Structural and Technical Evolution of US Navy Aircraft Carrier Aircraft: 1965–2025

Aircraft carrier operations represent one of the most complex and technically demanding disciplines in modern naval history. The sixty-year period spanning from 1965 to 2025 has witnessed a massive transformation in aviation technology, moving from mechanical brute force to digital precision, and from analogue control systems to artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous approaches. This evolution has fundamentally altered not only the aerodynamic forms of the aircraft but also the structural framework upon which these platforms are built, the catapult systems that launch them, and the avionics architecture that enables them to land on a moving deck in the middle of the sea. Platforms such as the F-4 Phantom II, which entered service in the mid-1960s, pushed the mechanical limits of steam catapults; today, the F-35C Lightning II maximises operational efficiency through electromagnetic launch systems (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System – EMALS) and digital landing modes such as ‘Magic Carpet’.

Aircraft carrier-based flight is, by its very nature, a high-risk engineering challenge. An aircraft accelerating from a standstill to 265 km/h over a distance of approximately 90 metres (launch) and decelerating to a standstill over a similar distance (arresting) places extreme loads on both the aircraft airframe and the ship’s systems. This report analyses the development of these processes between 1965 and 2025 with technical depth, focusing on the disciplines of materials science, aerodynamics, avionics and structural engineering.

Cover image: A US Navy F-35C Joint Strike Fighter is seen landing on the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) for the first time on 3 November 2014. (Photo: US Navy)

A Paradigm Shift in Catapult and Arresting Technologies: From C-13 to EMALS

Take-off from and landing on an aircraft carrier deck constitute the most severe mechanical stress cycles an aircraft is subjected to throughout its operational life. Steam catapult systems (particularly the C-13 variants), developed in the mid-1950s and used as standard until the first quarter of the 21st century, have proven their reliability; however, they have reached their operational limits in the face of the increasing weight of modern jets and the (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – UAV) have pushed them to their operational limits.

Operational Limits and Thermal-Mechanical Stress Analysis of Steam Catapult Systems

The C-13 and derivative steam catapults operate on the principle of storing high-pressure steam, derived from the ship’s nuclear reactor, in accumulators and releasing it into the cylinders at the moment of launch. The fundamental operating equation for these systems is based on the pressure force exerted by expanding steam on the pistons:

F(thrust) = P(steam) × A(piston)

Here, the steam pressure (P) reaches its maximum value at the start of the launch stroke. When the launch valve opens, the aircraft’s nose landing gear is suddenly subjected to this immense force. This situation leads to instantaneous loads on the aircraft fuselage known as ‘stress peaks’. The greatest disadvantage of steam systems is the lack of feedback control; once the launch has begun, it is not possible to precisely adjust the aircraft’s acceleration throughout the stroke.

From a thermal perspective, each launch requires the evaporation and release into the atmosphere of approximately 614 kg (1,350 lb) of fresh water. This massive energy loss confines the system’s efficiency to a low level of around 4–6 per cent. Furthermore, the high pressure required to launch heavy jets (such as a fully loaded F-14 or F/A-18E/F) causes severe mechanical wear in the piston bearings and cylinder walls, as well as structural fatigue resulting from thermal expansion.

Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Linear Induction Motors (LIM)

The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which entered service with the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, represents a revolution in control and energy management rather than a mechanical one. EMALS uses a Linear Induction Motor (LIM) to propel the aircraft along the launch rail via magnetic fields, rather than steam pistons.

The image below shows an F-35C Lightning II aircraft from the VFA-125 ‘Rough Raiders’ squadron’s inventory moments before its catapult launch from the flight deck of the USS George H.W. Bush on 12 December 2021. (Photo: US Navy)

The operating principle of EMALS is based on storing power drawn from the ship’s electrical network as kinetic energy in disc alternators. Four disc alternators can store a total of 484 MJ of energy—121 MJ each—and release this energy for launch within 2–3 seconds. The system adjusts the magnetic field within milliseconds by monitoring the aircraft’s weight and instantaneous speed throughout the launch stroke via sensors. This ‘closed-loop’ control smooths out the acceleration profile experienced by the aircraft.

