Evaluations on the Turkish Type Assault Boat Project

As you know, the Defense Industry Executive Committee met on January 3, 2023, under the chairmanship of our President. I would like to draw attention to the following decision taken and announced at this meeting, which made our naval forces and shipyards very happy: "... and decisions were taken regarding the construction of the national assault boat." In this article, you will read my ideas and thoughts about the “Turkish Type Assault Boat” Project (TTH).

Turkish Navy and Modern Attack Boats

Although our force has extensive experience in operating boats of various types and sizes, I would prefer to take having a modern assault boat as a milestone. In this context, I will take the starting point as the entry into service of the Kartal class boats. During the Cold War, we had our first modern assault boats, with an order from West Germany for 9 Kartal class assault boats, an advanced version of the Zobel class, capable of firing guided missiles. Produced at the Lürssen Werft Shipyard between 1966 and 1970, these boats had a hull made of steel and a superstructure made of wood. Our Navy uses these boats, despite their low silhouette and tonnage; They enjoyed using it throughout their tenure with its cannon, guided missile, heavy torpedo and mine-laying capabilities. The boats, which were gradually taken out of service between 2013 and 2016, caused our Navy to adopt the German Attack Boat School.

In the ongoing assault boat project with the Doğan class, which is also of German design, the first boat was produced locally in Germany and the remaining three boats were produced locally in Turkey. Doğans, the oldest assault boat class in the Turkish Naval Forces inventory, were accepted between 1977 and 1981 and only one was removed from the inventory. Again, the four German-designed Rüzgâr class assault boats are very similar to the Doğan class assault boats. Produced at the Taşkızak Shipyard in Turkey and commissioned between 1986 and 1988, these boats are capable of firing Harpoon missiles, like the Doğan classes.

The German influence in the Navy fleet continued with the Yıldız, Kılıç-1 and Kılıç-2 class assault boats. It can be said that the Kılıç-2 class, 6 of which were put into service between 2005 and 2010, replaced the 9 Kartal class boats. In addition, planning has been underway for some time to replace the aging Doğan and Rüzgar class boats with local and national platforms. In this context, we can take the official start as the signing of the Turkish Type Assault Boat Project Term-1 Contract Design Agreement between the Presidency of Defense Industries and STM on 31 August 2020.

What is the Mission Description of Attack Boat Platforms?

Even though the expectations from the attack bot platform vary by country, the definition of these bots can be put into the following framework. Although they are small and light boats, they carry enough weapons to cause serious damage to the enemy. They are faster than many other types of boats. They can hide in the shadows of islands, coastlines, and other large ships. Due to their small size, they have fewer personnel and limited sailing time at sea. For this reason, it can be said that it is a class that is more dependent on exponents. They have an offensive-oriented design and usage concept.

In the light of the above definition, these boats were produced for the purpose of sinking much heavier and more expensive boats; It can be said that it is the version of an asymmetric war doctrine adopted by a symmetrical navy, transformed into a platform as small as possible and incorporated into the existing force structure.

These boats, which started their lives as torpedo boats before World War I, using the torpedo, the most effective weapon of the time, are today; They have turned into assault boats that use guided missiles. They can also cause serious damage with the beach balls on them. However, the self-defense abilities of the class in question always lag behind their offensive capabilities.

The Changing Nature of Modern Naval Battles and Attack Boats

We observe radical changes in the battlefields in parallel with scientific developments, especially in information and communication technologies. It is natural that the change in modern naval combat affects all boat classes, especially assault boats. However, it can be predicted that assault boats, whose sanction power is quite large compared to their size, will be affected earlier and more than other classes. The natural reaction to this impact must be change and transformation. This need for change has led some navies (such as Japan) to remove assault boats from their inventory. Countries that have to operate in closed seas have rearranged their requirements.

In this context, assault boats need to be re-evaluated in the following aspects:

1. Increasing/strengthening threats. (Like cruise missiles with more variety and different features.)

2. New types of threats. (Such as drones, loitering ammunition and UCAVs.)

New types of platforms that can take on the task load of the 3rd class. (Such as SIDAs or OPVs.)

4. The potential of increasing electronic systems and subsystems to meet the increasing needs, especially in energy production and storage.

However, we also have to evaluate the common weaknesses of the assault boat class. For example, these boats, which are quite loaded for their size, suffer much higher damage than other classes when hit. For this reason, they need to not be detected if possible, and if they are, they need to have already fulfilled their duty. In our age, where the sky is equipped with more and more effective sensors than ever before, this expectation may be perceived as unrealistic.

For this reason, the FAC 55 design, which will increase the survival expectancy with its unprecedented speed in the world, was shaped in line with the requirements of the force. However, FAC 55, which had a stealth design principle and turned into a very challenging project both economically, technologically and industrially, was put on the archive shelves before it even started.

