The Effects of Military Geography on the Organization and Deployment of the Ottoman Army After the Armistice of Mudros

After fighting on different fronts for four years, the Ottoman Empire withdrew from the war by signing the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. The Ottoman Empire, which started to demobilize its soldiers in accordance with the armistice, withdrew its troops from these regions to the interior after the Allied Powers occupied some regions.

With this withdrawal, by April 2, 1919, all army headquarters were abolished and army units were reorganized into corps. The new units established as a result of this organization were deployed to various parts of the country.

While these organization and deployment activities were carried out, the threat assessment and the military assessment of the country's geography were based. Accordingly, a corps was deployed against every existing and potential threat. These corps were organized on the approach directions coming to these regions in a way to protect the inner parts of the country and strategic regions.

 

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The Ottoman Empire entered World War I on 29 October 1914.[1] After fighting on many fronts for four years, it lost most of its territory. In September 1918, upon the British army's offensive in Syria, the Yıldırım Army Group was disbanded. Meanwhile, the Bulgarians could not stop the Allies' offensive that started on the Macedonian Front on September 15 and offered a ceasefire on September 26. Upon these developments, the Ottoman Empire had no choice but to withdraw from the war. Because with the withdrawal of the Bulgarians from the war, the Ottoman Empire lost contact with its allies.[2]

The offensive launched by Germany on the Western Front in the spring also failed. When the Allies counterattacked on 8 August, the German army was dissolved in a short time.[3] In the face of this situation, the German government sent a note to the United States for a ceasefire on 3/4 October 1918.[4]

After the Germans, on October 5, the Ottoman government applied to the United States for a ceasefire. However, no response was received to this application and other applications.[5] Due to these developments, the Talat Pasha government, which received a vote of no confidence in the Parliament on 7 October 1918, resigned on 8 October.[6] The Sultan gave the task of forming a government to Tevfik (Okday) Pasha, but Tevfik Pasha could not form a government.[7] Thereupon, the task of forming a government was given to Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha.[8]

Ahmet İzzet Pasha started to work for peace as soon as possible in accordance with the Wilson Principles. Because the border of Thrace was under the threat of the armies of the Entente States and there were not enough military units in Thrace to eliminate this threat.[9] Troops in Iraq and Syria were fighting the British. The troops in northern Iran and the Caucasus were too far to reach Istanbul in time. Since the Ottoman navy was too weak to resist the Allied navies; Istanbul was also vulnerable to attacks from the sea.[10]

Despite these adverse conditions, most Ottoman statesmen believed that a reasonable peace agreement could be made with the Entente Powers. Because in a speech made by British Prime Minister Lloyd George on January 5, 1918, and in Article 12 of the Wilson Principles published on January 8, 1918, it was stated that the lands in Anatolia and Thrace, where the majority of the population were Turks, would be left to the Ottoman Empire.[11]

Encouraged by these statements, the government took initiatives before the Allies through British General Townshend, Bern Military Attaché Halil (Sedes) Bey, Chief Rabbi Hayim Naum Efendi and banker Marcev Savoie, who had been taken prisoner in Kut'ül Amare.[12] As a result of General Townshend's attempt, on October 23, the Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Calthorpe, reported that an Ottoman delegation was sent to the Port of Mudros.[13] Thereupon, a delegation headed by Rauf (Orbay) Bey went to Lemnos Island. As a result of the negotiations that started on October 26, the Armistice of Mudros was signed on October 30, 1918.[14]

It is seen that there is no clear expression that means unconditional surrender in the text of the armistice, which consists of 25 articles. However, it is understood that the articles of armistice were arranged according to the secret agreements between the Entente Powers, and were generally prepared according to the interests of the British.[15] The biggest indicator of this is that the seven articles of the armistice contain maritime matters. This shows that the British, who have the largest naval power among the Allied Powers, attach great importance to obtaining their special interests in the maritime field.[16]

In addition, in the armistice articles; The communication lines and railway transportation will be given to the Allied Powers, the logistics facilities will be under the control of the Entente Powers, the Germans and Austrians will be taken abroad, the Ottoman Empire will cut off its relations with the Central Powers.

Issues such as how the situation of the wars will be resolved and the starting time of the armistice are stated.[17]

The remaining items are those that paved the way for the demobilization and surrender of the Ottoman army and the occupation of some parts of the country. For example, according to Article 5; All military units other than border security and internal security needs should be demobilized. According to Article 11, troops in Northwest Iran will be withdrawn behind the pre-war frontier. According to Article 16, troops in Hejaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria and Iraq will surrender to the nearest Allied Command and all troops in Cilicia will leave the region, except those necessary for internal security.[18] According to Article 17, Turkish troops in Tripoli and Benghazi will surrender to the nearest Italian garrison.

The two most dangerous articles of the Armistice are Article 7[19], which states that the Allies can occupy any strategic point that they deem their security in danger, and Article 24, which states that if there is confusion in the six provinces (Vilâyat-ı Sitte), any of these provinces will be occupied. [20] Except those; It is stated that the Straits will be occupied in Article 1, the Taurus Tunnels in Article 10, and Batumi in Article 15.[21]

As can be seen, the armistice aims to bring the Ottoman Empire to the peace table completely collapsed.[22] The means to ensure this are the articles that foresee the surrender and demobilization of the army and the articles that allow new occupations. Because these articles allow the army to be weakened so much that it cannot resist and the Entente Powers to divide the rest of the country according to the secret agreements they made among themselves during the war.[23]

Despite these drawbacks, the Armistice of Mudros was welcomed by official authorities and throughout the country.[24] However, all army commanders, especially those in contact with the British, were worried about the armistice clauses.[25] Because the Bolsheviks, who seized power on November 7, 1917, after the coup they carried out in Russia,[26] the secret agreements between the Entente Powers were published in the newspapers.[27] The army commanders, who were aware of these secret agreements, thought that the armistice articles could be used by the Allies to invade the rest of the country.

It soon became clear that these suspicions of the army commanders were correct. The first movements that some parts of the country that are not yet occupied will be invaded, emerged in Mosul, the Bosphorus and Iskenderun. After that, the Allied Powers; They began to invade the country from the directions of Iraq, Syria, Caucasus, Straits and Thrace.[28]

1. The Situation of the Armies of the Ottoman Empire at the Signing of the Armistice of Mudros

At the time the armistice was signed, the Ottoman army consisted of eight army commands and some detached units.[29] Among these armies, the headquarters of the Yıldırım Army Group under the command of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) Pasha was stationed in Adana. There were 2nd and 7th Armies in the establishment of Yıldırım Army Group.

The headquarters of the 2nd Army under the command of Nihat (Anilmis) Pasha was in Adana. The troops of this army; They were stationed in Adana (12th Corps Headquarters), Tarsus (23rd Division), Ceyhan (15th Corps Headquarters and 44th Division) and İskenderun (41st Division).[30] The headquarters of the 7th Army, which Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha commanded by proxy,[31] was located in Raco. The troops of this army; They were organized in the Barracks (3rd Corps Headquarters), Kefrşil (24th Division), Kelcebrin (43rd Division), Katma (20th Corps Headquarters), Shuvarga (11th Division) and Kefrhaş (1st Division) regions.[32]

Some units of the Yıldırım Army Group continued to defend their positions against the British and Arabs in Hejaz, Asir and Yemen, unaware of the signing of an armistice. These; It consisted of the units in Medina under the command of Fahrettin Pasha and in Asir under the command of Muhittin Pasha, and the 7th Corps in Yemen under the command of Tevfik Pasha.[33] Prince Osman Fuat Efendi was in Tripoli.[34]

The headquarters of the 6th Army under the command of Ali İhsan (Sabis) Pasha, located in the north of Iraq, was in Mosul. 2nd Division, 5th Division, Cavalry Brigade and other units affiliated to the army in this army establishment; [35]

The 3rd and 5th Armies were stationed in the Thrace and Straits region. In addition, there was a Straits General Command directly subordinate to the General Headquarters. The 3rd Army, with its headquarters in Istanbul; He was in charge of defending Istanbul and the Bosphorus by relying on the Çatalca positions. The headquarters of the 3rd Army had just been brought from Batumi, and only one regiment of its units had completed its deployment. For this reason, until the Army Headquarters took over the task, the 25th Corps and Çatalca Müstahmek Location Command were directly subordinated to the General Headquarters. Border and line guard battalions in Thrace There was no force other than a regiment brought from the Caucasus.

