The United Kingdom’s Annual Reports on Greece (Part 2)

In my previous article, I focused on Greece’s balancing act between Bulgaria and Turkey and how this was perceived in the British annual reports. Although the British were sometimes able to predict the course of events accurately, based on forecasts made two or three years earlier, they were occasionally faced with surprises. I would like to emphasise once again the importance of every young Turk reading this particular volume of the work.

Following prolonged internal political strife, Greece declared its allegiance in line with Venizelos’s ideas and joined the war on the side of the Allies. Prior to Venizelos, there had been significant divisions within the country regarding whether to align with the German or Allied blocs. King Constantine had adopted a pro-German stance, advocating for non-intervention and neutrality. Although the Allies were initially reluctant to bring Greece into their fold, given their focus on Bulgaria, they were compelled to support Venizelos—who, by virtue of the existing political structure, acted contrary to the King’s views and had repeatedly urged the King to enter the war on the Allied side. In an effort to increase pressure on Greece and draw it into the war, the Allies had even promised Western Anatolia and Cyprus to Greece. When this failed to yield results, the Allies implemented a policy of supporting Venizelos’s forces, which had landed in Athens and Thessaloniki.

As the territorial claims of Italy and Greece clashed, Italian troops pre-empted the Greeks and, in a fait accompli, attempted to occupy Antalya and Kuşadası. In response to these fait accompli occupations by Italy, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, French Prime Minister George Clemenceau and US President Woodrow Wilson reached an agreement and decided on 6 May 1919 to allow Greece to land troops in Izmir. (1)

The fuse for the occupation of Izmir and the subsequent campaign into the interior of Anatolia had thus been lit. Volume 2 of the work, meanwhile, recounts the political and military crises unfolding at precisely this time. The questions I shall now pose have, in particular over the last 20 years, been presented by certain quarters as part of an operation directed against Turkey’s brightest minds. As I noted in my previous article, these annual reports are not documents leaked to the press. These reports consist solely of information provided to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the embassies of the countries in question. The notion that these two countries (Greece and the United Kingdom) would draft such reports merely to leave a false archive for posterity is not a reasonable conclusion.

Let us begin our examination immediately with the following questions and their answers:

“We merely fought against a weak Greece and won – even a child could do that!”

The first response to this absurd conclusion comes from a report written on 21 July 1921 by Granville, the British diplomat who served as Ambassador to Athens between 1917 and 1921.

Let us see what Granville had to say:

“The long-standing struggle reached its peak in September 1916 when Mr Venizelos secretly travelled from Athens to Crete. There he established his provisional government and immediately set off for Thessaloniki, where the Revolutionary Government had already been established. However much we may approve of his action and regard it as true patriotism, it cannot be denied that he instigated a rebellion against the King and divided Greece in two.” (2)

As I mentioned earlier, within the country, the Royalists and Venizelos’s supporters represented two distinct camps. Subsequently, the group aligned with the Venizelos mindset—backed by Britain!—would begin to advance as far as the interior of Anatolia, again with British support. In another section of the report, written on the same date, whilst assessing relations with Turkey, it is stated that Greece had already occupied Izmir on the orders of the Great Powers. (3)

Further evidence of Greece’s perspective towards the British lies in a conversation between Politis—Venizelos’s most ardent supporter—and Granville. In this conversation, Politis stated that if a British officer were found guilty of fraud, he would say that there were exceptions to the rule; however, in a scenario where the culprit were French, he would remark, “After all, he’s French”. This remark clearly illustrates Greece’s perspective towards Britain. Further on in the report, it was noted that Great Britain received full praise for all the support provided to Greece. In the section concerning the Greek navy, it was reported that Greek officers were rapidly assimilating the training and knowledge provided. However, it is important to note that in the subsequent lines of the report, the passage “When the influence of the British Naval Mission wanes, the navy’s overall efficiency declines rapidly.” (4) clearly reveals the extent of the support Greece received from Britain for its navy. In the reports of 1921, Lord Granville made a prediction on 20 January. According to Lord Granville, without financial and material support from the Allies, the likelihood of the Greeks being able to sustain their conquests in Anatolia for very long was considered low. (5)