Acceleration (a) is kept constant, the force (F = m.a) experienced by the aircraft is distributed more evenly throughout the stroke. This eliminates stress peaks found in steam-powered systems, thereby extending the aircraft’s airframe life and increasing maintenance intervals.

Table 1: Steam Catapult and EMALS

Parameter Steam Catapult (C-13) EMALS (Electromagnetic)

Energy Output Capacity ~95 MJ ~122 MJ (Peak)

Energy Efficiency 5% ~90%

Control Mechanism Manual/Hydraulic (Open-loop) Digital/Magnetic (Closed-loop)

Personnel Requirements High Low

Weight Flexibility Limited (Focused on heavy jets) Wide (From UAVs to heavy jets)

Recharge Time 45–60 seconds <45 seconds

The greatest operational flexibility provided by EMALS is its ability to launch platforms of vastly different weights using the same system. A 2,500 kg UAV and a 45,000 kg E-2D Hawkeye can be launched from the same catapult with minimal structural damage by adjusting the system’s software parameters.

Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) Technology

The changes to the launch system have been mirrored in the arresting system. Replacing the traditional Mark 7 hydraulic arresting systems, the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) features a turboelectric architecture. The AAG absorbs the aircraft’s kinetic energy using water brakes and induction motors.

The system digitally controls the resistance applied to the cable the moment the aircraft’s tail hook engages it. This optimises the stopping distance and the deceleration shock on the aircraft’s fuselage. However, the AAG programme initially experienced serious reliability issues. According to 2021 data, the AAG’s Mean Cycles Between Operational Mission Failures (MCBOMF) value was well below the target of 4,166, standing at around 614. 3 Despite this, the system’s performance has progressively improved during operational trials on CVN-78 USS Gerald R. Ford, with over 23, 000 successful recoveries were achieved.

On modern aircraft carriers, take-off and landing systems are one of the most important factors determining a ship’s combat capability and operational efficiency. The performance of these systems is directly measured by the Sortie Generation Rate (SGR).

The SGR indicates how many flight sorties a aircraft carrier can conduct within a specified timeframe (typically a 12- or 24-hour flight day).

1. Sortie Generation Rate and the Role of Systems

Technological advancements on aircraft carriers directly impact sortie numbers. This difference is clearly evident when comparing traditional Nimitz-class ships with the new-generation Gerald R. Ford-class ships:

-Steam Catapults (Steam Catapult - C-13): With this system used on Nimitz-class carriers, an average of 120 sorties can be produced per day during sustained operations. In high-intensity combat situations (surge tempo), this figure can temporarily rise to between 200 and 240. However, steam systems have a long recharging time, and it is difficult to make precise pressure adjustments based on aircraft weight.

-Electromagnetic Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG): On modern aircraft carriers (e.g. the USS Gerald R. Ford or China’s Fujian), EMALS—which utilises linear induction motors—has replaced steam systems. On the USS Gerald R. Ford, this technology enables the sustainable number of sorties per day to reach 160, and over 270 during intensive operations (an increase of approximately 30–33 per cent).

2. The Military and Strategic Importance of Sortie Production Rate

A high sortie production rate ensures that an aircraft carrier is not merely a “floating airfield” but also a “concentrated strike force”. Its importance can be summarised under the following headings:

-Firepower Concentration (Massing of Fire): To overwhelm enemy air defences or exert pressure across a broad front, a large number of aircraft must be airborne within a very short timeframe. Systems such as EMALS enable catapults to reload in as little as 45 seconds, allowing an entire air fleet to be deployed into the sky within minutes.

-Multi-Role Mission Flexibility: Whilst steam catapults are inadequate for launching light UAVs or may cause structural damage, EMALS can digitally adjust its power, allowing it to launch a 20,000-pound light drone and immediately follow it with a 100,000-pound heavy early warning aircraft (E-2D Hawkeye). This enables the simultaneous management of attack, reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling sorties within the same timeframe.