The 5th Army was in charge of protecting the Dardanelles by relying on the Bolayır positions. Most of the troops of the 5th Army, consisting of the 1st Corps (at Gallipoli) and the 14th Corps (at Çiftlik, south of Yahşiköy), are located on the Gallipoli Peninsula (49th Division Yahşiköy, 55th Division around Gelibolu and 60th Division Bayat'. ta), and one division (61st Firka north of Pınarbaşı) was on the Anatolian side.[36]

In Western Anatolia, there were units affiliated to the 8th Army Command, which was transferred from the Syrian Front in October. The commander of this army, whose headquarters was in Izmir and whose troops were spread from Ayvalık to Antalya, was Cevat (Çobanlı) Pasha.[37] The 17th Corps Headquarters and 56th Division of this army were in İzmir, the 21st Corps Headquarters was in Aydın and the 57th Division was in Antalya.[38]

The Caucasian Islamic Army and the 9th Army were located in the East. The Commander of the Caucasian Islamic Army was Nuri (Killigil) Pasha. Army headquarters and the 5th Caucasian Division were in Baku, the 15th Division was in Petrovsk. It was ordered that this army be abolished and the 5th Caucasian Division and the 15th Division to be transferred to Istanbul. The 36th Division, which was to be transferred to Istanbul to join the 3rd Army, was located in Gyumri and the 10th Caucasian Division was located in Batumi. Some units of the 36th Division were in Petrovsk and Baku under the command of the 5th Caucasian Division and the 15th Division. The 9th Army Commander Yakup Şevki (Subaşı) Pasha and the army headquarters were located in Kars. The 3rd Caucasian Party affiliated to this army was in Ahiska, the 9th Caucasian Party was in Kamarlı, the 11th Caucasian Party was in Hoy and the 12th Party was in Serdarabad.[39]

The total personnel of the combat and rear-front units of the Ottoman army, which consisted of the eight armies and detached units mentioned above, was more than 400 thousand.[40] This represented a very important military power. The war had also improved the Ottoman army in terms of weapons, equipment and technology. For example, the number of military aircraft, which was six at the beginning of the war, increased to 300 at the end of the war.[41] Weapons and ammunition in the hands of the army; It consisted of 1936 cannons, 4490 heavy machine guns, 904,394 rifles, 2,066,300 shells and 299 million rifle rounds.[42]

2. Evaluation of the Territories of the Ottoman Empire in terms of Geopolitics, Geostrategy and Military Geography

At the time the Armistice of Mudros was signed, the Ottoman Empire was a fairly large country with territory on two continents. Surrounded by the sea on three sides, the Ottoman Empire consists of the Anatolian and Thrace peninsulas. These two peninsulas, which are a bridge between Asia and Europe, are a lock between two continents with the straits in the north-south direction and the land country in the east-west direction. On these lands, connecting the Asian continent to the warm seas and Africa in the north-south direction; There are three strategic pivots, two of which pass by land and one by sea.[43]

One of them, the sea route passing through the straits, is the shortest route to the Indian Ocean from Central Europe and the Black Sea Basin, together with the Suez Canal. The strategic axis, which comes through the Balkans and goes in the direction of Edirne, Istanbul, Izmit, Eskisehir, Afyon, Konya, Adana and Aleppo, is the main road connecting Europe to the Middle East.[44]

The straits region, which is the intersection point of these two axis and land, sea and air routes, is a very important strategic region.[45] The Straits region is also at the center of German plans to land in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans in the direction of the Baltic, Istanbul and Basra. This plan of the Germans coincides with the plans of the Russians to go to the warm seas in this region.[46]

The third strategic axis is the axis that passes through Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, coming through the Caucasus, which is one of the directions that the Russians followed throughout history to descend into the warm seas. This axis then extends towards the Iskenderun Bay or the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.[47]

The Ottoman Empire, which was a bridge between continents, seas and oceans due to these axis, was a border state surrounded partly by seas and partly by land. For this reason, it is sensitive to threats from both sea and land. For him, both sea and land parts are of military importance.[48]

The southern coast of the Black Sea, from the seas surrounding the landlocked country, constitutes the longest coastline stretching from Batumi to Bulgaria. The part of this coastal area from Batumi to the west of Karadeniz Ereğlisi is surrounded by high mountains close to the coast. For this reason, it is not suitable for removal. The Sinop-Samsun-Çesamba regions in this region are suitable for mining, but the steep and high mountains make it difficult to move inland from the coast. The coastal part from the west of Black Sea Ereğli to Midye is suitable for landing operations.

In the Anatolian coasts, except for the Sakarya River, there are no valleys suitable for the operation of the troops coming ashore to the inner regions, since the other streams and creeks descend from the high mountains. The mountain ranges extending parallel to the sea constitute an obstacle for the troops to advance from the coast towards the interior of Anatolia.

With this one However, there are some militarily important strategic locations on the Black Sea coast. These; Sakarya mouth, which connects the Black Sea coast to the Geyve Strait, Inebolu that connects it to Ankara, Samsun that connects it to Sivas, Trabzon that connects it to Erzurum and Batumi that connects it to Baku and Kars by railway. The roads connecting these strategic locations to the interior also constitute the approach directions in the region.

For the Ottoman Empire, the most important of these strategic locations is Samsun. Because Samsun is at the exit point of the road that takes the shortest route to Uzunyayla in the center of Anatolia and connects the Black Sea to the Iskenderun Bay by the shortest route. For this reason, Samsun is a place that should be dealt with first for an external power that wants to control Anatolia. Trabzon port is also an important strategic location, as it reaches the Erzurum Plateau, which is the mainstay of the Eastern Plateau, from the shortest distance.

Batumi Port, on the other hand, provides the opportunity to take over the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea basin and Iran by making use of the land and railways. Thanks to the railway line that goes from Batumi to Sarıkamış, it also allows to reach Eastern Anatolia and Rize and Trabzon via Hopa. Therefore; An external power that wants to control the Caucasus, the Eastern Black Sea coast and Eastern Anatolia has to seize the port of Batumi.[49]

The Bosphorus has a strategic importance for the states that have a coast to the Black Sea and, thanks to the Danube River, for the Central European states as a way out to the Mediterranean and a suitable transit point for the armies that will advance from one of Anatolia or Thrace to the other. The importance of this region is increasing due to the city of Istanbul, which has many communication and accommodation opportunities. Istanbul is also the capital of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, it is a position that a power that wants to control the country should take control first.

For the defense of the Bosphorus and the city of Istanbul, both sides of the Bosphorus must be kept at hand. In addition, the part of the Black Sea coast from Şile to Terkos Lake is very important for the safety of the Bosphorus. Kocaeli and Çatalca Peninsulas should also be held against land attacks.

Haydarpaşa, İzmit, Gemlik, Mudanya, Bandırma, Biga piers on the Anatolian shores of the Marmara Sea and Ereğli, Tekirdağ and Şarköy piers on the Thrace side are important in terms of crossing between the two continents. These piers are also strategic points where armies coming from outside by sea can land.[50]

The Dardanelles Strait, like the Bosphorus, has a great strategic importance. Because an external power crossing this strait cuts off the connection of Istanbul and Thrace with Anatolia. In addition, by landing on the Anatolian shores of the Sea of ​​Marmara, he can reach the interior of Anatolia in a short time from the direction of Bursa and Eskişehir.[51] For this reason, defending the Çanakkale Strait is also important for the Anatolian defense.[52] For the defense of the Dardanelles, both sides of the strait should be kept. Also; Saros Bay, Gallipoli Peninsula, Biga Peninsula, Edremit Bay and Ayvalık region are important.

The Gulf of Saros in the Aegean Sea is suitable for a landing operation. However, the troops that landed here attack the fortified positions since the Balkan War. Dikili, Çandarlı, Foça, İzmir, Çeşme, Sığacık, Kuşadası and Güllük Gulfs and Büyük Menderes mouth on the Anatolian coasts are also suitable for landing operations. These places are connected to the interior of Anatolia thanks to the valleys opened by the rivers in the east-west direction.

Among them, Izmir port is the most important port on the Aegean Sea coast, as it is located at the beginning of the highways and railways going into Anatolia. The city of Izmir is an important strategic location due to the fact that it has a port suitable for the accommodation of ships and its supply opportunities are high. For this reason, the armies that want to occupy Anatolia from the west must first take control of the Izmir port and take the city under control.

The Gulfs of Gökova, Marmaris, Fethiye and Antalya, located in the western part of the Mediterranean coast, have harbors suitable for the accommodation of ships. The most important of these is the Gulf of Antalya. Since the Antalya Bay indents into Anatolia, the forces that will land from here can reach Central Anatolia as soon as possible. Because Afyon is 285 kilometers from Izmir but 210 kilometers from Antalya. A force that takes possession of Afyon from Antalya can capture Murat Başyaylası in a short time and separate Western and Central Anatolia from each other.

A unit that makes a landing in Silifke, which is located in the east of Antalya, can reach Central Anatolia via Konya. Mersin, Karataş, Yumurtalık and İskenderun ports further east are also suitable for landing operations. The roads leading from these regions to the interior of Anatolia increase the importance of these ports.

These ports are also; They are the starting points of the approach directions to Southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq and Syria.[53] Iskenderun Bay is the easiest way to intervene in the railway connecting Istanbul to the Middle East.

It is also important in terms of having a place to know.[54]

When we look at the land of the Ottoman Empire, which was surrounded by sea on three sides, it is seen that it consists of two peninsulas. Of these, the Thracian peninsula is very difficult to defend because it is a small piece of land and there are no land faults suitable for defense. The Anatolian peninsula; It is a high plateau that is the continuation of the Iranian plateau. For this reason, it is suitable for defense.

The rectangular shape of the Anatolian peninsula provides the opportunity to defend against attacks from the west or east by making distraction battles in the depths of the country. This gives time to form new units to match the enemy forces. On the other hand, the rather long distance between the western and eastern regions lengthens the supply lines for armies attacking from either of these two directions.

