Are there any grounds for the allegations made against Atatürk today?

From time to time, you may have come across people on television screens or on the internet who, with titles such as "researcher", "master" or any other academic title, make certain claims about Atatürk. The first thing that draws my attention in these publications is the sources on which these people base their statements against Atatürk. These people usually cite the memoirs and narratives of some people as sources for their claims with the expressions "Kazım Karabekir wrote/said this/that, so-and-so told the following in his memoirs, etc.".

On the other hand, people who make history programs on some television channels, although they do not say anything against Atatürk, say, "There is such and such a document in the memoirs of such and such a person, written in his own handwriting. I have not seen any document on this subject elsewhere, but this is what he wrote. So-and-so's memoirs are in his family. It has not been published yet. When it is published, many more things may come out." By making sentences such as this, it raises a lot of questions in people's minds.

The first thing we would say about this is that memoirs are sources of dubious accuracy. Because memoirs are also the self-defense of their authors. For this reason, no memoir is objective. Since most of them were written after a fight, they bear the traces of the resentments and traumas caused by that fight. Therefore, everything written in the memoirs is nothing but unreliable claims unless confirmed by other sources or official documents.

For example, Kazım Karabekir Pasha was at odds with Atatürk from 1924 onwards and led the establishment of an opposition party, which was shut down due to its links to the Sheikh Sait uprising. After the Izmir assassination, which was uncovered in 1926, he was arrested for his alleged involvement in the assassination and had to step aside from politics and state administration.

Moreover, in 1927, Atatürk wrote the Nutuk and made some negative statements about him in the Nutuk. In response, Kazım Karabekir first started to tell his memoirs from his own point of view in a newspaper, and when this publication was stopped, he later wrote his memoirs as a book. In other words, what he wrote was the aftermath of a great fight and the traumas he experienced during this fight.

Therefore, much of what he writes about bears the traces of this fight. On the other hand, since the events in the memoirs are written years later, many mistakes can be made about events, dates and places due to inability to remember details or misremembering. For these reasons, what is written in memoirs is doubtful unless its accuracy is confirmed by other sources. Therefore, if someone says, "So and so person said this about Atatürk in his memoirs" and presents it as an absolute truth and accurate news, they are doing a disservice.

In these days, some rumors have emerged over Vahdettin's unpublished memoirs and this situation has brought along some debates. In the last chapter of the book on Avni Pasha's memoirs published by Osman Öndeş in 2012, some of the memoirs dictated by Vahdettin to Avni Pasha were published, but I hope that whatever the problem is, it will be solved and the entire memoirs will be published soon.

Because, despite the fact that some insinuations have been made through Avni Pasha's memoirs before, there is nothing tangible and substantial in Avni Pasha's published memoirs that can form the basis for the allegations put forward. I don't think Vahdettin's memoirs are much different. Probably, his memoirs, like Avni Pasha's memoirs, consist of a one-sided defense.

When one reads Avni Pasha's memoirs, the traces of resentment and even hostility caused by his inclusion in the list of 150 and his difficult life abroad are visible at first glance. In his memoirs, Avni Pasha makes many statements about how successful, good and positive a person he was and how good the sultan, whose chief aide he was, was.

He makes many negative statements about other people, especially Atatürk. Looking at these statements, it is easy to see that most of them have no basis in fact. But why did Avni Pasha make negative statements about Atatürk and some other people?

This is understandable. Because, as a result of the hostility caused by being branded as a traitor and the difficulties he faced during his exile, he felt the need to defend himself and to show those who caused this as wrong and malicious.

There is a very common saying in Turkish that explains this situation. When a person says very harsh words, slanders or curses another person, a person who witnesses this says, "He said such words that you wouldn't say even in a fight." As this saying suggests, harsh words, accusations, curses and lies that would never normally be said can be said in a fight.

The expression "not even in a fight" means that very bad things are said in a fight, but here it means things that are so bad that they cannot be said even in a fight. What is strange is that today many people, some of whom have academic titles, tell these statements as if they were true. However, other memoirs and, most importantly, official documents show that these statements are not true or at least distorted.

To explain this with an example, I think it would be enough to look at Avni Pasha's memoirs. For this reason, I will first quote some of Avni Pasha's claims about Atatürk verbatim from his memoirs and then try to show with documents that this information is not true. For this, I will use official documents.

On pages 198 and 199 of the third edition of his memoirs published in 2012, Avni Pasha states the following:

Mustafa Kemal Pasha said, "... He was defeated with his army in Palestine and the Ottoman Empire was defeated and devastated with a disastrous result rarely recorded in the history of the Ottoman Empire.

