Why the Russian Air Force 'Failed' in the Russia-Ukraine War?

In order to properly assess how the Russian Air Force was used in the Russia-Ukraine War, it is necessary to briefly understand the Russian operational philosophy in Syria between 2015 and 2018.

New Weapons and Capabilities Used in Syria

Leaving aside Russia's goals and political objectives, the Syrian campaign was an operation that Russia used to showcase its new capabilities. Previously, the majority of Russian munitions were older, unguided weapons such as OFAB-100 and OFAB-200 anti-personnel cluster bombs. In Syria, most of the air-to-ground bombardments used "general-purpose bombs, commonly known as dumb or iron bombs", but for the first time in this war, Russian aircraft used guided munitions. In particular, the Kh-25 laser-guided missile and the KAB-500S Glonass or GPS-guided bomb were the Russian weapons that attracted the attention of experts at the time. Russia also used RBK-500-SPBE-D cluster bombs, ODAB-500PMB thermobaric bombs and BetAB-500 M62 penetration (or bunker-busting) bombs.

In Syria, Russian aircraft used medium altitudes for bombing, while attack helicopters carried out extremely aggressive strikes from low altitudes. Thus, in Syria, the Russians used a range of different weapons, including cluster bombs, thermobaric bombs, sound bombs, rockets, cruise missiles, satellite-guided bombs and electro-optically guided bombs. This dispelled preconceived notions that the Russian Air Force was a force limited to conventional aerial munitions. 

Meanwhile, the ships of the Caspian flotilla launched numerous cruise missile strikes on targets in Syria, following a pattern similar to the US strikes on Libya from the UK. The fleet used Iranian airspace before striking targets in Syria, launching 26 cruise missiles in the same time frame. Although US officials later said that four of the missiles failed in their flight over Iran, most of the missiles hit their targets, demonstrating Russia's new military capability in this area. For the first time, Russia's most modern naval force, the Caspian flotilla, was used for its intended purpose - to project Russia's military power in the Middle East.

By the end of the intensive years of the war, Russia had flown 34,000 sorties in Syria. Between 2015 and 2018, Russia lost only 6 aircraft in Syria. Of these, 5 were attack helicopters and 1 was a fighter jet. The majority of Russian aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired MANPADs. These losses led to comments that cast a shadow over the Russian air campaign in Syria. It was considered remarkable that Russia lost aircraft even in the absence of a proper surface-based air defense threat.

Since the Russian Air Force, given its size and capabilities, is globally comparable only to the United States, I think it is important to make a comparison with the US-style air campaign. The US flew more than 84,000 sorties in Syria over the same period. In contrast, unlike the Russians, it suffered no aircraft losses. The only reason for this is that American aircraft fly sorties from higher altitudes, while Russian aircraft use altitudes around 13,000 feet and below for most bombing missions. In particular, the fact that Russian aircraft flew missions such as close air support, armed reconnaissance, and combat air combat isolation from much lower altitudes was the most important factor that increased aircraft losses.

Russian Air Force

The most important lesson Russia could have learned from Syria would have been not to use low altitudes during attacks, to focus on precision-guided munitions attacks from medium and high altitudes, and to use cruise missiles more. After Syria, I had the expectation that we would see a much stronger and more effective air force than the Russian Air Force we saw in Syria in the Russian-Ukrainian War that started 4 years later. My expectation was that when the Russian-Ukrainian War started on February 24, 2022, the Russian Air Force would perform far beyond the performance in Syria. Because there was almost no air force in Ukraine. In every respect, the Russians had overwhelming superiority. An asymmetrical imbalance was evident in comparisons between the two air forces. The only thing Ukraine had against Russian air power were air defense weapons and systems that could be effective to a certain extent.

By the 2010s, the Russians had spent more than a decade acquiring 800 modern aircraft, which was a huge national investment for them. They had successfully used this modern air power in Syria. Now there were predictions that we would be ready for an even bigger Russian show. 

According to many, Russia has the second most powerful air force in the world. However, the Russian air force is very good at hitting static, known, planned and rehearsed targets. Indeed, at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, they hit most of the stationary air defense systems. But against mobile targets, the Russian Air Force has not been effective enough. They could not disable mobile SAMs, MANPADs. Of course, shoulder fired weapons are almost impossible to destroy. However, from a logistical point of view, MANPAD depots and, with good intelligence, hitting cruise missile supply vehicles could have been considered. In any case, they had to render the Mobile SAMs immobile at the beginning of the war. Any Mobile SAM on the move should have been shot down instantly. Apparently, the Russians lacked targeting systems, electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) apparatus to track such vehicles and monitor their radio transmissions. 

The Russians abandoned the task of neutralizing MANPADs and mobile SAMs and started low-altitude attacks, which proved to be very difficult. They suffered a lot of aircraft and helicopter losses. Instead of flying at high altitudes (25,000 feet and above) where these threats could not reach, they continued their low-altitude attacks. 