However, since the geographical structure of Anatolia allows attacks from more than one direction, it may require multi-frontal battles. The large number of fronts and their distance from each other, on the other hand, make it difficult to shift forces from one front to the other in a short time due to the inadequacy of transportation roads and means of transportation.[55]

However, Anatolian lands are like a fortress surrounded by a water barrier, with an average altitude of 1130 meters.[56] The mountain ranges, which extend parallel to the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts and start to rise suddenly like castle walls from the coast, make the operation to the inner parts of Anatolia dependent on certain roads and the straits, passages and rifts through which these roads pass.[57] It is easy to defend the Anatolian peninsula against attacks from the south and north, since the straits, passages and breaches can be defended with small units.

Although the Ottoman Empire consists of two peninsulas, it is generally divided into three parts in terms of military geography. These; They are expressed with the names of Thrace Highland, Anatolian Highland and Eastern (Oriental) Highland. Thrace Plateau is separated from the Anatolian Plateau by the Dardanelles, the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Bosphorus. Anatolia and the Eastern Plateau; It is separated from each other by the Ordu-Koyulhisar-Kemaliye-Fırat River-Ceylanpınar-Resulayn line.

Military operations in these plateaus generally follow the basins formed by the rivers. For this reason, the plateaus connecting the basins are strategically important regions. Plateaus connecting more than one basin are called basyayla. The highlands in Anatolia, together with the straits, are the most decisive regions in military operations. These highlands; Murat and Erzurum Plateau and Uzunyayla.

Murat Plateau; It connects the Marmara, Aegean and Black Sea basins to the inner regions. Murat, Zafer, Emir and Demirci Mountains merge with each other in this region. Kütahya and Afyon Plateaus, which are among these mountain ranges, and Altıntaş, Sandıklı, Banaz, Uşak and Örencik Plains are also within Murat Plateau. An army under control of the Murat Plateau can block all the approach directions coming from the Aegean Sea coasts to Central Anatolia. Murat Plateau, which hides Central Anatolia behind it, is the castle of Western Anatolia.

Uzunyayla; It covers the regions of Sivas, Kangal, Kayseri and Gurun along the east of the Upper Kızılırmak. The Kızılırmak, Seyhan, Ceyhan, Euphrates Rivers and many smaller streams originate in this region. Uzunyayla connects the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Euphrates basins. Kop, Çimen, Tecer and Taurus Mountains and Antitaurus Mountains unite in this region.

Uzunyayla is the last region where the defending forces in the east or west of Anatolia can withdraw. Because an army controlling Uzunyayla; The Caucasus can continue to defend, as it can control the strategic approach directions to Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Sea of ​​Marmara. For this reason, Uzunyayla is the inner castle of all Anatolia.

Erzurum Plateau is; It connects the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Euphrates Basin. The Coruh, Oltu, Tortum, Karasu, Aras, Murat streams originate from here. The roads coming from the Caucasus by following the river valleys pass through this region. Because of these features, Erzurum Plateau is the most suitable place to stop the attacks from Iran and the Caucasus and to prevent them from entering the country. Erzurum Plateau is the castle of Eastern Anatolia.[58]

These three plateaus are the main points of support for the forces that will defend Anatolia against the invading forces. It is not possible to defend Anatolia without holding these plateaus or to occupy these plateaus without capturing them. For this reason, each invasion army has to follow the approach directions targeting these three fortresses with its main forces.

When Anatolia and Thrace are evaluated together with the neighboring regions, these plateaus are also the intersection points of the main approach directions between the continents in Anatolia. For this reason, over the Ottoman lands that were not yet occupied when the Armistice of Mudros was signed.

The strategic roads passing through the straits follow the strategic regions formed by these highlands. These strategic ways; It consists of a total of six strategic approach routes, one by sea and five by land.

Two of them; These are the approach directions coming to Istanbul via Sofia-Plovdiv-Edirne-Çorlu and Thessaloniki-Gümülcine-Dimetoka-Çorlu. Two of the other three roads going by land start from Istanbul and reach Eskişehir via Izmit. These roads after Eskişehir; It goes in the direction of Konya, Adana and Aleppo or in the direction of Ankara-Kayseri-Sivas-Erzincan-Erzurum-Kars, Gyumri and Tbilisi.

The road to Aleppo is between the Middle East and Anatolia; The road to Tbilisi, on the other hand, forms the main approach direction in the military operations to be carried out between the Caucasus and Anatolia. Another road starting from İzmir comes from Manisa and Uşak to Afyon and from there it joins with other roads going in the direction of Ankara or Konya. This road connects a military operation that will start from the Aegean coasts to Central Anatolia and from there to other main approach directions.[59]

At the time the Armistice of Mudros was signed, there was a railway going from Kırklareli and Edirne to Istanbul and from Istanbul to Nusaybin via Izmit-Eskişehir-Kütahya-Afyon-Konya-Adana-Aleppo. The railway stretching between İzmir-Manisa-Uşak-Afyon joins with this railway line here. In addition, Bandırma-Balıkesir-Manisa-İzmir; İzmir-Söke-Burdur-Çivril and Burdur-Egir; There are also railway lines between Eskişehir and Ankara.[60]

These railways further increase the value of the main roads described above. Therefore, any army that wants to take control of the Ottoman lands that were not yet occupied at the time of the Armistice of Mudros must take control of the stations, passages, tunnels and bridges on these railway lines. Because the military operations to be carried out must follow these railway lines.

If this is not done, it is not possible to quickly transport vehicles, weapons and military units from one region to another in the vast Anatolian lands, where the highways are inadequate. The most important of these passages and tunnels are located in the Middle Taurus Passes region. Therefore, any foreign power aiming to invade will first want to seize this region.

The Thracian plateau, which is one of the three plateaus in the Ottoman lands, which we have examined in general terms in terms of military geography; It has a very different military characteristic from Anatolia. For this reason, the jump of an operation that started in Thrace to Anatolia means the beginning of a new era of war.[61]

in Thrace; There is an approach direction from Thessaloniki and Dimetoka to the Gallipoli Peninsula. The approach directions to Istanbul are; Sofia-Plovdiv-Edirne-Çorlu-Istanbul with the main approach direction Yanbolu-Gaipler-Kırklareli-Vize-Saray-Çatalca-Istanbul roads and Komotini-Kırcaali-Edirne-Kırklareli-Vize-Saray-Çatalca-Istanbul; Thessaloniki-Komulcine-Dedeagac-Dimetoka-Babaeski-Corlu-Silivri-Istanbul; Komotini, Alexandroupoli-Ferecik-Ipsala-Keşan-Malkara-Tekirdağ-Silivri-Istanbul are the approach directions.[62]

The first line suitable for defense on these approach directions is today's Turkish-Greek border line. The south of this line rests on the Enes swamp, the front reaches the Tunca and Meriç Rivers, and the north rests on the Istranca Mountains.[63] In addition, the tributaries of the Ergene River form suitable lines for defense in the north-south extension in the central part of Thrace.[64] Since Thrace gets narrower towards the east, defense can be made with less force in these regions. The most suitable line for defending Istanbul is the Çatalca line, which has defensive positions between Terkos Lake and Büyükçekmece Lake.[65] The most suitable place to defend the Gallipoli peninsula is the Koru Mountains region.[66]

Anatolian Plateau; It is a plateau surrounded by mountains and a flat middle.[67] This plateau; Western Anatolia is considered as a single operation area against threats from the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Syria directions. The Western Anatolian operation area is divided into two by the Şaphane Mountains. One of them constitutes the Aegean and the other the Marmara operation area. The Aegean Region is the part that starts from the Aegean Sea and extends to the Gediz and Menderes Rivers and the Afyon and Kütahya plateaus.

Marmara Region; It is the operation area extending towards Kütahya, Eskişehir and Ankara between Bandırma, Kemalpaşa, Orhaneli, Tavşanlı line and Adapazarı, Mudurnu, Beypazarı, Ayaş line. One of them connects the Marmara Sea with the Straits, and the other connects the Aegean Sea to Central Anatolia.[68]

Aegean Region is a mountainous region. The altitude, which is zero on the Aegean coast, rises to 2000 meters in the region where Afyon Plateau and Aegean basin meet. The Gediz, Büyük Menderes and Küçük Menderes rivers emerge from the mountains in this region. rivers in the Aegean Region; They open roads leading to the Afyon plateau from the coasts of Çandarlı, İzmir and Kuşadası. The armies that will land on the Aegean coasts can take over Central Anatolia by following these roads.[69]

There are three approach directions starting from Izmir in the Aegean Region. The most important of these is the advance of the great forces.

appropriate; It is the direction of Izmir-Manisa-Uşak-Afyon. One of the other directions; İzmir-Manisa-Balıkesir; the other is the Aydın-Denizli direction from Kuşadası or İzmir.[70] These three ways are also; It merges with more limited approach directions starting from Ayvalık, Dikili, Çandarlı and Kuşadası.

The first line suitable for defense in the Aegean Region is the first line of dominant ridges after the coast. The second line of defense is the line where the whole front is connected by side roads and known as the Milne Line[71] in the National Struggle. Murat Plateau, on the other hand, constitutes the last and most important defense area of ​​the region. The mountain ranges in this region cover Central Anatolia to the north and west.[72]

Balikesir in the Marmara region; Since it is at the center of the Sea of ​​Marmara, the Dardanelles, the Biga Peninsula and the Edremit Gulf, it is one of the most important strategic locations in this region. An army to be landed in Edremit Bay may advance towards Bursa, in the direction of Balıkesir, Bandırma and Karacabey. This approach direction allows the short-cut control of the Marmara coast.