Again in the reports of 1921, following Greece’s defeat at the Battle of Sakarya, Lord Granville, in his recommendations to the Foreign Office, stated that there was a possibility the Kemalists might destroy the Greek lines, and that should the Greeks be defeated, material and moral assistance should be provided to them. (6)

Britain supported Greece’s victory not because it was a fan of Greece, but because it needed Greece’s support in its Eastern policy, to break Soviet influence, and to gain control of Middle Eastern oil—a region where bloody conflicts continue to this day. “Britain, of course, did not take any part in the War of Independence; indeed, Britain even decided to support Kemal directly. Kemal would raise the banner of rebellion against the Ottoman Empire, which had ruled for centuries, and the British would use Greece as a decoy to bring down the Ottomans.” (!) Let us now find out where the flag of these so-called British supporters of Kemal was flying during the Greek offensive. The report contains the following clear statement from 1921, describing Greece’s perspective on Britain: “When Greece celebrated its victory, the British flag was placed side by side with the Greek flag, and the British Embassy became the centre of displays of friendship. When Greece demanded the right of visit and search, it gave Foreign Secretary Lord Granville assurances that British ships would not be searched.” (7)

“Did the Greeks arrive in Asia Minor bearing olive branches?”

In recent years, attempts have been made to downplay the atrocities committed by the Greeks and to present them as less severe by comparing them to certain works of fiction. Did the Greeks set foot on these lands with olive branches and cries for peace? Was every Turk regarded as a citizen of Greece, and were their religious freedoms guaranteed? A report written in 1921 states that Istanbul had repeatedly protested against Greece’s actions and that complaints regarding this had been lodged with the High Commissions of the Allies. Furthermore, the report documented Greece’s unjust interference in the Eastern Telegraph Company, the Ottoman Bank and public services. Although numerous correspondences were exchanged regarding these incidents, as Granville noted, no resolution was reached regarding interventions against these actions. (8)

In short, the occupiers, who had come to these lands under the pretence of establishing security and public order, were the primary cause of the breakdown of security and public order.

“Was the Mustafa Kemal Movement a staged conflict orchestrated through collaboration between the Greeks and the British?”

After the Greeks entered Izmir, they did not remain where they were and wait for peace talks to continue. On 22 June, as Greece began its advance into the interior of Anatolia, the British Government issued a warning note on 28 July to halt this advance. However, this note was not intended to defend the lives and property of the local population, but rather to prevent Greece from marching as far as the interior of Anatolia and becoming bogged down there, thereby avoiding the need for Britain to mobilise to assist that country. In his report, Granville conveyed the British High Commissioner’s fear as follows: “It was feared that such an action would stir the nationalist and patriotic sentiments of all Turks, thereby breathing new life into the Kemalist movement.” As can be seen, the High Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Government—supposedly the Kemalists’ number one supporter—had, for some reason, succumbed to such an unfounded fear. (!) Furthermore, another drawback of this move was the risk that it might be perceived as a betrayal by moderate Turks who were inclined towards a settlement. (9)

In other words, the vigilant were being suppressed at gunpoint, whilst the heads of those still asleep were being stroked in their slumber. These two actions served the same purpose: OCCUPATION. It is important to include here a passage from a section of the 1921 annual report written by Oswald Lindley to Lord Curzon. Lindley states: “When King Constantine returned to Greece, there was some speculation as to whether His Majesty would follow the policy of Mr Venizelos and whether he would be able to continue the war against Mustafa Kemal, which had been initiated by the Greeks on the orders of the Great Powers. Would the Greeks continue this war, which had been launched at the behest of the Great Powers with the aim of forcibly imposing the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres on those who refused to accept them?” (10)