Dilemmas and Technical Problems of the Russian Air Force 

1) The difficulty of hitting targets with conventional bombs from high altitude,

2) Insufficient number of precision-guided munitions to be fired at high-altitude targets,

3) Low altitude air-to-ground attack and close air support,

4) The lack of a defensive pressure capability to protect the attack aircraft.

Unable to overcome these problems, and therefore unable to maintain air superiority throughout the conflict, I think it would be useful to analyze these technical problems facing Moscow's air power projection under separate headings. 

1) The difficulty of hitting targets with conventional bombs at high altitude:

Even if you have the best system, since the bomb you drop is not guided, it is only a chance that it hits the target in free fall, without being exposed to the wind. The bomb falls near the target but hits the target by chance.

In order to hit targets at high altitudes, you need to have ammunition with as high accuracy as possible, that is, precision-guided ammunition that will explode on the target. Not only that, but you also need to have modern aircrafts capable of firing these modern munitions, targeting pods suitable for these munitions, and a sufficient number of these modern munitions. Today, a classic aerial munition, for example the MK-82 general purpose bomb, costs around $4,000, while the GBU-12, which is a laser-guided version of this bomb, which can also be considered a classic, costs around $22,000. In other words, there is a 1 to 5-6 cost difference. Despite this cost difference, from an effectiveness point of view, a target that can be hit with 15-20 conventional munitions can easily be hit with a single guided bomb. At the end of the day, using modern ammunition can help you conduct operations at a lower cost. Now, if you really want to win the war, you have no choice but to use modern munitions. This is true for the Russian Air Force as it is for all armies.

When we look at the later stages of the war, it seems that Russian pilots generally preferred or planned to take off at 25,000 feet and above, launch a single missile into Ukrainian territory, and then return to their airfields. This is something that is not very common in Western concepts. Maybe if you were to drop a nuclear bomb, this is the only way to do it.

2) Insufficient number of precision-guided munitions to be fired at high-altitude targets:

I said that Russian planes had to use 25,000 feet and above, so they had to have enough targeting pods and precision-guided munitions. Only in this way could they maintain their effectiveness in the war. However, Russia does not have modern targeting pods, at least not in sufficient numbers. In 2008, Russia decided to use a licensed version of the Damocles pods made by the French Thales, but the sanctions that followed Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 prevented the project from going ahead. On the other hand, some countries that have Russian aircraft in their inventory are using French, American or Israeli-made targeting pods. They are doing very successful work. The Russians, on the other hand, are having problems because they cannot buy these targeting pods from the West, and they cannot produce them themselves yet. Before entering this war, the Russians needed to produce and integrate a large number of targeting pods into their aircraft, and to focus on the production of modern ammunition in parallel. They still have not reached this level. Therefore, they are not able to use their air power effectively. 

As far as I know, Russia's infrared sensor technology is not very advanced. Even the Su-35 fighter jets have only recently acquired a modern targeting pod. The Su-34M is expected to receive a modernized targeting pod in the near future, but there are reports that only 20 aircraft pods were delivered in 2023 as part of the modernization program. 

The Western world, led by the US, continues to impose sanctions on Russia. The Russian economy has shrunk by 20%. We have a Russia that has difficulty in procuring some aircraft systems and parts from abroad. In order to overcome this, Russia needs to produce the aircraft parts they buy from abroad. The infrastructure of the defense industry is suitable for this. But I think they were not ready for this. Therefore, they need time. This leads to low activity rates of the aircraft. Currently, they cannot buy targeting pods and precision-guided ammunition from abroad. The targeting pods they produce themselves are a bit primitive. Even they are few in number. As a result, Russian planes, which do not have enough modern munitions and the targeting pods needed to launch them, are forced to approach the target and fly low for aerial bombardments.

3) The requirement to conduct low-altitude air-to-ground strikes and close air support:

In Ukraine, the lack of targeting pods and the limited stock of PGMs forced Russian aircraft to use unguided munitions for bombing missions. This means that Russian aircraft cannot effectively carry out high-altitude bombing missions above 25,000 feet, and targets cannot be easily destroyed by high-altitude strikes. At the very least, multiple sorties are required to hit a target. This is not a problem for targets that are not defended by anti-aircraft or air defense systems. At least that was the case in Syria. But Ukraine is a different geography. Russia first had to have air superiority in Ukrainian airspace. It is already impossible to establish air superiority through low-altitude strikes.

The point is that not all the airspace over Ukraine is being used. The Russians have partial air superiority over the eastern theater of operations, but even this is not guaranteed. Because it is still contested. 

The use of the tactical missile system ATACMS, which was delivered to Ukraine in October this year, and the use of the US-made HIMARS tactical missile systems, multi-barrel rocket launchers, which were previously delivered to Ukraine, have given the Ukrainian Army the firepower to cover almost all of the Russian ground troops in the south and southeast of Ukraine. In addition, the vast majority of Russian air bases inside Ukraine (north of Crimea) were also within the range of the tactical missiles (103 NM). As a precautionary measure, there are assessments that the Russians will be forced to relocate critical striking force elements within the range of ATACMS to safer rear areas. As a matter of fact, this is what happened. As a result, the ability of Russian attack helicopters stationed at these air bases to conduct air operations has been disrupted and fewer Russian attack helicopters have been seen in the depths of Ukraine. 

