Iran-Israel Conflict in the Context of Military Operation Planning and Implementation Techniques

In retaliation for the Israeli strike on the Iranian Embassy compound in Damascus, the capital of Syria, Iran launched a direct attack against Israel on the night of 13 April. Both the fact that the timing of the attack was announced in advance, thus eliminating the raid effect, and the fact that no serious damage was inflicted on the selected targets in response to the losses suffered in Syria led to the emergence of very different opinions on the nature of the attack. Publications on the balance sheet of the attack were limited to the statements of the parties. The operation, which was described by some as a fiasco in terms of its results and a theatre show played to the grandstands, was described as a great success by Iran. In this article, apart from the reflections of the operation on international relations and strategic level, the evaluation of the operation in terms of military planning techniques is emphasised. The attack and the defence operation carried out against it, which took place in a very wide geography and in which so many missiles and drones were used together for the first time, deserve to be examined from a military point of view.  It is too early to call this action a milestone in the evolution of warfare, but there are important lessons for military planners to learn from this technologically intensive attack and the defensive measures taken against it. Practical experience is the most important source for the development of conventional warfare doctrines. This article analyses how this conflict fits into the existing doctrines of warfare. 

The theatre of operations and the weapons used

With this attack, Iran directly targeted Israel on its territory for the first time. The distance between the two countries varies between 1000-1500 kilometres. It is geographically unlikely for either side to engage in a direct confrontation with ground forces. Iran, on the other hand, is in a position to have a direct impact on Israel with its pro-Israel elements in places surrounding Israel, such as Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen. The geography to be used for an aerial attack includes the airspace of the countries between the two countries, such as Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Considering the locations of the military elements and facilities of the countries that support Israel, regions such as the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman will also need to be included in the operational area.

For the attack, Iran used Kamikaze UAVs (Kamikaze UAVs), drones that can carry about 50 kg of explosives, and ballistic and cruise missiles that can carry warheads of 600-750 kg. Although there is conflicting information on their numbers, Israel has claimed that 170 UCAVs, more than 120 ballistic and about 30 cruise missiles were used. The headquarters, command centres, communication systems, launch vehicles, launch sites, satellites and surveillance systems that planned their use can also be counted among the elements involved in this operation. It is also necessary to take into account Iran's other troops and weapons spread throughout the country, whose level of readiness has been raised to the alert level, taking into account the risk of a possible counter-attack. 

In contrast, the means used by Israel are generally air and missile defence systems, aircraft, target detection and reconnaissance surveillance, and command and control systems. Similarly, its allies have supported Israel by actively using ships, aircraft, air defence systems and command and control elements that provide, analyse and distribute real-time intelligence information in a very wide area. For more detailed information, please refer to Arda Mevlütoğlu's article (https://www.siyahgribeyaz.com/2024/04/gosterisli-bir-hicbir-sey-israil-iran.html).

As can be seen, the amount and technological level of the weapons and systems used by the parties is not something that can be underestimated. Not only in terms of the weapons used, but also because of the developments that may lead to mutual escalation during and after the operation and the risks that may arise, it has been a period of time when decision makers in the capitals of many countries have been on high alert.

Conceptual Discussion and Applied Tactics

Such an operation is called a joint operation in the military literature. Joint operation is a type of operation in which a military operation is carried out with elements of more than one force. Although there is no information on the role of Iranian naval forces during the operation, it can be said that some elements of the air force took part in the operation. In fact, when reconnaissance, surveillance and communication satellites are taken into consideration, the operation also covers the space dimension. Therefore, it may constitute an example for the discussion of new concepts for joint operation doctrines. For Israel, it is a combined operation due to the actual participation of its allies in the conflict. Combined operations is a definition used for operations conducted by more than one state together. Today, it is also called ‘multinational operations’. Of course, considering the support of non-state elements such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, Iran's operation can also be called ‘Hybrid-Joint’ or ‘Hybrid Combined Operation’.

