What did the Turkish Army do to prevent the expected fire in Izmir?

In memory of the soldiers who fell in İzmir on 9 September 1922

Described as ‘the jewel of Asia’ in a British newspaper on 17 December 1853, İzmir was not only the largest trade hub of the Ottoman Empire but also of the entire Eastern Mediterranean as it entered the 20th century. Surrounded by a bay bearing its name, the city, with a population exceeding two hundred thousand, accounted for 55% of Ottoman Turkey's exports to the West. Administratively, Izmir, which was the administrative centre (central sanjak) of the Aydın Province, described as ‘the most developed, wealthiest, and most populous part of the Ottoman provinces,’ , was the administrative centre (central district) of Aydın. On the afternoon of 13 September 1922, a great fire broke out in Izmir, which is considered one of the largest urban fires in world history to have been deliberately set by humans. The cause and motive of the fire are still a matter of debate, but it is known that the city had been engulfed in flames many times before. At the beginning of the last century, Raif Nezihi, the first Turk to dedicate his life to writing the history of Izmir, stated that the city was burned down by the Lydian conquerors in 600 BC and that this was ‘the first great fire of Izmir, which would see many more fires...’

During the Ottoman period, Izmir experienced eight major fires in just 103 years, from 1742 to 1845. There is probably no other city that has suffered so many fires caused by humans, whether accidental or deliberate. It is impossible that those who started the last great fire in Izmir and those who tried to extinguish it were unaware of this unfortunate statistic. The ‘great fire’ was an inevitable consequence of a tactic effectively employed by the Greek Army in Anatolia, regardless of its strategic approach (offensive or defensive). Specifically, Greek military planners sought to ‘punish’ settlements where those resisting the occupation resided or provided support (or were believed to provide support) to the enemy; while in their unsuccessful operations, they did not hesitate to burn and destroy the abandoned area to turn it into a desert. There is no doubt that the purpose of this was to psychologically and logistically weaken the Turkish Army and its human resources.

Document proving that orders were given to Greek troops to burn villages in Anatolia

A. The Stain on the Greek Army: Crimes of Atrocity

Dr. Nihat Reşat Bey's document, which details the crimes committed by Greek troops in the first few weeks of the occupation in Izmir, Aydın, Bergama, Dikili, Kınık, Yunt Dağı, Menemen, Manisa, Urla, and the Küçük Menderes Valley, (Belger) in French in Paris (1920) and distributed to delegates, European parliamentarians and members of the press attending the Paris Peace Conference, and the Turkish translation of which I have prepared for publication, is presented at the end of this article as Appendix 1.

In order to avoid any allegations of bias regarding the practice of the aforementioned tactic, we would first like to refer to data that does not originate from Turkish sources. The first piece of data we have selected is from the telegram sent by Rear Admiral M. L. Bristol, sent a telegram to the State Department on 3 July 1921, stating, ‘... Greek troops have burned Turkish villages in Izmit. One of our warships has seen 15 villages in flames.’ The second piece of data we will present is more important because its objectivity is indisputable.

A document dated 17 January 1922, written by a Greek soldier and a photocopy of which is in our archives, reads as follows:

I am from Midilli, my name is Yoannis Eleftheriu Danglis, I am from the 7th Division, 23rd Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 11th Company. We have been retreating from the Sakarya Front for some time. The command gave orders to burn the villages. After receiving the 10th order of the division, I personally saw the villages set on fire by special squads belonging to the Greek Army, which were tasked with burning the villages.

Following the Battle of Dumlupınar (30 August 1922), evidence pointing to the Greek Army's arson is emerging: First Corps Commander İzzettin (Çalışlar) Pasha wrote in his diary on 2 September, ‘The enemy is retreating without stopping... They are burning and destroying villages as they flee’; and on 6 September, he noted, ‘The enemy has completely burned Salihli.’ The British Consul in Izmir, H. Lamb, sent a telegram to London on the same day, saying, ‘The Greeks are still retreating and burning everything in their path.’ On 7 September, when the Grand National Assembly of Turkey met and wrote, "We arrived in Ahmetli in the morning. The enemy continues to burn and flee. They are doing nothing but cruelty... Manisa is also burning..." On 7 September, the Grand National Assembly, which had convened, decided to protest to the Greek government before the civilised world and inform it that the Turkish people would never forget the crimes committed, in order to prevent similar developments in Bursa and Izmir, which were also inevitably going to be liberated from occupation.