Instead, the STM-MPAC (Multi-Purpose Assault Boat) project, developed with a more classical approach, based on our existing assault boat experiences, was unveiled. The MPAC platform, which is expected to have close air defense and self-defense capabilities with the use of guided missiles, proposes to include some of the new capabilities expected from assault boats. However, providing the air defense capability, which was previously tried to be covered only by the use of MANPADS, to the assault boat with a missile or barreled system; To what extent can the platform maintain its survivability and functionality on the modern battlefield? Because of these difficult questions to answer, SSİK's decisions may have emphasized that a single assault boat would be built.

Platform Production and Acceptance Style of the Turkish Naval Forces

Turkey started its journey to create a modern and national defense and aerospace industry much later than many countries. A consequence of this delay is to act carefully and diligently. For this reason, let's set out with ADA class corvettes within the scope of the MİLGEM project. There is a significant time period between the delivery and acceptance of the first ADA class corvette. During this time period, improvements were made in the design, the desired subsystems were matured, and the most accurate model for mass production was created. For this reason, the following three corvettes were quickly produced and entered into the inventory. The same situation is seen in the Stack class frigates.

I believe we will see a similar approach in the TTH project. For this reason, I think that after the production of a single prototype, we will go through a very long testing and evaluation process. Because not only a platform but also the "military philosophical basis" regarding the future of the assault boat class itself needs to be clarified.

First Challenge: The Place of the Attack Boat in Manned-Unmanned Systems Cooperation

Duration of stay at sea, operational scope, weapon power, etc. From all angles, there is a great similarity between Armed Unmanned Marine Vehicles (SIDA) and Attack Boats. For this reason, Turkey, which is making serious efforts in the field of SIDA, must first answer the question that comes to mind: Will SIDAs replace the attack boats? / Should he take it?

When it comes to SIDA, the first thing that comes to mind is the ability to perform "Swarm Operations". However, not enough thought is given to the "execution of this ability under human control" (human in the loop). To date, corvettes, assault boats, replenishment and support ships at sea, etc. The most suitable platform type for the SİDA command and control infrastructure, which is built on large platforms, is actually assault boats. Because the kinematic similarities of SİDA and assault boats dictate the consideration of joint operations.

To make an analogy, both assault boats and SIDAs are similar to Raiders, who are the first to confront the enemy, continue to do so in friendly or hostile seas, hit and get hit. In naval warfare, this means “front/line of fire”. The most accurate and accurate decisions on the front line are made by the commander on the front line, not the headquarters. For this reason, when discussing the future of assault boats, it is important to answer the following questions:

 In the SIDA herd concept, do we care about the concept of humans in the loop?

 How do we view the potential of using the assault boat platform for this purpose?

 In this regard, what changes should we make in the structural concept of the assault boat?

 Within the framework of the network-centric operation concept, distributed lethality and distributed sensor fusion concepts; How can we adapt it to a SİDA swarm operation concept with an assault boat at its center?

Second Challenge: Attack Boat Platform in Terms of Active/Passive Sensors, EW and Detectability

As you know, naval battles are fought as a clash of fleets, not ships. In other words, two enemy fleets consisting of different platforms have to find each other on the vast sea, weigh each other and most importantly defeat each other. One of the most common and important types of missions carried out in this direction is hunter-based reconnaissance. When it comes to forced reconnaissance, the platform most used by navies is the assault boat.

Let's re-evaluate this fact with the stealth feature expected from a naval platform. Success in avoiding detection by radar and other types of enemy sensors is directly proportional to not broadcasting active radar and data communication. On the other hand, the stealth concept is based on not reflecting radar waves back to their source. For this reason, models have been developed to physically separate the broadcasting and reflected wave detector parts from each other. Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities can also be included in this context as a different broadcast source.

It is clear that a platform responsible for forced discovery will need to be “less shy” about active broadcasting and EH. The modern combat questions we need to ask here are:

 New platforms and modern technologies such as unmanned aerial and marine vehicles, satellites, naval aviation elements; Could it eliminate the need to have forced discovery capabilities in the future?

 If there is a need for a relatively affordable and sacrificial platform that can be more easily detected by the enemy, provides active broadcasting and EH, can this need be fulfilled by assault boats?

 What kind of physical and qualitative changes does this new mission definition require in assault boats?

Geostrategic Needs and Requirements Specific to Our Country

It is a fact known to everyone interested in military maritime. The Greek navy, which would want to use the advantage of the islands in a possible Greek-Turkish war, would prefer to accept the war in the Sea of Islands. The Turkish navy, which wants to avoid this advantage, prefers to accept the war in the Eastern Mediterranean waters. So, do either side have the luxury of waiting where they think they will gain the upper hand?

