Why Did the Turkish Army Win the Battle of Sakarya?

The Greek army, which landed in Izmir on May 15, 1919 and advanced into Anatolia, could not break the resistance of the Turkish army despite the attacks it made in 1920 and 1921, and attacked again with larger forces in July 1921. The Turkish army, which could not stop this attack, was defeated in the battles in the Kütahya region and retreated to the east of Eskişehir, and when the counterattack there was not successful, signs of disintegration appeared in the troops. Thereupon, the Western Front Commander İsmet (İnönü) Pasha proposed to the General Staff of the General Staff to withdraw the troops as far as they could gather.
The strategy implemented by the Turkish army from the very beginning was based on resisting, detecting, slowing down and stopping these attacks as the Greek army attacked, and strengthening the army in the time gained. The defense of the Turkish army after the east of Eskişehir had to be done on the main strategic road of Ankara-Sivas-Erzurum-Kars, relying on the depths of the country and gradually retreating to this depth when necessary.
For this reason, Fevzi (Çakmak) Pasha, the Deputy of the General Staff of the General Staff, ordered that all the troops be gradually withdrawn to the back of the Sakarya River, leaving the covering troops at the front. Upon this order, the Turkish army withdrew to the east of the Sakarya River until 25 July 1921. The Greek troops, following the Turkish army, advanced to 45 kilometers east of Eskişehir and stopped in this area.
When it was understood that the Turkish army had completely withdrawn, the Greek Army Commander Papulas informed Athens that the first phase of the operation had been completed and was waiting for orders for the second phase. Upon this; A war council convened in Kütahya on 28 July 1921 with the participation of the King, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff.
In this meeting, Papulas said that the desired goal was achieved and there was no need to continue the forward operation, but the prime minister insisted that the offensive should be continued, saying that they were obliged to do this because if they could not succeed in crushing the Turkish army, there would be no benefit from the successes achieved.
Upon this statement of the Prime Minister, Papulas presented his report to the war council. According to this report, the purpose of the attack will be to crush the Turkish forces and destroy the supplies and ammunition in Ankara. However, if the Turks do not surrender, it will be dangerous to stay in Ankara, so it is necessary to destroy the railway and return to Eskişehir.
This report submitted by Papulas was approved and after 20 days of preparation, it was decided that the army would start the forward operation. Thereupon, the Greek army began to prepare an operation plan for the offensive. Meanwhile, the Turkish army is also planning for defense.
While preparing the operational plans, first of all, a situational judgment is made. During the case reasoning, the combat strength of the parties is calculated and compared with each other in order to decide what course of action to take. This process is called relative strength comparison (relative combat power comparison).
Relative combat power is determined based on the study of information on the status of enemy and friendly forces. The main factors of this power are maneuver and fire support units. Issues such as deception, mobility, terrain and weather conditions, troop deployment, logistic support, psychological operations and electronic warfare are additional factors.
Relative strength comparison; It is the sum of the qualitative and quantitative differences of the main and additional factors. The methods used in calculating the relative combat power according to the main factors are numerical comparison and comparison methods with troop effectiveness values. In numerical comparison, the troops of the parties are compared numerically (such as three battalions, five battalions). In comparison with the unit efficiency values, a value is found by treating the unit numbers with various force multipliers arising from their qualitative characteristics.
In this study, the relative combat strength of the Turkish and Greek troops participating in the Battle of Sakarya will be compared and it will be tried to determine why the Turkish army won the battle in the light of the information obtained. While doing this, the operational plans will not be taken into account, only the effects of the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the existing forces of the parties on the outcome of the battle will be revealed.
For this purpose, the Sakarya Pitched Battle will be briefly examined first. After that, respectively; The relative combat power ratios of the maneuver and fire support units, which are considered as the main factors, will be determined in terms of quantity, the results obtained will be evaluated in terms of quality, the additional factors will be compared in terms of quantity and quality, and the results will be presented in the conclusion section.

1. Sakarya Pitched Battle

The Turkish army retreating to the east of the Sakarya River, Ankara Stream-O Central Sakarya chose a defense line passing through the eastern ridges-Ilıcaözü northern ridges-Temürözü-Türbe Tepe-Mangal Mountain line and started to fortify this line as of 25 July 1921. However, places such as Türbe Tepe and Mangal Mountain could not be well fortified as they were steep and stony, and wire barriers could be pulled to some areas due to lack of materials. Water overflows were also made only in the area between Beylikköprü and Tekeköy.
Meanwhile, in the Assembly, there are fierce debates about the defeat, and many deputies want Mustafa Kemal Pasha to lead the army. As a result, on August 5, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was appointed as the commander-in-chief and the authority to use the power of the Assembly was given to him for three months.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who received this authority; He established a Commander-in-Chief Headquarters from the personnel of the General Staff of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense (Ministry of National Defense). An office has also been established to carry out works related to other ministries. In addition, Fevzi Pasha was taken from the Ministry of Defense and appointed as the Deputy of the General Staff.
After that, the work was accelerated to complete the preparations and to gather all the forces that could be used in the east of Sakarya. In order to solve the supply problem, Tekalifi Milliye orders were published on 7-8 August 1921. The headquarters of the Western Front Command is located in Polatlı and the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief is in Alagöz.