-Airframe Lifespan and Logistical Relief: Advanced arresting (AAG) and launch systems reduce the sudden G-forces and structural stress placed on the aircraft’s airframe. This reduces the frequency of aircraft failures. Aircraft spend less time in the hangar for repairs, and spend more time on the deck preparing for a new sortie.

-Platform Survivability: An aircraft carrier must face the wind and maintain a steady course whilst launching and recovering aircraft. These moments are when the ship is most vulnerable to submarine or guided missile threats. The rapid completion of the sortie launch and recovery process enables the ship to quickly move away from dangerous areas (manoeuvring freedom).

In short; modern take-off and landing systems aim not only to provide aircraft carriers with the ability to launch aircraft more quickly, but also to secure absolute superiority in modern asymmetric and conventional theatres of war by requiring fewer personnel, causing less wear and tear on aircraft, and enabling a much higher operational tempo.

Naval aviation is not a discipline that can be quickly learnt through theoretical training and swiftly put into practice in the field. This capability requires decades of patient investment, qualified personnel and immense financial resources. If we were to say that ‘the history of naval aviation has been written in blood’, we would not be exaggerating in the slightest. On this platform, every element is inextricably linked: the aircraft carrier determines the nature of the aircraft it deploys; those aircraft, in turn, directly shape the ship’s engineering, launch and recovery systems. This is an ecosystem that must function flawlessly and without error, each element dependent on the other for its existence.

The determination to procure an aircraft carrier and the air wing to serve on it represents a significant step in maritime geopolitics. However, it must not be forgotten that the desire to bring these two elements together does not, in itself, create an operational force.

Operating an aircraft carrier is not merely a matter of building a ship or filling hangars with aircraft. True power lies in the training of pilots and ground crew capable of flying those aircraft day and night in all weather conditions, and in the logistical sustainment capability to keep those complex systems operational in the middle of the sea. In short, unless a comprehensive naval aviation ecosystem is established that embodies a culture of combat readiness, this commitment to steel structures will amount to nothing more than a strategic illusion with no practical application on the battlefield.

Advanced Airframe Design, Materials Science and Corrosion Resistance (1970–2025)

Aircraft based on aircraft carriers have much higher structural strength requirements than their land-based counterparts. Whilst the sink rate during landing is around 10 feet/s for land-based aircraft, on aircraft carrier platforms this figure can exceed 26 feet/s. This situation has necessitated the strategic use of titanium and composites in material selection.

Titanium Alloys and the F-14 ‘Wing Box’ Analysis

The F-14 Tomcat, which entered service in the early 1970s, features a massive titanium ‘wing box’ structure at the centre of its variable-geometry (swing-wing) wing design. Titanium (particularly the Ti-6Al-4V alloy) has a higher melting point and significantly better fatigue resistance than aluminium.

The F-14’s wing box structure supports the pivot points that allow the wings to move between 20 and 68 degrees, whilst transferring the immense bending moments experienced during aircraft carrier landings to the fuselage. The use of titanium reduces the aircraft’s structural weight by 25 per cent, and the fact that titanium retains its mechanical properties up to 350°C—unlike aluminium, which begins to soften above 100°C—provided an advantage during high-speed flight (Mach 2+). However, the machining and welding of titanium (EBW – Electron Beam Welding) are extremely costly, which is one of the main reasons for the one of the main reasons for its high maintenance costs.

Modern Composite Materials and the Transition from the F/A-18E/F to the F-35C

Since the 1990s, the aerospace industry has shifted from metal alloys to carbon fibre-reinforced polymer (CFRP) composites. Whilst the composite content in the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fuselage is around 20%, this figure exceeds 40% in the F-35C.

