A Study on the Military Geography of the Western Front from the Occupation of Izmir to the Battle of Sakarya

Abstract

The branch of geography that determines on which lines and regions the wars will take place is military geography. Military operations in the National Struggle took place mostly in the Anatolian peninsula. The Anatolian peninsula, with its rectangular shape, provides a deep defense opportunity against attacks from the east and west. The mountain ranges in the south and north protect the interior against these directions.

There are three strategic regions in Anatolia that unit various basins. These are Murat, Erzurum and Uzunyayla plateaus. Three strategic roads passing through Anatolia follow these plateaus. These roads also constitute two strategic pivots. One of them starts from İzmir, follows the middle part of Anatolia and extends towards Kars. The second axis is Istanbul-Eskişehir-Afyon-Konya and Adana axis. The battles between the Greek and Turkish armies took place mainly on the first axis.

The Greek army landed in Izmir on May 15, 1919 and was able to cross the ridge line just east of the coast without encountering serious resistance. It easily overcame the second line of defense, the Milne Line, on 22 June 1920. However, although it attacked the defense line in the Murat Plateau region twice in 1921, it was not successful, but it was able to overcome this in the third attack

Thereupon, the Turkish army withdrew to the Ankara-Haymana plateau region. This defense zone, located behind the Sakarya River, provides very important advantages to the Turkish army. For this reason, the Sakarya positions are a defense zone that will bring the Greek army to the turning point of its power. For this reason, it is a region that will bring the power of the Greek army to the turning point.

In the classical sense, Strategy has three elements: force, time and space.[1] Although space is a fixed element, it has a force multiplier effect in wars. Because the war is affected by the geography where the war takes place as well as the factors such as the structure of the warring armies and technology.[2] This effect determines not only where to fight, but also how to fight.[3]

The branch of geography that studies the effects of geography on war is called military geography.[4] Military geography sheds light on the determination of the lines and regions on which wars will take place, on which pivots and directions the majority of the forces will advance, and which measures will be taken to achieve victory.[5]

A very detailed and accurate military geography study should be done in order to determine them correctly. Because the detailed and accurate survey has a direct effect on the success of the battles. As a matter of fact, when the military operations carried out in the National Struggle are examined, it is understood that the detailed military geography studies had a great effect on the victory of the war.

The same is true for the victory against the Greek army in the National Struggle. These three In this exercise, the military geography of the Western Front operation area, which was the scene of the struggles between the Turkish and Greek armies from the Greek army's landing in İzmir on May 15, 1919, until its arrival near Ankara in 1921, will be examined.

For this, first the military geography of the Anatolian peninsula and the Western Front will be discussed in general terms, then it will be explained where and how the battles were fought according to this military geography analysis, and then the military geography of the region where the Battle of Sakarya took place will be examined. Obtained results will be presented in the conclusion section.

1. Military Geography of the Anatolian Peninsula

Although the National Struggle also included the Thrace peninsula, the military operations were mainly carried out in the Anatolian peninsula. Therefore, the military operations carried out in the National Struggle were mainly shaped by the military geography of the Anatolian peninsula. The military geography of the Anatolian peninsula offers significant advantages for the parties who use this geography appropriately.

The first striking feature of the Anatolian peninsula is that it looks like a rectangle extending in the east-west direction. With this shape, the Anatolian peninsula provides an opportunity to defend at depth against offensive movements from the west or east. Having a high average altitude and many mountains further increases this defense possibility.

The mountains in the Anatolian peninsula generally extend in the east-west direction. The mountain ranges extending parallel to the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts make military operations to be carried out from these seas into Anatolia dependent on some straits, passages and breaches.[6] The Anatolian peninsula is easy to defend against attacks from the south and north, as the straits, passages and breaches can be defended with small units.

Since there are many mountains in the inner parts of the peninsula, military operations on Anatolian lands generally have to follow the basins formed by the rivers. For this reason, the highlands connecting the basins are the most decisive regions in the planning of the military operation. There are three headlands in Anatolia. These; Murat Plateau, Uzunyayla and Erzurum Plateau.

Murat Plateau; It connects the Marmara, Aegean and Black Sea basins to Central Anatolia. An army controlling the Murat Plateau blocks the approach directions to Central Anatolia from the Aegean and Marmara Sea coasts. For this reason, Murat Plateau is the mainstay of Western Anatolia.

Uzunyayla; It connects the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Euphrates basins. It is the last region where the forces defending against both the east and the west can withdraw. For this reason, Uzunyayla is the backbone of Anatolia.

Erzurum Plateau; It connects the Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Euphrates Basins. This plateau meets the invasion armies from Iran and the Caucasus and prevents these armies from entering the country. Because of this feature, Erzurum Plateau is the mainstay of Eastern Anatolia.[7]

The chief highlands in question are like castles that must be kept at hand for the forces that want to defend Anatolia. It is not possible to defend Anatolia without keeping these chief highlands. Invasion armies that want to seize Anatolia must also seize these plateaus. For this reason, the strategic routes to be followed by the armies carrying out military operations on Anatolian lands pass through these high plateaus.