As a result of the situational reasoning, it was decided that the Greeks were more likely to make an encircling maneuver from the south. For this reason, the Turkish army was positioned along a line of 80 kilometers and on the first ridges after the river bank. Five divisions were organized to the north of the Eskişehir-Ankara railway line, and 10 divisions to the south, and a two-division group was deployed around Sincanlı as a reserve.
It was decided to make the defense in a way that would resist step by step in the depth of the land and wear out the enemy with limited targeted attacks. Against sieges, the flanks will be protected by cavalry units, long retreats will not be made, when a unit is withdrawn, the unit next to it will not withdraw and will continue to defend by supporting the withdrawn unit.
On August 12, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Fevzi Pasha came to the front and the defense plan was revised. On August 14, the Greek army began to advance. The Western Front Commander, who followed the progress of the Greek army, realized that the Greeks were acting according to the possibility of the Turkish army defending in the Sivrihisar part, and when he saw that there was no defense there, the troops were shifted to the south, and therefore they were planning to carry out a siege operation from the south. Thereupon, he sent the 4th Group, which he kept on guard, to the left wing and the 3rd Group to the left wing.
The Greek army completed its deployment on August 22 and gathered three corps, one of which is missing, between the Yukarı Sakarya and Ilıca Stream arc. The aim of the Greek army commander is to break through the front in the Baraközü and Temirözü regions and to carry out a siege operation from the east. While the Greek army was making a show-off attack with the 7th Division in the Demirci region on August 23, it started an offensive with the 3rd, 1st and 2nd Corps from west to east and captured Mangal Mountain. The 7th Division passed to the east of the river in the form of a raid at night.
On August 24, the Greek army's eight divisions attacked from a 40-kilometer front, again hitting the forces of 10 divisions on the east of the Polatlı-Yıldız Mountain line. As a result of the ongoing attacks on August 25, Türbe Tepe was captured by the Greeks, but was taken back with a counterattack.
On August 26, while the Greek army was besieging the Turkish army from the south and east, it tried to unite with the 7th Division, which was attacking in the east-west direction. The Turkish army prevented the 2nd Greek Corps from besieging from the east and had the opportunity to shift forces to the left flank, but when the 2nd Group had to withdraw, the danger of splitting the front arose.
Upon this dangerous development, Mustafa Kemal Pasha informed the Minister of Interior that there was a possibility that the battles would go as far as Ankara, that the parliament, the government and the people who needed to leave Ankara should be transferred from Ankara to Kayseri and that these works should be completed by 29 August. . However, the Greeks could not reinforce their success with enough force and the troops continued to defend on the back ridge.
The cooperation and harmony of the Turkish command team has also been effective in this. At a time when the situation was most critical, Fevzi Pasha informed the Front Commander that success could be achieved by defending step by step. Inspired by this, the Commander-in-Chief gave the famous order that started with "There is no line defense, there is only surface defense...". This order means that the defense will not be carried out on a certain line, but in the whole region extending from the contact line to Ankara, step by step. The purpose of this is to wear out the enemy forces. To deprive him of the ability and power to continue the offensive.
When the Greek offensive was stopped, the order to move to Kayseri was cancelled. On August 27, Türbe Tepe was lost, but the defense continued on the ridges behind. The Greeks, who could not break the front and make a siege during the day, tried to break through the front with a night attack, but they had to be content with positional successes. After that, the Greek army tried to encircle the Turkish army from the eastern flank of the front with the 2nd Corps, on the one hand, and tried to break through the front with other corps, until 30 August.
Although he achieved some successes that could break the front from time to time, he could not get a result because he could not reinforce these successes with enough troops. On the other hand, as the Greek army moved eastward to lay siege, large gaps emerged between the corps, making coordination impossible.
Due to the intense fighting that continued for eight days, the Greek corps suffered so many casualties that it became impossible for them to make an effective attack. Moreover, due to the raids of the Cavalry Corps behind the front, the soldiers cannot eat properly, as the supply is interrupted. As a result of this, the severity of the Greek offensive began to break down on 31 August. Realizing this situation, Mustafa Kemal Pasha informed Refet (Bele) Pasha, the Deputy of the National Defense, that the battles had become a war of attrition and that success depended on uninterrupted supply.
After the bloody battles on September 1, 1921, on September 2, the 1st Greek Corps captured Çal Mountain at the expense of heavy casualties, but could not go further. Thereupon, Papulas, who saw that the troops were quite worn out, rested the Greek army in the positions it was on on 3 September. When he failed to achieve a significant success on September 4, he put his troops on the defensive and informed the Greek government that he saw no benefit in continuing the offensive.
When the Greek army did not attack on 5 and 6 September 1921, the Turkish army made reconnaissance raids in various regions on the night of 6/7 September. As a result, it was determined that the Greek army left weak units ahead and gathered most of its units behind. on September 7; The Greek Minister of Defense wrote a report to the Prime Minister and stated that the struggle was about to take on the character of positional battles and that he saw the continuation of the operation as dangerous.
On September 8, Papulas stated that the army has not spared its best so far, that prolonging the operation would be dangerous and asked the government to express its opinion on arranging military measures. The Prime Minister replied to this that he should decide only on the basis of military requirements, regardless of the influence of all kinds of political ideas and ambitions.