Composite materials (e.g. IM7/977-3) possess an extremely high strength-to-weight ratio. However, the anisotropic nature of composites (strength dependent on fibre orientation) presents design challenges under the complex stress profiles encountered during aircraft carrier landings. To ensure the structural integrity of the F-35C, AA7085-T7452 aluminium forgings have been used in the load-bearing ‘bulkhead’ sections, and the ‘Laser Shock Peening’ (LSP) technique has been applied to these components to increase their fatigue life.

LSP creates compressive residual stress up to 2 mm deep by directing high-energy laser pulses onto the material surface. This process prevents the propagation of micro-cracks on the surface, enabling the aircraft to achieve (approximately two service lives or 16,000 hours of testing).

Corrosion Resistance and Modern Coating Technologies

Aircraft carriers represent one of the most challenging corrosion environments in aviation history. High salinity, humidity, jet exhaust gases and galvanic interactions cause rapid degradation of metal structures.

Galvanic Corrosion Prevention Strategies: In aircraft such as the F-35C, which utilise a combination of carbon composite and metal (titanium/aluminium) parts, the risk of ‘galvanic corrosion’ is very high due to the conductivity of carbon fibres. The following technical measures have been implemented to manage this risk:

1. Fibreglass Barrier Layers: Fibreglass layers, which provide electrical insulation, are placed between carbon composite and aluminium components.
2. Chromate-Free Primers: New-generation epoxy primers, which are more environmentally friendly yet offer enhanced protective performance, have replaced traditional chromate-based anti-corrosion paints.
3. Drainage Systems: Advanced internal drainage channels, designed to prevent moisture build-up within the fuselage, prevent corrosion from progressing insidiously (hidden corrosion).

The F-35C’s radar-absorbing material (RAM), containing iron ferrite particles, may oxidise in a marine environment, creating a ‘rust-like’ appearance. Whilst this does not compromise the aircraft’s stealth capabilities or structural integrity, to ensure operational continuity, Lockheed Martin has revised the top layer of the RAM coating to enhance corrosion resistance.

The Evolution of Wing Aerodynamics and Variable Geometry

The greatest aerodynamic trade-off in carrier-based operations is the balance between low approach speed (for landing safety) and high supersonic performance (for operational efficiency).

The F-14 Tomcat and Variable Geometry (Swing-Wing) Analysis

The F-14 resolved this conflict using ‘mechanical brute force’ with 1970s technology. The wings are automatically swept between 20 and 68 degrees by the SCADC (Standard Central Air Data Computer) according to the aircraft’s speed and Mach number.

-Low Speed (20 degrees): Maximum wing span provides a high lift coefficient and a low stall speed. This allows the aircraft to approach the carrier safely at approximately 125 knots.

-High Speed (68 degrees): The wings are retracted towards the fuselage to reduce wave drag and minimise the effect of supersonic shock waves on the wings.

However, this mechanical flexibility has brought with it a massive weight and maintenance burden. The behaviour of the wing pivot mechanism and moving parts under aerodynamic loads creates a complex flow field. It takes 20 seconds to close the 40-degree gap between the F-14’s wings. Furthermore, when the wings are retracted, the aircraft’s centre of pressure shifts rearwards; to counterbalance this instability, small flaps known as ‘glove vanes’ automatically deploy at the front of the aircraft.

Modern Solution: FLCC and Advanced Flap Combinations

Since the 2000s, variable geometry has been replaced by digital flight control systems (Fly-by-Wire – FBW) and complex control surfaces. Although the F/A-18E/F and F-35C are fixed-wing aircraft, they offer an aerodynamic form optimised for every flight regime thanks to advanced flight control computers.

Compared to other variants, the F-35C features a larger wing area (668 square feet) and extended control surfaces. To maintain maximum low-speed stability during the aircraft’s carrier landing (approach) phase, combinations of Trailing Edge Flaps (TEF) and Leading Edge Flaps (Leading Edge Flaps – LEF) are dynamically positioned asymmetrically or synchronously within milliseconds, depending on the aircraft’s instantaneous angle of attack (AoA).

