Those Who Moved Ships Over Land. Legends and Truths (Part I)

Although the phrase ‘those who move ships over land’ immediately brings to mind Mehmed the Conqueror, moving ships over land has been a known warfare tactic since centuries before the Common Era. It was impossible for Mehmed, who had received an excellent education, not to know these tactics. We know that Mehmed read the original Iliad by Homer, who lived in the 8th century BC.

As is well known, ships are built on land and then ceremoniously launched into the sea on slipways. We cannot even imagine how difficult it is to pull them back onto land, transport them overland, and launch them into the sea again elsewhere. We are researching how many times this event has occurred throughout history, whether it is fact or legend, and if it is fact, how much of it is true.

1. The earliest known instance of ships being transported overland was recounted by Herodotus, who lived between 484 and 425 BC.

In Book IV, Chapter 179 of The Histories, Herodotus recounts the legendary story of the Argo, the first ship in history to be transported overland. The name of the ship, Argo, comes from Argus, the person who named it. The word ‘Argonauts’ literally means ‘sailors of the Argo’. The Argonauts lived before the Trojan War in the 12th or 13th century BC.

"After Argus had built his ship, he placed a bronze tripod and a hecatomb inside it and sailed around the Peloponnese to reach Delphi. When he reached the vicinity of Cape Malea, he was caught in the north winds, which blew him towards the Libyan coast. Before sighting land, he ran aground in the shallows near Lake Tritonis, believed to be in Libya, and did not know how to escape. Then Triton, son of Poseidon, appeared before him; he said he would show Jason the passage and send the sailors back unharmed. Jason agreed. Triton showed him the route he had to take to escape the sandbanks”.

Geographically, the return routes are unrealistic; it seems entirely impossible that a wind or storm could have thrown a large ship from the sea into the middle of the desert, that the ship could have been returned to the sea without modern machinery, and especially that it could have been moved across the desert for twelve days and nights from the Libyan desert.

The absence of any other accounts or documents supporting the event suggests it is a highly imaginative legend. Herodotus was accused by his contemporary and close friend, the historian Thucydides, of inventing stories for amusement. Most modern historians believe his accounts are partly inaccurate and exaggerated.

Due to the many strange stories and folk tales reported by Herodotus, his critics have given him the nickname ‘Father of Lies’.

Reference: Herodotus Historiai (History), Müntekim Ökmen (Trans.) (13th Edition), Istanbul: 2017. Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

2. There is no basis for the claim that Serhas, son of the Persian ruler Darius I, marched his ships overland at Çanakkale in the Achaemenid Empire founded by Cyrus.

Serhas marched from the city of Sardis, located within the borders of Manisa, towards the Dardanelles in 480 BC for his campaign against Greece. He had two bridges built from Abydos, near today's Nara Burnu, to Sestos on the opposite shore. However, the bridges were destroyed by a storm before he reached the Dardanelles. Herodotus recounts that the Emperor had those responsible for building the bridges beheaded and ordered 300 lashes to be administered as punishment into the waters of the strait (Herodotus, History, Book 7, Sections 34, 35).

The cover image depicts a representation of the bridge allegedly built by Serhas from ships across the Dardanelles (generated by artificial intelligence).

To enable armies to cross easily from Asia to Europe, architects, engineers, and labourers arranged 360 ships with 50 oars each, anchored at the front and rear and joined together, and 314 ships on the sides, forming two bridges of ships side by side across the Dardanelles. Wooden planks were laid on the ropes connecting the boats, and brushwood and earth were placed on these planks to form a road. In addition, screens were placed along the sides of the bridge to prevent horses and other animals from seeing the sea and becoming frightened. Three gaps were left for small boats to pass through.

Xerxes led his soldiers across by having them walk across the ships as if they were a bridge. Pedestrians and horsemen crossed from one bridge, while pack animals crossed from the other. According to Herodotus, it took seven days and seven nights for the army to cross. Herodotus states that the army numbered 170 Myriads (10,000), or 1,700,000. Current estimates suggest that approximately 360,000 soldiers crossed. Serhas then advanced to Thrace, located in the present-day Balkans, and invaded Greece in 480 BC, passing through Macedonia, one of the Persian provinces under his control.