There are three important strategic approaches passing through Anatolia. Two of them start from Istanbul and reach Eskişehir via Izmit. Here, one of the roads leads to Konya and Adana; the other one goes in the direction of Ankara-Kayseri-Sivas-Erzincan-Erzurum-Kars. The third road, which starts from İzmir, reaches Afyon from the direction of Manisa and Uşak and merges with the other two roads.[8]

During the National Struggle, there was a railway reaching Nusaybin from Istanbul via Izmit-Eskişehir-Kütahya-Afyon-Konya-Adana-Aleppo. The railway line coming from İzmir, Manisa and Uşak direction also joins with this railway line in Afyon.[9]

The railway lines in question further increase the values ​​of the approach directions on which they are located. Because the military operations to be carried out in Anatolia have to follow the railway routes. Otherwise, it will not be possible to quickly transfer weapons, equipment and military units to the desired regions in the vast Anatolian lands, where the highway network is insufficient.[10]

2. Military Geography of the Western Front Operational Area

Due to the above-mentioned features of the Anatolian peninsula, the Greek army, which landed in İzmir on May 15, 1919 and advanced towards the depths of Western Anatolia, generally followed the railway routes. Western Anatolia, which witnessed most of the battles during this invasion operation, is divided into two regions by the Şaphane Mountains. One of them formed the Aegean Region operation area and the other the Marmara Region operation area is raising.

The Aegean Region starts from the Aegean Sea coast and extends to the Gediz and Menderes Rivers and the Afyon and Kütahya plateaus. The Marmara Region is; It extends between Bandırma-Kemalpaşa-Orhaneli-Tavşanlı line and Adapazarı-Mudurnu-Beypazarı-Ayaş line towards Kütahya-Eskişehir and Ankara. One of them connects the Aegean Sea and the other connects the Straits and the Sea of ​​Marmara to Central Anatolia.[11]

The Aegean Region has a mountainous character. The altitude, which is zero on the Aegean coast, rises up to 2000 meters in the region where Afyon Plateau and Aegean basin meet. The rivers originating from this region; They open roads in the direction of Afyon from Çandarlı, İzmir and Kuşadası bays. An invasion army that makes a landing in the aforementioned gulfs can reach Central Anatolia by following these roads. The mountains between the valleys where the roads pass, cover the sides of the forces advancing from these roads.[12]

There are three important approach directions in the Aegean Region, starting from Izmir. The main approach direction suitable for advancing with large forces; It is the direction of Izmir-Uşak-Afyon. Others are İzmir-Manisa-Balıkesir and İzmir-Aydin-Denizli-Egirdir directions. On these three roads; There are İzmir-Manisa-Balıkesir-Bandırma, İzmir-Manisa-Uşak-Afyon and İzmir-Aydin-Denizli-Egirdir railways.[13]

The first line suitable for defense against a landing operation on the Aegean coast is the first ridge line where the mountains meet the sea. The second line of defense is the line known as the Milne Line[14] in the National Struggle, where there are sections of land suitable for defense and side roads running along the entire front. The last line of defense is the mountains in the Afyon region and the north and south extension line.[15]

Balikesir in the Marmara region; It is in the center of the Marmara Sea, the Dardanelles Strait, the Biga peninsula and the Edremit Gulf coasts. An army that will land in the Gulf of Edremit can advance to Bursa from Balıkesir, Bandırma and Karacabey. This direction provides a short route control of the Marmara coasts.

Bandırma or Gemlik gulfs are even more strategically important. Because landing in these gulfs is more convenient than advancing into Anatolia from the Aegean Region. While the distance between İzmir and Eskişehir is 450-500 kilometers, the distance between Mudanya and Eskişehir is 150 kilometers. The troops that will land in Gemlik or Mudanya can advance via the Bursa-İnegöl-İnönü-Eskişehir road. The fact that there is a railway line from Mudanya to Bursa also provides the opportunity to supply the troops that will advance on this road from the sea.[16]

The next area of ​​operation of an army advancing from the Western Anatolian operation area will be the Central Anatolian region. Central Anatolia is a plateau with mountainous edges and a flat middle. The altitude of the central parts is around 900-1000 meters, and the altitude of Uzunyayla region is over 1000 meters.[17]

Black Sea Mountains, Taurus Mountains, Antitaurus Mountains and Lakes Regions protect Central Anatolia from the north and south, as they have disability.[18] Due to this secure structure, Central Anatolia is the support, supply and rear region of all fronts.[19] For this reason, Central Anatolia is a region where any army that enters Anatolia has to fight with decisive results.