The Turkish army understood that the Greeks were about to withdraw from the movements made on September 9, 1921, and started a general counter-attack early in the morning of September 10. Dua Tepe was captured and some progress was made in other areas. Thereupon, Papulas informed that the 2nd Corps began to retreat and that the 3rd Corps' surplus material was sent to the Kavuncu Bridge.
Having received this order, the Greek troops began to cross to the west of Sakarya on the evening of 11/12 September 1921. The withdrawal was completed on the evening of 12/13 September and the Greek army took a defensive order between the Porsuk Stream and the upper part of the Sakarya River. Thus, the Battle of Sakarya, which had been going on for 22 days and 22 nights, came to an end.

2. Relative Combat Power

Before the Battle of Sakarya, the Greek Army of Asia Minor; It consists of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps (nine divisions) and detached units directly attached to the army command. These units affiliated to the army; It consists of 4th and 11th Divisions, Independent Division, Cavalry Brigade, 9th, 49th, 18th and 47th Infantry Regiments and support units.
The Turkish army is the Crew Corps (3 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, one cavalry regiment), 12th (one infantry division), 4th (two infantry divisions), 3rd (three infantry divisions), 2nd (three infantry divisions) and the 1st (two infantry divisions) Group and the 5th Cavalry Division (a cavalry division and a cavalry brigade) and detached troops. Independent units affiliated to the Front Command; It consists of the 6th and 57th Division, the 3rd Caucasian Division, the Crew Division, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Division, the Independent Cavalry Brigade, the 47th, 48th and 49th Infantry Regiments, the 29th Cavalry Regiment and other units.
In the light of this information, it is possible to compare the relative combat power of the two sides, but a comparison made according to the amount of troops given above will not give an accurate result. Because the amount of personnel, vehicles, weapons and equipment of the troops of the two sides is quite different from each other. For example, Papulas states that before the Battle of Sakarya, a Turkish division consisted of 2,700 personnel and a Greek division consisted of 5,200 personnel.
In this case, it is necessary to apply a comparative method with the union efficiency values. However, we do not have any information on the force efficiency values ​​of the Turkish and Greek troops. For this reason, the comparison; weapon, vehicle, equipment It will be made on the basis of t and personnel figures. The above-mentioned Turkish and Greek units show all the units of the parties in the Western Front operation area. Some of these units did not actually participate in the Sakarya Pitched Battle. For this reason, only the forces involved in combat will be taken into account in the relative combat power comparison.
Turkish forces, excluding Kocaeli Cavalry Brigade and national detachments, which did not actually participate in the battle, and 6th Division, Crew Division and range units; It consists of 5,401 officers, 96,326 privates, 54,572 rifles, 825 machine guns, 169 cannons, 32,137 animals, 1,284 cars and two planes. Greek forces, excluding the 4th Division, 11th Division, Independent Division and independent regiments, which did not actually participate in the battle; It consists of 3,780 officers, 120,000 privates, 75,900 rifles, 2,768 machine guns, 286 cannons, 3,800 animals, 600 three-ton trucks, 240 one-ton trucks and 18 aircraft. In the light of this information, the force comparison of the Turkish and Greek armies in terms of the main factors is presented in the table in the pictures.

3. Evaluation of Main Factors in terms of Quantity and Quality

When we look at the table, it is seen that the Turkish army is superior to the Greek army only in the number of animals and the number of officers, while the Greek army is superior in all other areas. The superiority in the number of animals is due to the large number of cavalry units of the Turkish army and the fact that the supply activities are carried out by carts pulled by animals.
It can be said that the superiority of the Turkish army in the number of animals used for transportation shows the weakness in the carrying capacity, not the superiority in terms of strength comparison. Because while the personnel and cargo transportation activities in the Greek army are carried out by motor vehicles, there are almost no motor vehicles in the Turkish army. Motor vehicles are both faster and have more carrying capacity than animal-pulled cars.
However, it is understood that the carrying capacity of the Turkish army does not create a great weakness in terms of meeting the needs. Considering that there are no proper roads suitable for the use of motor vehicles in Anatolia and that Turkish supply routes are shorter than Greek supply routes, it can even be said that the Turkish army is more advantageous in terms of supply activities.
Considering the amount of cavalry in the Turkish army, it is seen that there are four cavalry divisions, two cavalry brigades and two cavalry regiments participating in the battle. There is only one cavalry brigade in the Greek army. Brigades have two regiments, divisions have three regiments. Accordingly, 16 cavalry regiments in the Turkish army and two cavalry regiments in the Greek army participated in the battle. The amount of cavalry in the Turkish army is eight times more than the Greek army. In other words, the maneuverability of the Turkish army is far superior to that of the Greek army.
This is a force multiplier for the Turkish army. This force multiplier was used effectively in combat. For example, as soon as the Greek army moved from Eskişehir and Afyon regions, the cavalry was used as a cover force to delay their forward movement and to discover their strength, marching direction and targets. As the covering forces constantly harassed the Greek forces during the advance, the departure time of the Greek army was prolonged.
Cavalry units were also used effectively during the war. With a cavalry division and a cavalry regiment in the Crew Corps establishment, it was possible to cover a large area on the right flank (north) of the front. The remaining cavalry units are deployed to flank the enemy attacking the left flank. The two cavalry divisions, which were initially used under the command of the group on the far left of the front, were given the command of the Cavalry Group on 30 August and the left wing of the front was secured until the end of the defensive battles.