The next day (8 September), First Army Commander Nurettin Pasha sent a war report to Eighth Division Commander Kazım Bey, stating, "According to reports received from the Fifth (Cavalry) Corps... the enemy has completely burned the cities of Manisa and Nif (Kemalpaşa). And they are burning the surrounding villages and killing the inhabitants." After recalling that the town of Kasaba (Turgutlu), where this war report was sent, was completely burned down except for a small neighbourhood called ‘Küllük’ (the ashes of the burned city, named so because the ashes were carried here by the wind), we would like to emphasise a few points. (In the basement of the Turgutlu City Museum (TURKEM), where I served as a founding advisor, the Greek Army’s arson of the city as they retreated is described. The trauma (trauma) was so great that even today, the residents of Turgutlu, who frequently use the phrases ‘before the fire’ and ‘after the fire,’ consider the event a kind of turning point.

Firstly, while focusing on the large settlements (sanjak and district) that were set ablaze by the Greek Army as they withdrew from Anatolia, it is important not to forget the numerous smaller settlements (nahiye and village) with smaller populations and areas. It is known that the Greek Army set fire to three nahiyes (Seydiköy/Gaziemir, Torbalı, Dağkızılca) and four villages (Ahmetbeyli, Çaybaşı, Ahmetli, Kuşçuburnu) in the central district of the İzmir Sanjak. Secondly, after the Battle of Dumlupınar, the Greek Army, without hiding behind any excuse (or, one might say, without giving any reason), simultaneously with arson, committed crimes such as rape, looting, assault, deliberate and premeditated murder, torture, and taking hostages, which is what we mean by ‘crimes of oppression.’ (Essentially, independently of the arson that peaked after the Battle of Dumlupınar, Greek authorities committed the same crimes throughout the years of occupation, using excuses such as reports, complaints, searches for weapons, and collection of weapons.) In Anatolia, where these crimes were committed with impunity, it is undoubtedly impossible to speak of any kind of order in the days following 30 August 1922. What is dramatic is that the Greek authorities and army, i.e. those who disrupted the order, were essentially responsible for establishing and maintaining it.

B. The Longest Week in Izmir: A City and Its Residents in a Spiral of Fear

The domino that disrupted order in Izmir was a military bulletin published on 30 August 1922 in the Greek-language morning newspaper Amalthia (Izmir). Signed by Greek Army Commander Haci Anesti and dated 28 August 1922, the bulletin stated, ‘Due to the intensity of the enemy (Turkish Army) attack, the evacuation of Afyonkarahisar was ordered yesterday...’ Upon learning of the existence of a comprehensive Turkish attack in this manner, the people of Izmir realised that the front had collapsed as thousands of people from all nationalities, including Turks, began to flock to the city in the following days. Haci Anesti's military bulletin, which was published in the local press, probably on 4 September, stating that ‘the retreat on all fronts is continuing without enemy pressure,’ was clear proof that they were not mistaken.

Undoubtedly, during those days, Greeks and Armenians among the residents of Izmir were killed by the Turkish army and militias because they were suspected of collaborating with the occupying forces, while Levantines and Jews were killed because they could be mistaken for Greeks and/or Armenians. Turks, on the other hand, feared being killed by the Greek army and Greek militias out of resentment for losing the war. The fear shared by the Entente Powers and the Ankara Government was that the city would be set on fire and destroyed. Greek officers and soldiers frequently said, ‘If we are forced to leave Izmir to the Turks, we will burn it down,’ and this had reached the ears of diplomats working in the city.

