Why the largest airborne attack by the largest package arm in history failed on the third day of Operation Desert Storm in 1991

Although Desert Storm took place more than 30 years ago, it had consequences that have shaped contemporary military aviation. In particular, it is well known that the Coalition Forces' ostensible quick victory over Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime was, in reality, a massive, complex and difficult air logistical challenge. 

On the eve of the war, no one expected the Iraqi army to achieve any significant superiority over the huge force fielded against it. However, no one could underestimate that the Iraqi Air Force was well-equipped in terms of air defence weapons and systems under the conditions of that day. Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, was considered one of the best defended cities on the planet when Coalition aircraft first crossed the Iraqi border on 17 January 1991. 

In the months leading up to the first day of the conflict, Coalition aircraft continued to fly in large packs near the Iraqi border. The Iraqi Army, having become 'accustomed' to these flights, came to believe that the Coalition Forces would almost certainly not attack Iraq. Therefore, when the actual air operation started, the first border crossing of the fighter-bombers was a kind of 'surprise' for the Iraqi army. 

On the eve of the first day of the air campaign in Iraq, General Norman Schwarzkopf's coalition had 2,430 military aircraft at its disposal. The American general, who wanted to fulfil his orders and inflict a decisive defeat on Iraq, began the Gulf War with air strikes. The air strikes, which lasted for five weeks, were aimed at destroying Iraq's air defence weapons and systems, neutralising the Iraqi Navy's ability to deploy forces by sea, and finally paving the way for the land troops and heavy armour that would soon take part in the land operation to be launched against Iraq.

At the time, Iraq was reported to have more than 16,000 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in its arsenal. US stealth (low-visibility) F-117 Nighthawk aircraft were used to strike special targets deep inside Iraq. The 'wild weasel' F-4G Phantom fighters, which are defence pressure aircraft, were predominantly used to hunt and destroy SAM positions. F-4G fighters were a version of the Phantoms specially built for the defensive suppression (SEAD) role. The F-4Gs, which could blind the entire system by hitting the radars of active defence systems by being guided to the radar source, carried out these missions with AGB-88 HARM missiles that could be guided to the radar frequency. The F-4Gs, which lacked stealth capability, would enter enemy airspace, detect Iraqi air defence systems when they were on line (turned on) and shoot down their radars, usually using anti-radiation missiles such as the AGM-88 HARM. However, it was not always possible to send Wild Weasel aircraft into the target area before the air attack package arms and ask them to silence Iraqi radars.

The Iraqi Air Force was positioned according to the Soviet defence concept. With a large number of overlapping air defence systems and anti-aircraft artillery, supported by both radar-guided and optical surface-to-air missiles, the Coalition air forces were reluctant to attack the Iraqi capital. For this reason, only stealth F-117 Nighthawks were able to carry out air strikes on Baghdad during the first two days of hostilities. To a certain extent, the F-117 strikes were able to identify weak, vulnerable areas of Baghdad's defences. By now, air attack planners were beginning to believe that the city could be destroyed by large package arm attacks.

On the third day of the operation, the US Air Force decided to launch an air attack on Baghdad with a large package arm. Seventy-two F-16 Fighting Falcon F-16s, each armed with two 1,000kg Mk 84 bombs, totalling 144 large bombs, formed the main body of the strike force of the package arm tasked with destroying Iraqi government buildings in Baghdad and the Tawaitha nuclear reactor just south of the city. In addition to the bombs, the aircraft were required to carry two external fuel tanks and two AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air IR missiles on their wingtips for self-defence.

8 F-15 Eagles were planned to operate to gain regional air superiority and to prevent possible Iraqi fighter interceptors from entering the package attack area. The F-15s were asked to fly in the escort and sweep role together with the F-16s, which constitute the backbone of the package, and to operate against the possibility of air threats damaging the package. Similarly, 8 F-4G Wild Weasel SEAD aircraft were assigned to destroy Iraqi air defence systems in the target area. In addition, two EF-111 Raven electronic warfare aircraft were tasked to blind the radars with electronic warfare attacks and electronic jamming while the Wild Weasels were shooting down enemy radars. This package arm was the largest F-16 mission package not only in the Gulf Operation, but also in the history of air warfare.

Planning large package arm missions is a difficult task for any country's Air Force. The formation, mission planning, ensuring the integrity of the column, the munitions to be used, synchronisation between the aircraft, refuelling, defence pressure, electronic warfare, command and control, early warning and control in the air, etc. of large package columns, which are referred to as COMAO (Composite Air Operations) in the literature, have to be well planned by the package column leader and his deputies. 

Scheduled for 19 January 1991, the aircraft that would take part in this package arm had to be planned and brought together from different bases. At the beginning of the mission, the squadron of 72 F-16s consisted of groups from two wings: 56 were from the 388th Flying Squadron at Al Minhad Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, and the remaining 16 were from the 401st Squadron Command in Doha, Qatar. The aircraft planned for the Baghdad mission were supposed to take off from four different air bases, meet at the package arm rendezvous points, enter the target area in harmony, in accordance with the mission priority order, in accordance with the timings on the basis of seconds, stop in the target area as long as necessary (2-3 minutes) and leave the area without delay. At the same time, it was also necessary to keep such a large arm in the air at waiting points before the mission. As a result, this package, which was to be carried out over a long period of time, had to be supported by air refuelling, airborne early warning control (AWACS) and command and control aircraft. Since unmanned aerial vehicles had not yet matured enough to be introduced into operational environments at that time, there was no need for UAV coordination. If such an operation were carried out now, many new elements would have found their place in the coordination items.