When the Marmara coasts are controlled; Driving from Bandırma, Mudanya or Gemlik Bay in the Bursa-Eskişehir direction is more advantageous than going from the Aegean Region into Anatolia. Because while the distance between İzmir and Eskişehir is 450-500 kilometers, the distance between Mudanya and Eskişehir is 150 kilometers.

Izmit, on the other hand, is a gathering area for the troops coming from Istanbul by land or sea and is the starting point of the approach directions that allow progress into Anatolia. An army landing in Izmit can advance in the direction of Adapazarı-Bolu and Ankara. The forces that landed in Izmit could reach Ankara via Adapazarı-Mudurnu-Nallıhan-Beypazarı. Another approach direction is Izmit-Geyve-Eskişehir direction. The railway line from Istanbul also follows this direction. This approach direction is the main approach direction connecting the Marmara Region to Central Anatolia.

The troops to go to Gemlik or Mudanya; They can proceed with the strategic road Bursa-İnegöl-İnönü-Eskişehir. There are no major faults that would hinder the operation on this road. There are also some side roads that go in this direction. In addition, the presence of a railway line from Mudanya to Bursa facilitates supply and unit transfers.[73]

In the Central Anatolia region, the mountains lie parallel to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in the north and south. There are two bows in the east and west of the region. For this reason, Central Anatolia shows the characteristics of a plateau with mountainous edges and a flat middle. The altitude is around 900-1000 meters in the middle parts, and over 1000 meters in the Uzunyayla region. The elevations in the Uzunyayla region merge with the Eastern Anatolian mountains. The basins in the region; Sakarya, Kızılırmak, Yeşilırmak, Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers form.[74]

Since the Black Sea Mountains, Taurus and Antitaurus Mountains and the lakes region have the characteristics of disability, they protect Central Anatolia against the north and south.[75] These barriers constitute a defensive position against infiltrations to Central Anatolia from the Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts. Central Anatolia, located in the center of Anatolia, is the support, supply and rear region of all fronts with this sheltered structure.[76] Therefore, Central Anatolia is a region where invading armies have to fight decisively.[77]

Since Göksu, Manavgat Stream, Aksu, Alakız Stream, Kocaçay and Dalaman Stream in the Mediterranean operation area flow from north to south, the valleys of these streams form the roads leading from the Mediterranean to Central Anatolia. There are also lanes suitable for operation in the Hamidiye Plateau and the Lakes Region.

Güllük-Milas-Muğla-Tavas-Denizli road joins with Muğla-Akyaka-Marmaris road and connects to Denizli. The Antalya-Dinar-Isparta-Burdur-Afyon road and the Antalya-Acıpayam-Denizli road are also important. The Manavgat-Akseki-Konya road is very important as it directly touches Central Anatolia. The road, which comes to Karaman by leaving the Manavgat-Konya road in Çumra, and then joins with the Sivas-Kayseri-Niğde-Karaman road and descends to Silifke from the Göksu basin, connects Sivas, Ankara and Afyon with the Mediterranean.

The Syrian operation area starts from the north of Aleppo. Extending in the north-south direction, the Amanos Mountains separate the large plains in the east and west. Major rivers in the Syrian operation area; Asi, Fırat, Ceyhan and Seyhan. Except for the Orontes River, all the rivers flow in the north-south direction, so they form suitable roads to progress towards the interior of Anatolia.[78]

Çukurova, located on the Anatolian-Syrian historical caravan route, is one of the key points of Anatolia. The Central Taurus passes connecting Çukurova to the interior of Anatolia by road and railway are important strategic points.[79] The most important of the approach directions coming from Syria to Anatolia are the directions that take the shortest route to Central Anatolia and pass through the Gülek Strait. These; It comes to Adana from the directions of Aleppo-Islâhiye-Fevzipaşa-Osmaniye and Antakya-İskenderun-Dörtyol and comes to Tarsu via the road from Mersin Bay.

converges near s.[80]

These roads, which converge near Tarsus, then connect Syria and the Mediterranean region to Central Anatolia via the Gülek Strait. From this road, a branch leaves Ulukışla in the direction of Niğde and reaches Kayseri and Sivas. After Ulukışla; one branch goes to Konya-Afyon direction, and another branch goes to Tuz Gölü-Ankara direction.

These three directions are of primary importance from a strategic point of view, as they allow to reach Central Anatolia as soon as possible. [81] The Taurus Mountains, where these approach directions pass, are suitable for defense as they make the northward progression dependent on the Gülek Strait. In addition, the mountains to the northwest of Niğde, Salt Lake and Kızılırmak are obstacles.[82]

The final destinations of other approach routes from Syria are Diyarbakır, Sivas and Ankara. The roads coming from Deir ez-Zor-Mardin, Rakka-Harran-Urfa-Siverek and Aleppo-Urfa-Siverek reach Diyarbakır. The Aleppo-Kilis-Antep-Besni-Malatya road leads to Sivas, and the Aleppo-Kilis-Antep-Maraş-Göksun-Gürün-Aziziye-Kayseri road to Ankara.[83]

Eastern plateau; The Caucasus is a single operation area against Iran and Iraq. However, since the Caucasus, Iran and Iraq have different geographical features, the Eastern Anatolia and Iraq operation areas will be discussed separately. The most important strategic location in the Eastern Anatolian operational area is Erzurum Plateau.[84] The mountains in this region extend in the east-west direction as parallel mountain ranges from the north. These mountain ranges are intertwined in places and form clusters of mountain ranges that pose great obstacles to the east.[85]

Due to these mountain ranges, military operations can only be carried out by making use of certain passages, breaches and roads. Also, since the front is quite wide in the east but narrows towards the west, it is possible to defend with less force.[86]

The Çoruh, Kelkit, Karasu, Aras and Murat Rivers, which are among the mountain ranges, run parallel to each other. The Murat River flows in the east-west direction, the others in the west-east direction. The Tigris River in this region flows southward. The valleys formed by these rivers form the main approach directions and in some regions they merge with the side directions.

In the northernmost part of this region, there is the Batumi-Hopa-Rize-Trabzon coastal road. This road and the Tbilisi-Ahılkelek-Ardahan-Artvin-Çoruh Valley-İspir-Bayburt road in its south are not suitable for the operation of large forces. The Tbilisi-Ardahan-Göle-Oltu-Tortum-Georgian Strait-Erzurum road, which follows the Kura (Kür) River valley, is also not suitable for operation with its wide front, but it is important because it threatens the defense positions on the main approach direction from the north.

The Tbilisi-Gyumri-Kars-Sarıkamış-Köprüköy-Hasankale-Erzurum road following the Aras River basin is the main strategic approach direction. Kars Castle and Erzurum fortified areas are on this road. In addition, this road is the shortest way to the depths of Anatolia. Places suitable for defense in this approach direction; Barley Tea; Kalecik Mountain, Kars-Çalkavur Mountains, Kumru Mountain; Soğanlı Mountains-Sarıkamış-Allahüekber Mountains; Palandöken-Erzurum-Deveboynu-Kargapazarı Mountain-Georgian Strait-Gavur Mountain lines.

Another important approach direction is Tbilisi-Yerevan-Kağızman-Velibaba Pass-Köprüköy-Hasankale-Erzurum road. This road ensures that the main axis is supported from the south. Yerevan-Iğdır-Beyazıt-Karakose-Tahir Pass-Köprüköy-Erzurum road threatens Erzurum from the east. All of these roads lie in the east-west direction.

The roads leading to the south; Yerevan-Iğdır-Beyazıt-Karakose-Tutak-Malazgirt-Muş-Kulp-Diyarbakır or Muş-Bingöl-Elazığ, Beyazıt-Muradiye-Erciş-Ahlat-Bitlis-Diyarbakır and Beyazıt-Muradiye-Van Lake East-Van roads. Some roads also lead to this region via Iran. These; Tabriz-Hoy-Maku-Dogu Beyazit-Agri-Köprüköy-Erzurum road, Hoy-Saray-Van-Bitlis road, Hoy-Baskale-Hakkari or Urmiye-Baskale-Hakkari road.[87]

According to this road situation, the operational axis of an attack from the Caucasus to Eastern Anatolia; It is knotted at three main points in the Murat Basin: Eleşkirt-Ağrı region, Kars-Sarıkamış region and Artvin-Ardahan region. In an operation to be made from the sea, this knot takes place in the Trabzon region. Erzurum, which is in a central position behind these, constitutes the key point of the Eastern Anatolian operation area.[88]

In the Iraqi operation area to the south of the Eastern Plateau; The region from Baghdad to Diyarbakir is called Al Jazeera or Upper Mesopotamia.[89] The area of ​​operation in this region is the Tigris River basin. The land where the Diyarbakir plateau and the Tigris River pass is the main operation area. The Elazığ-Diyarbakır-Savur-Midyat-Cizre-Musul-Bağdat road, which separates from the Eskişehir-Kars main road in Sivas and connects to this region, forms the main strategic road of this front and connects the Iraqi Front to Central Anatolia.