Central parts of Central Anatolia; It is a region where large military units may experience supply and shelter problems due to weak vegetation, limited supply opportunities, harsh climate and distance from the seas. Despite this, every army that wants to invade Anatolia or pass from Istanbul to the Middle East has to enter Central Anatolia. Because, three strategic roads passing through Anatolia intersect with each other in Central Anatolia.

These three paths also form the two strategic pivots suitable for the advancing of the invasion armies. One of these strategic pivots; It is the main street of İzmir-Manisa-Uşak-Afyon-Ankara-Kayseri-Sivas-Erzincan-Erzurum-Kars. This street is the most suitable axis for a military operation in the depths of Anatolia.

The second strategic pivot is the street starting from Istanbul, passing through Central Anatolia and connecting to the Middle East. This axis divides both the country and the operation in the east and west. İzmir-Afyon-Ankara railway and İstanbul Afyon-Adana railway further increase the military value of these two axles. [20]

3. Battles Between Greek and Turkish Armies

On May 15, 1919, the Greeks landed in Izmir, the starting point of the strategic axis that crossed Anatolia from west to east, with a unit the size of a division[21] and advanced through the valleys of Küçük Menderes, Büyük Menderes, Gediz and Bakırçay, Ayvalık-Bergama-Ödemiş-Aydin. They captured a large part of the land up to the line.[22]

The Greeks, who were organized at the exit positions of an attack to seize the Afyon and Kütahya regions[23]; They placed divisions on the valleys of Bakırçay (Bergama), Gediz (Manisa), Küçük Menderes (Bayindır) and Büyük Menderes (Aydın) rivers, and took İzmir (Buca) and its surroundings under control with a division.[24]

The Greek army, which had been waiting on the Milne Line for about a year, Because in 1920, the attack started again along the İzmir-Aydın-Köşk, İzmir-Tire-Ödemiş, Manisa-Akhisar-Balıkesir, Manisa-Salihli-Alaşehir railway lines.[25] He brought two regiments of Xanthi Division to the shores of Erdek and Bandırma.[26] The Greek troops advancing to the Nazilli-Eşme-Demirci-Bursa line provided both a large back zone to İzmir and a safety zone for the straits.[27]

After that, a Greek corps was deployed to the Bursa-Gemlik line and thus headed the Bursa-İnegöl-Eskişehir-Ankara approach direction, which connects the Marmara basin to Central Anatolia. The Greek corps in the south occupied Nazilli with one division, and Uşak and Gediz with two divisions. After that, the Greek forces, on the Bursa-Uşak-Nazilli line; Turkish forces were organized on the Eskişehir-Gediz-Dumlupınar-Dinar line.[28]

Thus, the Greek army was deployed in two groups based on the Bandırma-Bursa and İzmir-Uşak-Afyon railway, which it would use until the end of the National Struggle. In this way, it gained the opportunity to carry out concentric attacks from the periphery to the center. The Turkish army was organized in two groups, based on the Ankara-Eskişehir and Konya-Afyon railways. Thus, it has taken a position to block the approach directions of the Greek forces and to be able to fight in the domestic lines against the concentric attacks to be made.

Since most of the Kuvayi Milliye elements were dispersed as a result of the Greeks' offensive on June 22, 1920, the Turkish army, which started to form regular units, will defend its strategic defense from now on; It has been planned on the Eskişehir-Ankara-Sivas-Erzurum-Kars axis, based on the depths of the country and gradually receding to this depth when necessary.

The most important thing to pay attention to in this plan is not to leave the main operational direction while withdrawing, not to be thrown into the Black Sea in the north or in the Bozkır and Central Taurus and Cilicia regions in the south. Because, sliding towards the Black Sea creates the danger of destruction, while diving towards the south eliminates the possibility of continuing the defense at depth. But if the main line of Central Anatolia is kept, it is possible to continue the defense.[29]

After waiting for four months on the lines where it was organized, the Greek army started the attack again on the morning of January 6, 1921,[30] the main attack was in the direction of İnegöl-Bozüyük, and the secondary attack was in the direction of Yenişehir-Söğüt, to seize the eastern ridges of the İnönü-Bilecik railway. The 1st Corps also made show-off attacks in the direction of Banaz and Sivaslı from Uşak.[31] However, the Greek troops, who could not overcome the Turkish defense, withdrew as of the night of 10/11 January.[32]

After this unsuccessful operation, the Greek army started forward again on March 23, 1921.[33] With the 3rd Corps in the Bursa region, in three branches; He attacked the positions of Yenişehir-Bilecik-Söğüt-Gündüzbey, Aksu-İnegöl-Pazarcık-Bozüyük and İnönü with a wide front between these two branches.[34] The 1st Greek Army Corps advanced in the direction of the Uşak-Afyon railway line with a division and in the direction of Kapaklar-Kızılcaköy-Ahlatköy with a division.[35]

The Greek troops, who attacked the İnönü positions, could not overcome these positions and started to withdraw as of March 31.[36] On the other hand, the 1st Greek Army Corps arrived at the Sinirköy-Saraycık-Balmahmut-Reşadiye-Çatkuyu line on March 26,[37] captured Afyon on March 27,[38] and with a division on April 2, reached Bolvadin and Çay. so far advanced.