The Turkish cavalry units also attacked the enemy's flanks and rears with great audacity during the defense, causing the decisive result to separate the forces from the place. In addition, the supply convoys were ambushed by infiltrating the enemy's rear, and the supply points were raided. In fact, a raid was made on the Greek army headquarters in Uzunbey on 27 August and the Greek Army Commander Papulas and his headquarters were able to escape at the last moment by withdrawing to the north. Due to these attacks on command posts, range lines and supply points, the Greek army experienced supply and command and control difficulties.
Since there was only one cavalry brigade in the Greek army, the mobility and maneuver superiority of the cavalry could not be utilized. The cavalry brigade tried to prevent the infiltration of the Turkish cavalry units and to protect the flank of the 2nd Corps from harassment and raids. For this reason, it was not possible to benefit from the success achieved by cavalry troops entering the rift at the moments when the front was split, as when Çaldağ fell on September 2, 1921.
It is understood that the use of the cavalry forces in this way, besides the numerical disproportion, was also effective in the qualities of the horses used by both sides. Turkish horses are small, YUnan horses are larger animals. For this reason, the Turkish cavalry always avoided engaging in close combat with the Greek cavalry.
Although Turkish horses are small, they are resistant to Anatolian conditions and are very fast animals. Greek horses, on the other hand, are old horses that were also used in the Balkan War and cannot run fast because they cannot eat enough barley and grass. For this reason, the Turkish cavalry units were able to easily harass the Greek infantry both during the transition and during the battle, and quickly moved away from the region without engaging in close combat with the Greek cavalry.
The second superiority of the Turkish army, the superiority in the number of officers, is also more important than the superiority of the cavalry. As a matter of fact, Papulas, in his memoirs, shows that one of the most important advantages of the Turkish army is the abundance of officers and that these officers know their hometown well. For this reason, he specifically mentioned the need for junior officers in the telegrams he sent to his country and asked for an officer to be sent.
The difference in the number of officers is due to the events in the recent past of the two countries. When Greece doubled its territory in the Balkan War, it was decided to enlarge the army, and for this, three corps with three divisions and a corps with two divisions were established. But the rapid growth of the army caused a shortage of officers. After the struggle of the King and Prime Minister Venizelos, who could not agree to participate in the First World War in 1916, when the King left the country in 1917, the officer shortage increased as 2000 officers were dismissed from the army because they were royalists.
Moreover, the Greek army had to grow even more during the National Struggle. This situation made the officer shortage irreparable. In 1920, when the Venizelos government fell and the Venizelist officers in the army left their units and started to go to Istanbul, the inadequacy of the officer cadres became grave. This deficiency was tried to be compensated by making reserve officers and non-commissioned officers, some of whom were illiterate. The officer needs of large unit headquarters and commands were also met by promoting junior officers.
There are many officers in the Turkish army. Because, during the First World War, many armies were established and officers were trained for these armies. At the end of the war, the total personnel of the Ottoman army, which consisted of eight armies and detached units, was more than 400 thousand. During the National Struggle, the army could never reach this number, so there was no significant officer shortage.
Turkish officers are also superior to Greek officers in terms of qualifications. Most of the Turkish officers participated in the battles on many fronts during the First World War and gained combat experience. Greece, on the other hand, joined the war on July 2, 1917, with only one corps in the Macedonian Front. For this reason, the number of officers with combat experience is very small.
Besides war experience, the biggest difference between officer cadres is the way they come to office. The officers of the Greek army were appointed to their positions by the army; Turkish officers participated in the war voluntarily. For this reason, they secretly fled to Anatolia from the regions under the control of the Entente Powers.
Due to this numerical and qualitative weakness, Papulas did not make any major changes in the unit commanders and headquarters officers after he was appointed to the Army Command. In addition, some of the officers who were dismissed from the army during the Venizelos period were recruited again. However, since the Venizelist officers, who used to be their subordinates, took one or two ranks in Anatolia, these officers became subordinates of the Venizelist young officers. Thereupon, they were also promoted and assigned positions. Thus, a large number of unemployed powerless high-ranking officers emerged.
According to the table, when it comes to the issues where the Greek army is superior; The first thing that draws attention is the superiority in the number of soldiers. However, this is not a huge advantage. Moreover, Turkish soldiers have the superiority of qualifications that can balance the numerical superiority of the Greek army. The Ottoman Empire recruited 2,850,000 people during the First World War, and most of these soldiers were recruited from Anatolia. For this reason, there are many war-experienced soldiers in the Turkish army and especially small unit commanders such as sergeants and corporals.
This was beneficial for the recruits to quickly adapt to the war environment. Also, veteran soldiers have set an example for new soldiers in difficult times, making them fight to the end. But the same is not true for the Greek army. Moreover, the Greek army also recruited Greeks who were Ottoman citizens. Since these soldiers did not serve in the Ottoman army, they have no experience in military service.
It is seen that the Greek army is also superior in terms of infantry rifles and machine guns. Especially the machine gun superiority is quite evident. This gives the Greek army a fire advantage. This superiority also goes beyond the technology of weapons. is worthwhile. The weapons of the Greek army are relatively new weapons obtained from England and France. The Turkish army, on the other hand, has old weapons, most of which were used in World War I.