On 2 September, a day marked by a series of developments related to security, the US Consul in Izmir, G. Horton, wrote to his headquarters: ‘If the demoralised Greek Army comes to Izmir, serious problems that cannot be prevented may arise, and threats to burn the city are clearly being heard...’ Secondly, the Greek government, through its embassy in London, had informed the British Foreign Office that its army was no longer able to defend Izmir and that the great powers should protect their own citizens. In response, the ministry immediately instructed its high commissioner in Istanbul (H. Rumbold) to cooperate with the navy to protect the British colony in Izmir and evacuate it if necessary, and to inform the French and Italian high commissioners in Istanbul and the British consul in Izmir (H. Lamb). Finally, A. Stergiadis, head of the Greek administration in Izmir, visited French Consul Graillet and informed him that the army had begun to desert and that he would no longer be able to ensure security, requesting that the French government protect the minorities. This prompted the consuls of the Allied Powers in Izmir to hastily gather and request that their governments send warships.

What frightened the Allied Powers was the possibility of the city being set on fire and destroyed, unlike the colonies, which could be evacuated: the shops, stores and warehouses owned by their citizens and the hundreds of thousands of lira worth of goods they contained. On 5 September, when Britain and the United States began evacuating their citizens from Izmir, a bread shortage had already begun, which was not an unexpected development. Fear deepened when Horton, described as a ‘Greek friend’ by Mihail Rodas, head of the Press Office of the Greek Administration in Izmir, made efforts to feed Greek and Armenian immigrants.

On 2 September, when Stergiadis visited the French Consul, the Mufti of Izmir also visited the British Consul, requesting protection on the grounds that Greek immigrants arriving in the city might burn down Turkish neighbourhoods. As reported by the British Chargé d'Affaires in Athens, Bentick, on 3 September, the Greek authorities had taken no measures to evacuate the immigrants from the city. Aware of this, the Greek Metropolitan of Izmir, Hrisostomos, and the Armenian Archbishop Turian, on the same day that army weapons and ammunition began to be loaded onto Greek transport ships, and were advised by Stergiadis to ‘request protection from the consuls.’ They first went to Lamb (on 4 September) and then to Horton (5 September) but received no satisfactory response.

In Izmir, where officers had sent their families away and public employees whose offices had been closed had left en masse, the martial law declared on 4 September did not provide security for the city and its inhabitants. On 5 September, it was understood that Greek soldiers had begun looting under the slogan ‘Long live Lenin.’ with the slogan ‘Long live Lenin.’ The Thracian Division, which Hacı Anesti was eagerly awaiting in İzmir, would not be able to remedy the situation either. Two battalions of this division, commanded by General Skarlatos, set out to bring order to those approaching the city from the direction of Menemen, but they were unable to stop the soldiers, whose ‘sole purpose was to board the ships,’ and the rest of the division refused to disembark, firing into the air.

The new commander-in-chief of the Greek Army, General Polimenakos, in a military bulletin issued on 7 September, the day he arrived in Izmir, addressed his former comrades-in-arms and advised them to ‘only maintain order and obey,’ stating that ‘this is the only way to save these individuals and the army.’ Faced with the Turkish Army, which was believed to be approaching Izmir, the Greeks and Armenians, seeing/thinking that they had been left to their fate, appear to have followed two paths to salvation at this point. The first was to strengthen the last line of defence that the Asia Minor Defence Organisation (KASÖ), a product of the attempt to isolate the Greek Army from Venizelist officers, was trying to establish in Nif. To this end, volunteers were being enlisted into the organisation, while pressure was being exerted on civilian and military authorities to hand over weapons and ammunition loaded onto transport ships to the KASÖ. The second was a tactical step considered for the worst-case scenario: to sit down for negotiations with the Turks of Izmir. Seeking to calm the rising excitement, the leaders of the communities in Izmir, along with some newspaper owners and opinion leaders, met at the kadı court on Beyler Street on 6 September. This meeting, which ended without result, was likely triggered by the following event reported in a Turkish-language newspaper:

Yesterday, Wednesday morning at ten-thirty, an incident occurred that excited the entire population. For no apparent reason, everyone began to flee, shops closed, and women and children started screaming. Naturally, many windows were broken, and some people were injured while trying to escape. It is clear that such incidents were carried out by some unscrupulous individuals who took advantage of the empty square to loot. It was reported that incidents similar to those in Kemeraltı also occurred in other neighbourhoods of the city.