In addition, Air Tasking Orders (ATO) and Airspace Coordination Orders (Airspace Coordination Order) for an operation of this scale were also arriving to the units with delays from time to time. Therefore, some command elements and units received such daily orders and change lines late. Therefore, pilots had to be given very little time to prepare for the missions. This flow of missions inevitably left almost no time for the pilots, who flew intensive flights in the flow of air operations, to rest sufficiently during breaks. In other words, pilots, who were already tired, were trying to carry out an incredibly complex and dangerous air operation with very little preparation. 

The first mission assigned to some of the F-16s in the Package Arm was to show up near Baghdad and activate the Iraqi air defence systems, while enabling the Wild Weasel arms to disable the air defence systems. It was realised that the biggest setback that could adversely affect the success of the mission was the weather. In particular, tanker aircraft could not have favourable weather conditions at safe points where they could deliver fuel to the columns. This situation limited the time the F-4Gs could stay in the air, making it difficult for them to hit all radars. Therefore, it seemed that it would not be possible to stick to the original plan. Since the F-4Gs could not stay in the air long enough to hit all Iraqi air defence systems, the F-16s were expected to fire at their targets under a partially dense air defence umbrella, to survive with evasive manoeuvres, and to try to stay out of enemy weapon ranges by taking into account the target information reflected on the mission systems. As the timing of the package arm began to be confused, the F-4Gs were forced to leave the target area early without being able to provide protection to the 72 F-16s, the main backbone of the package, during their attacks into the inner parts of the city. En route to the target, the entire strike column was exposed to anti-aircraft and SAM fire. Enemy low-altitude anti-aircraft barrage disrupted column integrity. Although the Wild Weasels attempted to engage some of these threats, they were unable to eliminate all of them. They did not even have the opportunity to use all the HARMs installed on their aircraft. Worse still, while the F-16 strike arms were dropping their bombs on their targets, the Wild Weasels were too low on fuel to stay in the area and left Iraqi airspace early.

The EF-111s realised that there were too many anti-aircraft systems in the area to effectively neutralise them all. They were therefore forced to leave a large part of the F-16 strike package vulnerable to Iraq's huge missile arsenal. Soon, the F-15Cs assigned to escort the F-16s also had to disappear. There were no enemy aircraft in the sky to fight. Instead, the skies were filled with anti-aircraft fire and surface-to-air missiles. There was nothing left for the F-15Cs to do, and they became additional targets for Iraqi fire. 

While the attack aircraft were exposed to anti-aircraft and SAM fire, the weather conditions were also bad, with clouds so thick that the targets could not be seen. Since Mk-84 bombs were conventional bombs, they did not allow remote guided fire on targets. For this reason, the pilots endeavoured to hit the targets by visual sighting of the target and diving within the calculated parameters, or by relying on GPS data, and by firing techniques with a straight pass from medium altitude. Under these conditions, it became very difficult for the F-16 package arms to operate safely. Soon after, it was decided to withdraw the entire package arm from Baghdad airspace.

Until this point, while the F-16s were carrying out their attacks on Baghdad, Iraq's surface-to-air missile systems continued to fire their missiles in such a way as to leave almost no space in the air. In this intense fire environment, American pilots continued to find their targets and drop ammunition. In fact, up to that point, tactical training for Air Force pilots on how to avoid enemy SAMs had been largely academic. The pilots were learning manoeuvres that would make the incoming missiles miss, and how to flare and mislead the missile with a sudden manoeuvre very close (4 seconds) to the missile hitting their aircraft. Now they had the opportunity to adapt what they had learnt to real combat conditions. As always, theory and practice were different, and this fact was now being tested by the American pilots in an intensely threatening environment.

The 27 surface-to-air missiles launched in less than three minutes made it difficult to operate safely in the sky. When an F-16 on the wing spotted an incoming missile, another F-16 pilot's radio call of "break right" was often a belated warning. For example, the F-16 of Captain Mike Roberts, a US Air Force pilot, was shot down in this way. Although the SAM missile, the size of a telephone pole, which exploded while passing close to another F-16, failed to shoot down the F-16, the aircraft was hit, and the F-16, which managed to fly for a while longer, was not allowed to return safely to its base. 

Despite all odds, many F-16s managed to hit their assigned primary or secondary targets. Others had to give priority to evasive manoeuvres in order to avoid falling prey to enemy SAMs and anti-aircraft guns. Despite being over the target area, they jettisoned their bombs and external fuel tanks before the missiles hit them. Flight safety and the principle of survivability required this. There was nothing strange about this. The target that was not hit today could be hit tomorrow, but it was almost impossible to replace the aircraft and pilots lost today with their replacements tomorrow. In the meantime, the aircraft that hit their targets could not avoid being targeted by missiles fired from behind them, even if they were evasive. At the end of the mission, many aircraft were hit. Two of them crashed. Iraq captured these pilots as prisoners of war. 

As the F-16s were returning to their bases at the end of the mission, they were chased by 8 MiG-29s. Eight MiG-29s were approaching the rear of the F-16s trying to escape. This was exactly the moment when the F-15Cs were needed. But they, too, had to leave the attack column early. It was back to square one. The F-16s, which had jettisoned the fuel tanks, were in charge. After all, each was loaded with two AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Leaving aside the bomber role, the F-16s saw the advantage of being multi-role here. They returned to take on the MiG-29s. When the MiG-29 pilots realised that they had no chance against the outnumbered F-16s, the MiG-29s returned to Iraq without a major air battle. Thus, the F-16s were able to return to their bases without further losses.

This packet arm was a great lesson learnt for the US Air Force. The difficulties of planning a package arm of this size were well recognised. From now on, it was decided to carry out attacks inside Iraq with smaller packages. For targets with greater depth, the F-117A stealth aircraft were emphasised. Everyone learnt the importance of the need for low visibility aircraft.