This digital flight control architecture (Fly-By-Wire) optimises the platform’s (glide path). Furthermore, when compared to the mechanical variable-geometry designs that characterised the second half of the 20th century (such as the F-14 Tomcat), this digital approach has:

- Optimised the structural empty weight,

-reduced the potential for hydraulic and mechanical failures, thereby significantly increasing the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) values.

The F-35C’s dynamic control surfaces represent a critical paradigm shift, demonstrating that aerodynamic performance in carrier-based aviation is now optimised not through heavy mechanical systems, but through avionics integration and digital flight algorithms.

The Evolution of Avionics and Automatic Landing Systems: From ICLS to Magic Carpet

Landing on an aircraft carrier has traditionally been the most stressful and mentally demanding task a pilot performs throughout their career. Technology between 1960 and 1990 expected the pilot to execute this process entirely as a manual ‘art’.

In the second half of the 20th century, the most critical and high-risk phase of aircraft carrier-based aviation was undoubtedly the creation of recovery (recovery) or landing operations on the ship. During this period, which spanned the maturation of the jet age, the fundamental technological infrastructure used for platform recovery consisted of the Instrument Carrier Landing System (ICLS) and the Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System (FLOLS – colloquially known as the ‘Meatball’ in military jargon). Understanding the doctrinal background of this operation requires grasping the operational principles of the sortie cycle on board the ship. The sortie cycle on aircraft carriers—encompassing a fighter aircraft’s take-off from the ship, execution of its mission, returning to the ship, and being prepared for the next mission—a massive logistical machine that is, quite literally, a race against time.

This cycle requires flawless synchronisation due to the extremely limited space on the flight deck and the high level of risk involved. The process essentially consists of the following steps:

1. Planning and Preparation (Briefing & Pre-flight)

-Mission Order: Whilst pilots plan the mission in the briefing room, the technical crew on the flight deck (hangar and flight deck personnel) prepare the aircraft.

-Weapons and Fuel: Missiles, bombs or external fuel tanks appropriate for the mission are loaded onto the aircraft, and refuelling is carried out.

2. Start-up and Taxiing (Marshalling & Taxi)

-Pre-flight Checks: The pilot enters the cockpit, starts the engines and performs system checks.

-Positioning: Under the commands of the marshallers in yellow vests (‘Yellow Shirts’), the aircraft taxis towards the launch position (catapult) with millimetre-precise movements within the confined space on the flight deck.

3. Launch

-Catapult Connection: The aircraft’s nose gear is connected to the catapult system (steam or EMALS).

-Final Checks: The ‘Green Shirts’ (catapult crew) and the pilot complete the final checks. The pilot engages full throttle (afterburner).

-Launch: At the signal from the catapult operator (‘Shooter’), the aircraft is launched from the ship, accelerating from zero to approximately 250 km/h within 2–3 seconds.

4. Mission Execution (Mission)

-The aircraft carries out its intended combat, patrol, reconnaissance or refuelling mission in the air.

5. Return or Recovery (Recovery / Recovery Cycle)

-Approach Sequence: Aircraft returning from mission circle around the ship at a specific altitude and in formation (‘stack’) whilst awaiting their landing sequence.

-Final Approach: Aircraft typically proceed to the landing approach one after another at intervals of 45–60 seconds. Landing Signal Officers (LSO – ‘Paddles’) guide the pilot using radio and light signals.

6. Arresting / Landing

-Hook Engagement: The aircraft engages its tailhook with one of the steel cables on the deck (there are usually 3 or 4 arresting cables), coming to a halt within approximately 100 metres rather than several hundred metres.

-Note: To prevent the hook from missing the cable during landing, (known as a ‘bolter’), the pilots open the engines to full throttle. The aircraft takes off again.

7. Turnaround

-Parking and Re-arming: The landing aircraft is quickly moved away from the landing area and towed to a parking area or hangar.

-The aircraft is refuelled, reloaded with munitions, serviced, and the cycle begins again from the start.

