation policies, and wartime exploitation. Therefore, for the Korean narrative, the atomic bombs are not an ending but a beginning: a painful but necessary turning point that paved the way for the regaining of national sovereignty and independence. This framework plays a central role in understanding Korea's 20th-century national identity and its troubled relationship with Japan.

‘A Just and Necessary Punishment’

Korea's stance on this issue has remained clear even years after the bombing. For example, in 1959, on the 15th anniversary of the ‘15 August Liberation,’ the conservative South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo published an article using a photograph of a devastated Hiroshima and captioned it with a headline that clearly summarised the Korean perspective: "A single atomic bomb wiped militarism from the face of the earth... This is their shattered corpse.‘ The article defined the bombing as a ’just and necessary punishment‘ for Japan's crimes and argued that this event directly led to ’Japan's unconditional surrender, and thus Korea's liberation." This perspective warns against succumbing to Japan's ‘sentimentalism for peace’ in the face of the human tragedy caused by the bombing.

Criticism of ‘Taking Out of Context’

Korean intellectuals have criticised Japan's narrative of Hiroshima as a strategy of ‘taking out of context’ that deliberately ignores the country's history of aggression. In 1995, journalist Choi Jung-ho drew attention to this hypocrisy by asking, ‘Why does Japan talk so much about Hiroshima when Germany remains silent about the Dresden tragedy?’ According to Choi, the difference stems from ‘the presence or absence of historical conscience.’ While Germans view Dresden as a consequence of Nazism, the Japanese remember only 1945, forgetting the 1931 invasion of China and the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. By abstracting Hiroshima from its own war history, Japan constructs a narrative of victimhood, as if it were innocent and was attacked by the US for no reason.

The Transformation of the American Narrative

This perspective in Korea strikingly coincides with the official US thesis. The US thesis that ‘the atomic bomb ended the war early, saving the lives of many American and Japanese soldiers’ has easily been transformed in Korea into the ‘theory of early liberation from colonial rule’. As noted by the prominent Korean intellectual Rhee Yeung-hee, ‘for the Korean people liberated by the atomic bomb, the only correct answer was the logic of the US, which ended the war in victory.’ Therefore, Japan's victim narrative or the universal peace discourse developed against nuclear weapons faces a problem of historical consistency in Korea. As long as the bombing is accepted as having brought about Korea's liberation, condemning this event as merely a crime against humanity can be interpreted as tantamount to wishing for the ‘prolongation of colonial rule,’ which is dangerous.

In contrast to Korea's clear stance, which places the bombing within a historical chain of causality, Japan's memory mechanisms have constructed a victim identity through much more indirect and complex means.

3- Construction of Victim Identity: Deciphering Japan's ‘Peace’ Narrative

Japan has strategically manoeuvred to transform the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki into a universal “peace” discourse and a national ‘victim’ identity, thereby avoiding uncomfortable issues such as war responsibility and its complex relations with the United States. This transformation has established a hegemonic memory regime through monuments, public spaces, and discourses, transforming Japan from an aggressive empire into the first and most innocent victim of the nuclear age. The two most prominent examples of this process are the construction of the Hiroshima Memorial Cemetery for the Victims and the Peace Park.

3.1 The Memorial Cemetery and the ‘Subject Debate’: Blurring Responsibility

The inscription at the centre of the Hiroshima Memorial Cemetery is one of the most refined examples of a discursive manoeuvre that obscures Japan's responsibility: "Rest in peace. For we will not repeat this mistake.‘ (Yasuraka ni nemutte kudasai. Ayamachi wa kurikaeshimasenu kara). Due to the grammatical structure of Japanese, the subject of ’the mistake" in this sentence is ambiguous. Whose mistake is it? That of the US, which dropped the bomb, that of Japan, which started the war, or that of humanity as a whole? This deliberate ambiguity has created a void of meaning, triggering a polemic known as the ‘subject debate,’ in which different ideological groups fiercely contend to impose their own interpretations of Japan's war responsibility and victimhood.

This debate has taken shape around three main perspectives:

Radha Binod Pal's Interpretation: Indian judge Pal, who served on the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, argued during his visit to Hiroshima in 1952 that the Japanese could not be the subject of the ‘mistake’ in the inscription. In his view, the Japanese did not drop the bomb; moreover, Japan's war was a legitimate defensive war to protect the East against Western imperialism. This interpretation has been enthusiastically embraced by the Japanese right wing.

Criticism from the Right Wing: Right-wing intellectuals such as Hayashi Fusao and groups such as the ‘Monument Correction Association’ criticised the inscription even more harshly. In their view, this statement is a ‘monument of shame that undermines national honour,’ covering up the war crimes of the United States and placing the blame on Japan. These groups have demanded that the inscription be removed and thrown into the Seto Inland Sea.

