The Ukraine-Russia War from Putin's Perspective, Its Causes, Political and Military Objectives

The Target Audience Putin Wants to Communicate His Messages to

On February 9, 2024, US Tucker Carlston's meeting with Putin in the Kremlin was mostly portrayed in the Western media as part of a one-sided propaganda war, but considering the number of viewers it reached, it was recorded as a successful media operation in conveying contradictory views on the Ukraine-Russia war to the masses.

The timing was well chosen. It was made at a time when the aid package was being questioned in the US Congress and governments in Europe were dealing with economic problems, especially farmer protests. NATO's biggest exercise in Europe since the Cold War is also taking place these days. It also has the potential to influence the upcoming US Presidential elections and, last but certainly not least, Putin's own public opinion.

Although his personality and political views have been criticized, the interview with a well-known member of the US media was a deliberate choice in order to convey the messages to a wide audience and to ensure their credibility. Considering the identity of the publisher and the language of communication, it is understood that the main target audience the messages are intended to reach is the US and Anglo-Saxon public opinion and decision-makers. 

At the beginning of the interview, he spent a long time explaining the situation in Ukraine and Russia's behavior through the historical process and tried to justify the war with the historical theses he defined. The fact that he devoted so much space to the historical process in such an important interview was evaluated as an effort to influence both the domestic public opinion of Ukraine and Russia and the public opinion of potential countries that could be a party to the issue. By showing some historical documents during the broadcast, it was aimed to arouse curiosity about their content, to increase credibility by showing evidence and to broadcast their content to a wide audience. However, addressing the causes of the events through the interpretation of facts that took place centuries ago makes what is put forward as historical fact controversial. As a result, Putin interpreted the historical process with his own references and tried to produce justifications from them.

The content of the interview and the messages it conveys have been analyzed and analyzed in various sources. It is certain that the messages hidden between the lines have been carefully evaluated by diplomatic and intelligence units. This article will focus on the reasons for the war, the relationship between Russia's political objectives and the objectives of the military operations carried out to realize them.

What Are the Causes of the Russia-Ukraine War According to Putin?

According to Putin, the causes of the ongoing war can be explained under three main headings. These are summarized as follows;

- Ukraine is an artificially created state. Ukrainians are a kindred society not very different from Russians. Therefore, they should not be involved in political and military formations that would be against Russia's interests.

- Ukraine was captured by the Nazis. The aim of the war is to cleanse Ukraine of Nazis and put an end to the conflicts started by them in 2014.

- NATO enlargement poses a threat to Russia and Ukraine's NATO membership increases the degree of threat to Russia and should therefore be blocked.

These are also the political objectives of the war from Russia's point of view. The question that comes to mind then is whether the military objectives of the operations conducted over the past two years are sufficient to achieve the political objectives put forward? Let us now briefly examine this issue.

Aren't Ukrainians a different nation from Russians?

The claims that Ukrainians are a separate nation and that there is no such state as Ukraine are not goals that can be achieved through military successes. The forces allocated by Russia are not sufficient for this goal, which requires occupying the entire country and eliminating its international recognition. In the ongoing process, it has modified this goal to occupy and hold the regions in the east where the majority of pro-Russian peoples live. In order to convince Ukrainians that they are not a separate nation, people's emotions, thoughts and cultural codes must change, and military success cannot achieve this goal. On the contrary, the suffering experienced during the war, the enmity, hatred and heroism that increased with the deaths, can turn into factors that contribute to the consciousness of nationhood and accelerate the rupture. It is inevitable that hatred, when used in conjunction with hatred and a sense of revenge, will become a convenient tool for Ukrainians to eliminate their differences and unite and coalesce against a common threat. This is the biggest obstacle to Putin's long-term vision of a unification of peoples. In addition, it is not possible for Russia to meet Ukrainians' preferences for values represented by the West for reasons such as a better life, increased prosperity, etc. with the level of development that Russia has. 

Historical enmities and territorial and population-based problems between countries have always been the justification for new wars, even when peace treaties have been concluded. Putin also complains that he has not been able to protect his interests in the states and communities that seceded from him after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he has openly expressed these views before. However, such unilateral interpretations of history as a justification for changing borders may lead to dangerous events in other geographies. While accusing the West of being imperialist and expansionist, he himself gave the appearance of a leader following the same path with nationalist arguments. While claiming that Ukraine is an artificial state, his emphasis on Poland and Hungary's right to some of its territory is a discourse aimed at breaking the solidarity of NATO and the West through the sensitivities of these countries.

Putin's statement that Ukrainians are not a separate nation, which he takes as a historical reference point for Russia, is a perspective that could pose a threat to Belarus as well. If a government inclined to cooperate with Europe comes to power, it would not be surprising for Putin to argue that they are not a separate nation for historical reasons.