The approach phases during the recovery period were an open-loop process entirely dependent on the pilot’s manual skill and split-second reflexes. During the critical final 18-second terminal phase of the glide path, the pilot had to constantly monitor the light indicator on the optical sight (ball) on the optical lens to keep the aircraft on the ideal trajectory. To counteract deviations caused by winds in the air corridor, turbulence and the ship’s wave motion, the pilot was required to make between 200 and 300 small, precise manual control inputs (aerodynamic and engine power adjustments) within this short timeframe. This situation created an extremely high cognitive workload for the pilot, whilst also making operational safety limits directly dependent on the limits of human factors.

The combination of ICLS and Fresnel lenses used in aircraft carrier operations in the 1960s and 70s , the combination of ICLS and Fresnel lenses used in aircraft carrier operations represented revolutionary steps in aviation safety; however, the lack of digitalisation in the human-machine interface left flight safety dependent on the pilot’s manual performance. This high workload became the primary driving force behind the development of flight control computers and autonomous approach algorithms in subsequent years.

The greatest major challenge was the close interdependence between the aircraft’s engine thrust and pitch control. Reducing engine power to lose altitude altered the aircraft’s angle of attack (AoA), which in turn caused the approach speed to deviate. Pilots required years of training and constantly refreshed skills to manage this cross-axis coupling.

The Magic Carpet and PLM (Precision Landing Modes) Revolution

Introduced to the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G fleets in 2016, and subsequently forming the core of the F-35C architecture, the Precision Landing Mode (PLM) – popularly known as ‘Magic Carpet’ – has brought about a paradigm shift in aircraft carrier landings.

PLM Software Architecture and Operating Principles: PLM decouples the flight control surfaces from engine thrust. In this system, the pilot’s stick movements command the “flight path” directly, rather than raising the aircraft’s nose.

1. Integrated Direct Lift Control (IDLC): When the pilot pulls back on the stick, the aircraft does not raise its nose; instead, the trailing edge flaps (Trailing Edge Flaps – TEF) and the ailerons move downwards instantly, increasing the aircraft’s “lift” and “pushing” the aircraft upwards along the vertical axis like an elevator.
2. Autonomous Synchronisation: The aircraft’s flight control computer analyses the approach profile hundreds of times per second. If the aircraft is below the ideal 3.5° glideslope, the system adjusts engine thrust and flap angles in a synchronised manner without pilot intervention, bringing the aircraft back onto the glideslope.
3. Reduced Pilot Workload: With PLM, the number of pilot inputs during the final approach has fallen from 300 to fewer than 10. This has transformed the pilot from an ‘operator’ into a ‘system manager’ and reduced the risk of accidents during night and stormy landings by more than 50 per cent.

Next-Generation Variant Analysis and Stealth Optimisation

The F-35C Lightning II is the first ‘low-observable’ (stealth) fighter aircraft designed from the ground up for carrier operations. However, significant engineering trade-offs have been made between its stealth capabilities and the carrier’s ‘rough’ mechanical requirements.

F-35C Structural Design Revisions and RCS Protection

The F-35C’s fuselage is significantly heavier and sturdier than that of the A and B variants to absorb the high g-forces during catapult launch and hook arrest.

-Reinforced Internal Frame: The aircraft’s main landing gear and tail hook attachment points have been reinforced with enlarged titanium and aluminium components to distribute the shock of aircraft carrier launches across the fuselage.

-Wing Area and RAM Relationship: The F-35C’s 668 (square feet) wings allow the aircraft to glide at lower speeds. However, this large area carries the risk of increasing the radar cross-section (RCS). For this reason, the wing edges have been designed to be precisely aligned at specific angles, such as 35 degrees or 55 degrees, (edge alignment) to scatter radar waves.

-Folding Wing Mechanism: Wing tips that fold to save space on the ship are a major weakness in stealth aircraft. Gaps at the wing joints are manufactured to precise tolerances of around 50 microns to prevent radar leakage, and these areas are sealed with special RAM coatings.