Official Interpretation: At the end of the debates, Hiroshima Mayor Yamada Setsuo explained that the subject of the inscription was neither the United States nor Japan, but rather ‘all of humanity.’ This interpretation removed the tragedy from its national and historical context and placed it within a universal framework of ‘humanity versus nuclear weapons.’ Japan thus effectively neutralised responsibility by avoiding confronting its own history of aggression and elevated itself to the position of a peace ambassador speaking on behalf of all humanity.

3.2- Peace Park and the Atomic Bomb Dome: The Spatialisation of Memory

The process of rebuilding Hiroshima after the bombing is another example of how memory is spatialised and selectively constructed. At the outset of the process, two fundamental views clashed: the ‘preservation of ruins’ theories, which advocated leaving the city centre as it was, as a memorial cemetery, and the ‘redevelopment’ theories, which aimed to rebuild the city as a modern metropolis.

Ultimately, it was understood that the most pragmatic way for the city to obtain funding for reconstruction from the central government was to position itself as a ‘city of peace’. This ‘peace’ narrative, adopted out of economic necessity, also provided an excellent ideological cover for removing a symbol of Japanese imperialism from its context and transforming it into a sacrificial symbol. With the 1949 ‘Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Act,’ state support was secured, and the concepts of ‘peace’ and ‘development’ were combined. However, this “peace” led to a ‘commercialisation of peace’ criticised by observers of the time, such as Asahi Shimbun and writer Günther Anders. Criticisms that tourists superficially consumed the tragedy and that the city profited from its past suffering exposed the contradictions behind this official narrative.

The decision to preserve the Atomic Bomb Dome was central to this strategy:

Concentration of Memory: Preserving the dome concentrated the horrific memory of the bombing into a single, powerful symbol. However, this ‘preservation’ also paved the way for the systematic destruction of dozens of other bombed buildings and ruins. While memory was confined to a single structure, the rest of the city was rebuilt in the name of ‘peace and development.’

Erasure of Historical Identity: More significantly, the pre-1945 identity of the Atomic Bomb Dome has been deliberately forgotten. This structure was actually the ‘Hiroshima Industrial Promotion Hall’, symbolising the economic expansion of Japanese imperialism. Its post-1945 identity as a ‘symbol of peace’ has been completely severed from the structure's colonial and militaristic past. Thus, a symbol of economic aggression has been miraculously transformed into a symbol of victimhood through a process of erasing responsibility.

While Peace Park and the Memorial Tomb physically anchor Japan's narrative of victimhood in universal terms, the most powerful and politically charged expression of this narrative has emerged in a discursive form: the widespread slogan that Japan is the ‘only country to have suffered an atomic bombing’.

4- ‘The Only Country to Have Been Bombed with an Atomic Bomb’: The Rise of Hibaku Nationalism

The phrase ‘the only country to have been bombed with an atomic bomb’ (yuiitsu no hibakukoku) is a political and ideological slogan that has become central to Japan's post-war national identity, signifying much more than a simple statement of fact. This discourse represents a phenomenon known as ‘Hibaku Nationalism,’ which singularises Japan's atomic bomb experience, transforming it into a source of moral superiority and a national victim identity. This expression has functioned as a means of both evading responsibility and securing national unity by confining memory within a specific national framework. That this perspective is not merely popular opinion but also a deeply rooted justification at the highest levels of government was clearly demonstrated when Defence Minister Kyuma Fumio stated in 2007 that the bombing was ‘inevitable’. This statement reflects a long-standing official logic, rather than being a single politician's isolated gaffe, as Emperor Hirohito used almost the exact same phrase in 1975 to state that the bombing was ‘inevitable.’

Timeline of Use

The use of this phrase has increased in parallel with certain historical turning points.

1950s: The phrase first emerged in the 1950s, particularly within anti-nuclear movements following US hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini Atoll.

1980s: Its use increased significantly in the 1980s with the proliferation of local governments declaring ‘nuclear-free zones’ and the spread of peace movements.

1990s and Beyond: The use of the phrase peaked with the end of the Cold War. In particular, the ‘discovery’ in the Japanese public consciousness of the existence of Korean atomic bomb victims and the emergence of North Korea's nuclear programme as a perceived threat led to the phrase being used more frequently and insistently in both right-wing and left-wing politics. This situation demonstrates that the expression is not merely an innocent call for peace, but also serves the purpose of reinforcing national identity in the face of changing geopolitical conditions and internal challenges.

Ideological Function

The ‘only country to have suffered an atomic bomb’ discourse fulfils two fundamental ideological functions: integration and exclusion.

