Turkish Air Force in the Second Cyprus Peace Operation (14-16 August 1974) (Chapter -6)
On the morning of 14 August 1974, the "Second Peace Operation", which was the second phase of the Cyprus Peace Operation, was launched with the motto of Foreign Minister Turan Güneş, "Let Ayşe take a holiday", with the fire of the navy at 02.00. The aim of the operation was determined as the liberation of the regions up to Famagusta in the east and Lefke in the west from the Greek occupation.
Following the inconclusive outcome of the second Geneva Talks held between 8-14 August 1974, the Air and Naval Forces Commands were put on alert together. The Government of the Republic of Turkey emphasised that the decisions taken at the First Geneva Conference were not complied with: "Turkey has been obliged to ensure that the existence, independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus will never again be threatened in any way and that the rights and security of the Turkish Community will be ensured on its own." and explained the reasons for Turkey's second peace operation.
On the morning of 14 August 1974, the "Second Peace Operation", which was the second phase of the Cyprus Peace Operation, was launched with the motto of Foreign Minister Turan Güneş, "Let Ayşe take a holiday", with the fire of the navy at 02.00. The aim of the operation was determined as the liberation of the regions up to Famagusta in the east and Lefke in the west from the Greek occupation.
In the directive given by the government, it was stated that "the Air Force was only to break the resistance of the enemy elements in the landing and landing areas, to provide close protection of the amphibious landing convoy with dropping and helicopter landing columns, and to have air and ground waiting elements". Independent air operations, strategic offensive and armed reconnaissance were not authorised in the directive. It was decided to plan and execute air operations in accordance with the daily directive given by the Air Force Command.
The Turkish Air Force carried out squadron deployments before the Second Peace Operation. The T-37 training aircraft at Çiğli were transferred to Cumaovası, the 142nd Squadron at Mürted (Akıncı) was transferred to Balıkesir with F-102 aircraft, the 152nd day interceptor F-5A squadron was transferred from Merzifon to Yenişehir, the 181st Squadron (F-100) stationed in Diyarbakır was transferred to Antalya, the 184th Squadron with RF-84 reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Diyarbakır was transferred to İncirlik, and the Naval Aviation 301st Squadron (with S-2 Tracker aircraft) stationed in Bandırma was transferred to Antalya. During this phase, the 171st, 172nd and 1/2 of the 181st Squadron stationed in Incirlik and the 1//2 of the 181st Squadron stationed in Antalya served. The reconnaissance requirements of the operation were carried out by the 184th Reconnaissance Squadron stationed in Incirlik.
At 05.40 in the morning, the ships of the Navy started bombarding the positions of the Greek National Guard Army from the sea. Between 06.00 and 06.25 on the same day, Turkish warplanes also bombed Greek Cypriot positions in the same area. Since Grammer School Hill was stubbornly defended by the Greek Regiment, 2 fighter jets of the Air Force were assigned to support the Turkish Cypriot Regiment. Thus, Grammer School, which was used as the command base of the Greek Regiment, was captured with the support of Turkish aircraft. The Greek Regiment suffered a heavy defeat and many weapons and equipment, including the Regimental Standard, were captured by Turkish troops.
The Air Force carried out a softening up operation with F-100 aircraft. Turkish jets attacked deep into the enemy front line positions, especially east of the Kyrenia-Lefkosa line. Acting according to the plan, the Turkish Army captured Famagusta on 15 August and Lefke on 16 August. On 15 August, aircraft of the Turkish Air Force were used to provide air support for the ground operation.
In the second phase of the operation, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the first phase, effective coordination was made and the executing ground and air elements had the opportunity to prepare an air support plan in accordance with the joint manoeuvre plan. For this reason, both in missions carried out by means of IHK and in attacks that did not require IHK, very high accuracy was achieved and the enemy was inflicted great casualties. Thus, enemy troops were demoralised and an air of panic was created. The missions flown were mostly close air support and reconnaissance missions. In this operation, the columns travelling to support missions were intercepted by the enemy. The logistic support of the operation was carried out completely, and although there were problems in the fields of communication, recognition and identification, all close air support was met due to the fact that the enemy did not have a serious air force.
The Second Peace Operation was terminated at 19.00 on 16 August 1974 when Turkey accepted the ceasefire by complying with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 357, 358, 359 and 360 on the same day. The close air support missions of the Turkish Air Force, which were carried out on 16 August, were stopped with the entry into force of the ceasefire.
With the Cyprus Peace Operation, the Turkish Cypriots, who had been living in economic and social difficulties for years, regained their full freedom. At the end of the third day of the Second Peace Operation, the Turkish Army reached the line between Famagusta, Nicosia and Kokkina and managed to take 38 per cent of the island under its control. A safe zone was thus established for the Turks on the island.
The Turkish Armed Forces reached the " Kokkina-Lefke-Lefkosa-Mağusa" line, which was called the "Atilla Line" and proposed by Rauf Denktaş as the border of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the Second Geneva Conference. By reaching the 100-kilometre Famagusta-Lefke line calledthe "Hawk line", this region was also taken under control. The continued presence of the Turkish Army in Cyprus since then has been the guarantee of peace on the island and the security of both sides.