On April 3, 1921, this corps also started to retreat westward along the railway, and on April 5, it evacuated Afyon and continued to withdraw in the direction of Dumlupınar.[39] Despite the attacks of the Turkish troops from April 9 to April 12, the Greek forces managed to withdraw to Dumlupınar positions.[40] Turkish troops, who attacked the Dumlupınar positions on 13 April and continued this attack until the evening of 14 April, could not oust the Greek forces from Dumlupınar, so they stopped the battle and were organized on the Altıntaş-Sincanlı western line.[41]

Thus, the Greeks settled in the Dumlupınar positions, entered between the Murat and Zafer mountain ranges and separated the defense line in these mountains from each other. By seizing the passages overlooking the Afyon and Altıntaş plains, they have come to dominate these plains as well. This situation disrupted the Turkish defense system, which was established on the İnönü-Kütahya-Murat Mountain-Dumlupınar and Zafer Mountain Ranges line and connected to the depths of the country by railways. The loss of Murat Mountain-Dumlupınar-Victory Mountain Range, that is, the last stronghold of Western Anatolia, made it impossible for the Turkish army to take advantage of its domestic position.

Thereupon, the Western Front Command; İnönü positions were organized on three lines around the Kütahya-Nasuhçal section and Afyon. A reserve group consisting of two infantry and one cavalry divisions was also stationed in Eskişehir. Kocaeli Group is located between İznik Lake and Sakarya River, Menderes Group is located in Dinar and Çivril region.[42]

Unable to reach his goal in the First and Second İnönü Battles On 10, 11 and 12 July 1921, the Greek army again approached the forward and contacted the positions on the main battle line on 13 July.[43] While the 3rd Corps was occupying Tavşanlı, the 1st and 2nd Greek Corps and the Southern Division advanced in six parallel arms and attacked the Turkish defense line in the form of a semicircle.[44]

Unable to stop this offensive, the Turkish army withdrew to the Beşkardeşler Mountain-Karacahisar-Süpüren-Seyitgazi line,[45] and from there to the Bozdağ-Sevinç-Sultaniye and Derbent-Tahtalıbaba lines until the evening of 18 July.[46] When the Greek forces, which attacked the Bozdağ-Gökdere-Sultaniye-Derbent-Tahtalıbaba-Sarıbaba-Şecaattin-Seyitgazi line on 20 July, slowed down, the Western Front Commander counterattacked the Greek force of 5-6 divisions gathered in the Eskişehir region with three groups.[47]

This attack on July 21 was effective at first, but after the Greek forces withdrawing in the direction of Eskişehir gathered here, they started a counter-attack.[48] Noticing that the troops were showing signs of dispersal, the Front Commander[49] left covering troops at the front and started to withdraw all his troops to the rear of Sakarya gradually, by order of the General Staff.[50]

Turkish troops withdrew without any Greek pressure.[51] Because the Greek troops stopped after advancing a little towards the east from Eskişehir.[52] Thanks to the Greek pause, all Turkish troops withdrew to the east of Sakarya until the evening of 25 July 1921. Thus, the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battles came to an end. [53]

3. Military Geography of the Sakarya Pitched Battle Field of Operations

Although the Greeks won a great victory in the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battles, they could not reach their strategic goals because they could not completely destroy the Turkish army. The Turkish army withdrew, but the GNAT government did not attempt a ceasefire or a peace agreement, on the contrary, it started preparations to continue the defense on a new line. For this reason, the Greeks decided to continue the offensive, to destroy the Turkish army and to seize Ankara.

According to the Greeks, if Ankara was captured, the Turkish army would have to retreat eastward, although it could not be destroyed. In such a case, since there is no railway to the east of Ankara, it will not be able to carry most of the military equipment and will be thrown into the Sivas, Kayseri or Elazig region. In this region, it will be stuck between Pontus Greek gangs in the north, Armenians in the east, Kurdish tribes in the south, rebellions inside and the Greek army in the west.[54]

While the Greeks were preparing to start a new offensive operation with these thoughts, they did not know for sure where the Turkish army was organized yet. In fact, while the Turkish army was defeated in the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battles and started to withdraw, the Turkish General Staff has not yet decided where the new defense line will be formed, although it has decided to make the withdrawal behind Sakarya. For this reason, a committee was formed for the exploration of the Sakarya River region in order to determine the exact place where the defense line would pass, and the maps of the region were started to be prepared.[55]

The delegation, which went to reconnaissance, traveled throughout the land and made their proposals about the general location of the defense positions. After the Murat-Zafer mountain range, the most suitable region for defense on the İzmir-Afyon-Ankara-Erzurum axis is the Ankara-Haymana highlands region. This region, which leans on the Kütüklüdağ-Aydos Mountain elevation in the north and Salt Lake in the south, and extends its front to the Ayaş-Polatlı-Mangal Mountain line, is a defense zone with sufficient depth and suitable for position battles with a sufficiently large force.