The branches of the Tigris form the approach directions at the operative level.[90] These ways; Starting from Mosul, Imadiye-Hakkari-Baskale-Van; Zaho-Silopi-Cizre-Şırnak-Siirt; Zaho-Mid It follows the yacht-Diyarbakir and Nusaybin-Mardin-Diyarbakir directions.[91] In this region, Diyarbakir is a strategic location as it is located at the intersection of many approach directions from Syria and Iraq and is located in a region that controls the roads leading from the Tigris Valley to the interior of Eastern Anatolia.

3. Invasions and Abolition of Army Commands

Immediately after the Armistice of Mudros, the Allies began to occupy some parts of the country that were not yet occupied. Initially, the invasions had three important objectives. The first of these was the Straits and Istanbul, the second was the region defined as Cilicia in the armistice, and the third was the province of Mosul.

On November 1, 1918, the British informed the Ottoman government that an investigation committee would arrive in Seddülbahir on November 2.[92] However, in the Iraq and Syria regions, they occupied Hamamalil (Hammam al-Alil)[93] and Reyhanlı on November 1, and Köysancak on November 2, without any warning.[94] After that, they headed for Iskenderun.[95]

Since it was clearly stated in the armistice that the Straits would be occupied, some obstacles in the Dardanelles Strait were removed on 2 and 3 November 1918 so that large ships could pass by the Command of the Fortified Area.[96] Occupations in other regions were met with resistance by the army commanders. However, this resistance could not turn into an actual resistance due to the orders given by the government.

On the other hand, in accordance with the armistice, the process of demobilization of the soldiers began. When the soldiers were discharged, the personnel numbers of the units decreased rapidly. Army commands were also abolished one by one. The units of the disbanded armies withdrew from the occupied regions to the inner regions and were reorganized. Since Cevat Pasha was appointed as the Chief of the General Staff on November 3, 1918, these activities were planned and put into effect by him.[97]

On November 3, when Cevat Pasha became the Chief of the General Staff of the General Staff, a French ship entered the Iskenderun Port in the Yıldırım Army Group region and announced that it would search for mines. On November 4, five Entente ships began scanning the port. On November 5, the British demanded the surrender of the Ottoman troops in the Aleppo region and announced that they would occupy Iskenderun to supply their troops in Aleppo.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, considering that these demands were a step towards the surrender of the 7th Army by besieging, started to move the army headquarters to Adana and the 20th Corps Headquarters to İslahiye.[98] He also ordered the troops in Iskenderun to respond with fire if the British landed troops. Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) sent a telegram to Pasha and stated this situation. [99] But on 6 November 1918, Ahmet İzzet Pasha was ordered to just protest against the British occupation.[100] On November 7, it was reported that the Yıldırım Army Group and the 7th Army were dissolved, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was summoned to Istanbul.[101]

After this, on 9 November 1918 the British[102] and on 10 November the French landed troops in Iskenderun.[103] Ottoman troops evacuated Iskenderun on 9 November and the region up to Payas on 10 November.[104] The 20th Corps, which was founded by the disbanded 7th Army, was attached to the 2nd Army on 13 November. The headquarters of the 3rd Corps was sent to Sivas. The 43rd Division affiliated to this corps was abolished and the 24th Division was included in the establishment of the 20 Corps. In addition, the headquarters of the 15th Corps in the establishment of the 2nd Army was sent to Erzurum. The 44th Division of this corps was abolished and the 41st Division was given to the 12th Corps.[105]

In the 6th Army region, the British attacked Köysancak, north of Kirkuk, and 20 km from Mosul, on 1 November. They advanced as far south as Hamamalil. On November 2; They announced that Mosul would be occupied and demanded that the Ottoman troops withdraw to 5 miles north of the city.

British General Cassel arrived in Mosul on 3 November 1918. He demanded the surrender of the troops south of the Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Akra, Imadiye, Siirt, Silvan, Osmaniye and Siverek lines, which he claimed were the Iraqi border. Ali İhsan (Sabis) Pasha rejected this border claim and the demand of the troops to surrender. When the government ordered the evacuation of the city, he began pulling his troops northward on 8 November. By November 15, all the troops left Mosul Province and were deployed on the Diyarbakir Province border line.[106]

Meanwhile, in the 9th Army region, the troops in Iran and the Caucasus were withdrawing without any enemy pressure. Because Ahmet İzzet Pasha had ordered the withdrawal of these troops before the armistice was signed, in order to keep Batum, Kars and Ardahan won with the Brest-Litovsk Agreement.[107]

When the retreat began, the Muslims living in the region began to organize to prevent their lands from being handed over to the Armenians. This organization was also supported by the Ottoman troops.[108] Upon these developments, the British demanded that Elviye-i Selase be evacuated as soon as possible on 11 November 1918.[109]

Unlike these three regions, the Straits The region was occupied in coordination with the Ottoman government. But here, too, there was the English-French struggle. When the British took action to occupy the Dardanelles, the French sent some officers from Bulgaria to Uzunköprü on 6 November. On November 10, 1918, a force of 100 and later a regiment arrived in Uzunköprü. These units moved to Istanbul by train on November 16 and settled in the Reşadiye Barracks in Bakırköy.[110]

The British, on the other hand, landed troops on both sides of the Dardanelles and took over the control of the region from the Ottoman troops on November 10.[111] On the same day, the 61-piece Allied navy, which entered the Dardanelles, reached Istanbul on 13 November 1918. 3500 British and French soldiers landed from the ships began to occupy the bastions in the Bosphorus as of the morning of 15 November.[112] Upon the settlement of the Allied soldiers in the straits, the 3rd and 5th Army headquarters, whose troops were removed from these regions, were abolished. The 8th Army Headquarters, which had been transferred from Syria to Izmir at the end of October, was also abolished on 13 November 1918.[113]

On November 24, British General Allenby informed the Ottoman government that Çukurova would also be occupied. After this, the British landed two battalions of soldiers in Mersin and expanded the occupation area to Adana.[114] Upon these invasions, the Commander of the 2nd Army, Nihat Pasha, left Adana with his headquarters on 13 December 1918 and went to Konya. However, the government abolished the 2nd Army on December 15 and appointed Nihat Pasha as the deputy governor of Adana.

The corps of the 2nd Army withdrew to the north of Pozantı until 26 December. The 12th Corps Headquarters settled in Ereğli, the 11th Division in Bor and the 41st Division in Karaman. The 20th Corps Headquarters and the 1st Division in the establishment of this corps settled in Ulukışla, and the 23rd and 24th Divisions settled in Konya.[115]

Upon the advance of the English in the Cilicia region, the French also took action. On 11 December 1918, a French battalion occupied Dörtyol. On 17 December, 1500 French soldiers landed in Mersin and some of them were sent to Tarsus, Adana and Misis. The French occupied Pozantı on 27 December. After the occupation of Akköprü and Çiftehan on February 3, the forward operation of the French troops ended.[116]

Meanwhile, Cevat Pasha left the General Staff of the General Staff on 19 December 1918 and became the Minister of War. After that, the activities of reorganizing and deploying the army were continued by Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha, who became the Chief of the General Staff on 24 December 1918.[117]

Meanwhile, the 6th Army Headquarters and the 5th Division in the army establishment were stationed in Nusaybin, the 2nd Division was stationed in Cizre, and the Cavalry Brigade was stationed in Rasulayn. The British could not cross this line and enter the borders of Diyarbakır Province, but occupied Kilis, which was evacuated by the 2nd Army, on 27 December 1918, Antep on 1 January 1919 and Carablus on 3 January. On January 14, they took the Arappınar and Siftek railway stations under control. [118]

During these occupations, the attitude of Ali İhsan Pasha and the presence of the 6th Army disturbed the British. For this reason, General Allenby arrived in Istanbul on 7 February. He called the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs to the embassy and demanded the dismissal of Ali İhsan Pasha and the abolition of the 6th Army. On February 9, the 6th Army was abolished and replaced by the 13th Corps.[119] After this, the British occupied Maraş on February 22 and Birecik on February 27.[120]

In the 9th Army region, the organizations established by the people appeared against the British. The 9th Army also supported these organizations.[121] In Article 24 of the Armistice, it was stated that if there was confusion in the six provinces (Vilâyat-ı Sitte), any of these provinces would be occupied. For this reason, the Ministry of War issued an order on December 4, 1918, for the military units in this region to assist the gendarmerie in maintaining security. With this order; Four regions, consisting of the eastern border region, six eastern provinces, Trabzon and its east, Samsun, Amasya and Sivas, were determined and the responsibility of these regions was divided among the army units.[122]

Meanwhile, the British first sent a cruiser to Batumi on 1 December 1918 to intervene in the region.[123] On 7 and 18 December, another British warship arrived in Batumi. The British, who landed soldiers from these ships on December 24, 1918, took over the administration of the city two days later.

After that, they sent General Walker to Kars on 7 January. Meeting with Yakup Şevki Pasha, Walker requested that the three sanjaks be evacuated by 25 January 1919. On January 13, a British contingent of 200 people arrived in Kars. Meanwhile, Yakup Şevki Pasha, who was trying to withdraw the troops and carry as much weapons, supplies and ammunition as possible to the back regions, moved to Erzurum with the 9th Army Headquarters before the British entered Kars.[124]

The British occupied Samsun on March 9, 1919 and sent some soldiers from Samsun to Merzifon on March 30.[125] In Eastern Anatolia, the existing councils were used to prepare the region for Armenian occupation.

They wanted to disable it. However, the presence of the 9th Army under the command of Yakup Şevki Pasha prevented the British from doing this.