As decided, a series of decisions taken at the second meeting held at the same place at 9:00 the next morning were put into a ‘declaration’ (Islahat, although it states that those who attended the meeting at the qadi's court on 7 September 1922 would meet every day at 4:00 p.m. at the municipal office to discuss public order, we did not find any information about this meeting taking place on 8 Septemberwe have not found any evidence that this meeting took place). The aforementioned declaration, which drew attention to the critical days being experienced, advised the communities to refrain from any behaviour that would cause distress, such as saying things that would hurt each other's pride or carrying weapons.

It is clear that the Greek occupation of Izmir ended on 8 September. This is because the senior officials of the Greek Administration in Izmir, with the archives of their offices in their possession, boarded the ship named ‘Naksos’ that had been detained for them in the port, showing the permission papers they had obtained from Stergiadis; and in the evening, Kavas Dimos lowered the Greek flag flying over the Government House. At the same time, Stergiadis, accompanied by a Greek crowd shouting ‘damn and hate the traitor,’ was escorted onto an English motorboat and taken to the Iron Duke ship in the harbour. By midnight, Polimenakos, who had boarded a Greek warship anchored in the bay, had informed the War Ministry that the army commander-in-chief would be in Çeşme from noon on 9 September.

On the evening of 8 September, while sailors from the Allied warships were patrolling Punta (Kordon), developments contrary to the decisions we had reported, which had been taken at the second meeting held at the kadı court and announced to the people of Izmir through the press, were taking place. The writings of Fazıl Bey, the Chief Clerk of the Customs Passenger Hall and Treasurer at the Passport Pier, are like photographs of the city:

On 7 and 8 September 1338 (1922), the city of Izmir was virtually abandoned, as Greek military and civil authorities had completely withdrawn, leaving the city and its surroundings without police or gendarmerie, i.e., without law and order. Taking advantage of this anarchy, local Greeks and Armenians, driven by the desire to take their final revenge by burning beautiful İzmir, which they could not capture, leaving no stone unturned, and massacring Turks and Muslims, attacked Islamic neighbourhoods, setting them ablaze with paint and petrol. Upon hearing this, the people were moving their families as far away as possible from this dangerous border to the foothills of Kadifekale, a safe place, leaving no one alive in their homes. No one knew at what hour the army would enter the city. There was a wide and natural area between the Christian and Armenian neighbourhoods and the Islamic neighbourhoods. That was Rahmi Bey Boulevard, which had been opened many years earlier opposite Basmahane Station and is now Fevzi Paşa Boulevard. In accordance with this precaution, we left our house, which was close to the attack zone, filled a sack with some bread and condiments and a set of underwear for each of us, and went to our brother's house, which was relatively far from the danger zone. It was Friday, and we spent the night in excitement and fear. While these precautionary measures were being taken, the militia neighbourhood security organisation sprang into action, arming young men with whatever weapons they could find and stationing them at street corners until dawn. Armed with iron bars, sticks, knives, machetes, and hunting rifles, these selfless young men of the neighbourhood defended the Islamic neighbourhoods against attack and ambush, remaining at their posts until morning. Among them, the bravest and most self-sacrificing young man in our neighbourhood was a young man named Zühtü Efendi... Another citizen, hiding in the cemetery at Musalla Taşı, used a pistol he had obtained to keep watch over the enemy until morning. The brave and courageous Albanian Ali Ağa and Cretan Lütfü Efendi, our patriotic and heroic fellow believers, were exposed to the fire of numerous Armenian gangs and, having exhausted their ammunition, they fell as martyrs there, but they did not allow the aggressors to pass...

C. From the Red of the Turkish Flag to the Red of Fire: 9 September-13 September

As Horton wrote, before noon on 9 September, ‘Turkish cavalry entered Izmir in perfect order...’. The liberation of Izmir and the start of the great fire (afternoon of 13 September) were marked by the Turkish Army's efforts to secure the city on a comprehensive scale (appointments, declaration of martial law, deployment of security units, control of prisoners, work of the military court, etc.). For this reason, we will take a selective approach to the subject and look at it solely from the perspective of the fire.