However, since the Turkish army, which was weakened by the casualties in the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battles and the soldiers fleeing during the retreat, cannot be increased in a short time, it is not possible to organize in such a large area with the existing units. For this reason, it is necessary to establish a defense zone on both sides of the Eskişehir-Ankara-Sivas line and wide enough to organize the existing forces.

For this, a defensive line should be established on the Ayaş-Polatlı-Mangal Mountain line from Kırmır Suyu to the south, passing through some strategically and tactically important points. The north of this line is under the protection of the Black Sea mountains. For this reason, it is not possible for the Greek army to attempt a siege from the north.

The Mangal Mountain region in the south has completely different characteristics. The approach direction coming from Afyon and going to Kırşehir via Bala collides with these positions. It is possible for the Greek army to move its troops in Eskişehir to the south. For this reason, strong guards should be kept behind the southern part of the defensive line in case the Greeks make a siege maneuver from the south.

In the part of Sakarya River between the downstream of Porsuk Stream and Beşköprü, the valley is wide and the ridges on the west side are more dominant.

It is not appropriate to prepare a position right next to the river. For this reason, the defense line has to be established quite far from the river.[56]

The line of defense chosen according to this evaluation; It was formed on the line of Ankara Stream-Middle Sakarya eastern ridges-Ilıcaözü northern ridges-Temürözü-Türbe Tepe-Mangal Mountain. This line of defense is 100-120 kilometers long. Since the Ankara Stream region, located to the north of the defense line, is very steep, it is not suitable for large troops to make a siege. Because the Sakarya River is deep and narrow, it is suitable for building bridges, but the land after the river is in a structure that rises gradually up to Ankara and provides the opportunity to defend on the lines behind each other.

The south of the line poses significant difficulties against the siege operation. Because, in order to be successful in a siege operation from this region, it is necessary to move far south. The siege force, which moves towards the south, has to give the rest to a roadless and arid land. In this case, the troops must be resupplied from Afyon, but this road is too long and open to attacks from the south.

Another feature of the Sakarya positions is that the distance between the two wings is quite short. The fact that the roads from Ankara extend like fans all over the front is an advantage for the Turkish army to shift and supply units. The railway is closer to the north flank, which is difficult to besieged. These features increase the defensive power of the position.

The Sakarya positions, which were determined according to this evaluation, started to be fortified on 25 July 1921. Places such as Türbe Tepe and Mangal Mountain could not be well fortified as they are quite steep and stony. Some parts of Beylikköprü and Tekeköy overflowed water. Wire barriers were drawn only in some areas due to lack of material.[57]

However, the defensive line is capable of causing enough difficulties for the Greek army. For example, the Sakarya positions provide an advantage to the defending side and a disadvantage to the attacking side in terms of its location in the Anatolian geography. Because, while the Turkish army, which has withdrawn to these positions, gets very close to Ankara, the main supply base, the Greek army will have to move far away from the mainland. This situation has the potential to pose a problem for the Greek army in terms of logistics activities as well as operations.

Because of this drawback, French Marshal Foch and General Gourould and British Colonel George warned the Greeks not to advance too far into Anatolia during the negotiations during the London Conference. But the Greeks did not listen to these warnings.[58] However, it has been clearly seen in some battles in the recent past that extending the range lines so much has devastating consequences for the armies.

For example, Napoleon advanced 900 kilometers to Moscow and was finally defeated. The distance from İzmir to Ankara is 600 kilometers and the distance to Sivas is 900 kilometers. Moreover, the capacity of Greece is so limited that it cannot be compared with Napoleonic France. The successes of the Greek army since May 15, 1919 are not as effective as the victories of Napoleon. [59]

In World War I, the British moved 600 kilometers away from their base in Basra[60] and were defeated in Selman-i Pak near Baghdad on November 24, 1915. When the British retreated to Kut'ül Amare on 3 December 1915, they were besieged by the Ottoman troops when they were organized here for defense.[61]

After that, although they organized many operations to save the besieged troops, which they supplied with river ships and planes, these troops had to surrender on April 29, 1916.[62] It is possible that a similar situation will happen to the Greek army. Moreover, the Greeks are incomparably weaker than the British in terms of vehicles, equipment and personnel.