De-Nazification of Ukraine

In terms of the goal of de-Nazification of Ukraine and stopping the war that started in 2014, the conduct of military operations on the frontline is controversial. A change of power took place in Ukraine on February 21, 2014, with the fall of the government and the flight of the head of state to Russia as a result of the demonstrations described as the Orange Revolution. In his speech, Putin stated that after this change, the violence against pro-Russian groups in the east and other parts of the country and the war was actually started much earlier by the Ukrainian government with the support of the West. On the other hand, he claimed that the special operation launched by him two years ago was aimed at stopping this war. Immediately after the change of power, he also approved the annexation of Crimea to Russia on March 21. Although the annexation of Crimea was justified by the demands of the local population, the real reason was Russia's security concerns in the Black Sea region. 

The operation, which is said to have been launched to put an end to the violence against the pro-Russian population living on Ukraine's eastern borders, was not limited to these regions, but was launched simultaneously from many parts of the approximately 2500-kilometer front. Initially, when the offensive against Kiev was halted, the fighting intensified in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Places that would ensure the security of Crimea from the north were seized, as well as areas where the pro-Russian population was in the majority, and important industrial and agricultural areas. Although Russia has recognized the independence of these autonomous regions, it has not yet captured the territories up to their administrative borders in the west. The heavy casualties suffered by the Russian army against Ukrainian troops in conventional warfare have tarnished its image. On the other hand, the Ukrainian army paid a much higher price and gained an advantage in terms of breaking the will and determination of the other side to fight. The war experience gained by the Russian army and its ability to mobilize its defense industry according to the needs of the war are other gains that can be counted. However, the fact that it could not protect the people living in the occupied territories from the effects of Ukraine's long-range weapons unless there is a ceasefire is an indication that it has not yet achieved a military success that will realize the political goal it has put forward. 

The goal of de-Nazification is a more abstract concept than others. It is also difficult for planners to translate into concrete military objectives. From a military point of view, the most important military objective for the realization of this goal is the seizure of the capital and the administration, the change of power, and the removal of pro-Nazi groups in the army and bureaucracy. Indeed, in the Second Gulf War, the US and coalition forces considered the occupation of Baghdad and the elimination of the Ba'athist mentality in the military and administrative structure in order to realize a similar objective. These goals were not achieved during the two years of conflict. For the time being, it considers it a sufficient goal to establish control over the occupied territories and to be able to protect the pro-Russian population from violence. Putin stated in his speech that this goal has not been achieved for the rest of Ukraine. One of his expectations for achieving his goal in the whole of Ukraine could be a change of power through a coup d'état in Kiev.

The choice of the abstract and somewhat symbolic goal of de-Nazification should be sought in Russia's recent historical memory of the threat that emerged in these territories and the struggle against it. During the Second World War, the bloodiest battles against the occupying Nazi Germans and their local collaborators took place on these lands. The Nazis were the object of hatred in this victory, which was won at a price far superior to that of the other allies in terms of the number of people lost, and which has been passed down from generation to generation as the Great Patriotic War. It may have been thought that a political target that evoked these feelings, even if symbolically, would also be useful for the motivation of the army. There may also have been an expectation that this discourse would make the objectives of the operation more acceptable to the Ukrainian people in order to reduce the resistance that would be encountered. However, it is seen that the Russians regarded the collaborative Nazi mentality and the personalities they see as their extensions to the present day as the heroic symbols of Ukrainian nationalism. Therefore, the destruction of these representatives at the front was considered a military objective that would ensure the political goal.

Three quarters of a century after the Great War, it may not make much sense for current generations to revisit the Nazi threat. But according to Kissinger, "threats are full of uncertainties because they also involve the concept of the future. Leaders and the security bureaucracies that support them, faced with a dilemma between the current state of the threat and the choice to act according to the shape it will take in the future, may either act too early and make the wrong decisions, or too late and risk jeopardizing the survival of the country." In his speech on December 21, 2022, Putin explained Russia's justification for intervention in Ukraine as follows. "A special operation was inevitable due to the transformation of Ukraine into a hostile Nazi state. It turned out that a conflict with these forces, including Ukraine, was inevitable. The only question was when it would happen. Since today is better than tomorrow, the operation was decided." 

As noted above, history will show whether this was an early or late decision. Why the winter season was chosen for the operation when it was not a suitable time for it has been a matter of debate among military experts. The date chosen for the start of the operation, February 22, 2022, also shows that the forces that seized power on the same day eight years ago identified with the historical enemy Nazis.

Putin Aims to Stop NATO's Expansion

As can be seen, the realism and achievability of the goals listed so far are questionable. In my opinion, the most important goal for Putin is to prevent NATO's expansion, which he considers to be a major security problem for Russia. The others are objectives that support or help mask this goal in terms of international law and public opinion persuasion. To understand the roots of Russia's threat perception, its fears, and its distrust and concerns towards the West, it is necessary to look at the historical background. The explanations of the historical process, which occupy a long part of the interview, reflect these concerns.