Moreover, the rifles in the Turkish army; They are different weapons produced in many countries such as Paraguay, USA (common martin and common martin), German (small and large-caliber mauser), Russian, Mexico, Austria, England, France, Belgium and Bulgaria. Machine guns, like infantry rifles, were procured from many different countries. This negatively affected firepower as it made it impossible to provide a standard.
The Greek army is also superior to the Turkish army in terms of the number of cannons. This superiority is further increased by the fact that the gun models in the Turkish army are old and of different origin, as is the case with rifles and machine guns. However, the Turkish army is superior to the Greek army in terms of the number of heavy artillery. There are seven fifteen-gun howitzers in the Turkish army. There is no useful heavy artillery in the Greek army. The heavy artillery available are those used and worn in Verdun and Thessaloniki.
In the First World War, it was revealed that the infantry defending the positions fortified with barbed wire and supported by machine guns could not be neutralized with light artillery. For this reason, it can be said that the lack of heavy artillery of the Greek army reduced its combat power. As a matter of fact, Papulas, in his memoirs, shows that the Turkish army's heavy artillery being more and his own heavy artillery being both less and worse in terms of quality is one of the most important reasons for the failure. It is understood from the memories of İsmet Pasha, the Commander of the Western Front, that he also agreed.
When the number of swords of the Greek and Turkish armies is examined, it is seen that the amount of swords on both sides is very close to each other. The sword is a weapon used by cavalrymen and officers. It is not considered to have had a major impact on the outcome of the battle.
The greatest advantage of the Greek army over the Turkish army is the superiority in the number of motor vehicles. This provides an important advantage for carrying out supply activities and transporting soldiers when necessary when they are away from the railway line.
Another great numerical advantage of the Greek army is the superiority in the number of aircraft. Greek planes are also superior to Turkish planes in terms of technology. Because Greek planes are relatively new planes bought from England and France. Turkish planes are very old and collectible planes. For this reason, the Greeks used the planes effectively in reconnaissance, surveillance, prevention, bombardment and air-to-ground attack missions. However, because the planes had very limited capacity, they could not have as big an impact on the outcome of the battle as the superiority ratio.

4. Evaluation of Additional Factors

Additional factors of relative combat power comparison; deception, mobility, terrain and weather conditions, deployment of troops, logistic support, morale, characteristics of the command staff and command and control system will be discussed.
It is seen that the Greek army did not resort to deception measures in the operative and strategic field. The Turkish army, on the other hand, attached great importance to deception measures at the operative and strategic level. For this purpose, cavalry units were used as a covering force. Since the 1st Group was positioned on the Sivrihisar-Mihalıççık line until the Greek army advanced and made contact, the Greeks were given the opinion that a defense would be made on this line.
Before the operation, Papulas thought that although he received information that the Turkish army was in the east of Sakarya, he might have withdrawn to Sivrihisar and its south. However, being unsure of this, he planned the forward operation in two possibilities, as the Turkish army might have been organized on the Sivrihisar line or east of Sakarya. For this reason, he moved most of his forces from both sides of the railway until they came to the Sivrihisar-Mihalıççık line. When he realized that there would be no defense here, he shifted his troops to the south. This situation caused the Greek offensive plan to be revealed.
When evaluated in terms of maneuverability and mobility, it is seen that the Turkish army is in a superior position. There are two main reasons for this superiority. The first of these is that there are more cavalry units in the Turkish army. Cavalry forces enabled the Turkish army to carry out an effective cover-up operation in the corrupt and barren Anatolian steppe, to protect the open side of the defense line, to quickly move troops from one region to another, and to maneuver in a very wide area.
The second reason for the superiority of maneuver and mobility is that the Turkish army has more divisions with a lower presence than the Greek army. The Turkish command staff did not change this organizational structure until the end of the National Struggle, as the presence of a small number of divisions increased their maneuverability and there were enough officers for these units. In reality In nth, the divisions were able to be withdrawn from one part of the front during the battle and quickly moved to other places where they were needed. It is considered that this is the most important reason for the success of the volatile defense applied by the Turkish army. Large and cumbersome Greek divisions could not be used with the same flexibility.
The use of group organization in the Turkish army also has an effect on this. When the Southern Front Command was abolished on 3 May 1921 and the front was united under the name of the Western Front Command, there were problems in the management and administration of many divisions spread over a wide front, and groups consisting of two or more divisions were established.
The group organization, which was used until the end of the Sakarya Pitched Battle, has a rather small headquarters compared to the corps organization. Unlike the corps, there are no logistics and administrative units. Since these activities were carried out by the Front Command, it was possible to quickly send groups from one place to another and even change the organizational structure when necessary.
Weather and terrain conditions also provide advantages for the Turkish army. Because geography creates effects that reduce the power of the Greek army. This situation is an inevitable result of the wrong decisions taken by the Greek army at the strategic level. Despite being warned by the French and British military representatives during the London Conference, it is a mistake for the Greek army to carry out such a long-range operation. Moreover, the consequences of acting in this way have been evident in some recent battles.
For example, Napoleon advanced 900 kilometers to Moscow, but was eventually defeated. Ankara is 600 kilometers from Izmir and Sivas is 900 kilometers away. The British, advancing on the Iraqi Front in World War I, were defeated by the Ottoman forces in Selman-ı Pak, 600 kilometers from Basra.
