What is the Dilemma Facing the Chinese Army?

Every individual who is even slightly interested in personal development has heard of the concept of comfort zone. This is because for development, first of all, people are advised to give up their comfort today, to get out of their comfort zone in order to be able to stand firmly on their own feet in a world where they have control over everything inside them and can predict what will happen in the future. The inherent human tendency towards 'comfort' also applies to states and armies. The development and growth of the state, and the survival of the army as a modern army ready for war at any time, require the state to get out of its comfort zone and systematically search for the future without becoming complacent. I would like to illustrate this approach with the following example:

The American army is structured entirely in an offensive role. To be able to project power in every region of the world, to dominate all seas, air, space and trade routes, and to maintain hegemony is the greatest strategy for the American state and military. Its mainland, relatively remote and isolated from the rest of the world, provides sufficient security for this. Moreover, the culture of aggressive capitalist society, dating back to the Wild West era, provides a favorable environment for the military and the state's need for combative human resources. 

Yet China has always lived within its own borders throughout its thousands of years of history. It has always accepted conflicts and wars within its own borders, even if they were caused by external forces. Its expansion has always been based on trade and politics, prioritizing soft power. Sometimes it has been even more cruel to itself than its external enemies. China's struggle has been with itself. In fact, in Chinese culture, the world means Chinese territory. The rest of the world can only be China's satellites. 

Even if China is perceived as a whole, it can be said that they are a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society, and they are just beginning to create their national unity and consciousness. In short, while the Americans continue to do what they are used to and specialized in, the Chinese may find it difficult to get out of the comfort zone that has been ingrained in their genetics for thousands of years.

Today's Chinese army has based its entire existence on the discourse of "defense" since its foundation. The organizational purpose of defending the regime, the communist party, is the embodiment of this. While targeting the Chinese army of the future, we see that they still cannot get out of the mental comfort zone of this defense. Because what they aim for, what they name, what they want to transform into: Active Defense. That is to say, a limited projection of offensive military power for defense.

But is there a limit / framework to this declared active defense? Unfortunately, yes. We see it in the three rings surrounding the China Sea. The idea that the three lines of defense dictated by the natural island chains, or rather the geological structure, will be sufficient for China is the generally accepted idea in the Chinese state system. As of today, they aim to project military power to the first of these defense lines. Taiwan is within this first line of defense and is of special importance. 

However offensive it may undoubtedly be, China's path forward, like the infamous Maginot Line of the second world war, is a fateful option sealed for defeat. In many ways, the war in Ukraine has brought this home to the Chinese leadership.

For a military with a high ability to persecute itself and a low ability to fight the outside world, Taiwan is also an important first testing ground that will determine whether the processes of change and transformation forced by the future will be successful. In other words, the fate of a possible Taiwan war is sealed on whether China can transform into a global power in the future.

The starting point of the Soviet system, which the Chinese military has modeled itself after in the past, is undoubtedly different and meaningful in itself. For the Soviet Union, with its enemies right at its doorstep and with its vast land and sea borders, it seemed logical to adopt a defense-oriented approach. Just as people throughout history have been motivated to build castles and fortifications. 

With the end of the Cold War, Russia was plunged into a period of depression, while the Western countries were caught up in a new kind of race for technological superiority (the digital age). Russia's natural response was to concentrate its resources in areas where it believed it could sustain itself, and to fill the gaps with its relevance and effectiveness in those areas. Missile technologies were their priority. This is why we saw Soviet air defenses evolve primarily into an A2/AD (Deny Access / Deny Area) concept. They did the same with land-based anti-ship missile systems. On land, relying on their superior firepower and numerical superiority, they did not see the need to change much for the future.

We were seeing the same strategy being applied to the Chinese military. In fact, even in the first China Sea ring, China's motivation was to turn this area into an A2/AD theater. I will build a fortress here and I will be safe inside it. I will be able to separate friendly and hostile elements much more easily by looking over this fortress. This mental / military / philosophical comfort zone has been deeply shaken by the realities of life. Both the wall on which it will stand and the ground on which it will stand are shaking.

What were the main elements that made the Turks world conquerors for thousands of years? Horse, iron and the power of the bow. In other words, the ability to keep their soldiers mobile and fluid. Being ahead of their adversaries in the mastery and skill of using iron, that is, weapons. The ability to strike the enemy from a distance using the bow, or in modern terms, air and naval forces. Now we see that the American military has embraced these war values. China, on the other hand, has begun to realize that it must avoid a modern repetition of its bitter experiences with the Turks over more than a thousand years.

All these facts lead us to the following conclusion: China must first fight against its own nature and prevail. Only then can it try to fight and prevail against its external enemies. It can do so, and it has the potential and vast resources to do so. The key to success on this path is time. It needs a process of transformation that will take place over one or more generations. Or at the very least, it needs to break down the struggles it has to face into small pieces and digest them slowly. What will challenge it the most is that it will have to fight against both its own nature and its potential enemies at the same time, without having the initiative of time and space. Because this is like telling "air defense" systems to go deep into enemy airspace, establish a center of gravity there and establish air dominance.