On the surface, Iran, as the attacker, and Israel, as the defender, carried out their activities with the plans they prepared according to the tactics and techniques in their own military doctrines. While some of the practices correspond to the definitions in military doctrine, it is difficult to define some of them by finding appropriate concepts. Let us first consider the Iranian attack. It would be more appropriate to use the term offensive instead of attack. Although there are different types of attacks such as prepared, unprepared, demonstration, disruptive attack, etc., the attack carried out by Iran does not fit these. Because there was no element participating in the operation from the ground. Therefore, the most appropriate concept may be offensive by fire.  Attack by fire can be carried out with the aim of destroying, suppressing or misleading the enemy with fire support means without approaching him. In the doctrine of joint operations, air-to-ground and ground-to-air fire attack tactics are known practices. In this case, however, Iran's tactics involve the use of ground-based vehicles to deliver firepower from the air to targets at great distances. The amount of explosives carried by airborne UCAVs and missiles to have an impact on selected targets is considerable. Based on the figures mentioned in the introduction, it is estimated that approximately 8500 kg of ballistic warheads from UCAVs and 90-110,000 kg of explosive warheads from cruise missiles are directed at selected targets inside Israel. Among the artillery weapons, the most well-known 155 mm howitzer shells, which are frequently used in the battles in Ukraine, weigh 48 kg and carry 6.6-8 kg of explosives. In this case, it can be assumed that each UCAV carries an explosive equivalent to approximately 6 to 8 artillery shells. Although the blast effect of artillery shells is higher due to the warhead in which they are placed and the kinetic energy they possess, the amount of explosives carried on a drone also has a considerable destructive power. This means that the total amount of explosives equivalent to the total amount of shells carried on the vehicle by a four-gun Fırtına battery can be carried by 25-30 UCAVs. Therefore, if the Iranian offensive against Israel had been successful, the consequences could have been devastating.

Iran undoubtedly considered that an offensive with such a large number of vehicles, if successful, would have a high destructive power, which would provide a justification for a larger-scale Israeli counter-attack. There must be another answer to why Iran used so many weapons when it knew that most of them would be destroyed by Israeli defences before they reached their targets. Intimidation, gaining prestige in the eyes of its supporters, demonstrating its capabilities are some of the reasons that come to mind. In my opinion, there may be a more important reason: to test the capabilities and weaknesses of Israeli defence systems. In classical military doctrine, the most appropriate tactics for this purpose are forced reconnaissance (reconnaissance by force) and reconnaissance by fire. The first is to force the enemy to react by launching mock attacks, and the second by firing at locations where the enemy is likely to be. The aim of this practice is to reveal the enemy's locations, weapons, strengths and weaknesses. The Iranian tactic is more in line with fire reconnaissance. 

Since Iran and Israel have openly identified each other as enemies, they have been closely monitoring each other's capabilities for years. Past conflicts contain the most valuable lessons in this regard. However, Iran has not been in a direct conflict with Israel until today. Through the actions of its allies in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran has gained knowledge about the functioning of Israel's air defence systems, their locations, reaction times and strike probabilities. For example, Hamas seems to have identified Israel's weaknesses well before its actions on 7 October. Having determined that Israel's Iron Dome air defence system was 96% successful in intercepting rockets fired from Gaza and Lebanon, the organisation allegedly fired a large number of rockets simultaneously during the 7 October attack, allowing some rockets to pass through the 4% window without being intercepted and hit targets in Israel. (1)

These and similar findings may have shaped the tactics employed by Iran. Air defence systems can protect a facility or a region on a perimeter, or they can be deployed against threats from a specific direction to provide a more effective defence. To date, Israel has established an effective defence against threats from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. In the 13 April incident, when the contributions of Hezbollah from Lebanon and the Houthis from Yemen are taken into account, Israel had to build a defence against threats that could be directed against it from an area of 270 degrees in the west, excluding the Mediterranean region. This may be one of the reasons why allies such as the US, Britain and France are actively contributing to Israel's defence. This is undoubtedly an advantage for Iran.

Operation planning

In the military doctrine practised in Western cultures, the factors taken into account in the planning of an operation are expressed in its simplest form as VDAM (Mission, Enemy, air, terrain, available forces). We do not know how these factors were considered in Iran's planning, but let us continue to analyse the operation based on them

The purpose of the mission may have been determined as a show of strength with a force large enough for retaliation, and not to leave the Israeli attack unanswered. The tasks to be carried out in this context may have been determined as providing deterrence by demonstrating the effectiveness of the weapon systems, identifying the weaknesses of the Israeli defence systems, testing the developed tactics for the use of force, exhausting and weakening the enemy by keeping him on high alert for a long time, and inflicting maximum casualties on selected targets. In addition to these, other missions for political purposes have been identified, but only the military aspects are discussed here.

Since this is a limited show of force operation, the enemy is not all of Israel's military capabilities, but only those that are relevant to the purpose of the mission. For example, it is understood that some of the missiles targeted the Nevatim military base. It was reported in open sources that this was a base used by aircraft involved in the attack on the embassy building in Damascus. Damage to civilian targets was avoided. 

Although terrain and weather are very important in land warfare, they became less important in this operation. Although the terrain did not have any effect on the planning for fire support vehicles fired from the ground and expected to reach the target by travelling a long distance, the situation of the countries through whose airspace the aircraft would pass was undoubtedly taken into consideration. The state of civilian air traffic in the region must also have been considered as a limiting factor. International law has become one of the grounds for the use of airspace. Closing straits at sea or a passage or bridge on land is an activity that can be carried out by force within the scope of the sovereignty rights of the relevant countries. As in this case, it is not an easy task to prevent the passage of hundreds of UCAVs and missiles even if it is intended to be closed. To date, the intercontinental ballistic missiles owned by the superpowers have not been on the agenda much because other countries do not have the ability to counter them. However, as in this example, hundreds of low-flying cruise missiles, UAVs, UCAVs and UCAVs have opened the door for further discussion of the legal problems that will arise in the event that the firepower crossing the borders crosses the airspace of third parties.  