Ukraine also had a large number of shoulder-fired MANPADs and a good stock of Stingers (mostly from the Baltic states) before the war. It was almost impossible for the Russians to destroy such shoulder-fired weapons, which could give the Russians a lot of trouble at low altitude, and which were unknown where and when they would be fired. The only solution was not to fly airplanes and helicopters at low altitude.

On the other hand, the fact that Russian warplanes could only hit their targets if they attacked from low altitude forced the Russians to use general purpose bombs. Russia bought the risk of aircraft loss. For Russian aircraft and helicopters, the possibility of being hit by short-range mobile SAMs or even MANPADs remains a major problem in low-altitude attacks. Moreover, the presence of these threats forces the Russians to conduct more sorties in order to hit targets.

Since the beginning of the conflict, even according to the most optimistic estimates, 93 airplanes, 132 helicopters and 320 drones have been shot down. Due to their speed and maneuverability, even when flying at low altitude, Russian aircraft are not easy to hit by conventional anti-aircraft guns, SAMs and shoulder-fired weapons. Nevertheless, these aircraft losses must be seen as large numbers for today's wars. In order not to lose such a large number of aircraft, the enemy's defensive weapons and systems must be kept under pressure.

4) Lack of defensive suppression capability to protect attack aircraft:

The Russian military lacks a truly sophisticated SEAD capability other than brute force from tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missile strikes. The devil is in the details. In SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses), the Russians went into this war with an Air Force that was far from mastered. Not only at the beginning of the war, but also today, Ukraine's IADS (Integrated Air Defense Systems) can be very lively and effective. Ukrainian airspace remains dangerous for the Russians.

In this war, Russia is paying the price for not investing in defense pressure capabilities earlier. Russia never had the funding or training to master SEAD. If Russia had taken out Ukraine's integrated air defense system at the beginning of the war, within the first week (which it would have done if a NATO country had carried out this operation), it would have chosen to do so. It would not have even started a ground operation against Ukraine without destroying its air defense systems), the course of this war would have been very different. In this respect, Russian doctrine seems unable to manage the dynamics of the air offensive in modern warfare. 

If Russia had been able to destroy Ukraine's air defense systems, it would have been able to use its air superiority to fly over the entire Ukrainian airspace in a very short time, avoid aircraft losses, and then easily capture the targets it wanted. As a result, the government in Kiev would have been firmly entrenched. But this did not happen. Russia's enormous advantage in aircraft has never translated into success on the ground.

Even Russia's Critical Technologies Failed to Change the Course of the Air Campaign

Kinzhal Hypersonic Missiles

In this war, the Russians demonstrated a certain degree of world leadership with their Hypersonic Missile Strikes. The Kinzhal missile in particular attracted attention at first. But these were expensive missiles and could only be useful if they were fired at selected strategic targets. Instead of using these missiles to achieve strategic results, the Russians preferred to use them to demonstrate technology and build national pride, and they quickly used them up.

This was because Kinzhal had not yet produced enough of its missiles for war stockpiling. There was no time for that. Hypersonic missiles are still under development. They mainly have prototype missiles. Mass production has not yet fully started. Their ability to produce in large numbers has not developed. Time was needed here too. 

In addition, the Russians initially claimed that these missiles could not be shot down by defense systems due to their high speed, and that they would destroy their targets without being intercepted. Despite the Russian claim, these missiles followed a trajectory almost equivalent to that of ballistic missiles and were shot down by Patriot-like defense systems. 

Fifth Generation Su-57 Fighter Jets

Russia has Su-57 fighter jets. These planes are claimed to be on the level of the American F-22. However, the production of these aircraft has also been delayed. Even if these fifth-generation aircraft are produced, the lack of low-visibility engines, the lack of some sensors to be procured from the Western world due to sanctions, and the fact that it will take time to produce national versions prevent the Su-57s from being used in Ukraine. The Su-57, normally expected to be a game changer for this war, is unlikely to be a game changer in Ukraine. These planes are not ready for this war. Or they are not being fielded because they are not really good enough to benefit this war.

Conclusion

The Russia-Ukraine war has stagnated. It has turned into a frontal war. It looks like a war of mutual struggles for positional gains and small settlements. Until the spring of 2024, I believe that this picture will not change.

Ukraine has also started to hit Russian air force bases with tactical missile systems such as ATACMS and HIMARS. From time to time, Ukrainian UAVs can harass the Russians with harassment attacks. However, Ukraine is also unable to make moves that will change the course of the war. Its capabilities are limited. The arrival of F-16s, which are expected to be delivered to Ukraine in 2024, may not win Ukraine a war in air operations, but it may give the Ukrainian Army the ability to intercept Russian aircraft and perhaps strike air bases close to Ukraine in Russia's western region with F-16s. No one expects 61 F-16s from the Netherlands and Denmark to break the game in favor of Ukraine in the air. This is because there is no properly conducted Russian air campaign.