How and Because of Whom Did We Participate in World War I?
The Germans' deception or the impulsiveness of the Unionists are the most common allegations for our participation in the war. However, when we look at the writings of the Unionists, it is understood that not all of them were aware of this, that they blamed some people among themselves for this, or that they presented it as an accident caused by necessity. In order to reach a correct answer on this issue, I think it would be better to look at the writings of those who were in the decision-making mechanisms of the period.
More than 100 years after World War I, there is still a debate about how and because of whom we participated in the war. This debate started immediately after the war and everyone put forward an opinion from their own point of view and blamed someone. The most common allegations were that the Germans' deception or the CUP's recklessness were to blame for our participation in the war. However, when we look at the writings of the Unionists, it is understood that not all of them were aware of this, that they blamed some people among themselves for this, or that they presented it as an accident caused by necessity.
In order to reach a correct answer on this issue, I think it would be correct to look at the writings of the people who were in the decision-making mechanisms of the period. The grand vizier at the head of the government before the war started was Said Halim Pasha. Said Halim Pasha wrote his memoirs and explained how the war started before he was shot and martyred by an Armenian in France in 1921.
The person who could actually start the war at that time was Enver Pasha, who was the Minister of War (Minister of Defense). However, Enver Pasha's memoirs of that period have not been published. Therefore, it is necessary to consult the memoirs of Enver Pasha's close colleagues and the officers who served in his headquarters at the time. The memoirs of Cemal Pasha, Talat Pasha and Hafız Hakkı Pasha have been published. For this reason, I will examine the subject by examining the memoirs of these individuals, without diversifying the subject too much.
Said Halim Pasha mentions in his memoirs that the Ottoman government first tried to get closer to the British, French and Russians. However, the Germans were closer to the Ottomans than the other states and offered an alliance, thus the Ottoman-German alliance was signed on August 2, 1914. Later, Austria-Hungary also joined this alliance. However, the alliance was not to enter the World War, but to act together in case of a possible Russian attack. For this reason, when World War I started, the Ottoman Empire declared mobilization and announced that it would implement a policy of armed neutrality.
However, Austria and Germany started to push for the Ottoman entry into the war. Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha rejected this demand each time with an excuse. The Germans continued their pressure. They even said that if the Ottoman Empire insisted on neutrality, the German officers who had reformed the army would be recalled. Despite this, Said Halim Pasha insisted on not entering the war.
After the two warships Goeben and Breslau passed through the straits, the Germans, claiming that they would establish naval dominance in the Black Sea with these ships, increased their insistence on attacking the Russians as soon as possible. Enver Pasha allowed these ships to enter the straits without consulting anyone. Said Halim Pasha summoned the German ambassador and showed his reaction against this fait accompli.
The ambassador informed him that Germany would not accept the disarmament of the ships according to the law of neutrality unless the alliance agreement was canceled. Thereupon, he told the ambassador that he would declare that the ships had been purchased by the Ottoman Empire and that he should not deny this. The ambassador accepted this offer. Thus, it was announced that the Goeben and Breslau ships were purchased by the Ottoman Empire and their names were changed to Yavuz and Midilli.
The crews of these two ships were dressed in Ottoman uniforms and allowed to continue their duties. However, these ships started to exhibit behaviors that would pose a danger for the Ottoman Empire to enter the war. Admiral Souchon, the commander of the German ships, was training the Ottoman navy in the Marmara Sea. After a while, he requested that the navy be moved to the Black Sea for shooting training in rough seas. The government, fearing that the Admiral would enter into a conflict with Russian ships and force the Ottoman Empire to enter the war, partially accepted this request. Accordingly, Yavuz and Midilli would not sail to the Black Sea, while the other ships would sail one by one and return before nightfall.
Despite this, the Grand Vizier saw Yavuz sailing to the Black Sea and warned Enver Pasha. Enver Pasha promised that nothing like this would ever happen again. However, the day before Eid, Enver Pasha informed the Grand Vizier that there had been an incident between Ottoman and Russian ships a few miles off the Bosphorus, but that he had not yet received detailed information.
An hour later, Navy Minister Cemal Pasha's report on the incident arrived. The report said that the Ottoman fleet, consisting of Yavuz and Midilli, had encountered a Russian fleet busy laying mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus. The Russian fleet fired back at our ships asking them to stop laying mines and withdraw. Yavuz and Midilli responded and chased the Russian ships to Sevastopol and had to bombard this port.
The Grand Vizier says that this incident, which took place on October 30, 1914, was due to the fact that Cemal and Enver Pasha did not respect the government's decision. He also states that he does not think that the incident was carried out without the knowledge of Enver, Cemal and Talat Pasha. He had known from the beginning that Enver Pasha wanted to enter the war on the side of the Germans. Although Talat Pasha was not as pro-war as Enver Pasha, he applauded the breakdown of neutrality. Cemal Pasha, on the other hand, was initially against the alliance with the Germans, but later became a war supporter like the others.
Said Halim Pasha then resigned as grand vizier. Talat, Enver and Cemal Pasha came to the Grand Vizier's house to ask him to rescind his decision and told him that they were not aware of Souchon's actions and that they were not aware of his having the navy attack the Russians in the Black Sea. As can be understood from all these, Said Halim Pasha sees Enver Pasha as primarily responsible for the entry into the war, and claims that Talat and Cemal Pasha were also aware of it, and even if they were not, they were happy about it.