Nurettin Pasha's two (2) numbered orders given to his subordinate units on 9 September reveal that the Turkish Army was concerned that Izmir would be burned down. Article 9 of the order states, ‘The fire brigade organisations belonging to both the municipality and the neighbourhoods shall be registered and requested in full, and the necessary measures shall be taken for their use in the event of a fire.’ Izzettin Pasha, who was appointed Military Governor of Izmir by Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha after the liberation of Izmir, wrote the following note in his diary on 10 September: "... I entered Izmir at around 9.30 a.m. I went to the governor's office with Muharrem Mazlum (İskora) and Fettah... I took over the governor's office and received visits from prominent figures. I immediately formed an administrative council, a municipal council, and a special committee to fight against the possibility of fire".

Cover of the magazine containing the second instruction mentioned in Article 1 of Nurettin Pasha's (at the end of this article) APPENDIX 2

Although sources remain silent about the names and (if any) work of the members of this committee, Greskoviç, the Fire Chief of İzmir Insurance, states that between 10 and 12 September, in the area stretching from the Armenian Quarter (Haynots/Basmane) to the Tepecik Quarter, there were more fires than recorded in 30 years of fire statistics. This situation demonstrates that the army's concerns were not unfounded. An order sent by Izzettin Pasha to Kazım Bey, Commander of the Eighth Division, who was appointed Commander of the Izmir Garrison and thus responsible for the city's security, a few hours before the outbreak of the great fire, is of utmost importance. The first article of this 23-article order, which begins with the phrase ‘The following measures will be taken for the security of the city of İzmir,’ states that one regiment of the Division will be divided into 10 large stations (500 people), each with 1 commander (captain) and 30 small outposts (900 men), each with one commander and 30 soldiers. The same article, which assigned a regiment of infantry (total: 1,400 men) to act as police for the city's security, divided the city into three districts.

Incidentally, it should be noted that this arrangement was not new. As mentioned earlier, in the two (2) numbered orders issued by Nurettin Pasha to his subordinate units on 9 September, it is stated that Izmir was divided into three security districts: Fasolya, Karantina, and Karşıyaka. The Fasolya District Command, which appears to have been tasked with ensuring the security of the neighbourhood that would be destroyed by the great fire a few days later, was assigned two infantry companies (one of which was incomplete), a demolition unit, four heavy machine guns, a cavalry squad, and a communications detachment (Article 1). The units assigned to the security of these districts were to maintain a squad and a soldier capable of performing police duties at each police station (Article 2). Order No. 40 issued by Kazım Bey to his division on the same day provides further information about the Fasolya District Command. According to this, the 131st Regiment stationed in the hangars in Punta (Alsancak) would provide support when necessary for the security of the district under the command of Major İbrahim Bey (Article 6).

Returning to the 23-article order that we mentioned was sent by İzzettin Pasha to Kazım Bey immediately before the great fire, it was stated that ‘small police stations should be established’ at the entry points (methal) to Izmir to prevent soldiers without documents from entering the city, and that automatic rifles should be placed at important entry points (Article 3). The order stated that ‘a platoon with weapons at the ready should be kept in front of the police stations’ (Article 4) and that it was stated that ‘the province shall provide the police stations with as many police officers as necessary’ and that it shall cooperate with the (First) Corps Command in establishing and ensuring security, and then it was stated that ‘necessary measures shall be taken for the rapid formation of the gendarmerie and police’ (Article 8). The eleventh article of the order, which states, ‘measures must be taken against fire, the fortification unit must be utilised for this purpose, and the fire hydrants in the neighbourhoods must be identified and ensured to be operational,’ also states that soldiers or civilians who engage in looting and dare to violate security shall be shot (Article 10); Those who steal animals shall be referred to the military court of martial law, and within 24 hours, a verdict shall be rendered and executed. (Article 12); (From Article 3 of the first order sent by the Eighth Division Commander Kazım Bey to his subordinate units, signed ‘Kazım, Commander of İzmir and Surrounding Areas,’ martial law was declared in İzmir and its surroundings from the moment the division entered, and in the İzmir barracks (Sarıkışla) 169th Regiment Commander Avni Bey as chairman; 169th Regiment 1st Battalion Commander Cemal Bey, Artillery Battalion Commander Hikmet Bey, Second Corps Artillery Battalion Commander Yaşar Bey, and 135th Regiment (Eighth Division) and 135th Regiment Lieutenant Şemsi Efendi as the prosecutor.) Searching soldiers and civilians who wish to leave the city, arresting those carrying stolen goods and referring them to the military court, collecting such confiscated goods at police stations and transferring them to a public warehouse designated by the district commander (Article 13); the allocation of a car to each district commander for inspection purposes (Article 14); the commanders of large police stations to inspect the small police stations under their jurisdiction several times a day (Article 16); the commanders to fill in the registers to be placed in all large and small police stations after each inspection (Article 17); District and major police station commanders shall be punished if they fail to fill out the aforementioned ledgers twice a day (Article 18).