RAM Durability and Operational Shocks

Radar-absorbent material (RAM), the most critical component of low observability (LO), must be resistant to the mechanical shocks and vibrations encountered during aircraft carrier landings. Durability tests conducted on the F-35C have shown that micro-cracks can form in RAM coatings under high g-loads.

This has been overcome through the integration of next-generation advanced manufacturing and material technologies, such as Laser Shock Peening (LSP) and Conductive Gap Filler, which maintains continuity at panel joint lines.

The contributions of these integrated technologies to structural stability are as follows:

-Laser Shock Peening (LSP): Controlled residual compressive stresses induced on the material surface by high-energy laser pulses have dramatically increased surface resistance against metal fatigue and micro-crack propagation.

-Conductive Gap Filler: Filling the micro-gaps between the fuselage panels and the moving control surfaces with flexible and electromagnetically conductive materials has maximised the coating’s flexibility and tolerance capacity during the aircraft’s dynamic manoeuvres and catapult shocks.

Laser Shock Peening and Conductive Gap Filler applications have resolved the engineering trade-off between structural flexibility and low observability criteria. Thanks to these technologies, the surface life of RAM coatings has been extended even under the harshest sea and operational conditions, and the platforms’ radar stability has been made sustainable.

Case Study: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35C Lightning II

In this section, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which forms the operational backbone of the US Navy, is compared with the new-generation ‘game-changer’ F-35C, based on technical parameters.

Table 2: Comparison of F/A-18E/F Block III and F-35C Block 4

Feature F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (Block III) F-35C Lightning II (Block 4)

Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) 66,000 lb (29,937 kg) 70,000 lb (31,751 kg)

Landing Gear Damping Type Single-Wheel Nose, Oleo-Pneumatic Twin-Wheel Nose, Heavy-Duty Type

Tail Hook Energy Absorption ~64.4 MJ (System Limit) Optimised High Absorption

Angle of Attack (AoA) Landing Limit 7.5 degrees – 8.1 degrees 11 degrees – 13 degrees (Nose-High Approach)

Internal Fuel Capacity 14,400 lb 19,200 lb

Avionics Landing Support PLM (Magic Carpet) – Optional PLM (Magic Carpet) – Integrated/Full

Radar Cross-Section (RCS) ~0.1 – 1 square metre (Improved) <0.001 square metre (VLO – Stealth)

Technical Comparison Analysis

1. Landing Gear and Damping Capacity: The F/A-18E/F features a proven single-wheel nose landing gear design. This design is optimised for the direct integration of the ‘launch bar’ mechanism with the catapult. The F -35C, however, uses a twin-wheel nose landing gear to accommodate the aircraft’s higher empty weight and landing impact. The F-35C’s “diagonal drag brace” structure is designed to be much ‘beefy’ (thick and robust) design to distribute the instantaneous energy of over 120 MJ applied by the catapult to the aircraft’s main structure.
2. Tail Hook and Kinetic Energy Absorption: The Super Hornet’s tail hook features software support that automatically reduces engine thrust to 70% following a successful catch. The F-35C’s hook design, however, was completely revised by Fokker Technologies following initial issues (hook-point skipping) and was completely revised by Fokker Technologies. The F-35C’s new hook, thanks to its “scoop” shape, catches the ground cable with a much higher success rate, and the hook dampers prevent the aircraft from bouncing, thereby minimising the risk of a “bolter” (missing the cable).
3. Angle of Attack (AoA) Management and Approach Profile: The Super Hornet pilot must constantly adjust the throttle to keep the aircraft “ on-speed" during landing. In the F-35C, however, the pilot does not touch the throttle; the aircraft’s flight control computer autonomously manages engine thrust (utilising the F135-PW-100 engine’s 40,000 lb thrust capacity). The F-35C’s ability to approach at a higher angle of attack (12 degrees+), the pilot has a better view of the outside (and the ‘meatball’ light), but this situation makes the hook angle far more critical due to the aircraft’s ‘nose-up’ position.