For this reason, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul asked the government to invite Yakup Şevki Pasha to Istanbul at the end of February. Pasha refused this, claiming that he was uncomfortable with his eyes, but the British repeated their request on 29 March.

Thereupon, on April 2, 1919, the 9th Army was abolished and Yakup Şevki Pasha was summoned to Istanbul. The 9th Army units were attached to the 15th Corps. On April 3, the 15th Corps and the 3rd Corps in the Sivas-Samsun region were directly attached to the Ministry of War.[126] Thus, all army commands were abolished.

4. Reorganization and Deployment of the Army

After the armistice was signed, Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Presidency started to work on the reorganization of the army, on the one hand, carrying out the abolition and reorganization activities with the withdrawal of the troops. In fact, the General Headquarters was abolished on October 7, 1918, and the General Staff, which had 27 branches, was transformed into seven branches.[127] After the armistice, the army commands were abolished one after another, and the military units were reorganized as corps directly affiliated to the Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Presidency.

At the time the armistice was signed, the number of Ottoman army units was around 400 thousand people. The Allies wanted this reduced to 50,000. Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Presidency, which started its establishment works, enlisted the army on January 2, 1919; He informed the British that he would organize nine corps, 20 divisions and four cavalry regiments. From this organization, it is understood that since the amount of troops was not specified in the armistice, it was tried to preserve as many troops as possible, even if they were small.[128]

At the end of the war, there were eight Army Commands. In the establishment of these armies (excluding the troops in Hejaz, Asir, Yemen and Tripoli and which will surrender to the Allied Powers in accordance with the armistice), there were a total of 10 Corps and 24 Squadrons. Of these, the 4th Corps headquarters[129] was abolished in Mosul on 1 November 1918, and the 14th Division of the 6th Army was captured by the British on 31 October.[130]

The 43rd Division in the establishment of the 3rd Corps of the 7th Army and the 44th Division in the establishment of the 15th Corps of the 2nd Army were abolished before they were withdrawn to the north of the Taurus Mountains, since their personnel numbers were very low due to the demobilizations.[131] Since the 36th Division of the 3rd Army was abolished in December 1918,[132] a total of nine corps and 20 divisions remained. In this case, the Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Presidency only abolished the army headquarters, but kept the same amount of corps and divisions.

 The government expressed this plan at the meeting of commissioners on January 9, 1919. When he did not encounter any objections, he started to work on determining the personnel and weapon cadres of the troops and completed this work on January 21, 1919. Accordingly, in the army; There would be 40,801 infantrymen with rifles, 632 cannons and 756 machine guns. Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Chief Fevzi Pasha presented the determined organization and staff to General Milne on 27 January. The British only reduced the amount of guns to 256 and machine guns to 240, without touching the cadres.[133]

Upon the adoption of this plan, the reorganization and deployment of army units continued as planned. According to this; Headquarters of the 1st Corps is in Edirne; 49. The division covers the Bulgarian border in the Kırklareli and Edirne regions; The 60th Division was organized in the Şarköy-Malkara-Keşan regions to cover the Greek border.

Two corps were commissioned for the Straits region. Of these, the headquarters of the 25th Corps in the Bosphorus and the 10th Caucasian Division to Istanbul, the 1st Division to the Kocaeli Peninsula; The headquarters of the 14th Corps and the 55th Division in the Dardanelles were stationed in Tekirdağ, and the 61st Division in Bandırma and Balıkesir.

The remaining corps were deployed on Anatolian lands. Headquarters of the 17th Corps, which is responsible for the region from Ayvalık to Antalya, is in Izmir; Division 56 in İzmir, Menemen, Manisa and Ayvalık; The 57th Fırka was organized in Aydın and Antalya. The only change made in this region was the relocation of the 57th Division headquarters in Antalya to Aydın after the 21st Corps was abolished.

The headquarters of the 12th Corps were relocated to Konya, the 11th Division to Niğde and the 41st Division to Karaman. The headquarters of the 13th Corps were deployed in Diyarbakır, the 5th Division in Nusaybin and the 2nd Division in Cizre. Later, the 5th Division withdrew to Mardin, and the 2nd Division to Silvan, in order to ensure the security and defense of the Diyarbakır region.

The headquarters of the 15th Corps and the 9th Caucasian Division were deployed in Erzurum, the 3rd Caucasian Division in Erzincan, the 11th Caucasian Division in Van and the 12th Division in the Harput region. However, due to the developments that emerged later, the 12th Division was left in the Hasankale and Horasan regions. The 3rd Division was transferred to Trabzon.

The headquarters of the 3rd Corps is in Sivas, the 5th. The Caucasian Division was organized in Amasya and the 15th Division was organized in Samsun. The headquarters of the 20th Corps and the 24th Division were deployed in Ankara, while the 23rd Division was deployed in Afyon, almost like a strategic reserve.[134] Thus, the entire Ottoman army was reorganized and deployed. [135]

Conclusion:

When we look at the reorganization of the army after the Armistice of Mudros, it is seen that the existing structure consisting of 9 corps and 20 divisions has been preserved in the same way, except for the army headquarters and the units that were abolished during the retreat. This situation shows that the Ottoman military authorities had an expectation that the struggle could be continued rather than the expectation that peace would be made after the armistice and that the war would end.

The places where the army was reorganized also confirm that the military authorities are of this opinion. Because, measures were tried to be taken with a corps against all possible threats, and the troops were organized in strategic regions, positions and points in a way to block the approach directions coming from these threats into the country.

Although army units have been assigned the responsibility of some regions to support the gendarme in internal security, it is understood from the way the units are organized that a higher priority is given to external threats.

According to the threat assessment made, it is seen that the Armenians are accepted as the closest and greatest threat. Because while a weak corps with two divisions was allocated against other threats, a relatively stronger corps with four divisions was established in the east.

It can also be said that this situation is a result of limited transportation opportunities. Because there is no railway line connecting this region to Anatolia and other parts of the country. For this reason, it is not possible to move troops from other regions to this region in a short time when needed. In order to compensate for this weakness, the 15th Corps was organized in such a way that it could withstand the current threat and be self-sufficient.

The fact that the 3rd Corps, which formed the 7th Army, which was abolished right after the armistice, was sent to the Sivas region without losing any time shows that the Samsun-based Pontus movement, which could be strengthened even more with a possible Greek-British intervention, is also seen as a close and important threat. As a matter of fact, the 5th Caucasian Division and the 15th Division, which were withdrawn from the Caucasus, were deployed to Samsun and Amasya. The sending of the 3rd Division of the 15th Corps to Trabzon after a while is also related to the same threat assessment.

Apart from this, it is seen that all existing troops are deployed to cover Anatolia, Thrace and the Straits all around. It is understood that these three highlands will be three separate operational areas, since one-third of the existing 20 divisions are allocated to the defense of Thrace, the Straits and Istanbul, one-third to the Anatolian Plateau, and one-third to the Eastern Plateau. The two sects were placed in the center of Anatolia as a strategic reserve.

Although it is the smallest of these three plateaus, it is understood that the most important aim is to protect Istanbul, the most strategic region of the country, since six divisions have been allocated for the defense of Thrace and the straits region. As a matter of fact, while a corps with two divisions was organized to cover the approach directions from Bulgaria and Greece, it was planned to use the Çatalca Defense Line as the last line of defense of Istanbul. Both corps with two divisions were deployed to secure the waterway coming to Istanbul from the Black Sea and Aegean Seas.

The troops in Anatolia, on the other hand, were deployed by taking into account the geographical factors. Anatolia is like a castle surrounded by a water barrier on three sides. In the north and south of this castle, there are mountain ranges that suddenly rise from the coast like castle walls. Murat and Erzurum plateaus are the defense towers in the east and west of this castle. There are mountain ranges extending from these two towers to the east and west like the fingers of a hand. Uzunyayla is the inner castle of the Anatolian castle.

When we look at the positions of the troops in Anatolia, it is seen that the defense of the inner castle with the lands between the city walls in the north and south and the towers in the east and west is the basis for the organization of these troops. The 3rd, 12th and 13th Corps were organized to hold the gates (approach directions following the strait, passage and breaches) opening to the inner region from the north and south walls.

While the 15th Corps in the east is holding the Erzurum plateau with one of its divisions and its subordinates, the other divisions of the corps are blocking the approach directions between the mountain ranges in the position of outer bastions. In the west, while the 17th Corps, with its troops deployed from the coast, covered the approach directions to the interior of Anatolia, Murat Plateau and its rear area were held by the 20th Corps.

While organizing existing troops, strategic pivots, main approach directions and existing railways were also taken into account. Considering the shape of the country, it is seen that there are two main pivots suitable for the defense of the existing lands. The first of these is the axis of Edirne-Corlu-Istanbul-Izmit-Eskişehir-Konya-Adana-Aleppo; the other is İzmir-Manisa-Uşak-Afyon-Ankara-Kayseri-Sivas-Erzincan-Erzurum-Kars-Gyumri axis.

The first axis is an axis that has the potential to divide the country into two. The second axis is the axis that has the potential to determine whether the defense of Anatolia will be possible or not. For this reason, the troops were organized in such a way as to stand on these two axis and prevent these two axis from being cut by an outside intervention.

At the end of the first axis in Thrace is the 1st Corps. Other troops in Thrace were deployed to protect the part of the first axis in Thrace. The 12th Corps is located at the exit point of this axis from Central Anatolia.