In fact, waiting where you want to accept the battle is like waiting in the port. Fleets worth billions of dollars waiting in the port are destroyed by much cheaper and more effective means, before they even have the opportunity to carry out operations. Therefore, it is clear that we need a force that can forcefully drive and expose the Greek navy, despite the islands. Until now, this mission had been planned mainly with assault boats. It was up to the submarine platforms to wear down and deal blows. How and on which platforms will this ongoing need be fulfilled in the future?

The leaven of victory is blood. This cost increases especially if you have to fight in geographies where you are at a disadvantage. This definition fits the description of a possible Greek-Turkish naval war. Therefore, when evaluating the structure of our current and future naval forces and shaping our expectations from the assault boat platform, it is imperative to include the current circumstances and conditions into the equation.

Speculations:

In publications and comments about TTH, it is stated that the need is 10 units. It was also emphasized that there was no one specified in the SSİK decisions. In navies, there is generally a tendency to replace a ship that is removed from the inventory with a new one. In addition, a purchase package that will replace the Kartal, Doğan and Rüzgâr class boats one-to-one and reach 10 units; How can it be reconciled with the changing realities of naval warfare? I am skeptical about this. Therefore, I expect a single bot to be built and this bot to be subjected to testing and evaluation processes for much longer than its counterparts in many respects. Possibly, more than one single boat can be built with different concepts. Undoubtedly, this course of action would be more accurate.

It is said that there are differences of opinion between the force and the industry regarding TTH. This is quite natural and is clearly seen in the process that evolved from FAC 55 to MPAC. However, I believe that it is unrealistic to expect these differences to turn into insurmountable obstacles to the TTH project. STM is an institution capable of producing meaningful solutions and alternatives in the time given to it. Therefore, we should look for possible delays in this project not by differences of opinion between institutions, but by looking at the change in expectations from the nature and future of the assault boat platform.

Question marks have arisen in the public mind regarding the speed expected from TTH. In the MPAC design, the choice of propulsion system, which is not classical, includes the use of two water jets; It has led to discussions about how local and national the boots will be. Because the Turkish defense and aviation industry does not have sufficient knowledge and experience in water jet propulsion system production.

We must admit that when combined with speed, maneuverability and stealth design; It is the first solution that comes to mind in terms of avoiding modern threats and increasing mission effectiveness and survivability. Therefore, assault boats, SİDA, etc., where the speed factor is prioritized. It is possible that we will see other boat types in the future. For this reason, we need to carry out comprehensive studies on both power group, hybrid electric drive systems and propulsion systems, including alternative and new methods.

Conclusion:

As the weight of war shifts to deep waters for many navies around the world, assault boats are turning into platforms that are falling out of favor. But for Türkiye, this is an issue that needs to be evaluated carefully. Because our unique needs arising from the unique geographical structure of our environment may increase our demands and expectations from the assault boat platform. For this reason, it is necessary to reconsider the platform in question, along with potential changes, by contemplating the battlefield of the future.

What should we expect from the TTH project? Frankly, the expectation that will disappoint me the most will be the repetition of a completely classical military and industrial approach that remains stuck in the classical assault boat structure for one-to-one change. Because the potential change and transformation, meaning and importance of this platform may manifest itself in a way that goes beyond expectations.

However, it is also important to start working on alternative platforms. For this reason, I have been sharing my thoughts on the "Turkish Type Light Corvette" on social media for a while. Just as I shared my thoughts on “OPVs” at the same time. I am particularly proud that these thoughts seem to have been adopted by our naval forces (even though they manifested differently than I expected). (See: Defenceturk Deep Thoughts on Our Navy Article)

The TTH project is not only platform-oriented; I attach special importance to the context, including our work in SİHA and other fields. For this reason, I consider the project in question as a decisive factor, as an indicator of the mental transformation in the Turkish Naval Forces. I wish success to both the force and our industry in this difficult journey. May your bow be clear, your rudder be light, and your wind be fair.

On the Article:

As you know, Turkish is a conjunction language. For people who have acquired the habit of thinking using this language, connecting different topics is a very natural process. However, another natural consequence of this process is the difficulty of writing focused on a topic and the impossibility of conveying something in a comprehensive cause-effect relationship. For this reason, in the article you read, you found a very small part of my thoughts about the TTH project and the future of the assault boat. I could only include two items of the challenges in the article.

Articles like these are actually comprehensive studies that should be turned into book format. These are researches that will be much more meaningful if they are produced through the collaboration of a group, rather than the product of one person. But even as a person, I must admit that I have had to refrain from sharing my thoughts as they are on this matter. We continue to wait with "vain hope" for the Turkish defense and aerospace industry to value such intellectual works in line with their importance.