War of Independence Articles: “Activities Conducted on 8 November 1918” (Chapter 12)

Mustafa Kemal Pasha issued another order regarding the same issue to the 2nd Army on 8 November. According to this; All units of the 2nd Army stationed in Adana were attached to the 12th Corps. The Corps Commander will create a new organization from the detachments subordinate to him and the detachments subordinate to the 2nd Army. However, the Torpedo Detachment, Telegraph Team and Harmonica Team will be directly affiliated with the Group. The order will be notified for the personnel belonging to the branches of the 2nd Army. Kelebek Ammunition Depot will be placed under the command of the Range Inspectorate. The buildings used by the 2nd Army were allocated to the Group Headquarters. The Location Command will organize the evacuation of these buildings and the settlement of the evacuated officers.

Meanwhile, upon a letter from the 20th Corps, he sent a telegram to Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha. In this telegram; He reported that the interview officers who came from Aleppo in the morning told the 20th Corps interview officers that a gang affiliated with the Turkish army was operating around Idlib and suggested sending an officer to investigate and ban them, and they were told that they belonged to Arab tribes, not the Turkish army. . He emphasized that although it is not possible for a gang affiliated with the Turkish army to operate in Idlib, located 50 kilometers northwest of Aleppo, there is no seriousness or sincerity in these demands of the British.

This telegram was followed by a telegram addressed to the 7th Army Command from Ahmet İzzet Pasha. In this telegram, the issues in the telegram sent by Admiral Carlthorpe the day before were explained. After this, it was stated that it was obvious that they were absolutely incapable of continuing the war and that the armistice, which was barely signed, could be terminated for the city of Iskenderun, and therefore, when an application was made, orders should be given immediately to those who responded to the evacuation and surrender of the city. According to Ahmet İzzet Pasha; It comes to mind that the fact that they were exposed to such a terrible response when they were offered to benefit from the Iskenderun port and the Aleppo road was also due to the harsh and cold response the Allied Powers received when they first applied to the Iskenderun Command. For this reason, it is very necessary for the well-being of the country to be aware of this weakness and to do words and deeds accordingly, provided that we do not show laxity.

This telegram shows that Ahmet İzzet Pasha's resistance to internal and external pressures has been completely broken. As a matter of fact, he could not withstand the internal pressures and resigned from the Government on 8 November. In addition, he could not withstand the pressure created by the fact that the Allied Powers were about to come to Istanbul by land from Thrace and by sea from Çanakkale, and ordered the evacuation of Mosul. Upon this order, the 6th Army began to withdraw towards the north.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha immediately responded to Ahmet İzzet Pasha's order. While writing this telegram at the Murat Palas Hotel, Colonel Fahrettin (Altay) Bey is with him. “He stated that he received the order dated 8 November regarding the surrender of the city of Iskenderun to the British, but he could not understand the reason for the thought that the applications of the Allied Powers to benefit from the Iskenderun port and the Aleppo road were given a harsh and cold response. The response given by the unit commander there to the British applications for occupation of Iskenderun, in accordance with the instructions given to him, was given very delicately and in accordance with the orders given by the Government and the conditions of the armistice. There is no record indicating that even the British Government's delegates were told that a harsh and cold response was received on this issue. Therefore, it is necessary to seek elsewhere the reasons for the appalling final responses of the British. Since there is no doubt that such terrible responses, which will gradually lead to the occupation of the entire country, will be renewed, the reasons given should be evaluated with deep thought.

The British Commander in Aleppo reported that the British Commander-in-Chief had suggested to Istanbul that Turkish troops be moved to the north of the Kilis-Payas line in order to secure the Iskenderun-Aleppo highway, which they wanted to take advantage of, and that the exploration of the Aleppo-Iskenderun highway should be allowed in order to avoid loss of time. According to the report of the 6th Army Command dated 7 November 1918; Considering the occupation of the Nusaybin-Cizre-Aleppo railway line and the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in Iraq that the Turkish troops would withdraw from Mosul immediately, otherwise they would be entered by force, it can be seen that the problem does not need to be interpreted with the coldness that is thought to be towards the British delegates.

The signed armistice does not have the meaning and content to ensure the protection and well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Some items are ambiguous and their general meaning should be determined as soon as possible. The British proposals were not responded to as they have been until today. 

If we continue, the proposals of the British, who want the land up to the Payas-Kilis line today, for the occupation of the Cilicia region up to the Taurus Mountains and then the Konya-Izmir line, will follow each other, and as a result, the Turkish army will be led and administered by them, and moreover, the Ottoman Council of Ministers will be in control of the British Government. It is not impossible to be against the suggestions as it should be chosen by.