The defense of Anatolia mainly depends on the second axis. A corps at each end of this axis (15th and 17th corps), the 3rd corps against threats from the Black Sea coast, the 12th corps against threats from the Mediterranean coast and Syria, and the 13th corps against threats from Iraq. . The 20th Corps is stationed at the intersection of the two axis.

Within the framework of this general structure, in such a way that the military units can stop the threats that may attack the four strategic regions of the country and the Axis passing through these regions; It is understood that they are deployed in strategic regions, positions and points. This arrangement also formed an infrastructure for the National Struggle to be held in the future.

Note: PRESENTED AS A PRESENTATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ATATÜRK AND TURKISH INDEPENDENCE ON THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF MAY 19th. PUBLISHED ON PAGES 431 AND 456 OF THE PROCEDURE BOOK.

(The symposium was hosted by Hacettepe University, in cooperation with HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY Atatürk Principles and Revolution History Institute and ANITKABIR ASSOCIATION, between 15-18 May 2019, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's landing in Samsun and starting the National Struggle. edited.)

 

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Hikmet Bayur, XX. Yüzyılda Türklüğün Acun Siyasası Üzerindeki Etkileri, TTK Basımevi, Ankara, 1989, s. 83.

[2] Gnkur. Bşk. Harp Tarihi Dairesi Resmi Yayınları Seri No.; 1, Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 1, Mondros Mütarekesi ve Tatbikatı, Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1962, s. 11-13; Ayrıca bkz. Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, C. 1, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 5. Baskı, İstanbul, 2014, s. 1-2.

[3] Jeremy Black, Savaş ve Dünya, Askerî Güç ve Dünyanın Kaderi, 1450-2000, Çev.: Yeliz Özkan, İstanbul, 1998, s. 406-407.

[4] David Fromkin, Barışa Son Veren Barış, Modern Ortadoğu Nasıl Yaratıldı?, 1914-1922, Çev.: Mehmet Harmancı, Epsilon Yayınevi, İstanbul, t.y., s. 306-307;

[5] TİH, C. 1, s. 27.

[6] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam, Mustafa Kemal, 1881-1919, C. 1, Remzi Kitabevi, 12. Basım, İstanbul, 1991, s. 333.

[7] TİH, C. 1, s. 28.

[8] Hükümet değişikliği ile ilgili geniş bilgi için bkz. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, İstiklal Harbi’nin Gerçekleri, Feryadım, C.2, Timaş Yayınları, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 2017, s. 16-19: Ayrıca bkz. Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Moudros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi, Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları: 7, Ankara, 1948, s. 28.

[9] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Feryadım, C. 2, s. 24-25; Ayrıca bkz. Charles V. F. Townshend, Mezopotamya Seferim, Kurna, Kutülamare ve Selmanıpak Muharebeleri, Çev.: Gürol Koca, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, s. 629-630.

[10] Rauf Orbay, Siyasi Hatıralar, Örgün Yayınevi, 3. Baskı, İstanbul, 2009, s. 91-92.

[11] TİH, C. 1, s. 22; R. Orbay, a.g.e., s. 82-83.

[12] Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Feryadım, C. 2, s. 25-26.

[13] TİH, C. 1, s. 29.

[14] Görüşmeleri hakkında geniş bilgi için bkz. R. Orbay, a.g.e.,  s. 131-197.

[15] TİH, C. 1, s. 44; Ayrıca bkz. İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar, Yay. Haz.: Sebahattin Selek, Bilgi Yayınevi, 3. Baskı, Ankara, 2009, s. 158.

[16] Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris To Sevres, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1974, s. 4.

[17] Mütareke’nin tam metni için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 41-43.

[18] İtilaf Devletlerinin 7 Ekim 1918’de yaptıkları toplantıda alınan kararlarda, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kilikya’yı boşaltacağı belirtiliyordu. İngilizlerin, Mütareke’de bu maddeyi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun bölgedeki kanun ve düzeni sağlayacak kadar birlik bırakabileceği şeklinde değiştirmesi, bölgeyi ele geçirmeyi planlayan Fransa’nın çıkarlarına karşı yapılmış bir hareket olarak kabul edilebilir. P. C. Helmreich, a.g.e., s. 4-5.

[19] 7. madde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki iç gelişmelere müdahale etmenin yanında, başta Bolşevizm olmak üzere dış tehditlerin Osmanlı topraklarına yayılma ihtimaline karşı müdahale edebilmek maksadıyla da kullanılabilecek bir maddedir. Bkz. P. A.g.e., s. 4.

[20] Bu maddede belirtilen altı vilayet, Ermenilere verilmesi planlanan vilayetlerdir. İngiltere, Rusya ile ortak sınırlara sahip olmak istemiyordu. Bu sebeple, daha savaş sırasında Ortadoğu’da kontrolü altına girecek topraklarla Rusya arasında Ermeni ve Kürt tampon devletleri kurmayı planlamıştı. Bkz. M. Derviş Kılınçkaya, Osmanlı Yönetimindeki Topraklarda Arap Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu ve Suriye, ATAM Yayınları, 3. Baskı, Ankara, 2015, s. 83.

[21] TİH, C. 1, s. 41-42.

[22] Bülent Tanör, Türkiye (1918-19), Kurtuluş, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997, s. 31.

[23] Gizli anlaşmalar hakkında geniş bilgi için bkz. İzzet Öztoprak, Türk ve Batı Kamuoyunda Millî Mücadele, TTK Basımevi, Ankara, 1989, s. 1-4.

[24] İ. İnönü, a.g.e., s. 158.

[25] TİH, C. 1, s. 50-54.

[26] Mustafa Sarı, Türkiye-Kafkasya İlişkilerinde Batum (1917-1921), TTK Yayınları, 2014, s. 53.

[27] E. H. Carr, Sovyet Rusya Tarihi, Bolşevik Devrimi, C. 3, 1917-19, Çev.: Tuncay Birkan, Metis Yayınları, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 2015, s. 22.

[28] Zeki Sarıhan, Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü I, (Açıklamalı Kronoloji), Mondros’tan Erzurum Kongresi’ne (30 Ekim 1918-22 Temmuz 1919), ATAM Yayınları, Ankara, 1993, s. 9, 22-23.

[29] TİH, C. 1, s. 48, Kroki No: 2, 2/A

[30] TİH, C. 1, s. 57, 63;

[31] 20. Kolordu Komutanı Ali Fuat Paşa, asli görevi uhdesinde kalmak üzere 7. Ordu Komutanlığı’na da vekâlet ediyordu. Bkz. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Bilinmeyen Hatıralar, Kuva-yı Milliye’nin İçyüzü, Temel Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, s. 3.

[32] TİH, C. 1, s. 57.

[33] TİH, C. 1, s. 46-48.

[34] Zekeriya Türkmen, Mütareke Döneminde Ordunun Durumu ve Yeniden Yapılanması,  (1918-1920), TTK Basımevi, Ankara, 2011, s. 58-59.

[35] TİH, C. 1, s. 78-79; Bu bölgede bulunan 14. Fırka, 31. Ekim’de İngilizlerce esir alındı. 4. Kolordu Karargâhı ise 1 Kasım’da Musul’da lağvedildi. Bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 104, Kroki No: 3, 3/A.

[36] TİH, C. 1, s. 107-108, 128, Kroki No: 5.

[37] R. Orbay, a.g.e., s. 126.

[38] TİH, C. 1, s. 152, Kroki No: 6.

[39] TİH, C. 1, s. 152-154, 176, Kroki No: 7, 9.

[40] TİH, C. 1, s. 49.

[41] Güray Alpar, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Strateji ve Savaş Kültürünün Gelişimi, Palet Yayınları, Konya, 2015, s. 301.

[42] Alptekin Müderrisoğlu, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın Mali Kaynakları, ATAM Yayınları, 2. Baskı, Ankara, 2013, s. 28.

[43] Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, Küre Yayınları, 72. Baskı, İstanbul, 2011, s. 116.

[44] Kamil Günel, Coğrafyanın Siyasal Gücü, Çantay Kitabevi, 2. Baskı, İstanbul, 1997, s. 32.

[45] Cemal Akbay, Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, C.1, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Siyasi ve Askerî Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi, ATASE Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, a.g.e., s. 77.

[46] Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Çanakkale Cephesi (25 Nisan 1915-04 Haziran 1915), C. 5, II. Kitap, ATASE Yayınları, Ankara, 2012, s. 1.

[47] A. Davutoğlu, a.g.e., s. 116.

[48] Türkiye’nin jeostratejik özellikleri hakkında geniş bilgi için bkz. Mert Bayat, Millî Güç ve Devlet, Belge Yayınları, Ankara, 1986., s. 360-363.

[49]  Geniş bilgi için bkz. İ. Hakkı, Türkiye Askerî Coğrafyası, Sevkulceyş, Tabiye ve Harp Tarihi Bakımından Tetkik, Necmistiklal Matbaası, 2. Basılış, İstanbul, 1934, s. 30-32.

[50] Geniş bilgi için bkz. A.g.e., s. 14-15.

[51] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Hakkı Erdem, Yunanlılarla İstiklal Harbi, Tabiye ve Sevkulceyş Bakımından Tetkik, Necmistikbaal Matbaası, Üçüncü Basılış, İstanbul, 1935, s. 6.