The exit positions of the Greek army are also quite far from the battlefield. The distance from Eskişehir to Ankara is 265 kilometers via Sivrihisar and 300 kilometers by the Çifteler-İnler road. Moreover, the weather conditions of Anatolia create very important problems for conducting such long-range operations. For example, the heavy rainy season starts in September when the operation is carried out. There are vague road traces in the region, where wheeled vehicles can only be used in summer, but not impassable in winter. For this reason, the Greek army faced great difficulties while using its motor vehicles.
The Turkish army, on the other hand, was able to easily use these roads, which can be crossed in all seasons, with unsprung carts pulled by oxen, since all transportation works were done with animals. Since the supply routes of the Turkish army were also very short, the supply activities could be carried out without any significant disruption.
The Turkish army is also in an advantageous position in terms of the location, shape and other characteristics of the defense positions. Since the Ankara Stream region to the north of the defense line is steep, it is not suitable for large troops to make a siege. Because the Sakarya River is narrow, it is suitable for building bridges, but the land after the river allows defense in lines behind each other until Ankara.
The south of the line also poses significant difficulties to the siege operation. In order to be successful in the siege, it is necessary to move far south. The siege force shifting to the south has to give the rest to a waterless, roadless and arid land section. In addition, the fact that the roads from Ankara extend like fans all over the front and that the railway is close to the northern wing, which is difficult to besieged, increases the defense power of the position.
The shape of the defense line also provides an advantage for the Turkish army. The defensive line is semicircular or “L” shaped. The Turkish army is located in the inner part of this line (in the position of domestic lines). As the guards are located in Haymana, in the middle of the line connecting the semicircle, it is a short distance from all parts of the front. For this reason, they were able to intervene quickly in the areas needed. Since the distance from one end of the defense line to the other was short, the troops could also be quickly moved from one area to the other.
For this reason, the Turkish army gathered all its forces in the region to be defended and was able to engage in combat in the regions it needed. As the center of gravity of the Greek army changed, by using his precaution and withdrawing troops from the region where the intensity of the battle was low, creating a new reserve, he formed the majority of the force in this region.
The opposite is true for the Greek army. For the Greek army on the outer lines, the distance between the two ends of the front line is too much. For this reason, the Greek army had to expand the offensive front, which was 50 kilometers on 22 August, to 90 kilometers on 24 August. According to the manuals of that period, the front of the Greek army of 10 divisions was 40 kilometers maximum. The Greek army spread to a 90-kilometer front, reducing its offensive power from the very beginning. For this reason, it could not establish contact, joint influence and a strong weight center among the corps. 
truck.
From a logistical point of view, it is seen that the Turkish army was quite inadequate before the battle. Moreover, the opportunity to obtain new logistics resources is also limited. The need for weapons, vehicles and materials is tried to be met with those smuggled from the warehouses in Istanbul and those sent from the Eastern Front and the Elcezire Front. Outsourcing can only be made from Russia. These resources are insufficient to meet the urgent needs before the battle in a short time. For this reason, with the Tekalif-i Milliye orders, the needs of the people were collected from the people.
There are also some logistical problems in the Greek army. In the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battle, shoes and clothes were worn, some of the rifles, equipment and cannons were damaged, and some of them became completely unusable. However, Greece has the opportunity to make up for these deficiencies from internal and external sources. However, sufficient clothing, equipment and weapons could not be supplied before the battle.
This is because the distance from the Greek mainland to the front is so great that it takes at least 15 days for personnel and materials to reach the front. Since the majority of the Greek army moved away from the railway line from the beginning of the war, the supply from the railway was made by motor vehicles. As the freight cars were moving in a roadless area, they were soon worn out, malfunctioned and their numbers decreased.
When the Turkish cavalry units infiltrated behind the front and attacked the vehicle convoys, the Greek army had difficulty in supplying enough. The disruption of the supply caused a decrease in morale. In any case, the morale of the Greek army is not good even before the battle. The morale of the Greek army has decreased due to the increase in casualties in the battles since the beginning of 1921, and the war that has been going on for three years, against the Turkish army, which has passed to the establishment of a regular army. As a matter of fact, after the victory of the Kütahya Eskişehir Battles, the soldiers were handing out medals in Eskişehir; "Discharge! Discharge!" they shouted.
When we look at the Turkish side, a quite different picture appears. The defeat and loss of a large piece of land; The army created a great trauma in the parliament and the people, but this situation caused an emotional development not in the direction of surrender, but in the opposite direction. This is due to the belief of the military leaders in victory and the fact that they read the current situation well and explained it in the parliament.
For example, Fevzi Pasha, in his speech in the Assembly, said that the advance of the Greeks into Anatolia brought them closer to their graves. The Commander of the Western Front, on the other hand, stated in the statements he published that the aim of the Turkish army was to destroy the Greek army in a way that it would not be able to survive in Anatolia, and that this definite result would be achieved with the help of the terrain structure.
On the other hand, while there is complete unity and solidarity in the Turkish army, there is no unity and solidarity in almost any level of the Greek army. In 1914, the conflict between the King and Venizelos, who advocated the policy of neutrality, fell apart, and with the help of the Entente States, Venizelos made the King leave the country. This situation caused the country to be divided into two as royalists and Venizelists.