Conclusion

The correct evaluation of the "Military Geography of the Western Front from the Occupation of Izmir to the Battle of Sakarya", which constitutes the main axis of our study, and the successful conclusion of the battles according to this evaluation, shows that the leading cadre carrying out the National Struggle are fully acquainted with the geography of the country.

Due to the geographical structure of the Anatolian lands, this leader cadre controlled most of the armed forces in the struggle between the Istanbul-İzmit-Eskişehir-Konya-Adana axis intersecting in Central Anatolia and the İzmir-Manisa-Uşak-Afyon-Ankara-Kayseri-Sivas-Erzincan-Erzurum-Kars axis. deployed to fight.

The first axis is an axis that has the potential to divide both the country and the eastern and western operations by dividing them into two. The second axis is the main axis that will determine whether the battles with the Greek army will be successful or not. For this reason, the battles with the Greek army generally took place on the second axis, but the most important battles that determined the final outcome of the war were fought in the region between Eskişehir, Kütahya, Afyon, Konya and Ankara, where the two axis intersect is gone.

As the strategy applied was based on the principle of resisting, detecting, slowing down and stopping these attacks as the Greek army attacked, and strengthening the army in the time gained, the geographical structure of the land was utilized in the best way and the defensive operations were carried out in lines behind each other.

In this way, time was gained to prepare forces, and on the other hand, the Greek army was removed from its homeland and its supply bases on the Aegean coast. Thus, it was tried to weaken the Greek army, which had to fight in a hostile environment and faced supply difficulties due to long range lines, due to the friction created by this situation.

The Sakarya Pitched Battle was the battle in which this weakening brought the balance of power to a turning point. The characteristics of the chosen defense line were also effective in this. The Sakarya defense line was chosen in a way that will channel the Greek army to a certain area, wear it down with the step-by-step defense operations on the hills and ridges behind each other, and reach the balance of power by enabling it to reach the turning point.

The northern flank of these positions is based on a rough terrain that does not allow a siege operation and a water barrier, although the frontal barrier is limited. The railway, which is the main supply route, was left too far out of the reach of the Greek siege wing.

Since the combat power of the Turkish forces is less than that of the Greek army, the shape of the defense line was formed in the form of a semicircle to compensate for this weakness. Since this shape is suitable for domestic battles, it was planned to quickly move the troops to the needed areas by taking advantage of the short distances.

While the chosen defense line forced the Greek troops to be channeled to the south wing to carry out operations in an area with a limited road network, the Turkish army's main supply base, Ankara, was enabled to carry out its supply and resupply activities easily and quickly thanks to the roads extending like a fan to the entire front.

This shows that the Turkish army's command committee not only studied the National Struggle and the military geography of the Western Front, which was the most important front of this struggle, but also determined the regions where all the battles on this front, especially the Battle of Sakarya, took place with the same sensitivity.

The last word to be said on all these results of the study is the fact that it is imperative for those who run the army and the state to know the geography of the country well in order to make the right decisions at the decision moments that determine the future of the country. The National Struggle and the practices of the leading cadre who successfully concluded this struggle reveal this clearly.

(Presented as a paper at the Sakarya Pitched Battle Symposium on its 100th Anniversary, organized by Hacettepe University Atatürk Principles and Revolution History Institute on September 9-10, 2021 at the Polatlı Municipality 13 September Cultural Center under the coordination of POTA.)

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Sayı: 127, Belge: 1, 2.

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CEBESOY, Ali Fuat; Millî Mücadele Hatıraları, Temel Yayınları, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 2010.

ENER, Suat; Türkiye’nin Sıradağları, Havzaları, Ana Yolları, Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Stratejik Bakış, C. 1, Türkiye’nin Sıradağları, Ankara Basım ve Cilt Evi, Ankara, 1937.

………; C. 2, Türkiye’nin Havzaları, Ana Yolları, Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Bir Bakış, Ankara Basım ve Cilt Evi, Ankara, 1937.

………; Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, Harp Okulu Basımevi, Ankara, 1938.

ERİKAN, Celal; Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi, Hazırlayan: Rıdvan Akın, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010.

ESLEN, Nejat, Tarih Boyu Savaş ve Strateji, Q Matris Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003.

Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarih Encümeni, Türk İstiklal Harbi Hülasası, 1919-1922, Askeri Matbaa, İstanbul, 1937.

İsmail, HAKKI, Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası, Sevkulceyş, Tabiye ve Harp Tarihi Bakımından Tetkik, Necmistiklal Matbaası, İkinci Basılış, İstanbul, 1934.

İNÖNÜ, İsmet; Hatıralar, Yay. Haz.: Sebahattin Selek, Bilgi Yayınevi, 3. Baskı, Ankara, 2009.

Jeopolitik, Jeostrateji ve Strateji, Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, İstanbul, 2000.

KANE, Thomas M. and David J. LONSDALE; Understanding Cotemporary Strategy, Routledge, U.S.A., Newyork, 2012.