Integration: This expression melts the different individual experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki into a common ‘Japanese national experience’. It unites all Japanese people, regardless of class, gender or political views, under a single identity as common victims of the nuclear disaster.

Exclusion: At the same time, this national framework ruthlessly excludes non-Japanese. The tens of thousands of Korean forced labourers, American prisoners of war, and other foreigners present in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the bombings are left outside this ‘national’ memory space. The existence of Korean victims (Hibakusha) signifies much more than a simple statistical detail. These people had been brought to Japan under Japan's colonial rule to be forced into labour. Therefore, their presence in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is living proof of Japan's pre-war history of aggression and colonialism. Moreover, this situation reveals another memory that is diametrically opposed to the Japanese narrative of victimhood: the perspective prevalent in South Korea that views the bombing as a ‘just and necessary punishment’ that liberated Korea from colonial rule. Along with this, anger towards the US, which dropped the bomb, and demands for accountability are neutralised by being dissolved into the rhetoric of ‘universal peace.’ The systematic exclusion of Korean victims from this narrative is not only a historical oversight but also one of the fundamental elements of Japan's difficulty in resolving historical issues with South Korea in the post-war period.

Contrast with the Memorial Cemetery

The function of this discourse stands in stark contrast to the purpose of the inscription at the Memorial Cemetery in Hiroshima. While the impersonal statement at the Memorial Cemetery represents an effort to ‘denationalise’ the atomic bomb experience and transform it into a universal human tragedy, the ‘only country to have suffered an atomic bomb’ narrative works in the opposite direction. This phrase ‘re-nationalises’ the experience, reconstructing the Japanese people within a national framework as unique and unparalleled victims. These two mechanisms reveal the dual strategy of Japan's memory politics: a flexible victim identity that universalises when necessary and nationalises when required.

The synthesis of these conflicting memory narratives yields important insights into the post-war struggles over identity and power in East Asia.

5- Conclusion: Memory Wars and National Identity

The legacy of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has created two diametrically opposed national memory narratives in Japan and Korea. This analysis demonstrates that these narratives are not merely simple differences in historical interpretation, but rather complex mechanisms that play an active role in the construction and maintenance of post-war national identities.

Japan's memory strategy is based on a dual approach. On the one hand, through the ambiguous inscription on the Hiroshima Memorial Cemetery, it has universalised and ‘de-nationalised’ the atomic bomb experience, blurring its own responsibility for the war and the United States' role as perpetrator. On the other hand, by re-nationalising this experience through the narrative of being the ‘only country to have suffered an atomic bombing,’ it has constructed a ‘Hibaku Nationalism’ that excludes ‘others’ such as Korean victims and positions the Japanese people as the sole victims of the nuclear age. This flexible strategy has allowed Japan to project an image of itself as a universal ‘nation of peace’ while also rallying around a national identity of victimhood.

In contrast, Korea's narrative has persistently placed the bombing in its historical context. For Korea, the bombs were the direct cause of liberation from Japanese colonialism and a deserved punishment for Japanese militarism. This perspective codes the event not as a universal tragedy but as a painful yet formative moment in its own national history.

Ultimately, these conflicting memory mechanisms are not an academic debate about the past. They are ongoing memory wars that are vital to today's geopolitical stance. Control over the Hiroshima narrative remains an indispensable tool for Japan in managing both its relationship with the US (as a natural ally) and its relationship with its Asian neighbours (as a former aggressor). These different narratives rising from the ashes of Hiroshima are among the strongest evidence of how political, selective, and national interest-serving a tool memory can be.

Brief Information About Kwon Heok-Tae:

Kwon Heok-Tae was born in Daejeon, Korea, in 1959. He holds a bachelor's degree in History from Korea University. He received his PhD in Economics from Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Economics. He previously worked as an assistant professor at Yamaguchi University Faculty of Economics. He is currently a professor in the Department of Humanities at Sungkonghoe University in Korea (2023). His research focuses on the history of Japan-Korea relations and contemporary Japanese history.

References

1. English Translation Publication Date: The English translation of the article (‘Rethinking “Peace” of Hiroshima: Restoring the Subject, and the Logic of “the Only A-bombed Nation”’) was published in the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus on 20 December 2023. The article is listed as Volume 21, Issue 12, Number 4 of the journal.

2. Original Source Date: This article is a translation of Chapter 6 of the book 『平和なき「平和主義」　戦後日本の思想と運動』 (Peace Without Pacifism: Thoughts and Movements of Post-war Japan) by Kwon Heok-Tae (translated from Korean into Japanese by Chong Young-Hwan). This book was published in Japan in 2016 by Hosei Daigaku Shuppankai.

https://apjjf.org/2023/12/kwon-norimatsu

https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiro%C5%9Fima_Bar%C4%B1%C5%9F_An%C4%B1t%C4%B1