The numerous data we have used in our article, including published data and some unpublished data in different languages whose content we are aware of, reveal that the Turkish Army made serious efforts to prevent the burning of Izmir and to secure the city. These efforts the economic and psychological difficulties specific to the period, such as the need to pay the price and compensate for losses, prevented the feared outcome from occurring and security breaches from being completely eliminated. The good news is that the data presented in this article has pruned a few more branches from the tree of those who insist on attributing responsibility for the great fire solely to the Turks.

References

Archives

- Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate Archive (Ankara)

ATASE Archive, Folder: 2267, File: 7, Index: 3-66; 3-69 and 3-70.

ATASE Archive, Folder: 2267, File: 4, Index: 164.

- Presidential Atatürk Archive (Ankara)

Presidential Atatürk Archive, A. III-10-6-1, Ds. 46, F. 6, 6-1 and F. 10.

Old Turkish Newspapers

Islahat, 7 and 8 September 1922 (Izmir).

Sada-yı Hak, 7 September 1922 (Izmir).

Şark, 8 September 1922 (Izmir).

Official Publications

- Turkish

1923 Senesi İZMİR Vilayeti İstatistiği (1923 Statistics of the Province of Izmir), Prepared for Publication by Erkan Serçe, Izmir: İBB Kültür Yayını, 2001.

Harp Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi (Journal of War History Documents), Issue: 64, Document No. 1441.

Journal of War History Documents, Issue: 64, Document No. 1443.

Salname-i Vilayet-i Aydın, 1890/1891.

- Greek

Greek Military and Naval Encyclopaedia (Unpublished Typewritten Text at the ATASE Library), Trans. Vasil Kiriakidis, Volume 1.

Copyright Works

Arıkan, Zeki, The Press in Izmir During the Armistice and Occupation Period (30 October 1918-8 September 1922), Ankara, 1989.

Berber, Engin, ‘Some War of Independence Monuments in Izmir and Their Place in Turkish Tourism,’ Dr. Eren Akçiçek'e Armağan, Izmir, 2010.

_____________, Preliminary Report on the Izmir Fire; Case Study: The Burning of Odemiş-Birgi; The Izmir Fire: Preliminary Report Case Study: The Burning of Odemiş-Birgi, Odemiş: Yıldız City Archive and Museum Publication: 3, 2013.

_____________, Troubled Years: Izmir 1918-1922; The Izmir Sanjak during the Armistice and Greek Occupation, Ankara: Ayraç Publishing House, 1997.

_____________, “Life in the Anatolian Countryside during the Greek Occupation: The Example of Foça”, Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean, Edited by: Lorans Tanatar Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis, Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2010.

______________, “Reflections on an Electronic Mail Note Criticising Our Newspaper Article on the Asia Minor Defence Organisation”, Black Sea Studies Journal of Balkan, Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Anatolia Studies, Issue: 16, Winter 2008.

Duru, Orhan, The Years of Turkey's Liberation with American Secret Documents, 2nd Edition, Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001.

Frangakis-Syrett, Elena, ‘A Look at the Economy of Izmir from the 18th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century,’ Izmir at the Threshold of the 21st Century, Trans. Ayşegül Sabuktay, Izmir: Izmir Publishing, 2001.

Report on the Great Fire of Izmir by Mr. Greskoviç, Fire Chief of Izmir Insurance, Istanbul: Hüsnü Tabiat Printing House, 1339.

