War of Independence Articles: "Activities on November 5, 1918" (Chapter 9)

As November 3 developments required rapid decision-making and implementation, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent orders directly to the relevant division and corps commanders. For this purpose, on November 3, he even proposed to the Chief of Staff that the 2nd and 7th Armies be abolished and the corps be directly attached to him. The 2nd Army Command was uncomfortable with the direct orders given to its subordinate units and sent a letter to the Presidency of the General Staff and the Lightning Armies Group Command, stating that it would be more appropriate for the affairs of the corps and divisions to be carried out through the Army. 

Meanwhile, one of the most important problems for the Government was the withdrawal of the German and Austrian military and civilian personnel from the fronts as soon as possible. These personnel are scattered in different parts of the country. For this reason, an order was sent by Ahmet İzzet Pasha asking for the fulfillment of the necessary issues to ensure that the Germans and Austrians could leave the country within the period specified in the armistice. 

This was followed by a report sent by the 41st Division Commander from Belen on the evening of November 4, explaining the demands of the British major. According to this report, the written reply to the request of the captain of the destroyer Arbalet and British Major Mackmislent on November 4 was that the torpedo sites would be shown when the torpedo officer arrived, but that the landing of troops would be prevented. The British major told the harbor master who delivered this letter that they requested a face-to-face meeting. Thereupon, the delegation disembarked from the ship and was received at the harbor administration building in the evening. 

During this meeting, the Allied delegation stated that they would wait for the arrival of the torpedo officer, that the steamships loaded with foodstuffs to be taken to the armies around Aleppo would probably arrive tomorrow, that military troops would land with these foodstuffs and that they needed help in this regard. They were told that the answers to these requests had been given in writing and that it was beyond their authority to take any further action, and therefore no packages or troops would be allowed to land. They were also informed that the highway was not suitable for the transportation of foodstuffs by buffalo carts or automobiles. When the British major said that they would repair the highway with their own troops, it was replied that if they tried to occupy the İskenderun-Aleppo road in violation of the armistice, they would be strongly opposed. Thereupon, the delegation went to their ships. It was understood that the British intended to clear the torpedoes in Iskenderun harbor for this transportation.

Meanwhile, these articles of the order sent by the Erkan-ı Harbiye-yi Umumiye Riyaseti on November 4 to answer Mustafa Kemal Pasha's questions about the armistice on November 3, but the second and fifth articles could not be read because the cipher could not be opened, were dictated by telephone to Cevat Bey, the aide to the Commander of the Lightning Armies Group. Accordingly, the article in the Armistice regarding the surrender of the troops in Syria was written precautionarily. Since there are no troops in Syria, this article does not concern the Lightning Armies Group. The Group Command will notify only the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, the First Force and the troops in the Maan region to act according to the Armistice by utilizing the British radio. Other units will continue to remain where they are.  

Despite this optimistic attitude of the Erkan-ı Harbiye-yi Umumiye Riyaseti, new developments emerged in the meantime that justified Mustafa Kemal Pasha's concerns. A negotiating delegation headed by a British general arrived at the 7th Army Headquarters in Katma. Ali Fuat Pasha organized a delegation consisting of the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Staff of the 20th Corps and Major Ömer Halis Bey to conduct the negotiations. When the negotiations began, the British stated that Cilicia was a part of Syria, therefore Turkish troops in the region were considered prisoners of war and would be sent to Aleppo.  Upon this, Ali Fuat Pasha called Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the head of the telegraph, explained the demand of the British delegation and informed him that he had decided to refuse. Mustafa Kemal Pasha agreed and told him to come to Adana the next day and that he would talk to him about important things.

In his memoirs, Ali Fuat Pasha mentions that after this telegraphic conversation, Major Ömer Halis Bey brought a letter secretly given to Ahmet İzzet Pasha by Captain Nuri Sait, who had studied at the Ottoman Military Academy and belonged to the forces of Sharif Faisal, who was among the British negotiating delegation. Ali Fuat Pasha wrote that he opened the envelope, saw that the paper inside contained some proposals for the establishment of a Muslim federation with the participation of the Ottoman Empire, realized that it was a British trick and instructed the major to tell him that the letter would be forwarded. However, he did not explain what he did with this letter. 