This statement may illustrate the consequences of Mustafa Kemal’s movement and demonstrate that the Allied forces issued military directives to Greece solely to secure the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres and to corner the Turks. As for Lord Granville’s view on the definitive support of one side, it appeared that Britain believed supporting Greece would yield more beneficial results. Granville explicitly emphasised that Ankara was being overly obstinate and that, should the Greeks achieve victory, there was no doubt the matter would end in Istanbul and Thrace. In the alternative scenario, had Greece been supported and the war won, the directives issued regarding finding a moderate solution for Greece might have been more successful. (11)

The most clear-cut shift in Britain’s passive policy towards the Turks occurred on 1 June 1921. A press telegram, received in Athens on 1 June to great jubilation and joy, stated that His Majesty’s Government would support Greece. Claims frequently voiced by certain quarters today—such as that Greece could not touch the monarchy or intervene in the Imperial Court—are illogical. For immediately following this British support, King Constantine of Greece set off for the front, as if he had taken on the role of Constantine Palaiologos, the Eastern Roman Emperor who died in 1453. The King’s undertaking such an initiative 468 years later gave rise to a perception amongst the Greeks that, 468 years on, a march on Istanbul would once again take place under the leadership of a Hellenic leader. (12)

Before concluding my account, I would like to share with you another excerpt from the report on the Great Offensive, which began on 26 August, and the subsequent collapse of the Greek army. Let us see what the British (!), the (so-called) partners of the Kemalist movement, had to say about this defeat.

“The collapse of the Greek army sealed the fate of the Greek population in Anatolia; the great Ionian colony, which had withstood storms since the time of Pericles and stood as an outpost of European civilisation amidst the barbarism of Asia, vanished within a few weeks. Few tragedies in history have had such dramatic or such bitter consequences. A new and dangerous situation arose for the Allies, and particularly for Great Britain. Since the armistice, British policy in the Near East had relied on Greek strength for success. Yet it had taken none of the measures that would have ensured that strength’s victory. Consequently, although not a single British soldier had fought nor a single penny spent, Greece’s defeat was regarded as a British defeat in the Levant. It was, first and foremost, British statesmen who had insisted on the rights of the Christian population in Turkey, and most of those who had fled during the war had returned to their homes in Turkey on the basis of promises made by the British. To the agonising state of our position was added an imminent danger to our forces at Gallipoli and Istanbul, and these forces found themselves facing the full might of the Turkish army, which was intoxicated by an unexpected success.” (13)

As can be seen, Greece’s ambition, which was beyond its means, and the British use of Greece solely to retain control of the Middle Eastern territories were thwarted in Turkey thanks to the Kemalist Movement. This work enables us to view our enemy through the eyes of our enemy. History is not written with hearsay, rumours and far-fetched tales. History is written with archives and official records. If history is distorted, the future is distorted. As Atatürk said, “Writing history is as important as making history. If the writer is not faithful to the doer, the unchanging truth takes on a nature that will bewilder humanity.”

I conclude this article by paying tribute, with deep gratitude, to Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his comrades-in-arms and the heroic Turkish Army for their strategic manoeuvres, astute planning and the sacrifices they made. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr Ali Satan and Assoc. Prof. Dr Resul Yavuz for their contributions to the publication of this work and for bringing a fresh perspective to the subject.

Footnotes:

(1) Çınar Atay, The Beginning and End of the Occupation of İzmir (2–15 May 1919 and 9–13 September 1922), Date of access: 16 June 2026, https://ttk.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/9-Cinar-Turkce.pdf

(2) Ali Satan – Resul Yavuz, Britain’s Annual Reports on Greece, Volume 1, Turkish Historical Society, p. 3. https://ttk.gov.tr/ingiltere-nin-yunanistan-yillik-raporlari-cilt-ii/

(3) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 19.

(4) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 37.

(5) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 72.

(6) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 85.

(7) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 88.

(8) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 20.

(9) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 22.

(10) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 72.

(11) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 78.

(12) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 79.

(13) Satan-Yavuz, op. cit., p. 162.