Thoughts on Augmenting Kamikaze IDAs with Drones

When it comes to Kamikaze Unmanned Naval Vehicles (UUVs), we should not ignore the adaptation of other game-changing technologies. In this article, we will look at the concepts of using drones and Kamikaze UUVs together, with a focus on platform-based deployment.

Airborne Part of Optical Sensors

As you know, our first national work on Kamikaze IDA is the ULAQ KAMA platform, which is being realized in partnership with ARES Shipyard and METEKSAN Defense. When we examine the platform in question, we see two separate optical equipment on the hull. The main equipment, which is located approximately in the center, and the smaller auxiliary equipment in front of the hull. Unlike the handmade platforms we have seen in the Ukrainian war, we can assume that at least one of them will be stabilized. It is obvious that the stabilization, most probably on the main optics, will provide better quality and effective day/night vision.

Of course, we should not forget that all optical equipment is vulnerable to enemy fire. Especially if it is integrated with the IDA. So, with what kind of equipment can we achieve a more effective and durable point of view?

The first thing that comes to mind at this point is drones. The types of drones that do not have a battery on board and provide the necessary power and data communication via cable from the platform to which they are connected are one step ahead with their resistance to jamming. Therefore, on this type of Kamikaze IDA, it may be preferable for the backup optical equipment to be in the air via a drone with a cable rather than on the nose.

For this purpose, let's assume that we extend the rear and rear-facing side (skirt) armor of the ULAQ KAMA platform. Here we can add a reservoir that is not in contact with water. When our main optics are damaged, the drone with the aforementioned cable can be released from this chamber to provide images. In addition, the drone's higher vantage point will provide quality information about activities above deck. Thus, in the future, we can take a step forward in developing tactics to counter activities aimed at countering our Kamikaze IDAs.

A Different Perspective Can Bring Different Possibilities

As is evident in the images from the Ukrainian war, the enemy ship appears as a silhouette. The presence of this silhouette, even with low-resolution camera systems, makes a rough target designation possible. So, for what purposes can we use this rough targeting?

Imagine that you develop a fast FPV drone that is fully controlled by artificial intelligence. Its mission is just to go to the point you want in the silhouette and detonate the cluster bomb it carries. In this way, you can target the enemy ship's extremely valuable optical and radio sensors. You can damage remote-controlled weapon stations. You can suppress personnel on deck.

Let's say we install a fogger mechanism instead of an explosive. You can do the blinding without causing casualties. Also, by starting the fogging system early, you can cover a desired surface route. A Kamikaze IDA can carry more than one drone. The target selection of these drones, which will be in the air in a very short time, can be performed by the operator with a single finger touch, or it can be automated in advance with the help of artificial intelligence or by uploading the intelligence information of the platform to be attacked.

Potential Use of Drones to Counter Kamikaze IEDs

Of course, we should not neglect to look at the other side of the story. I have already mentioned specialized anti-tank missiles (ATGMs) as an instrument of self-defense of the target ship, but the fact remains that with the helipad available on almost all modern naval ships, starting from the corvette class, single and multi-use drones can be used to counter Kamikaze ASWs.

In the case of Kamikaze UCAVs, on-board drones should be capable of executing both types of missions. Go and see what is in a suspicious spot (detection). If there is a target, track and destroy it. If there are multiple targets, leave the destruction strategy to the discretion of the command echelon. In the future, in this context, a flying patrol mission type can also be considered in line with the characteristics of the platform, especially the duration of its stay in the air. 

Let's take a look at the methods that a drone deployed on a naval platform can use to engage kamikaze IDAs:

1. The drone can also be kamikaze and fire its mounted fixed explosive payload by ramming into the enemy IED.

2. The drone is multi-use. It can attempt to destroy the (probably hollow spelling justified) ammunition it carries by hitting the enemy IDA.

3. The drone can engage the enemy IDA with the guided munitions it carries (various missiles and rockets).

4. Multi-use drones can use mini-torpedoes to destroy enemy IDA from underwater.

5. By spraying special paints, flammable substances, etc., the enemy may consider making the IDA much more visible and causing limited damage to sensors and mobility.

The items listed above can be multiplied. However, if we need to create a vision of the future, we can say that it will be a decade full of trials and errors, starting from the use of existing platforms for their intended purpose to the design of special-purpose defense drones.

The Stern of a Ship Means Two Different and Valuable Targets

Let's look at the issue again from the point of view of Kamikaze IDAs. As we have seen in the Ukraine war, the primary target of this type of weapon is the stern of the ships. The reason for this is to make the platform immobile and unable to maneuver by eliminating the mobility systems (mobility kill). An immobile platform will now be an easy target for both IDAs and other weapon types.

When we examine the structure of platforms, we see that helipads are usually located at the stern. In other words, whether using ATGMs or drones, the most suitable area for countering Kamikaze IDAs is the helicopter platform. For this reason, the Kamikaze ASWs that we will produce will also need to have various measures aimed at the stern of the enemy ship.

For example, a drone type that will target this area and restrict its use with flammable chemicals such as napalm can be considered. 

In addition, it would be much more logical for a Kamikaze IDA docking with the ship and reaching the terminal stage to use catapults, spring or air-pressurized systems, or a cable (carrier) drone type, to affect the helipad and fuel the fire started by the drones. Thus, if the stern of the enemy boat is to be targeted, it would be wise to have a dual-use swarm member that can disable the helipad in parallel with the mobility kill.

Having Kamikaze IDAs capable of targeting the helipad and hangar, even if known, will push the enemy to develop more complex, expensive and time-consuming countermeasures. 

Conclusion 

I have excluded the involvement of drone capabilities in the use of mine-capable Kamikaze IDA. However, as you can see, the vehicle in question is very open to change and development, and can incorporate other game-changing technologies.

At this point, it is imperative that any vision to be developed must be considered in a chain, such as measures, countermeasures, countermeasures against countermeasures, and countermeasures against countermeasures. This undoubtedly applies to all other countermeasures, especially ATGM. As I exemplified earlier, a KARAOK missile with an IIR trajectory can be a layer of protection against Kamikaze IDAs, or it can be placed on Kamikaze IDAs in a protected manner, turning it into a force multiplier to suppress the enemy platform.

Note: I have been writing articles focusing on these issues for some time now, and although I have noticed that they have attracted a lot of attention, I do not see any effort to learn the details that I could not write about due to the sensitivity of the subject. This situation undoubtedly causes me to have a personal concern about the future and seriousness of our defence and aerospace industry. I sincerely want to believe that I am wrong.