How is the Chinese Army Different from Western Armies?
The Chinese army was established as the armed force of the Chinese Communist Party. It is responsible only to this communist party and is doctrinized and trained for this purpose. This is why there is a radical difference between our understanding of the army and that of a Chinese.
They say that one knows others as oneself. This is indeed a true statement. The human mind works by analogy and tends to associate other things with what it knows. What he knows best is himself and his environment. But unfortunately, because the world is so vast and diverse, he is often wrong in these prejudices. As you will see with the Chinese army.
The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) is an organization established to ensure the unity and security of our country. It is responsible to its people as a whole, to the democratic government that represents the people. In other words, the government changes, a new government is formed, but this responsibility towards the whole nation does not change. It remains the same. The Chinese army was established as the armed force of the Chinese Communist Party. It is responsible only to this communist party and is doctrinized and trained for this purpose. This is why there is a radical difference between our understanding of the army and that of a Chinese.
The Chinese army is therefore doctrinized to fulfill the objectives of the political power. Therefore, it is not possible to question the decisions taken, nor is it possible to avoid implementing them.
The first dilemma of the Chinese army is this: It is very difficult, even from an operational philosophical point of view, for an organization that is closely tied to and accountable only to the central political authority to transform into a dynamic army that can take the initiative in the field of operations, make and implement decisions. The dynamism of Western armies, which is rooted in their cultural structure, and the high mobility that derives from it, has to be compensated for by finding something else.
The Chinese army has been a "Soviet Model" organization since its inception. Of course, it has been exposed to all the negative effects of this for more than half a century. It has been well understood in the last 15-20 years that this model would not work. This time it has taken the American army as its role model. This understanding proved its correctness in the Ukraine war.
However, China's unique circumstances also required it to revise the Soviet model. Mao's military doctrine, which was shaped under the intense influence of irregular warfare, which can force the enemy to fight decisive battles with the centers of gravity when necessary by ensuring territorial dominance on land, led to the organization of the naval and air forces as a sub-branch of the land army. This continues to this day. So, in fact, China's Air Force and Navy are not separate forces (services). They are subordinate to the land forces. Today's conditions dictate the opposite, the necessity to change.
There are clear signs of change in China. However, the pangs of change are successfully concealed by this closed country. It is true that such a radical change can only be achieved by raising a new generation. Therefore, the completion of a fundamental reform process in the Chinese military will only be possible between 2030 and 2040.
It is also a fact that the American Military Machine, which has been set as a role model, is also undergoing a radical change and transformation process. Moreover, the American side is quite successful in reflecting the effects of its own transformation to other powers through parallel processes. Now China has to not only catch up with its rivals, but also overtake them. Otherwise, it is unlikely to become more than a regional power.
The success of the Chinese armed forces is only possible through the provision and maintenance of a robust, healthy, continuous and real-time communication infrastructure. In fact, this approach is a mandatory requirement for all armies that are directed and managed by a mechanism under centralized authority. China has come to the conclusion that it can fulfill this need with modern information and communication technologies.
This tendency has naturally led the Chinese military to cut off all of the enemy's communication facilities as its first objective. To this end, it has sought to specialize in this particular field, from cyber-attacks targeting military and civilian communications infrastructure to active intervention based on using the necessary capabilities against various information and energy nodes. Parallel to the same process, the strategy of achieving infrastructural superiority and a digital presence in the field of a potential adversary through the civilian GSM sector has been largely undermined by embargoes.
However, the entire information and communication infrastructure, both military and civilian, has been shaped on the foundations of Western-style technology, in Western standards. The US, on the other hand, is building new infrastructures that support non-binary forms of communication. With programmable RAMDACs, it is creating orbital networks that support hybrid communication modes, are resistant to jamming, and can tunnel one laser into another laser like a fiber optic cable. In short, Chinese culture, accustomed to starting with copying/inspiration, is forced to be creative like never before.