The degree of weakness and weakness of the Ottoman Empire is known. However, it is necessary to determine and limit the degree of sacrifice that the State has to make. Otherwise, presenting the results that the British could achieve by helping them would be very dark pages in history for the Ottoman Empire and the government. If the government has made a secret alliance with the British whose seriousness and sincerity can be trusted, or if the possibility of making a secret alliance has become stronger, information about this should be given, even if indirectly.

After these statements, Mustafa Kemal Pasha; His views, which should undoubtedly be sincere, arising from his concern for the end of the country, were known especially by Ahmet İzzet Pasha, that his statements should not be interpreted as an intention to open a debate, that he considered it necessary for the well-being of the country to inform those who needed to know the issues that he believed to be true, no matter what situation and situation he was in, and that he had the power to prevent these beliefs. However, he stated that there is no doubt that the ordered matters will be done as desired. As a matter of fact, he ordered the 41st Division around Iskenderun to immediately withdraw to Payas, take the necessary precautions for the surrender of the city, and allow the exploration of the Iskenderun-Aleppo highway. "In addition, it has already taken measures to withdraw all troops to the north of the Payas-Kilis line."

According to the information given by some writers in their works, based on eyewitnesses of the period, it is stated that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had close relations with the people in Adana and tried to warn them, and held meetings with intellectuals from Adana and representatives from Adana sanjaks to exchange views. According to what is stated in these works; Among the intellectuals he met with were Suphi Pasha (Ramazanoğlu), Kadri (Ramazanoğlu), Nalbantzade Ahmet Efendi, İbrahim Rasıh, Hoca Mücteba (Ramazanoğlu), Bağdadizade Kadri Efendi, Mısırlızade Lawyer Ahmet Efendi and Dıblanzade Fuat. These meetings focused on issues such as how to defend the city against attacks from the east. In addition, Mustafa Kemal Pasha held a meeting with non-Muslim representatives and some people in Kırmızı Konak, known as the home of the Tırpaniler, but did not get any results from this meeting.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha gathered some people who were not pessimistic and had positive thoughts about salvation, at the house belonging to Aliye Hanım (Yerdelen) in Şakirpaşa on November 8. This meeting was attended by 2nd Army Commander Nihat Pasha, Ceyhan Military Squad Commander Remzi Bey, Quartermaster Squad Leader Avni (Dogan), Military Manufacturing Plants Manager Ahmet Remzi, Nalbantzade Ahmet, Ramazanoğlu Kadri, İsmail Safa (Özler), Mücavirzade Mustafa Efendi, Central Commander Hulusi. and some others participated. Again, according to these authors, Mustafa Kemal Pasha stated that he would leave Adana on 10 November during the meeting and asked what they would do if the enemy came, saying that he did not see the situation of the country well, that the Allied Powers would not comply with the provisions of the armistice, that they would crush the country under more severe conditions, so they had to make preparations. He told them to establish an organization, dig trenches in suitable places, and that the necessary weapons and materials would be provided. After this meeting, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had fortifications built in the Gülek Strait and Misis.

It seems that some of the information given by these writers, such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha's statement at the meeting held on 8 November that he would leave Adana on 10 November, does not match the information in the existing documents. When looking at these documents, it is understood that although Mustafa Kemal Pasha knew that some army units and army headquarters would be abolished, he did not know exactly when he would go to Istanbul and which units would be abolished. As a matter of fact, it is seen that a debate started between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Ahmet İzzet Pasha about which armies would be abolished as of November 3. Mustafa Kemal Pasha proposed to abolish the 2nd and 7th Armies and attach the units directly to the Yıldırım Army Group, but on November 5, the order came that the 2nd Army and Yıldırım Army Group Headquarters would be abolished and all units would be attached to the 7th Army. Thereupon, Mustafa Kemal Pasha proposed on 6 November to abolish the two armies and preserve the Yıldırım Army Group. Ahmet İzzet Pasha responded to this proposal that the 2nd Army and Group Headquarters could be abolished and the Group headquarters could be called the 7th Army Headquarters.

Despite this, since the 7th Army would also be abolished, Mustafa Kemal Pasha insisted on the proposal to organize all units under the name of Yıldırım Group. However, on 7 November, Ahmet İzzet Pasha received a decree stating that the 7th Army and Yıldırım Army Group were abolished and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was placed under the command of the Ministry of War. But it is understood that this will was not sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Because the orders written by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to all units on November 7 and to the 2nd Army on November 8, specify the principles regarding the reorganization and deployment of the units, considering that the 7th and 2nd Armies will be abolished. On the other hand, Ahmet İzzet Pasha also addressed the 7th Army with the order he sent on 8 November stating that Iskenderun would be occupied by the British as if the 2nd Army and Yıldırım Army Group were abolished.