Apart from the Achaemenid source that has survived to the present day, the Bisitun Inscription, the most important sources are the tablets found in Persepolis itself. Apart from Serhas' invasion of Greece, none of these provide information or evidence to support Herodotus' account. There are no Achaemenid sources that have survived to the present day concerning the Greek wars. Gene R. Garthwaite, author of A History of Iran, makes no mention of Serhas having his soldiers cross over by walking across the ships like a bridge.

It is well known that poets exaggerate their subjects and that various historians alter unrealistic events simply to make them sound more appealing (Thucydides, Book XXI, p. 16).

References

HACIKÖYLÜ, Büşra (2019). The Anatolian Route of King Xerxes I of Persia's Campaign in Greece, Unpublished Master's Thesis; Herodotus (2017).

Gene R. Garthwaite, The Persians, İnkılap Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2011.

3. 428 BC: During the Peloponnesian Wars, the Spartans transported their ships overland from the Locadia Isthmus to counter Hylos' siege

The Spartans transported their ships via a special road called the Diolkos at the Corinthian Isthmus in order to bypass the siege of Hylos, threaten Athens from the sea, and place their naval forces in an advantageous position. This was an ingenious method used to overcome a geographical obstacle.

This tactic was not only a demonstration of Sparta's military genius, but also a strategic, impressive and remarkable manoeuvre that could change the course of the war.

“Diolkos: (Greek: Δίολκος). Built during the reign of Periander, Tyrant of Corinth, in the 6th century BC. This road enabled ships and cargo to bypass the long and dangerous route (approximately 200 miles) around the Peloponnese peninsula, transporting them overland from the Gulf of Corinth to the Saronic Gulf. The road is one of the greatest engineering achievements of the ancient world.

It is believed that the Diolkos was regularly used and maintained until the mid-1st century AD. This represents an active service life of approximately 650 years. The road ran along the narrowest part of the Isthmus, was approximately 6 to 8.5 kilometres long and 3.5 to 4.2 metres wide.

Diolkos is considered a primitive form of modern railways. On the stone paving, there were two deep, parallel grooves (rails) approximately 1.5 metres apart (quite close to the modern standard rail width), into which the wheels of the vehicles sat.

Ships and/or cargo were loaded onto a wheeled platform (probably an olkos) that moved along these grooves. The platforms were pushed and pulled using human power and/or animals (such as oxen). Large warships (such as triremes) had their cargo unloaded to lighten them before transport. Ships and cargo were usually transported separately; cargo was loaded onto a different ship at the other end of the slipway.

Sparta's plan, devised in 428 BC to aid Mytilene, which had rebelled against Athens, was unsuccessful. The Spartans were quite slow in preparing and mobilising their fleet. Faced with Athens' swift and decisive response, they failed to meet the expectations of the Mytilene rebels. Mytilene surrendered to Athenian forces before the Spartan fleet could reach it. Thucydides' “History of the Peloponnesian War” is the primary source for this event.

4. Octavianus' (Augustus) fleet crossing the Diolkos to pursue Antony and Cleopatra after the Battle of Actium (1st century BC)

The Battle of Actium took place off the coast of Actium, on the western coast of Greece, between Octavian's naval commander Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa and the combined forces of Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) and Cleopatra. After the battle, Antony and Cleopatra fled south towards Egypt with the remaining ships, having lost a large part of their fleets.

Octavian's aim was to quickly pursue Antony's surviving forces and transfer his troops to the Eastern Mediterranean without delay for the final showdown in Egypt.

Actium was on the western coast of Greece (in the Ionian Sea). Egypt was in the eastern Mediterranean (in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas). To reach Egypt from the west, it was necessary to navigate the dangerous and lengthy southern tip of the Peloponnese (the Cape of Malea).

Octavianus made a strategic decision to bypass this long sea route by transporting part of his forces and/or logistical equipment overland via Diolkos. This claim is attributed to Cassius Dio, who lived between 150 and 235 AD. Plutarch (46-120 AD) and Suetonius (69-122 AD), historians of the Actium period who lived long after the Battle of Actium, make no mention of the transport via Diolkos.