The British, whose demand for the surrender of Turkish troops was rejected, were asked to discuss the surrender of prisoners in the Tarsus region. The answer to this written request was brought to Kefr-i Altun by three British Staff Officers. In this reply, it was requested that the Ottoman troops in the vicinity of Aleppo surrender in accordance with the armistice, that only the Allied prisoners in this region be sent to Aleppo, and that the current numbers of Ottoman troops and Allied prisoners and the timing of their delivery be reported in order to provide food and other necessities. To these requests, it was replied that the surrender conditions specified in the armistice covered the troops south of the Latakia-Han Sheikhoun line and could not apply to the troops around Aleppo. The British officers said that they would submit this answer to their superiors and that they would probably not be able to give an answer tomorrow. This situation was immediately reported by the 7th Army Command to the Lightning Armies Group Command. 

Upon these developments, Mustafa Kemal Pasha examined a geography atlas he had found in the Adana American School Library and realized where the regions the British wanted with the terms Cilicia, Syria and Iraq, which they inserted into the articles of armistice, were. According to him, the statement in Article 16 of the Armistice that the troops in Iraq and Syria would surrender to the nearest Allied commander was written to take the 6th and 7th Armies. 

After these determinations, he asked the Erkan-ı Harbiye-yi Umumiye Riyaseti whether the amount of the force that would occupy the Taurus Tunnels, which was stated to be notified by the British, would be allowed to occupy the whole of Anatolia. He then objected to the statement that the surrender of the garrisons in Syria was a precautionary clause. According to him, this article was written by the British to seduce the Turkish side. Because the British wanted the surrender of the 7th Army in Syria. He also stated that his purpose in asking about the Cilician border, which he had mentioned in the telegram he had sent on November 3, was to find out whether the government had taken into account that the northern border passed north of Maraş in the English atlas showing this region. Because he had no doubt that the British would consider the Syrian border as an extension of the Cilician border to the east. The fact that the British indicated on the map they showed to the 6th Army that the Iraqi border passed through Siirt proves this. The fact that the British have been talking about landing troops in Iskenderun for a few days and transferring supplies to Aleppo despite the fact that there were sufficient supplies there is also due to the fact that Iskenderun is located on the borders of Syria and Cilicia on the map showing the Cilicia region. If the armies are demobilized without taking measures to prevent misunderstandings in the articles of the armistice and if the British are obeyed, there will be no way to prevent the ambitions of the British. 

After this telegram was sent, Ahmet İzzet Pasha sent two telegrams, one open and the other encrypted. In the first telegram, it was reported that the British Army in Iraq was neither authorized to occupy Mosul nor to define Iraq as it wished, that there was no record in the armistice regarding the occupation of Iskenderun by the British, that this had been written to Admiral Caltlthorpe, and that the aforementioned person had immediately informed London in order to prevent such misunderstood actions about Mosul and other regions. This situation will be told to the British Army Commander and it will be ensured that he will act according to the order from London. 

In the encrypted telegram; the report sent by the Lightning Armies Group on November 4 about the British request to land troops in Iskenderun was replied. Ahmet İzzet Pasha stated that although the British did not have the right and authority to occupy Iskenderun according to the armistice, it was a justified demand to utilize Iskenderun to feed their armies around Aleppo. He also stated that he did not see any harm in the British utilizing the Iskenderun Port for the transportation of supplies and repairing the Iskenderun-Aleppo road in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Greece to its field of activity and as a gesture of gratitude in return for the gentleness of the British negotiator, who amended many articles in the armistice and gave explanations and assurances only verbally due to lack of time. By allowing them to use the port and the road, the port and the city of Iskenderun would not be abandoned to them. They would still remain in the Ottoman Empire, the military and civil administration would remain in place, and they would only benefit from the port and the road. Ahmet İzzet Pasha requested that this situation be conveyed to the Commander of the British Syrian Army.

As can be seen, two telegrams sent on the same day on the same subject contradict each other. This situation shows that Ahmet İzzet Pasha feared the violation of the armistice agreement and the resumption of hostilities, and that he was worried that Mustafa Kemal Pasha's tendency to resist the Entente since he took command of the Lightning Armies Group would lead to this. For this reason, on the same day, he first said that the British had no right to land in Iskenderun and shortly afterwards he sent an order that if they did, they should not be resisted. 