Miralay İsmet Bey, known in the army by the name of Deaf İsmet and for his stubbornness towards the committee, was commanding one of the corps of this defeated army. The heroic commanders, who had surrendered their armies and corps to the enemy and saved only their precious lives, arrived in Aleppo empty-handed.

In the meantime, İzzet Pasha, who had formed the armistice cabinet, had invited İsmet Bey to Istanbul as Undersecretary of War and had appointed Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the Commander of the Lightning Armies Group in place of Müşir Limon von Sanders Pasha. However, the commander of this group, which consisted of a handful of makeshift soldiers, met with İzzet Pasha from Aleppo and attempted to negotiate.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha insisted on two important points:

First, the appointment of Fethi Bey to the Ministry of Interior and himself to the Ministry of War.

Secondly, since he could no longer hold on in that neighborhood, he proposed that the armistice be concluded at any cost.

In the replies received from İzzet Pasha, he stated that Fethi Bey had been transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and that the Ministry of War had been allocated and assigned to him and was being administered temporarily and by proxy, and he asked for some time to be gained in order to ease the terms of the armistice. However, despite such assurances and assurances, Pasha was still impatient to get to Istanbul an hour earlier.

Finally, he left Adana for Istanbul on a train with lightning speed. While this train was passing through Konya, I joined the same train at Çumra station near Konya and came to Istanbul together."

As soon as you start reading these lines, Avni Pasha's state of mind becomes clear. The fact that he starts by calling İsmet İnönü by the nickname of Deaf İsmet and emphasizing his stubbornness and tries to blame Mustafa Kemal Pasha and İsmet İnönü for the defeat on the Syrian front, the last defeat of the Ottoman Empire, clearly shows this.

This attitude is also common among those who slander Atatürk today. Like Avni Pasha, they try to blame Atatürk for the defeat by narrating the events as if he was the commander of the front. However, the situation is completely different. At that time, all the troops in Syria were gathered under the command of a command called the Lightning Armies Group. The commander of this group was the German Limon von Sanders Pasha.

Sanders Pasha had three armies under his command. Cevat (Çobanlı) Pasha is the commander of the 8th Army deployed from the Mediterranean coast to the west. Mustafa Kemal Pasha is the commander of the 7th Army, which is organized to the east of him, in the middle of the group of armies. The commander of the 4th Army, which was the easternmost, was Cemal Pasha from Mersin.

Atatürk was appointed commander of the army in mid-July. Until he became the commander of the army, the war situation on the Syrian-Palestinian front was constantly unfavorable to the Ottoman army. As a result, Beersheba, Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Jericho were lost. Due to these failures, Falkenhayn, the commander of the Lightning Armies Group, was dismissed and replaced by General Liman von Sanders on March 2, 1918.

In the period from the time he took over the command until July 1918, the Jordan region was lost. Thereupon, a new defense line was established in Nablus. Meanwhile, the Lightning Armies Group was weakened due to the disagreement between the Germans and Enver Pasha over the operations in the Caucasus.

The Germans did not want the Ottoman army to enter Baku, which had vast oil resources, but Enver Pasha continued the Azerbaijan operation despite the Germans. In response, the Germans landed troops in Georgia and moved some German troops from the Syria-Palestine region to Georgia. Similarly, Enver Pasha sent some troops from Syria and Iraq to Azerbaijan.

Thus, the troops in Syria were weakened not only because of the casualties they suffered in many battles in which they fought without food and water, but also because of the withdrawal of Turkish and German troops. The actual strength of the Lightning Armies Group, which was organized as three armies, was not even the size of an army. For this reason, since the troops in the defense line are arranged in a line, the defense has no depth. The group of armies also did not have a large enough reserve.

Taking advantage of this situation, when the British attacked from the center of gravity and near the coast on September 19, 1918, the 8th Army front was breached and British armored vehicles and cavalry units entering through the breach captured critical areas on the retreat routes. The British infantry maneuvered and surrounded the army units.

Thus, the 8th Army was completely lost, and Liman von Sanders and the Army Commander Cevat Pasha were saved from being captured by the British at the last moment during the offensive. This situation, i.e. the splitting of the front, disrupted the cohesion of the defense and created the risk that the 7th Army would also be surrounded and destroyed.

The remaining troops were then withdrawn to the east of the Jordan River. Mustafa Kemal Pasha proposed to continue the withdrawal due to the difficulty of organizing for defense in this area and the inability to ensure the safety of the rear area due to Arab raids. Seeing this as appropriate, Liman von Sanders ordered the remaining troops of the army group to continue withdrawing on October 3.