During the second Cyprus air operation, Turkish Air Force aircraft flew a total of 197 sorties, including 70 sorties by 171st Squadron within the scope of 29 missions, 47 sorties by 172nd Squadron within the scope of 29 missions, 46 sorties by 81st Squadron within the scope of 18 missions and 34 sorties by 184th Squadron within the scope of reconnaissance missions.
Conclusion and Evaluation
The Cyprus Peace Operation was conducted under unfavourable conditions in terms of air operations due to the coexistence of friendly and hostile elements. Due to the inadequacies in intelligence and especially in Turkey-Cyprus and air-ground communications in the first phase of the operation, air missions had to be carried out with insufficient information. This situation led to major problems during the operation.
In the second phase of the operation, communication deficiencies were overcome. As a result of the lessons learned from the Cyprus Peace Operation, it became evident that land-sea-air cooperation procedures should be improved, operation centres should be reorganised and adapted to the current communication conditions. It was observed that the use of electronic jamming and deception by the enemy on the columns going on close air support missions caused hesitation about the targets to be attacked.
Despite the problems experienced during the Cyprus Peace Operation, the elements of the Turkish Air Force successfully fulfilled the missions they undertook during the Cyprus Peace Operation. The Air Force Command provided air support for the operation with the squadrons allocated to the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command, and carried out airborne, reconnaissance, isolation, protection and attack missions. In addition, during the landing, an assault boat belonging to the Greek National Guard Army, which was preparing to interfere with the Turkish ships, was neutralised by Turkish fighter jets.
During the dropping part of the airborne operation, most of the communication equipment was damaged. This situation weakened the communication of the troops. Although the squadrons allocated for the operation were sufficient in quantity, the limitations imposed on the air missions carried out on the first day adversely affected the operation, and the troops landing and landing faced difficulties. For this reason, the restrictions were lifted on the other days of the operation, provided that civilian targets and residential areas were not fired upon.
It was revealed as a result of post-operation researches that the degree of accuracy of the air operations carried out was much higher than the estimates. During the First Peace Operation, 35 anti-aircraft positions and 8 military vehicles were destroyed by Turkish warplanes. In addition, 1 square, 1 military unit and 1 motor vehicle maintenance facility were moderately damaged and 1 barracks and military vehicles were slightly damaged.
During the Second Peace Operation, Turkish warplanes destroyed 3 tanks, 11 gun positions, 3 anti-aircraft positions, 33 military vehicles, 24 military buildings and 2 radio stations. In addition, 4 radio stations, 3 artillery positions and 1 military unit were jointly damaged and 4 military trailers were destroyed.
The most important lesson learned after the Cyprus Peace Operation, apart from tactical and logistical lessons, was the necessity of a domestic and national defence industry. Because Turkey's use of US-made weapons in the Cyprus Peace Operation was met with reaction by the US Congress, the US Senate and the House of Representatives decided in December 1974 to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, effective from 5 February 1975. Turkey's response to this decision was the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" on 13 February 1975. The embargo, which lasted until 25 July 1978 and lasted 42 months, caused significant problems in the military field. However, the US embargo laid the foundation for the establishment of the Turkish war industry, and defence industry companies such as ASELSAN and HAVELSAN were established. In addition to air, land and naval aviators, Turkish Airlines and Turkish Aeronautical Association provided great support to the Cyprus Peace Operation. During the Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey received military equipment and material support from Iran and Libya due to the fact that the USA and NATO, in particular, stopped the flow of spare parts and jet fuel. Ammunition and supplies could not be obtained from Belgium and Germany due to the embargo, while the order placed with the USA was delivered by sea, but the ammunition was confiscated by the Greeks in Piraeus Port.
UH1-H helicopters were used in the landing operation by helicopters. The helicopters of the Helicopter Regiment, which was stationed near the coast in Taşucu in the Ovacık area, landed the Turkish Commandos in the Kırnı-Gönyeli area. During the landing, the helicopters encountered strong fire from the ground and some helicopters were damaged. There were no helicopter casualties in this operation and the helicopters returned after completing their mission. During the second sortie, the helicopters acted in a more organised manner, flying at a high altitude so that all helicopters were assembled in the air beforehand and reaching the target area. The helicopters landed in a "V" formation and only two helicopters were hit. The landing mission was successfully completed without any casualties, and the helicopters flew a total of 4 sorties on the first day.
On the first day of the operation, F-104s of the 141st Squadron, which took off from Mürted Air Base, attacked two Trident-type 3-engine jet passenger aircraft at Nicosia Airport, which provides the connection of the island under Greek Cypriot control with abroad, the runway was bombed and the aircraft were destroyed. F-100 aircraft constituted the main strike force of the operation. RF-84F aircraft carried out reconnaissance missions. The F-102 squadron at Mürted Air Base was transferred to Balıkesir, and kept ready against an attack from Greece in the Aegean. In Bandırma, F-5A aircraft were again made ready for Thrace and the Aegean. Prior to the operation, some Turkish pilots were assigned to the Turkish Regiment in Cyprus and made preliminary studies on the familiarisation of the region, target identification and management for a possible operation. These pilots served as Forward Operational Control (FOC) with the first troops landing on the beach. During the operation, a total of 7 pilots (10 in the second operation), most of whom were F-100 fighters, served as IHK officers.