When we look at the military elements used, we see an attack force consisting of jet-propelled guided missiles carrying warheads and explosives, as well as propeller-driven UCAVs. Even if they are launched from different launch sites, their visibility and density in the air will increase as they approach selected targets. This force, consisting of UCAVs, ballistic and cruise missiles, can be likened to the elements of a mixed force structure in the military literature, where various classes and weapons come together. Because each of them has a separate function and capability. These elements, which can play different roles in overcoming and penetrating enemy defence systems, also have synergistic effects when they come together. For example, in addition to UCAVs and UCAVs that constitute the striking force, how will the organisations in which UAVs with functions such as electronic warfare, radar, communication, etc. work together be named? These elements, which can be defined as columns, task groups, battalion task forces, squadrons, etc., will undertake different tasks just like the units belonging to different classes in a mixed force organisation.  What kind of a name can be given to such a force, and what organisational structure should it have? These will be new concepts to be introduced to the literature in the near future according to the military cultures of the countries. In many countries, missiles, rockets, UAVs and UCAVs are predominantly organised within the land forces. While rockets and missiles are organised as a separate class, others are included in the organisational structures as part of artillery, intelligence and land aviation classes. Since they will be used more intensively in the future, it is time for them to be transformed into a separate class. For the development of class culture, tactical and technical usage methods, and doctrinal publications, they will need to be included as a separate class in the organisational structure of the land forces.   

Manoeuvre is one of the main factors to be considered in offensive planning. As it is known, manoeuvre includes the direction, method, tactics and techniques chosen to capture the target.  For example, tactics such as frontal assault, siege, breach, etc. are widely known and applied in the art of war. In addition, the formation of the force, the status of the reserves, and the timing of the fires are also taken into consideration within the scope of manoeuvre. Considering the way the operation was carried out, it is understood that Iran created an offensive order by defining separate roles for each of the weapons it used. The most numerous elements are the UCAVs, and the task assigned to them is likely to be to dull the target detection capabilities of the air defence systems by occupying their radars beyond their capacities and bringing them to a saturation point, and to allow cruise and ballistic missiles to pass through the window created in this way without being destroyed. Since their cruising speed is low, it is known that they take off before others. From this point of view, UCAVs can also be likened to sacrifice forces (in a land operation with soldiers, such a task cannot be easily assigned to any unit). It is likely that ballistic and cruise missiles will be considered as the main offensive elements in this operation. One of the issues that must be taken into account in military planning is the reserve force. In this operation, reserves may not have been allocated as a one-time offensive was planned for limited purposes, but it should be kept in mind that Iran did not use all of its capabilities. It is highly probable that these capabilities would have been taken into consideration as reserves in alternative plans in case of need.

One of the most important issues to be faced in such an operation planning is the issue of synchronisation. Bringing together more than 300 weapons, each travelling at different altitudes and speeds, at the desired place and time on the way to the target requires complex calculations and techniques. The use of command and control systems supported by computer technologies and artificial intelligence will be most needed in this area. The simultaneous delivery of UCAVs and missiles to the target area is reminiscent of the time-on-target technique used in artillery firing. This technique, which envisages that the shots of weapons of different diameters and types fall on the target at the same time and thus increase the destructive effect, can be applied at much longer distances with today's developing weapons. The term Time on Target (ToT), which is used in air operations, can also be used in this context. 

In land operations, manoeuvre takes into account the use of flanking and surprising directions. One may wonder whether this is possible with rockets and UCAVs that follow a linear course after launch. Changing course during flight is possible depending on the technical characteristics of the missiles, while others are generally known to follow predetermined routes. At this point, the geographical situation gains importance. In countries with a large surface area, it is possible to direct these missiles towards targets from different directions, since there will be many options for launching locations. In this respect, Iran is in a more advantageous position than Israel.  

As mentioned at the beginning, Israel's air and missile defence tactics and techniques and the systems used against this attack include high-tech weapon systems. In addition to its own capabilities in meeting the threat, it had to receive significant support from its allies. Considering the area where reconnaissance surveillance and target detection systems are deployed and distributed, almost the entire Middle East geography is within the scope of the operational area.  Therefore, although the parties to the conflict appeared to be Israel and Iran, the airspaces of other countries were used against their will. There have been developments that will lead to new interpretations in terms of I/A law. Israel's defence includes activities in the region from the launching points of the missiles to its own airspace. Although the destruction of the missiles and UCAVs took place in the vicinity of Israeli airspace, some sources reported that a significant number of the launched weapons malfunctioned or veered off course during launch. It should be noted that this may also have been caused by sabotage, cyber-attacks and electronic warfare activities in the target country, which constitutes the first phase of missile defence (left of launch). (2) 

The air defence measures implemented by Israel are too broad and technical to be the subject of another article. The reality of the incident is that for the first time Israel has faced a direct Iranian threat and has been unable to meet this threat with its own capabilities alone. In order to prevent escalation and to downplay his own support, the US President said in his statement after the attack, ‘This is an achievement that proves Israel's military superiority’.