KEEGAN, John; Savaş Sanatı Tarihi, Çev.: Selma Koçak, Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007.

KINAL, Füruzan; Eski Anadolu Tarihi, TTK Basımevi, 2. Baskı, Ankara, 1987.

Org. İzzettin Çalışlar’ın Anılarıyla Gün Gün, saat saat İstiklal Harbi’nde Batı Cephesi, Haz.: İzzeddin Çalışlar, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009.

ÖZALP, Kâzım; Millî Mücadele, 1919-1922, C. 1, TTK Basımevi, 4. Baskı, Ankara, 1998.

PALLİS, Alexander Anastasius; Yunanlıların Anadolu Macerası, (1915-1922), Çev.: Orhan Azizoğlu, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 1997.

ŞİMŞEK, Halil; Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2002.

TOWNSHEND, Charles V. F.; Mezopotamya Seferim, Kurna, Kut’ülamare ve Selmanıpak Muharebeleri, Çev.: Gürol Koca, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012.

TÜMERDEM, İsmail Hakkı; Başkomutan Atatürk’e Değin; Türk Orduları Başkomutanları ve Yaptıkları Büyük Meydan Muharebeleri Üzerine Araştırma, K.K.K. İstanbul Askeri Basımevi, İstanbul, 1953.

Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 2, Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1965.

Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 3, Kütahya, Eskişehir Muharebeleri (15 Mayıs 1921-25 Temmuz 921), Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1974.

Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 4, Kütahya, Eskişehir Muharebeleri (15 Mayıs 1921-25 Temmuz 921), Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1974.

Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 5, 1. Kitap, Sakarya Meydan Muharebesinden Önceki Olaylar ve Mevzi İlerisindeki Harekât (25 Temmuz-22 Ağustos 1922), Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1972.

MAKALELER

KAYMAZ, İhsan Şerif; ‘’Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Irak’’, 100. Yılında Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Ed.: Ümit Özdağ, Kripto Yayınları, Ankara, 2014, s. 245-256.

[1] Nejat Eslen, Tarih Boyu Savaş ve Strateji, Q Matris Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, s. 143.

[2] T. M. Kane and D. J. Lonsdale, Understanding Cotemporary Strategy, Routledge, U. S. A., Newyork, 2012, s. 20.

[3] Geniş bilgi için bkz. John Keegan, Savaş Sanatı Tarihi, Çev.: Selma Koçak, Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, s. 93-105.

[4] Jeopolitik, Jeostrateji ve Strateji, Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, İstanbul, 2000, s. 111-114; Halil Şimşek, Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2002, s. 18.

[5] Askeri Coğrafya (Kara, Deniz ve Hava Harp Akademileri İçin), (Seri No:3), Harp Akademileri Basımevi, İstanbul, 1992, s. 8-9.

[6] Füruzan Kınal, Eski Anadolu Tarihi, TTK Basımevi, 2. Baskı, Ankara, 1987, s. 1-2; İ. Hakkı Tümerdem, Başkomutan Atatürk’e Değin; Türk Orduları Başkomutanları ve Yaptıkları Büyük Meydan Muharebeleri Üzerine Araştırma, K.K.K. İstanbul Askeri Basımevi, İstanbul, 1953, s. 40-41.

[7] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Suat Ener, Türkiye’nin Sıradağları, Havzaları, Ana Yolları, Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Stratejik Bakış, C. 1, Türkiye’nin Sıradağları, Ankara Basım ve Cilt Evi, Ankara, 1937, s. 15-17.

[8] Bkz. İsmail Hakkı, Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası, Sevkulceyş, Tabiye ve Harp Tarihi Bakımından Tetkik, Necmistiklal Matbaası, İkinci Basılış, İstanbul, 1934, s. 4.

[9] Demiryolu hatları için bkz. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarih Encümeni, Türk İstiklal Harbi Hülasası, 1919-1922, Askeri Matbaa, İstanbul, 1937, s. Kroki No-1.

[10] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Suat Ener, Türkiye’nin Sıradağları, Havzaları, Ana Yolları, Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Stratejik Bakış, C. 2, Türkiye’nin Havzaları ve Ana Yolları, Ankara Basım ve Cilt Evi, Ankara, 1937, s. 17-20.

[11] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Ana Yollar, C. 2, s. 6.

[12] Cemal Akbay, Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, C.1, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi, ATASE Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, s. 75.

[13] Bkz. İ. Hakkı, Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası, s. 24-25.

[14] Paris Barış Konferansı’ndaki Yüksek Konsey tarafından, Temmuz 1919’da Türk ve Yunan tarafları arasında iki tarafın da aşamayacağı bir hat belirlemekle görevlendirilen İngiliz General Milne’nin tespit ettiği hattır. Bu hat, Osmanlı Harbiye Nezareti’ne 3 Kasım 1919’da bildirilmiştir. Geniş bilgi için bkz. Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 2, Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1965, s. 120-122.