This disintegration, which also spread to the army, continued when Venizelos fled abroad and the King returned to the country. For this reason, Venizelist unit commanders were dismissed and Royalist officers and generals were appointed in their place. This change weakened the Greek army. Because Papulas, who was brought to the Army Command, and most of the newly appointed corps and division commanders are people who have been away from the battlefields for a long time. For this reason, they do not have sufficient combat experience.
Moreover, this change could not provide unity and solidarity in the command levels of the Greek army. Although they are on the same side politically, the command staff cannot come to an agreement with each other due to personal reasons. For example, there has been disagreement from the beginning between the General Staff Headquarters and the Army Headquarters. There are also intense conflicts between the unit commanders and the subordinate unit commanders and headquarters officers. The Greek army commander Papulas also does not have good relations with the subordinate unit commanders. This situation led to discussions between Papulas and the 2nd Corps Commander, Prince Andre, on 9-10 September 1921, the most critical period of the war for the Greek army.
The unit commanders of the Turkish army, on the other hand, were in the great management and administration staff in the First World War and gained important experience from the battles of the National Struggle until that time. For this reason, they were able to move the troops they commanded like a machine. The qualities of the people in the top management of the army were also effective in this.
Clausewitz said, “As the soldiers collapsed one by one, the whole weight of the internal resistance of the masses was gradually put on the will of the commander-in-chief, that the fire in his heart and the light in his head were the aim of everyone. He emphasizes how important the commander-in-chief is for the success of an army, saying that he must rekindle the fire and the light of hope, and that he can dominate the masses only to the extent that he can do this. For this reason, it is possible to say that the most important issue affecting the combat power is the quality differences between the commanders-in-chief and army commanders of the two sides.
In the Battle of Sakarya, the Front Commander of the Turkish army was İsmet Pasha, and the Commander-in-Chief was Mustafa Kemal Pasha. When these two commanders are compared with their counterparts in the Greek army, the first striking difference is that the Greek command staff is older than the Turkish command staff. İsmet Pasha is 37 years old and Mustafa Kemal Pasha is 40 years old. Papulas and the King are much older than them.
For this reason, the Greek army's command committee is not as assertive as the Turkish army's command committee. The training and experience of the Greek army's command staff is not as good as the Turkish army's command staff. According to İsmet Pasha, since the Greek army did not enter the world war, he did not know the combat methods of the time. That's why he lost the war.
To understand this, it is sufficient to compare the high command teams of the two sides. For example, İsmet Pasha graduated from the Mühendislikhane-i Hati Hümayun and Erkan-ı Harbiye Schools with honors. After graduating from school, he served in almost every level of headquarters and unit commanders. During these duties, he participated in many battles and increased his war knowledge and experience.
He participated in the suppression of the 1911 Yemeni Revolt and commanded the corps in the Eastern and Palestine-Syrian Fronts during the First World War. During the National Struggle; He was appointed as the Deputy of the General Staff (Minister of General Staff) first, and as the commander of the units in the northern part of the Western Front on November 10, 1920. After the Second Battle of İnönü, he became the Commander of the Western Front and continued this duty without interruption until the Battle of Sakarya.
The Greek army commander Papulas is a successful officer who received his Military Academy training in Berlin. However, he is too weak to be compared with İsmet Pasha in terms of both his headquarters and unit command experience and his war experience. His entire war experience consists of the Turkish-Greek War of 1897 and the Balkan Wars. He participated in the Balkan War as a regimental commander and became a general due to his success.
 Papulas could not serve as a general for a long time. Because during the Venizelos government, he was arrested and imprisoned on the grounds of being a royalist and remained in prison until 4 November 1920. He was appointed commander of the Asia Minor Army on 7 November 1920, three days after he was released from prison. Papulas, who has not commanded a larger unit than a regiment on the battlefields, is not at a level enough to command an army during a difficult and ambiguous war in terms of his general knowledge and military lore and upbringing. He was chosen as the commander because he remained loyal to the king and was imprisoned between 1917-1920. In other words, he came to this position not because of his merit, but because of his loyalty.
As a great unit commander, he gained all his war experience in the battles with İsmet Pasha. In these battles, he learned by experience that İsmet Pasha was a very determined and astute commander. For this reason, after the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battles, he was reluctant to move forward. Papulas, who continues the forward operation under the pressure of the Prime Minister, has no belief in victory from the beginning. Because he is afraid that a disaster will happen and he thinks that the Turks will become stronger thanks to the mobilization.
İsmet Pasha also recognized Papulas' personality in the battles he fought throughout 1921. According to him, Papulas; He is a commander who has a command over the military, always at the head of the soldier, who prepares and dispatches the soldier well, but whose nerves are quickly deteriorated. When the battle is prolonged, his nerves start to work in reverse, and delusions dominate his direction and administration.
In addition, he thinks that the forces under his command are not sufficient since he is in a large continent like Anatolia. When he sees an unexpected resistance, he quits the struggle after struggling for two or three days. Being cautious and cautious, he gives the order to withdraw before time in battle to avoid danger. Because of this personality trait, Papulas always feared disaster. In this way, he never suffered a disaster, but he did not win any battle. Because he doesn't trust himself. Prince Andre, on the other hand, claims that he does not understand the art of war.