Contrary to what Ahmet İzzet Pasha said, Mustafa Kemal Pasha concluded that the British were planning to cut the 7th Army's withdrawal routes and force the troops to surrender, since they said they would land troops in Iskenderun and demanded the surrender of the troops. Therefore, he decided to withdraw the 7th Army without the British noticing it. The 7th Army sent an order to the 3rd Corps and the 41st Division, informing them that the 20th Corps should leave a weak outpost, gather with the bulk of its forces at night around Katma and Subaşı, and then withdraw to Islahiye. In order not to violate secrecy, he ordered that the officers who came into contact with the British should not mention the force at all, that if necessary they should say that the Army Headquarters was far away, and that the decisions to be taken should be signed by the executive officers authorized by the Army Command. He also ordered the 3rd Corps to stop the landing of forces in Iskenderun, if necessary with fire, until the withdrawal of the 20th Corps was completed. In addition, the 7th Army was notified to transfer its headquarters to Adana immediately.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha informed the Erkan-ı Harbiye Riyaseti of the above-mentioned developments in a telegram, which is considered to be a daily operational status report. Furthermore, on the afternoon of November 5, at 04. 00 in the afternoon of November 5, one of the boats unloaded from the British steamers searching for torpedoes in İskenderun Harbor sank as a result of an explosion, 7th Army sent pursuit detachments to follow an Armenian gang in the vicinity of İslâhiye, and 6th Army ordered 20th Corps to withdraw to İslâhiye in order to avoid the situation in Mosul and to prevent the British from landing troops in İskenderun by using weapons if necessary until the withdrawal was completed.   

After this, an order was sent from the Ministry of War stating that the headquarters of the Lightning Armies Group and the 2nd Army were abolished. Accordingly, all personnel and affiliated units of the abolished headquarters, except for their commanders and chiefs of staff, would be placed under the command of the 7th Army Command. Upon this order, the Commander of the 2nd Army asked for information on how the troops would be transferred to the 7th Army. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied that the order of the Ministry on this matter was not understood by the Group and that he was being asked, and that he would be informed when he received an answer. 

On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal Pasha learned that the Germans, who were preparing to leave the region, had destroyed some war weapons, equipment and supplies. Upon this; he issued an order regarding the measures to be taken. In this order, it was stated that the Germans had been informed that they were burning their passenger and freight automobiles by pouring gasoline on them, destroying the equipment they had left behind and disrupting the lines of communication, and that in order to prevent this, every commander and every range officer should confiscate all German equipment in their vicinity, nothing should be allowed to be destroyed, and the automobiles that were allowed to be taken to Konya and Ereğli in accordance with the order given on November 3 should be immediately taken over where they were found and those who destroyed the equipment should be arrested.

The Adana Line Command and Inspectorate were also instructed to effectively protect all industrial products and tunnels on the railroad line and to inform the commander of the German Railroad Company, which would be the last to depart from these places, that if the slightest damage was caused to industrial goods, all German trains on the roads would be seized and their occupants would be considered prisoners of war. It is understood that this order sent to those concerned on the night of November 5/6 was meticulously implemented by the subordinate unit commanders. Fahrettin (Altay) Pasha states in his memoirs that thanks to these measures, eleven airplanes were forcibly taken from the Germans and sent to Konya.

As can be seen, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was busy with many activities on November 5. Moreover, he was in intense communication with Ahmet İzzet Pasha, with whom he disagreed on the method to be followed. However, according to the memories of some people living at the time, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had left Şakir Paşa Neighborhood, where he had been living from time to time since his inauguration, to explore the Yüreğir Plain and the north of Tarsus, went to Mersin on November 5 and became the guest of Colonel Bahaeddin Bey, the commander of the 23rd Division. During the meeting, which lasted until late, he said that the situation was deteriorating and emphasized the measures to be taken. He also summoned the Governor and Gendarmerie Captain Talat Bey and received information about the weapons and personnel numbers of the police stations and recommended that the police stations on the borders of Silifke and the Taurus foothills be increased and that the new weapons in the warehouses be distributed to the mountain villages with plenty of ammunition. Upon this, Captain Talat Bey distributed weapons and ammunition to the mountain villages through Arslanköy Hüsnü, the commander of the Mobile Gendarmerie Detachment.

When Mustafa Kemal Pasha returned to Adana in the evening, he did not stay idle and attended a dinner given in his honor by the people of Adana at the Muradiye Hotel on Ali Münif Street, which stretched from the old station to the clock tower. In his speech at this dinner, he said that the country would be saved, that hopes were not yet extinguished, that he would fight for it, and that the Turkish nation and its army could protect its homeland and independence.