After the Battle of Actium, Octavian wintered in Samos and returned to Brundisium to quell an uprising. He himself went to Syria, while his commanders crossed over to Egypt via Libya. The fall of Alexandria and the suicide of Antony and Cleopatra enabled Octavian to rise as the sole leader of Rome. Even if it is true that some of his ships were transported via the Diolkos, this did not provide Octavian with any political or military advantage.

References: Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Marcus Antonius, Alfa Yay., Istanbul, 2006 and Cassius Dio, The Roman History: The Rain of Augustus, Penguin Classics, London:1987.

5. The Avars' land transport of ships alongside the Slavs during the siege of Constantinople (AD 626)

Although the Eastern Roman Empire had signed a non-aggression pact with the Avar state, the Avars invaded Roman territory with the aim of seizing control of the empire's European part. They were not after money or booty. They simply wanted to bring Constantinople and the entire Balkans under their rule.

In 626, taking advantage of the Emperor and his army's struggle with the Persians, the Avars marched on Constantinople under the leadership of the eldest son of Bayan Hakan. The Sasanian general Shahvaraz (Shahrvarâz) also crossed Anatolia from end to end, reaching Kadıköy, where he set up his headquarters and waited for the Avars to arrive. During this time, he burned and destroyed the city's suburbs and places of worship. The people of Istanbul were terrified.

According to the Paschale chronicle, on 26 June 626, the first Avar vanguard of 30,000 appeared before the city. Pisides gives the figure as 80,000. Theodoros Synkellos does not give a figure but uses the expression ‘countless tens of thousands’. Another source states that Theodore Synkellos indicated that for every Byzantine soldier there were ten Avar soldiers, suggesting that the Avar army numbered between 120,000 and 150,000.

The first Avar unit, consisting of about 1,000 cavalrymen, arrived near the Church of the Maccabees in Galata and signalled their arrival to the Persians on the opposite bank by lighting a fire. The Persians did the same, thus establishing communication between the two sides. Although it is not certain that the Persians and Avars agreed to besiege Istanbul, it is clear that they were aware of each other's movements and acted accordingly.

The actual siege began on 31 July. The most intense attack was directed at the walls between Edirnekapı and Topkapı (Fatih Sultan Mehmed did the same in 1453). On 31 July, the Avar Khan launched an attack ‘like a storm accompanied by thunder.’ The Avars began to batter the walls with battering rams and towers. The Roman soldiers tried to keep the enemy at bay by throwing spears, stones and arrows from above. The Slavs were in the front line of the Avar army, with the Avars behind them.

The Avars brought small flotillas (small ships) to the Bosphorus via the Black Sea route from the Danube and Sava rivers. They also gathered sailors from among the Slavs. These light flotillas were transported overland from Beşiktaş on carts (later, just as Fatih did) and entered the Golden Horn near the St. Callinicos gate, a place inaccessible to the Byzantine fleet.

To prevent the Avar flotillas from manoeuvring freely in the bay, the Byzantine naval fleet patrolled the Bosphorus, preventing the Avars and Sassanids from acting in concert. The Byzantine commanders took up positions along the entire stretch from St. Nicolas to St. Canon on the other side. They sank the flotillas that entered the Golden Horn (Golden Horn) and hundreds of Slavic boats in a sudden raid, burned the remaining ones, and threw the sailors into the Golden Horn and killed them. The Byzantines' large ships also prevented a number of Persian soldiers from being transferred from Üsküdar to the Beşiktaş side. Upon this, the khan was forced to retreat. Therefore, the siege was unsuccessful. The Avars were forced to retreat under very difficult conditions. This unsuccessful retreat led to the Avar Khaganate losing its influence and prestige, and its state weakening. The failure of this six-day siege rapidly led to the collapse of the Avars.

If an Avar (male) wanted to go anywhere, he would not harness a horse or ox to a cart; three, four or five ‘Duleb’ wives would harness themselves and pull him along. (A. N. Kurat)

References:

Akdes Nimet KURAT, AVARS. Journal of Historical Studies Volume XXVI, Number 1 July 2011, 81-110.

Öner TOLAN, From a Political and Socio-economic Perspective: TURKS IN THE NORTHERN BLACK SEA REGION AND THE BALKANS (4th-10th CENTURY), İksad Yay., Ankara:2023.

F. BARISIC, The Siege of Constantinople by the Avars and Slavs in 626, Byz. 24 (1954)