The situation does not change at the level of commanders-in-chief. According to the Greek constitution, the King is the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Forces. He participated in the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 and the Balkan War. He served as a regimental commander in the Balkan War, but his military career came to an end soon after he became king. Moreover, after the events of 1916-17, he abdicated and went to Switzerland, staying away from the army and his country.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha graduated from the Military Academy and the Military Academy. After graduating, he worked as a headquarters officer and unit commander in units at different levels. He fought in Tripoli in 1911, took part in the Balkan War, and commanded the corps and army in Çanakkale, the Eastern Front and the Syrian Front in the First World War. At the end of the war, he was appointed as the Commander of the Yıldırım Army Group. In other words, he came to his position not because his father was the king, but because of his own efforts and talents.
The most important feature of the Turkish command team is that they participated in many battles together and knew each other very well. This made it easier for them to work in harmony. The Greek command staff, on the other hand, had never served together in any battle before. Some of them have never even worked together before.
The Turkish command team has some advantages in terms of the command and command system they are in, as well as their qualitative advantages. First of all, there are great differences between the powers and responsibilities of the two command posts. For example, the Greek king declared himself the head of the army and came to Izmir in June 1921, and according to the constitution he is the commander-in-chief of the King's Land and Naval Forces, but during the trip, the prime minister, the war minister and other high-ranking military officials discussed the actual execution of the king's command-in-chief. and decided to keep the King out of administration and administration.
For this reason, the King did not interfere in anything during the battle. The army is led by Papulas, but he also has no power to decide everything. Papulas, who took the operative decisions on his own, felt the need to get the approval of the Prime Minister in strategic decisions. For example, when he decided to withdraw the army, he had to wait for the prime minister's telegram to approve it.
On the Turkish side, there is a completely different situation. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was appointed to this task by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Moreover, besides the task of leading the army as the commander-in-chief, he was also given the authority to use the power of the Assembly in every field necessary for the war. In other words, unlike the King, who has neither political nor military power, he is the highest authority in both matters.
However, the operations, personnel and logistics activities of the battles on the front were planned and implemented by the Front Commander and his headquarters. The Commander-in-Chief already has a very small headquarters, which is not sufficient for these tasks. In other words, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief is not a planning authority, but an authority that makes the final decisions, ensures coordination between the government, the Assembly and the army, and closely monitors the battles.
For this reason, İsmet Pasha reviewed the situation with the Front Command Headquarters every evening, made the next day's orders an order, and took it to the Commander-in-Chief and explained it. The Commander-in-Chief made the final decision or approved the decision and did so quickly by being at the front. The next day, the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff Fevzi Pasha went to the places they deem necessary and helped the unit commander. Thus, the Front Commander was not as indecisive as Papulas in implementing his decisions.

Conclusion:

It is seen that the Greek army has a relative combat power superiority in almost every field compared to the Turkish army in terms of numerical values ​​that show the main factors. However, considering that today, in military planning, three-to-three superiority is generally sought to be able to attack, it is understood that the numerical superiority of the Greek army is not enough to make an effective attack.
Considering the situation of vehicles, weapons and ammunition, it is seen that the Greek army also has technological superiority compared to the Turkish army. It can be said that this superiority increases the troop efficiency values ​​and compensates for the numerical inadequacy of the Greek army in the comparison of relative combat power.
The Turkish army is numerically superior only in terms of animals, heavy artillery and officers. The superiority in the number of animals is actually an indicator of a weakness in the supply activities. However, the superiority resulting from the large amount of cavalry units constitutes a very important force multiplier in terms of maneuverability and mobility compared to relative combat power.
Considering the superiority in the number of heavy cannons, it is not possible to determine the effects of this superiority. However, since the commanders of both armies agreed on the same issue, it is certain that the superiority achieved in terms of heavy artillery had a positive effect on the relative combat power of the Turkish army.
The superiority in the number of officers is a very important force multiplier in terms of both facilitating the administration and enabling the establishment of smaller and more divisions. Because the establishment of many small divisions has increased the maneuverability and mobility of the army.
Within the framework of this information, it is evaluated that the relative combat power of the Greek army is superior according to the main factors and especially in terms of quantity. But additional factors When examined, the Turkish army; In terms of deception, mobility, terrain and weather conditions, troop deployment, logistical support, morale, unity and integrity, command systems and motivation, it seems to have a distinct advantage over the Greek army.
The most important superiority of the Turkish army against the Greek army is the superiority of the soldiers and officers and the command staff at all levels, from the smallest unit to the commander-in-chief. Thanks to this superiority, the defense area has been chosen in a place and in a way that will compensate for the weaknesses in the relative combat power and increase the superiorities.
The defense plan and the type of operation on which this plan is based (volatile defense) have also been chosen in such a way as to get the maximum benefit from the army's advantages such as mobility and maneuverability. The successful execution of the planned operation by moving the troops like a machine without deviating from the goal has also shown how great a difference this superiority of quality makes.
As a result, it can be said that the most important reason why the Sakarya Pitched Battle was won by the Turkish army, which is weaker in terms of numerical values, is the result of the superiority of the army's soldiers, officers and generals.
Note: It was presented as a paper at the Sakarya Melhame-i Kübrasi: Sakarya Pitched Battle Symposium on the 100th Anniversary on September 19, 2021 at the Turkish Military Academy.

References
Yayınlanmış Arşiv Belgeleri:
Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi (ATBD)
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