Kasaba, Reşat, ‘Izmir,’ Port Cities in the Eastern Mediterranean 1800–1914, Ed. Çağlar Keyder, Özveren Y. Eyüp and Quataert, Donald, Istanbul: History Foundation Yurt Publications, October 1994.

Kütükoğlu, Mübahat, ‘The Role of the Port of İzmir and Customs in the Development of Ottoman Foreign Trade,’ Sections from the History of İzmir, İzmir: İzmir Yayıncılık, 2000.

Oeconomos, Lysimachos, The Martyrdom of Smyrna and Eastern Christendom, London, 1922.

Ten Years of War; Notes from the Notebooks of İzzettin Çalışlar on the Balkan, First World and Independence Wars, Edited by İzzeddin Çalışlar, Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010.

Pandelias, Dimitrios G. Blood and Fire, The Last Days of Izmir (Ema ke Pir, İ Televtees Meres tis Smirnis), Athens, 1976.

Raif Nezihi, The History of Izmir, Prepared and Completed with Explanations by Erol Üyepazarcı, Izmir: Izmir Metropolitan Municipality Cultural Publications, 2001.

Rodas, Mihail, Greece in Asia Minor 1918-1922 (İ Ellada sti Mikran Asian), Athens, 1958.

Safvet, New Illustrated and Mapped Geography of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, 1913/14.

Smith, Michael Llewellyn, The Eye on Anatolia, Istanbul, 1978.

Stalin, J. Strategy and Tactics, Trans. A. Fırat, Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 1999.

Şimşir, Bilal, British Documents from Sakarya to Izmir, 1921-1922, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1989.

Ülker, Necmi, ‘The 1688 Earthquake and the Destruction of Izmir,’ XVII and XVIII Centuries in the History of Izmir I, Trade History Research, Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1994.

History of the Greek Nation (Istoria tu Elliniku Ethnus IE), Athens, 1980.

APPENDIX – 1

Dr. Nihad Reşad, Les Grecs a Smyrne; Nouveaux Témoignases et sur leurs Atrocités un Document Officel Probant (The Greeks in Smyrna: New Information and Documents on Greek Atrocities) Translated by: Rahmi Hüseyin Ünal, Edited by: Engin Berber, Izmir Development Agency Cultural Publications- VII; Izmir History Series- III, Izmir, 2022 (16+205pp).

APPENDIX 2

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MEASURES TAKEN BY THE TURKISH ARMY TO PREVENT THE BURNING OF SMYRNA

(9–13 September 1922)

1. Order No. 2 dated 9 September issued by First Army Commander Nurettin Pasha to his subordinate units (Source: Journal of Military History Documents, Issue: 64, Document No. 1441).

Summary: Regarding the fire brigade organisations of municipalities and neighbourhoods being kept ready for use in case of fire and the assignment of military units to perform police duties in three security zones established in Izmir, one in the north of the bay (Karşıyaka) and two in the south (Punta and Karantina).

2. Order No. 40 issued by Kazım Bey, Commander of the Eighth Division, to his division on 9 September (ATASE Archive, Folder: 2267, File: 7, Index: 3-69).

Summary: Regarding the 131st Regiment stationed in the hangars at Punta, which can be used when necessary for the security zone under the responsibility of Major İbrahim Bey.

3. The work of the Commander of the First Corps and Military Governor of Izmir, İzzettin Pasha, on 10 September at the Izmir Province building (Source: Ten Years of War; Notes from the Notebooks of Org. İzzettin Çalışlar on the Balkan, First World and Independence Wars, p. 580).

Summary: Regarding the special committee formed in case of a possible fire.

4. Order given by Commander of the First Corps and Military Governor of Izmir, İzzettin Pasha, to Kazım Bey, Commander of the 8th Division appointed to the Izmir Military Command, on the morning of 13 September (Source: ATASE Archive, Folder: 2267, File: 4, Index: 164).

Summary: Assignment of one regiment of the 8th Division to 10 large and 30 small police stations (total: 1,400 personnel) to ensure the security of İzmir; taking precautions against a possible fire, requesting assistance from the fortification unit in this regard, and identifying and keeping the fire hydrants in the neighbourhoods in working order.