Conclusion

The sixty-year period between 1965 and 2025 has transformed carrier-based aviation from a mechanical ‘skill’ test into an advanced technology "system management " discipline. The analogue thrust provided by steam catapults (C-13) has been replaced by the digital, smooth and scalable electromagnetic power provided by EMALS and AAG. This shift has enabled the reduction of stress peaks in aircraft structural engineering, paving the way for lighter yet more durable platforms.

In materials science, the transition from titanium wing boxes (F-14) to LSP-reinforced composite fuselages (F-35C) has dramatically increased the aircraft’s structural lifespan (MTBF) and operational efficiency. In the field of aerodynamics, the mechanical complexity introduced by variable geometry (F-14) has been replaced by software solutions such as digital flight control computers and IDLC (Integrated Direct Lift Control), ensuring the aircraft delivers peak performance at every stage.

When examining the historical period between 1965 and 2025, it is evident that the most radical transformation in naval aviation has been driven by avionics integration and digital flight algorithms. In this context, one of the most innovative developments in avionics architecture is the Precision Landing Modes (PLM) software (known in military terminology as ‘Magic Carpet’). The excessive physical and mental workload placed on the pilot during traditional landing operations has been reduced to a minimum thanks to this system. PLM has reduced the aircraft carrier landing phase to a routine ‘administrative task’ , thereby maximising the pilot’s situational awareness and operational focus, and bringing flight safety to its highest level in history.

This digital revolution in avionics has been supported by achievements in materials science and structural engineering. Indeed, with the F-35C—a fifth-generation platform—the integration of very low observability (VLO – Very Low Observable / Stealth) technology has successfully passed the rigorous structural shock tests posed by the aircraft carrier environment—including aggressive corrosion, high salinity, and catapult/arresting-gear stresses—marking a critical turning point in aviation history. This integration clearly demonstrates that naval aviation retains its status as the most powerful and indispensable strategic power projection (A2/AD – Anti-Access/Area Denial) threat environments.

Projections for the future point to the synergy between these maturing technologies and autonomous systems. In the near future, the fully integrated operation of these advanced platforms with unmanned tanker aircraft such as the MQ-25 Stingray will radically increase the operational radius and logistical reach of aircraft carrier strike groups.

This technological continuity between avionics solutions such as PLM, stealth airframe designs and the unmanned aerial platforms of the future confirms that carrier-based air assets are not merely combat platforms, but also the strategic network-centric actors with the highest survivability in the multi-domain (multi-domain) battlefields.

Our Naval Aviation series will continue.

Reading the first three articles that form the foundation of our Naval Aviation series will help you understand the technical details and doctrinal background in this article much more clearly. I have provided the link to the relevant publications below for your reference.

Take-off and Landing Configurations on Naval Aviation Platforms: CATOBAR, STOBAR and STOVL

https://strasam.org/savunma/deniz-silah-ve-sistemleri/deniz-havaciligi-platformlarinda-inis-kalkis-konfigurasyonlari-catobar-stobar-ve-stovl-4160

The Evolution of US Navy Jets from an Engine Architecture Perspective

https://strasam.org/savunma/deniz-silah-ve-sistemleri/motor-mimarisi-perspektifinden-abd-donanma-jetlerinin-evrimi-4166

Structural and Technical Evolution of US Navy Aircraft Carrier Aircraft: 1945 –1965

https://strasam.org/savunma/deniz-silah-ve-sistemleri/abd-donanmasi-ucak-gemisi-ucaklarinda-yapisal-ve-teknik-evrim-19451965-4168

References

1. EMALS & AAG - General Atomics, https://www.ga.com/alre
2. F/A-18 Hornet vs F-35 Lightning II — Legacy Multirole Fighter vs Stealth Jet - The Defense Watch, https://thedefensewatch.com/comparison/f-a-18-hornet-vs-f-35-lightning-ii/
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