Upon this order, Mustafa Kemal Pasha conveyed the order to Corps Commanders İsmet İnönü and Ali Fuat Cebesoy to withdraw their troops. He himself arrived in Aleppo on the evening of October 5, 1918 in accordance with the orders of Liman von Sanders and established his headquarters at the Baron Hotel.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who evaluated the situation here, sent a telegram to Vahdettin and informed him that a new cabinet should be formed under the chairmanship of Ahmet İzzet Pasha, in which he himself would be included as the Minister of War, and that an armistice should be signed as soon as possible. However, he was not given a position in the new cabinet formed under the chairmanship of İzzet Pasha.

Meanwhile, the retreating troops suffered heavy casualties due to the firing from the Arab villages as they passed by. As a result, first the 8th Army, most of which had been martyred or captured in the first days of the offensive, and then the 4th Army, which was disbanded during the retreat, were disbanded.

The remaining troops from these armies were incorporated into the 7th Army. The Lightning Armies Group Command was also reorganized to consist of the 2nd and 7th Armies. Until October 25, 1918, all the troops under the command of the 7th Army were gathered around Aleppo.

However, Aleppo was evacuated the same day after clashes broke out when armed Arabs entered the city. On October 26, the offensive of Arab and British troops was halted north of Aleppo. Thus, the Iskenderun region was secured from the south against the British invasion.

As can be understood from this information, neither Mustafa Kemal Pasha surrendered his army nor Miralay İsmet (İnönü) surrendered his corps to the enemy as Avni Pasha claimed. The units belonging to the other two armies that were disbanded or captured by the enemy during the retreat were disbanded. The 7th Army, commanded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, was the only army that was not disbanded.

Among the two corps attached to the 7th Army, the 3rd Corps commanded by Miralay İsmet (İnönü) Bey and the 20th Corps commanded by Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha were also not disbanded. After the Armistice of Mudros, the 3rd Corps was moved to Samsun and the 20th Corps was moved first to Konya and then to Ankara. These corps, together with the 15th Corps, were the most important pillars of Atatürk and his comrades-in-arms during the organization of the National Struggle.

On the other hand, as Avni Pasha claims, the army headquarters and corps headquarters did not stay in Aleppo for a long time. Aleppo was abandoned on October 25th. The 7th Army headquarters withdrew to Rajo until October 30, 1918. The 20th Corps Headquarters was organized in Katma and the 3rd Corps Headquarters in Kurtkulak.

On October 30, the Armistice of Mudros was signed and with an order from the Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha, Liman von Sanders was asked to hand over the command of the Lightning Armies Group to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Upon this, Mustafa Kemal Pasha handed over the command of the 7th Army to Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha by proxy and set off for Adana. On October 31, 1918, he took over the mission.

As can be seen, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was neither the commander of the troops in Syria nor his army suffered a major defeat. On the contrary, although the other two armies were completely wiped out, the 7th Army was able to retreat to Aleppo, preserving the integrity of the unity of the troops even though it suffered casualties. Mustafa Kemal Pasha reorganized and reorganized the 24-26 thousand soldiers gathered here and deployed them north of Aleppo.

With these makeshift troops, he stopped the armed Arabs and the British, the last military success of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, no matter what the above-mentioned circles do, it is not possible for them to blame the defeat on the Syrian Front on Mustafa Kemal Pasha. This is also clearly understood from Liman von Sanders' memoirs, which have also been published in Turkish.

But in passing, Avni Pasha tried to put this responsibility not only on Atatürk but also on Ismet Pasha. Interestingly, while he slandered Colonel İsmet (İnönü), the commander of the 3rd Corps, one of the two main subordinate units of the 7th Army, he never mentioned Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha, the commander of the 20th Corps, the other main subordinate unit.

Probably, since Ali Fuat Pasha had a falling out with Atatürk after 1924 and was one of the founders of the first opposition party, he did not feel the need to throw mud at him. If he sincerely believed that the 7th Army had failed and that the responsibility for the defeat belonged to the commander of the 7th Army, he would have been expected to make some negative statements about him as well.

When one reads Avni Pasha's statements in their entirety, it becomes clear that he not only deliberately misrepresented the events, but also confused the chronological order of events. However, he had served as Range Inspector in the Lightning Armies Group. After Atatürk was appointed as the Group Commander, he dismissed him because of his incompetence.

Therefore, it is impossible that he was not aware of what was going on in the Lightning Armies Group. It is especially incomprehensible that he confused the date of appointment of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was appointed as his superior. Moreover, he not only mixes up the date of appointment, but also makes other mistakes in terms of place and time.

For example, he says that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was appointed as the Commander of the Lightning Armies Group while he was in Aleppo. However, Atatürk received the appointment order on October 30, when he was in Katma and the Armistice of Mudros was signed. When he received this order, without delay, he handed over the 7th Army Command to Ali Fuat Pasha as acting commander and the next day he got into his car and arrived in Adana. On the same day, i.e. August 31, 1918, he received the mission from Liman von Sanders.

