Which armoured vehicles are better?

With the end of the Cold War, defence expenditures decreased rapidly all over the world, but especially in Europe. As a result, armies downsized, and the Cold War-era army structures based on armoured units underwent a process of change. The number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and armoured combat vehicles decreased rapidly. This was because the threat posed by the Soviet Union's massive armoured and motorised divisions of land forces had disappeared.

In its place, new multidimensional threats in the new multipolar world, which were also included in NATO threat assessments, began to be mentioned. These threats were recognised to emanate from failed states, terrorist organisations, transnational criminal organisations, radicalism, ethnic and religious conflicts and other non-state actors. Therefore, new doctrines and concepts were developed according to the new threats. 

With such a diversification of threats, conflicts naturally multiplied rapidly compared to the Cold War period. These conflicts were mostly in the form of low-intensity conflicts. However, since the threats were perceived as global, operations against these conflicts and threats were carried out by alliances in which many countries participated.

These operations were given various names such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, democratisation, humanitarian aid, counter-terrorism and even war on terror. The wars and conflicts that emerged were fights between allied armies and non-state actors (insurgents, terrorists, separatists, radical groups, etc.), rather than mutual regular armies, and in which irregular warfare techniques came to the fore. Most of these struggles took place in residential areas.

These battles in urban areas revealed the inadequacies and drawbacks of the existing weapons and tools, organisational structures, doctrines and concepts produced and used according to the conventional warfare understanding of the bipolar world. Consequently, the armies of the world started to make innovations in their personnel and organisational structures, training, equipment, doctrines, weapons and vehicles.

Armoured troops were the most affected by this change. Because it was seen that caterpillar armoured vehicles were not suitable for combat in built-up areas. First of all, when tracks were used on asphalt roads and in the city, they spoiled the roads and damaged the infrastructure. Hard ground and berms with sharp corners damaged the tracks. As a result of this, failure rates increased, and it was started to be considered that these vehicles, especially armoured personnel carriers, were not profitable.

On the other hand, these vehicles, which were quite wide and high, were nothing but a bigger target on the streets and avenues. Since they did not fit into narrow streets, they could not enter everywhere, and when they did, they were easily destroyed. The height and length of the vehicles prevented them from turning, the tracks of the vehicles that turned on the spot on narrow asphalt roads with berms on the sides were thrown off, and the turning possibilities of the weapon systems were reduced due to the electricity poles and wires on the roads.

For this reason, smaller vehicles with rubber tyres, which can carry more personnel, consume less fuel and have lower maintenance costs, started to be produced. The 2nd Iraq War and the Afghanistan operation (as well as internal security operations in countries like Turkey) accelerated this trend. As a result, tank and caterpillar armoured vehicle production in the world has fallen to probably the lowest levels in history. However, this was not the right decision based on a sound assessment. It was an illusion resulting from the world's delusion that conventional wars would never happen again because the Cold War era had ended. 

Indeed, in 2008, the first sensational development took place which showed that this illusion had to be shattered. Russia, using the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an excuse, entered Georgian territory with armoured divisions and advanced rapidly southwards. The world was at a loss, waiting to see what the outcome of this event would be. Fortunately, Russia stopped after taking control of the territories of the autonomous regions.

This was an alarm bell, but Georgia was a long way from Europe. Therefore, what happened there could not have a direct impact on Europe. For this reason, European countries and most NATO countries were not willing to sacrifice the prosperity of reducing their defence spending. They did not rearm, nor did they react in a big way against Russia. They have remained largely silent. But silence has emboldened Russia and encouraged it to take even greater steps.

In 2014, taking advantage of the political turmoil in Ukraine, Russia moved its armoured troops into the Crimean Peninsula and declared the annexation of Crimea. Moreover, Russia was supporting ethnic Russian separatists in Ukraine. This was the beginning of the events that changed everything. As a result of these developments, an arms race started to re-emerge, albeit slowly, in European countries, primarily in Eastern European countries close to Russia. As a result, former Soviet republics such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have started to purchase/manufacture large numbers of tanks and armoured vehicles.

Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine under the pretext of special operations accelerated this new trend and spread to almost all European countries. The world has realised once again that conventional warfare, and therefore armoured units, are not obsolete, they have only changed their shape. As seen in Ukraine, the new wars were fought mostly in residential neighbourhoods and low-intensity battles. In these wars, tanks and armoured vehicles were still useful, despite the lethal effects of UCAVs and new generation anti-tank weapons. 

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian war led to a global increase in spending on armoured vehicles. Production and procurement programmes for high-cost and high-profile main battle tanks and tracked armoured personnel carriers/armoured fighting vehicles proliferated. However, the most striking increase was in wheeled armoured vehicles. Looking at the production and procurement plans of the countries, it is understood that this increase will continue in the coming years.

This increase in spending on armoured vehicles is mainly due to the changing dynamics of the global defence concept. These dynamics have emerged from the experiences gained from the post-Cold War wars and conflicts, especially the Ukraine War. The importance of speed, manoeuvrability and the ability to make quick decisions at the strategic level and to act quickly has become clear. Such mobility requires armoured personnel carriers and armoured command and control vehicles.

This situation increases the demand for armoured vehicles, especially rubber-wheeled armoured vehicles. In fact, according to reports prepared by some defence journals (e.g. Defense Insight's market report), it is estimated that $25.6 billion will be spent worldwide on rubber-tired armoured vehicle programmes between 2022 and 2035. However, it appears that more will be spent on caterpillar armoured vehicles and tanks. According to estimates, $62.2 billion is planned to be invested in caterpillar armoured vehicles and $84 billion in main battle tanks. 

For example, Qatar will allocate $1.8 billion for 2024/25, while Greece will allocate $2.8 billion for 2026. On the other hand, France is also launching a modernisation programme for Jaguar tanks. In addition to the ongoing Stryker modernisation project, the US Army is also planning to purchase new caterpillar vehicles. Canada is planning the modernisation of its LAV 6.0 (Light Armoured Vehicle) and the purchase of new vehicles to replace the outdated M113 caterpillar vehicles (armoured personnel carriers).

Not only these countries, but also many other countries have prepared their own plans and projects for the purchase, modernisation or production of armoured vehicles. In other words, it seems that almost every army will be composed of armoured vehicle-intensive units from now on. There is a general trend in this regard, and the only issue to be decided is which armoured vehicles to prefer. There are ongoing debates among the decision-makers of each country as to whether caterpillar or wheeled armoured vehicles should be preferred. 

Comparative advantages such as ease of maintenance, cost advantage, modularity, lower overheads, reduced maintenance burden and improved strategic mobility are important in deciding which of these is preferred. It is a fact that wheeled armoured vehicles have more of these advantages. Therefore, it seems that wheeled armoured vehicles will be preferred over caterpillar armoured vehicles in the future. 

If developments take place in this direction, this will be an advantageous situation for Turkey. This is because Turkey has the capacity to produce wheeled armoured vehicles in a quality and quantity that can both meet its own needs and export them to demanding countries. As seen in the war in Ukraine, these vehicles protect personnel not only against small arms fire and classic anti-tank weapons such as RPGs, but also against artillery, mortar fire and mines. 

According to a video circulating on the Internet, a Turkish armoured vehicle exposed to such fire did not lose its mobility despite the destruction of one of its wheels. In another video, the Kirpi armoured vehicle was hit by an advanced anti-tank weapon, but was not destroyed and its personnel were able to leave the conflict zone. These images will certainly help to increase the demand for Turkish-made wheeled armoured vehicles.