For Russia, the defense of its territories in Europe and Eurasia has been shaped by a threat perception based on historical experiences. Until the Cold War, the main threat to Russia was Japan in the east and Germany in the west, with whom Russia fought twice in the twentieth century. In order to avoid this problem again, the existence of pro-Russian states that would be a buffer between Germany and Russia after the war was seen as a kind of assurance. At the end of the war, NATO and the Warsaw Pact became the symbols of the military power of the two sides during the Cold War period, which continued in the form of superpower rivalry with the former allies splitting into separate camps. In the balance of terror provided by nuclear weapons, the deployment of weapon-carrying ballistic missiles and airplanes were critical capabilities that shaped the threat perception in order to guarantee mutual destruction. Despite the transoceanic remoteness of the US mainland, Russia has felt this threat at its borders due to weapons deployed in Europe. This has been decisive in shaping threat perceptions and security architecture. At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union disintegrated, the WP disappeared, and the ideological divide, which was seen as the most important source of threat besides military capabilities, came to an end. NATO, on the other hand, continued to expand its presence. 

During the interview, Putin pointed out that he had questioned NATO's real intentions, recalling that he had asked NATO to let us in if the Cold War was over, ideological conflicts were over, and the source of hostilities had disappeared, but was told that he was not ready to do so. Although a token relationship between Russia and NATO was later established under the name of Partnership for Peace (PfP), it was not intended to initiate real cooperation that would undermine NATO's raison d'être. Russia's close cooperation with Europe was also seen as a challenge to the hegemonic power of the United States in a unipolar world. For a military organization to survive, there must be an enemy or enemies directed against it. In fact, this enemy must be strong enough to keep the organization together, as it was during the Cold War. The saying "He who strengthens his enemy strengthens his own existence" points to this fact. 

After the Cold War, NATO threat assessments included terrorism, mass migration, climate change, etc., but these threats did not provide sufficient input for military operation planning, training and exercises, and armament programs. Although not mentioned by name in the exercise planning, the existence of an imaginary enemy that adopted the Soviet doctrine was included in the scenarios as an opposing force. The absence of a serious, comparable threat led to the emergence of views that NATO was brain dead. In one of his works (Inventing Enemy), Umberto Eco explains the need to have an enemy as follows. "The creation or possession of an enemy allows us not only to define our own identity, but also to create another measure of value against which we can compare our system of values in order to overcome, to compare, to demonstrate our worth. So if there is no enemy, we have to create one. For a while, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States was in danger of almost losing its identity." 

After the collapse of communism and the removal of the ideological basis for hostility, countries around the world began to be defined as free and authoritarian. This view underpinned the political foundations of the military organization and provided the justification to see NATO as the representative of the alliance of free countries and to expand it. However, the fact that Turkey was not invited to the meeting attended by the representatives of the so-called free countries despite being a member of this organization is a contradiction that calls into question the consistency of this view. 

For Russia, Ukraine's NATO membership means the disappearance of the last buffer zone between it and the West at a time when it is experiencing insecurity stemming from historical processes and its concerns are increasing with the latest developments. It is not difficult to guess that this membership is considered as a survival problem for Russia, as it increases the threats not only on its land borders but also to the center of its mainland through the Black Sea.

What are the chances of Russia attacking a NATO country?

In the interview, he sent a message to the other side by stating that Russia has no intention of attacking any NATO country. One of the components of threat perception is military capabilities and the other is the intention to use them. Even though Russia has been identified as a threat by NATO, its statement that it has no intention to use these capabilities against NATO is aimed at destroying the threat perception originating from Russia, which has been tried to be created in the minds of Western public opinion. It is also a message to reassure the domestic public opinion by saying that it cannot be defeated militarily and to explain to the foreign public opinion that the efforts to prolong the war are unwarranted. It also sent the message that the political goals were not fully realized, but that the military gains were sufficient, that the conflicts would end if Western aid ceased, and that it was open to a treaty through negotiations.

On the other hand, in the light of recent developments, NATO's involvement in the Arctic region with its new members has strengthened the US hand. The emergence of a threat that is sufficiently frightening, serious and acceptable to all European allies has increased solidarity and defense expenditures among the members and created a climate in which countries will be forced to make voluntary concessions in their sovereignty rights with the dependencies created by arms procurement. Another gain for the US is that it has preserved the ability to use NATO as a force that will ensure that Russia does not divert its attention from Europe in the event of a crisis with China.  In this process, nuclear weapons, the enabler of cold peace, will again be on the table, but this time with an even higher probability of hot use. Russia's conventional capabilities have been seen and assessed on the ground, but its intentions will remain a source of concern.

Conclusion

As a result, it is assessed that the US and NATO will endeavor to prolong the conflicts with the contributions of their members instead of directly intervening in the conflict, while Russia will want to start ceasefire and peace talks in a shorter time by protecting the positions it has reached. It is also seen that Russia's most important expectation in the negotiations will be measures to ensure its security. This situation shows that the requests that Russia presented to the US and its allies at the beginning of the war, but which were not accepted, will come to the agenda again in a modified form. If this is the case, it seems likely to resemble the story of the agha and the marabah.

While fulfilling its obligations within the alliance, Turkey should continue to pursue multifaceted policies that also take into account the vital interests of Ukraine and Russia, its regional neighbors over the Black Sea, and should not allow decisions to be taken that require the use of NATO's capabilities in terms of aid. It should also be prepared for similar developments to be brought to the agenda through Georgia.