Turkish Army Aviation units supported the flying unit operation with 72 UH-1 helicopters. Naval aviation units were deployed to Antalya, Antalya, Turkey, and flew maritime patrol missions with S-2E Tracker aircraft, flying 66 sorties in the Mediterranean Sea during the two operations, and helicopters based in Çiğli carried out 149 sorties of armed reconnaissance flights in the Aegean Sea.
With the Cyprus Peace Operation carried out in 1974, the foundations were laid for the peace in the region to last until today. Thus, the Turkish Air Force played an important role in the protection of the Turkish presence in Cyprus and the continuation of the Turkish presence on the island. The Enosis dream of the Greeks was eliminated. The Cyprus Peace Operation was a joint operation carried out by the Land, Naval and Air Forces, and the units of the Gendarmerie General Command against a coast under the control of the enemy. The Air Operation was planned and executed by the joint operation centre in accordance with the daily directive given by the Air Force Command. On the first day of the operation, the Turkish Air Force provided air support for the operation and successfully carried out the airborne operation. During the Cyprus Air Operation, the Turkish Air Force flew more than 1000 sorties within the scope of close air support, airdrop, reconnaissance, isolation, protection and offensive operations.
On 20 July 1974, air support for the operation was provided by the squadrons allocated to the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command, and an airborne operation was carried out by using all the facilities of the 12th Air Transport Main Base Command. The air operation was planned and executed by the joint operation centre in accordance with the daily directives given by the Air Force Command. During the Cyprus Peace Operation, 10 aircraft were lost. Among these aircraft, 2 F-100 C, 3 F-100 D, 1 F-100 F, 1 F-104 G, 2 F-102 and 1 RF-84 F were lost. 12 helicopters were damaged and 1 C-47 transport aircraft made a forced landing.
Despite some adversities experienced during the Cyprus Peace Operation, the air operations conducted by the Turkish Air Force were evaluated in the light of internationally recognised principles of the use of air power, such as centralised control and decentralised execution, continuity, correct determination of priorities, balanced use of power, creation of synergy, and keeping the operational tempo high. In peacetime, it is very important to reach a high level of training through continuous training and exercises, and to ensure that the doctrines developed in the light of past experiences are updated in the light of modern defence systems and the concepts of use of these systems.
On the other hand, the success of air operations depends on the availability of high-tech weapon-systems and an air force with qualified, highly disciplined and highly trained manpower. At the same time, the Turkish Air Force has confirmed its commitment to international agreements and proved to the world that it will not be a bystander to developments that would jeopardise its own security and the security of the Turkish Cypriot people. The principles of the application of air power have been experienced and the principles of the use of air power reflect the lessons learned from the history of aviation and current defence industry developments.
The principles of the use of air power were complementary to the principles of operations and were determined as centralised control and decentralised execution, continuity, correct determination of priorities, balanced use of power, synergy creation and keeping the operational tempo high. Paratroopers trained by the Turkish Air Association took part in the airborne assault. In addition to Captain Sami Akbulut, THK personnel Taner Erdem, Ceyhun Demirkol, Osman Örencik, Orhan Özcan, Naci Çelikkol, who did their military service, took part in the first sortie of the airdrop operation. Captain Sami Akbulut, who was among the first paratrooper commandos to land on the island, was martyred.
Within the scope of the First and Second Peace Operations of the Turkish Armed Forces in establishing peace in Cyprus, the Turkish Army lost a total of 498 martyrs, including 35 officers, 41 non-commissioned officers, 421 privates and privates and 1 civilian worker. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus suffered 340 martyrs, 70 of whom were mujahideen, and around 1,200 wounded. Within the scope of this operation, 411 of the martyrs were personnel of the Land Forces, 69 of the Naval Forces, 5 of the Turkish Air Force and 13 of the Gendarmerie General Command.
Air Pilot Major Fehmi Ercan, Air Pilot First Lieutenant İlker Karter, Air Pilot First Lieutenant İbrahim Çınar, Air Pilot First Lieutenant Türker Aydın and Air Traffic Control Sergeant Major Sami Emen from the Air Force Command were martyred. Staff Sergeant Sami Emen was assigned to the flight tower of the Cyprus-Tymvou (Ercan Airport) Airport Command and was shot and martyred by unknown assailants at his residence on 29 October 1974. Thanks to them, it has been shown to the whole world that Cyprus will remain an eternal Turkish territory, an inseparable part of the Republic of Turkey as a baby homeland.
In 1974, after more than half a century of peace following the liberation of Izmir on 9 September 1922, an overseas joint operation was successfully carried out with the participation of almost all units of the Turkish Armed Forces, supported by special forces and using three forces together.
(Son)
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