Therefore, the allegation that he negotiated with Ahmet İzzet Pasha in Aleppo after taking over as commander is not true. The topics of the negotiations mentioned are also untrue. Ataturk informed Vahdettin, not Ahmet İzzet Pasha, of the above-mentioned views on a date before October 25 (probably between October 5 and 14, since Ahmet İzzet Pasha formed a government on October 14).

Avni Pasha makes major mistakes in his account of these events, either because he does not remember the dates or because he deliberately distorts the subject. However, not only that, he also tells false stories. Supposedly, İzzet Pasha asked him to "buy some time to ease the terms of the armistice, but Atatürk was impatient to get to Istanbul an hour earlier. Finally, he left Adana for Istanbul on a lightning-fast train."

I can say with certainty that these statements are complete lies and distortions. Because the texts of all the radio and telegraphic communications between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Ahmet İzzet Pasha during this period are available in the General Staff ATASE Archive. In fact, ATASE has published the texts of these telegraph and radio communications in the Journal of War History Vesikaları. Both the original text and the transcription of the documents were published in the journal.

When these documents are examined, contrary to Avni Pasha's account, Ahmet İzzet Pasha repeatedly warned Mustafa Kemal Pasha not to get into friction with the British, not to engage in any behavior that could lead to the resumption of hostilities, and to be content with merely protesting the aggressive behavior of the British.

Despite all these warnings, Mustafa Kemal Pasha rejected the British demands, saying that the British were trying to encircle and capture Turkish forces with a fait accompli. He even informed the British that if they tried to land in Iskenderun, they would be responded with fire and ordered the troops in Iskenderun accordingly. When he reported this to Ahmet İzzet Pasha, Pasha became excited and sternly warned him not to fire. Rauf Orbay also mentions this incident in his memoirs.

Avni Pasha's claim that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was impatient to go to Istanbul as soon as possible and left Adana for Istanbul like lightning does not reflect the truth. Mustafa Kemal Pasha took over the command of the Lightning Armies Group on October 31, 1918 and stayed in Adana for 11 days.

In the meantime, Ahmet İzzet Pasha and members of the government, who were worried that he would restart clashes with the British, tried to leave Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the open by disbanding the armies group. Despite this, he remained in Adana and continued his duty and corresponded about the necessity of not disbanding the Lightning Group of Armies. When the government insisted on the disbandment, he sent telegrams proposing that even if the 2nd and 7th Armies were disbanded, the group should be protected and he should be left in Adana as the commander.

However, he could not get any result from these attempts. Since the group was disbanded, on November 9th, he no longer used the title of Group Commander in his telegrams, but continued to stay in Adana. However, when he received a telegram from Ahmet İzzet Pasha stating that the government had resigned, that he was much needed in Istanbul and that he should come immediately, he took the train on the evening of November 10 and set off.

In the rest of his memoirs, Avni Pasha mentions that he also boarded the train at Çumra station near Konya, that he thought Mustafa Kemal Pasha was going to Istanbul as the Minister of War, and that he was very bored when he read in a newspaper that the government of Ahmet İzzet Pasha had collapsed and Abdullah Pasha was the Minister of War in the new government. However, this is not true. He learned that Ahmet İzzet Pasha had resigned with a telegram sent to him in Adana.

In conclusion, as it is understood from Avni Pasha's memoirs, one should be very careful when using memoirs as a source of history, and what is written in memoirs should not be accepted as absolute truth unless it is confirmed by other sources and documents. Without following this most basic rule, all accusations and accusations made against Atatürk are inconsistent, false and untrue. They do not reflect the truth, but the delusions of the authors, who are caught up in political or religious emotions.

Note: Those who want to learn more about Atatürk's activities in Adana after he became the Commander of the Lightning Armies Group and his correspondence in the meantime can refer to the following sources. What I have written above is based on the information in these official documents.

References:

-Atatürk ile İlgili Arşiv Belgeleri (1911-1921 Tarihleri Arasına Ait 106 Belge), Ankara: Başbakanlık Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayın No: 1, 1982, Belge No:18.

-Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri IV, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1991.

-Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi, Sayı: 27, Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, Mart 1959: Vesika Nu. 690/A, 690/B, 690/C, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708,709, 710/A, 710/B, 710/C, 711, 712, 713, 714.

-Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi, Sayı: 28, Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, Mart 1959: Vesika Nu. 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 746.

-Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi, Sayı: 29, Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, Mart 1959: Vesika Nu. 741, 743, 744, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760.

-Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi, Sayı: 30, Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, Mart 1959: Vesika Nu. 762, 762/a.

-Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi, Sayı: 31, Ankara: E. U. Basımevi, Mart 1960: Vesika Nu. 767.