Talat Pasha's memoirs, on the other hand, tell a slightly different story. When the disarmament of the Goeben and Breslau was being discussed between the Grand Vizier and the German ambassador, Talat Pasha came to them with Halil Bey. Halil Bey and Talat Pasha entered the German ambassador's room and saw that the ambassador strongly rejected the disarmament of the ships. Halil Bey proposed the purchase of the ships as a solution that came to his mind at that moment and the Ambassador accepted it.
After that, delegations were sent to the Greeks, Bulgarians and Romanians in order to make an alliance agreement with them. A delegation was also sent to Germany in order to insist that the war would be fought when the day came and not to insist on it too much. But on the eve of the eve, they received the news that there was a communication between the Black Sea Fleet and Admiral Souchon and that the Goeben was bombarding the Russian coast. The Grand Vizier was very excited by this news.
None of them had known about this event before. But like everyone else, Talat Pasha believed that Enver Pasha knew about it. On the day of Eid, they gathered at the house of Halil Bey, the Speaker of the Parliament. Talat Pasha attacked Enver Pasha a lot, but he swore that he had no knowledge of the incident. On the third day of Eid, they gathered at the house of the Grand Vizier. Most of the ministers were not in favor of going to war immediately.
The ambassadors of the Entente had stipulated that the German military delegation and the Goeben with all its personnel must be taken out of the border in order not to start the war. It was not within the power and authority of the government to fulfill this condition. Some ministers were in favor of entering the war immediately if the Allies insisted. Thereupon, the Grand Vizier decided to enter a state of war.
Cemal Pasha also mentions similar issues. Initially, the whole cabinet was in favor of remaining neutral. However, one day the French ambassador told Cemal Pasha that Enver Pasha was sure that the Germans had completely won and that they would soon create an incident that would require a declaration of war through German officers, especially the Goeben and Breslau.
When Cemal Pasha objected to this, the ambassador said, "No, Cemal Pasha, you are deceived! I am sure that these Germans would not hesitate to stage a coup d'état to achieve their goals." At that time, the government was in favor of not entering the war before the Bulgarians joined the alliance, but the Germans were pressuring for entering the war as soon as possible. Enver Pasha ordered the Goeben and Breslau not to sail to the Black Sea in case the German officers were up to something.
On October 12, 1914, the council of ministers met. Two ideas emerged about the war. The first idea was to enter the war immediately and the second idea was to send a delegation to Germany to maintain neutrality for 6 months. Cavit Bey defended the second idea and other ministers defended the first idea. The Grand Vizier was undecided. Meanwhile, Enver Pasha stated that he could no longer continue to prevent the Goeben and Breslau from sailing to the Black Sea because the Admiral had put forward many justifiable military reasons. Cemal Pasha supported Enver Pasha by saying that the ban on the navy sailing to the Black Sea should be lifted. In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha briefly describes the entry into the war by referring to the bombardment in the Black Sea, but does not mention who gave the order or who was responsible for the attack.
Hafız Hakkı Pasha's memoirs, on the other hand, point to Enver Pasha as the one responsible for entering the war. Since he worked at the headquarters, he used more concrete expressions in his memoirs about how the incident occurred. According to Hafız Hakkı Pasha, at that time, an order written in German was prepared for the Navy Commander in order to be able to act quickly when needed. The order was placed in an envelope and delivered to Hafız Hakkı Pasha. He put the envelope in a safe in his room. This order included the phrase "to gain control of the Black Sea by destroying the Russian navy".
Before Hafız Hakkı Pasha set off with the delegation to Berlin for negotiations, Enver Pasha asked for the envelope. He told him that he would deliver the order to Souchon in a sealed envelope and that he would only order him to open the envelope when needed. Hafız Hakkı Pasha was suspicious of this. He asked him not to give the envelope, but Enver Pasha did not listen to him. He took the envelope and gave it to Souchon.
Although Hafız Hakkı Pasha holds Enver Pasha responsible for giving the order to the admiral, he does not put the blame directly on him and attributes it to the German mind. According to his statement, Souchon opened the envelope with a German mindset, did what he did and brought the Ottoman Empire into the war untimely.
As can be seen, all of the most knowledgeable people on the subject point to Enver Pasha for the responsibility of the incident. Although no one directly blames him, it can be said that Admiral Souchon or the German government and Enver Pasha, seeing the government's reluctance to enter the war, brought the country into the war with a fait accompli. However, it is not possible to say that Cemal Pasha, the Minister of Navy, did not know about this. Because the navy was under his command. In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha admits that he supported Enver Pasha in getting the ships to the Black Sea.
REFERENCES:
BARDAKÇI, Murat (Publisher), Hafız Hakkı Pasha'nın Sarıkamış Diary, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018.
Cemal Pasha, Memories, ed. Alpay Kabacalı, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017.
Talat Pasha's Memories, Ed. Alpay Kabacalı, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2021.
Said Halim Pasha, Ottoman Empire and the World War, Trans. Fatih Yücel, Kronik Publications, 2019.