[52] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 19.

[53] Geniş bilgi için bkz. A.g.e., s. 14-30.

[54] James Barr, Kırmızı Çizgi, Paylaşılamayan Toprakların Yakın Tarihi, Çev.: Ekin Can Göksoy, Pegasus Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, s. 24-25.

[55] İ. Hakkı Tümerdem, Başkomutan Atatürk’e Değin; Türk Orduları Başkomutanları ve Yaptıkları Büyük Meydan Muharebeleri Üzerine Araştırma, K.K.K. İstanbul Askerî Basımevi, İstanbul, 1953,  s. 40-41;

[56] Geniş bilgi için bkz. M. Bayat; a.g.e., s. 358.

[57] Anadolu coğrafyası hakkında geniş bilgi için bkz. Füruzan Kınal, Eski Anadolu Tarihi, TTK Basımevi, 2. Baskı, Ankara, 1987, s. 1-6.

[58] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Suat Ener, Türkiye’nin Sıradağları, Havzaları, Ana Yolları, Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Stratejik Bakış, Ankara Basım ve Cilt Evi, Ankara, 1937, s. 9-17.

[59] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 4-5.

[60] Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarih Encümeni, Türk İstiklal Harbi Hülasası, 1919-1922, Askerî Matbaa, İstanbul, 1937, s. 2, Kroki No-1.

[61] S. Ener, a.g.e., s. 14.

[62] Suat Ener, Türkiye’nin Havzaları, Ana Yolları, C.2, Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Engebelerine Genel Bir Bakış, Ankara Basım ve Cilt Evi, Ankara, 1937, s. 11-12.

[63] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 12-13.

[64] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 74.

[65] Mahmut Beliğ Uzdil, Balkan Savaşı’nda Mürettep 1. Kolordu’nun Harekâtı, Yay. Haz.: Ahmet Tetik ve Şeyda Büyükcan, ATASE Yayınları, 2006, s. 4.

[66] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 75.

[67] S. Ener, a.g.e., s. 9.

[68] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Sıradağlar, C.2, s. 6.

[69] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 75.

[70] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 24.

[71] Temmuz 1919’da Paris Barış Konferansı’nda Yüksek Konsey, İngiliz General Milne’i, Türk ve Yunan tarafları arasında, iki tarafın da aşamayacağı bir hat tespit etmekle görevlendirmiştir. Bunun üzerine, Milne tarafından Ayvalık kuzeyinde sahilden başlayarak Hacıosman, Yaylacıkdağı, Madra Dağı, Kestane Dağı, Akmaz Dağı, Döşeme Köyü, Bakırçay ve Cumali Deresi birleşme noktası, Fuğracık batısı, Örpekkaya, Karasilli, Yenice, Tepecik, Tatarköy, Yeni Çiftlik, Papazlı (Halitpaşa), Belen Dağı güneydoğusu, Kestelli, Sart, Bucak, Çaylı, Bademiye, İzmir Sancağı güney sınırı, Umurlu, Büyükmenderes Nehri, Muşlukdere’nin Büyükmenderes Nehri’ni kestiği nokta, Aydın demiryolunun Selçuk yakınlarında İzmir Sancağı sınırını kestiği nokta ve İzmir Sancağı’nın Yunan işgal bölgesi ile kesiştiği noktada Ege denizi ile birleşen hat tespit edilmiş ve 3 Kasım 1919’da Harbiye Nezareti’ne bildirilmiştir. Gnkur. Bşk. Harp Tarihi Dairesi Resmi Yayınları Seri No.; 1, Türk İstiklal Harbi, C. 2, Batı Cephesi, Ks. 2, Haz.: Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu ve Diğerleri, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1965, s. 120-122.

[72] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 75.

[73] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 19-26.

[74] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 81.

[75] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Sıradağlar, C.2, s. 8.

[76] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 82.

[77] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Suat İlhan, Türk Askerî Kültürünün Tarihi Gelişmesi, Kutsal Ocak, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 1999, s. 129-140.

[78] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Sıradağlar, C. 2, s. 13-15.

[79] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Süleyman Hatipoğlu, Türk-Fransız Mücadelesi (Orta Toros Geçitleri, 1915-1921), ATAM Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, s. 3-4.

[80] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 40.

[81] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Sıradağlar, C. 2, s. 13-14.

[82] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 29-30.

[83] A.g.e., s. 39-40.

[84] Geniş bilgi için bkz. S. Ener, a.g.e., s. 10-12.

[85] Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Osmanlı Devri, Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi, Kafkas Cephesi (1853-1856), ATASE Yayınları, 1986,  s. 13.

[86] Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi, s. 28.

[87] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 32-38.

[88] Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi, s. 25.

[89] C. Akbay, a.g.e., s. 86.

[90] S. Ener, Havzalar ve Sıradağlar, C. 2, s. 12.

[91] İ. Hakkı, a.g.e., s. 38.

[92] TİH, C. 1, s. 110.

[93] TİH, C. 1, s. 80;

[94] Z. Sarıhan, a.g.e., s. 5-6.

[95] Geniş bilgi için bkz. Kemal Çelik, Millî Mücadelede Adana ve Havalisi, TTK Basımevi, Ankara, 1999, s. 39.

[96] TİH, C. 1, s. 110.

[97] Zeki Sarıhan, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İkili İktidar, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, s. 32.

[98] TİH, C. 1, s. 58-61; Ayrıca bkz. K. Çelik, a.g.e., s. 39-40.

[99] Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, C.4, ATAM Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, s. 19-20.

[100] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 47-48.

[101] Atatürk İle İlgili Arşiv Belgeleri (1911-1921 Tarihleri Arasına Ait 106 Belge), T.C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, Yayın No: 1, Gn. No.:060, Ankara, 1982, Belge: 18, s. 21.

[102] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 50.

[103] K. Çelik, a.g.e., s. 54.

[104] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 48-50.

[105] TİH, C. 1, s. 67-68, 72, Kuruluş 1, Kuruluş 2.

[106] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 80-92.

[107] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 153-154.

[108] Ahmet Ender Gökdemir, Cenub-i Garbi Kafkas Hükumeti, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, s. 35.

[109] TİH, C. 1, s. 157.

[110] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 120-121.

[111] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 29.

[112] Gotthard Jaeschke; Kurtuluş Savaşı İle İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri, Çev.: Cemal Köprülü, TTK Basımevi, 3. Baskı (Tıpkıbasım), Ankara, 2011, s. 29;  ATASE ARŞ., K.7, D.83; K.7, D.83AA; Boğazların işgali hakkında geniş bilgi için ayrıca bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 111-116.

[113] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 29-30.

[114] S. Hatipoğlu, a.g.e., s. 37-38.

[115] TİH, C. 1, s. 69.

[116] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 70, 73.

[117] Mütarekeden, en son lağvedilen ordu olan 9. Ordu’nun 2 Nisan 1919’da lağvedilmesine kadar geçen beş ay içinde, asil ve vekil olarak dokuz farklı Harbiye Nazırı görev yapmıştır. Harbiye Nazırları çok kısa sürelerde görevde kaldıklarından, ordunun yeniden teşkilatlandırılması ve konuşlandırılması üzerinde fazla bir etkilerinin olmadığı değerlendirilmektedir. Fakat aynı dönem içinde Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi olarak sadece Cevat ve Fevzi Paşalar görev yapmıştır. Bu sebeple, yukarıda açıklanan ordunun yeniden teşkilatlandırılması ve konuşlandırılması faaliyetleri Cevat ve Fevzi Paşalar tarafından yerine getirilmiştir. Geniş bilgi için Bkz. Z. Sarıhan, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda İkili İktidar, s. 32-33.

[118] TİH, C. 1, s. 95-97.

[119] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 41-45.

[120] TİH, C. 1, s. 104.

[121] Selma Yel, Yakup Şevki Paşa ve Askerî Faaliyetleri, ATAM Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, s. 89-90.

[122] TİH, C. 1, s. 171.

[123] M. Sarı, a.g.e., s. 196.

[124] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 161-164.

[125] TİH, C. 1, s. 174.

[126] Geniş bilgi için bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 169-170.

[127] Zekeriya Türkmen, Yeni Devletin Şafağında Mustafa Kemal (Ekim 1918-Ocak 1920), ATAM Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, s. 39.

[128] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 78-80; Ayrıca bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 49, 175.

[129] 4. Kolordu, 9. Ordu’ya bağlıydı. Kuzeybatı İran’ın boşaltılması yönünde verilen emir gereğince Revandiz Üzerinden Musul’a çekilmiş ve 6. Ordu emrine girmişti. Bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 154.

[130] Bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 104, Kuruluş 2.

[131] TİH, C. 1, s. 67-68, 72, Kuruluş 1, Kuruluş 2.

[132] TİH, C. 1, s. 154.

[133] Z. Türkmen, a.g.e., s. 80-81; Geniş bilgi için ayrıca bkz. TİH, C. 1, s. 175-180.

[134] TİH, C. 1, s. 176-177; Ayrıca bkz. TİH. C. 2, Ks. 1, s. 37; Zekeriya Türkmen, Yeni Devletin Şafağında…, s. 37.

[135] Osmanlı ordusunun 14 Mayıs 1919 itibarıyla konuş durumu için bkz. TİH, C. 2, Ks. 1, s. 36, Kroki No.: 2.