One of the issues to be emphasised from the Israeli point of view is the cost of the operation. According to information available in open sources, the cost is over 1 billion dollars. When the contributions of allies such as the US, the UK and France are taken into account, it can be concluded that this cost is much higher. Although there is no precise information on the cost of the weapons used by Iran, it is likely to be much lower. For example, the Iron Dome system used by Israel is said to be 100 times more expensive than Hezbollah's and Hamas' rockets, which cost about $50,000. During the Cold War, it was calculated that for every dollar invested in air defence systems to be developed by the US to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles, Soviet missiles would have to spend $7 to penetrate the system, and this idea formed the basis of the Star Wars project. (3) Now this ratio has been reversed. Cheap and simple weapons can be effective against very expensive and high-tech defence systems.

One last point should be made about what the parties have achieved and learnt in this incident. Warfare is an art of analogy by nature. Whoever you are going to fight against, you need to acquire superior skills to overcome their weapons and capabilities and develop tactics and techniques that will make their fighting methods futile. For this reason, the tactics and techniques applied by the enemy are taken into consideration in the training and exercises carried out in the preparation of armies for war in peacetime, and intensive intelligence efforts are carried out to learn them. For example, during the Cold War, a brigade-level opposing force, which applied the Soviet doctrine and used the same weapon systems, was formed at the Ft Irwin exercise centre in California, and this ensured that the exercises were conducted in a more realistic environment. The Iranian and Israeli armed forces, which have openly declared their enmity for many years, have undoubtedly developed scenarios for their training that take into account each other's capabilities. New weapons may have a dominant effect when first used, but they may lose their initial advantage when countermeasures are developed. For the first time, capabilities known to have been used by Hezbollah and Hamas have been used directly by Iranian armed forces against Israel in a conflict. Moreover, some of these weapons were used for the first time. Likewise, Iran has directly tested Israel's capabilities.

Simulation models are used in virtual warfare game scenarios prepared for larger-scale exercises, as well as for training and exercises. With the developing virtual realism techniques, the battlefield can be recreated very close to reality.  The realism of simulation models increases in proportion to the production and usage information of the modelled weapon systems. The Iranian attack has been a very valuable experience for both sides in this regard. From now on, it will be possible to see models in which tactical pictures containing similar scenarios are created in the armies of the world more frequently in training and exercises.

Another area of use for simulation models is that they create relatively cheap and fast development opportunities for concept development, design, modelling and testing of new weapons in combat environments. After this operation, Israel, which had all kinds of information on modelling its own air defence systems, also had critical information on the behaviour of vehicles such as UCAVs and missiles. Countries such as the USA, the UK and France, which actually support Israel, are among the parties that will use this information. Likewise, it should not be forgotten that the information obtained by Iran is eagerly awaited by Russia and China. 

Conclusion

The current incident has the appearance of an operation carried out as a result of provocation to see Iran's capabilities and to develop countermeasures, as in Ukraine.

It is not an operation that can be considered minor or a fiasco by looking at the fact that only a few missiles have caused light damage by passing through the defence network. What happened is an attack that can have an impact beyond its dimensions. It can be seen as an event that will lead to the questioning of the geostrategic deterrence and immunity of Israel in particular and the United States in general. 

It is a practice that will contribute to the discussion of military doctrines in terms of planning, execution and the means used.

Concepts, types of military operations, and operational planning, the content of which has not yet been fully defined, have created seminal examples for war game scenarios. 

It has been seen that asymmetric effects can be created with cheaper means against expensive and high-tech weapon systems.

While discussing the role of robots in the battlefield of the future, it should not be overlooked that the vehicles that take part in this operation and carry the firepower from the air to the target are also a kind of robot. With the help of artificial intelligence, it is possible for a very small number of people to command such a voluminous force. This situation will lead to developments that will affect many issues from the organisational structures of military units to training and leadership practices. 

It would be beneficial for Turkey, which has a say in UAV and UCAV production technologies, to examine the real application examples in detail by obtaining information from the source.

Footnotes

(1) Herald Malmgren, Pipa Malmgren Gaza will change the future of war - UnHerd, 18 October 2023

(2) Black Grey White: On Missile Defence: ‘Left of Launch’

(3) Herald Malmgren, UnHerd, 18 October 2023