[15] C. Akbay, s. 75.

[16] İ. Hakkı, Türkiye Askeri Coğrafyası, s. 19-22.

[17] C. Akbay, s. 81.

[18] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Ana Yollar, C. 2, s. 8.

[19] C. Akbay, s. 82.

[20] Geniş bilgi için bkz. S. Ener, Havzalar ve Ana Yollar, C. 2, s. 9-20.

[21] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Kazım Özalp, Milli Mücadele, 1919-1922, C. 1, TTK Basımevi, 4. Baskı, Ankara, 1998, s. 5-8.

[22] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 2, s. 118.

[23] Suat Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, Harp Okulu Basımevi, Ankara, 1938, s. 7.

[24] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 2, Ks. 2, s. 117-118.

[25] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 2, Kroki:12, s. 188-193. İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar, Yay. Haz.: Sebahattin Selek, Bilgi Yayınevi, 3. Baskı, Ankara, 2009, s. 201; K. Özalp, s. 134.

[26] Geniş bilgi için bkz. HTVD, Sayı: 20, Vesika, 512,513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518.

[27] Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Millî Mücadele Hatıraları, Temel Yayınları, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 2010, s. 497.

[28] S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, 13.

[29] Geniş bilgi için bkz. S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 17-23.

[30] ATBD, Sayı: 127, Belge: 1, 2.

[31] Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 3, Kütahya, Eskişehir Muharebeleri (15 Mayıs 1921-25 Temmuz 921), Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1974, s. 153.

[32] S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 31.

[33] K. Özalp, s. 175.

[34] S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 35.

[35] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 316.

[36] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 430.

[37] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 343.

[38] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 359-363.

[39] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 474, 493, 518.

[40] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 534-561.

[41] Celal Erikan, Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi, Hazırlayan: Rıdvan Akın, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, s. 212-213; TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 562-569.

[42] Geniş bilgi için bkz. S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 42-48; Ayrıca bkz. Org. İzzettin Çalışlar’ın Anılarıyla Gün Gün, saat saat İstiklal Harbi’nde Batı Cephesi, Haz.: İzzeddin Çalışlar, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, s. 41-42.

[43] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 4, Kütahya, Eskişehir Muharebeleri (15 Mayıs 1921-25 Temmuz 921), Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1974, s. 190-234; Ayrıca bkz. ATBD, Sayı: 95, Belge: 2481, 2482, 2483.

[44] S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 49-50.

[45] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 4, s. 366.

[46] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 4, s. 388; ATBD, Sayı: 95, Belge: 2496, 2499, 2500.

[47] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 4, s. 441.

[48] ATBD, Sayı: 95, Belge: 2528.

[49] S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 53.

[50] ATBD, Sayı: 95, Belge: 2513, 2519; İ. İnönü, s. 247-248.

[51] ATBD, Sayı: 95, Belge: 2519.

[52] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 4, s. 490-492.

[53] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 4, s. 536; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, s. 455-456; S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 53.

[54] Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 5, 1. Kitap, Sakarya Meydan Muharebesinden Önceki Olaylar ve Mevzi İlerisindeki Harekât (25 Temmuz-22 Ağustos 1922), Yay. Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1972, s. 22-23.

[55] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 4, s. 485.

[56] S. Ener, Türk İstiklal Harbinin Ana Hatları, s. 54-55.

[57] TİH, C. 2, Ks. 5, 1. Kitap, s. 38-41.

[58] Mareşah Foch, Anadolu’nun işgali için 1.000.000 askere ihtiyaç olduğunu, bu sebeple Yunanlıların askeri olarak kesin sonuçlu bir başarı elde etmesinin zor olduğunu belirtmiştir. General Gourould ise Yunanlıların Kuvayı Milliye diye Türk ordusunu küçümsemesinin doğru olmadığını söylemiştir. İngiliz Albay George de benzer itirazlarda bulunmuştur. Ancak Yunanlılar bu ikazlara karşı çıkmış ve Anadolu’daki ordularının 120.000 kişiye yükseldiğini, bu kadar birlikle en geç üç ay içinde Şark Meselesi’ni çözeceklerini ileri sürmüşlerdir. TİH, C. 2, Ks. 3, s. 260-261.

[59] Alexander Anastasius Pallis, Yunanlıların Anadolu Macerası, (1915-1922), Çev.: Orhan Azizoğlu, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 1997, s. 50.

[60] Charles V. F. Townshend, Mezopotamya Seferim, Kurna, Kut’ülamare ve Selmanıpak Muharebeleri, Çev.: Gürol Koca, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, s. 45.

[61] İhsan Şerif Kaymaz, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Irak”, 100. Yılında Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Ed.: Ümit Özdağ, Kripto Yayınları, Ankara, 2014, s. 248-249.

[62] Geniş bilgi için bkz. C. V. F. Townshend, s. 417-596.