The UK’s Annual Reports on Greece (Part 1)

Recently, the power struggle between Turkey and Greece, particularly over the Aegean islands, has intensified once again. When I sought to explore the historical development of this issue, I came across a work that proved extremely useful. This work (*), co-authored by Prof. Dr Ali Satan, a lecturer at Marmara University, and Assoc. Prof. Dr Resul Yavuz, a lecturer at Bandırma Onyedi Eylül University, sheds light on the historical background of current events. Before providing a brief overview of the subject, I would like to share with you the three questions I asked myself.

What are the root causes of this conflict?

Why are these two societies constantly engaged in competition in the military and political spheres?

Has Britain, which has been influential in Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean politics since the 18th century, played a role in the formation and perpetuation of this tension?

Let us briefly examine together what this work, prepared to provide answers to these questions, has to say!

No historian can deny Britain’s influence over Greece throughout history. As a community that had remained under Ottoman rule for years, the Orthodox Greeks were influenced by the nationalist movements that spread following the French Revolution of 1789. The superpowers of the era—such as Britain, Russia and France—accelerated the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which was already in the process of breaking up, by guaranteeing Greece’s independence. From its very inception, Greece developed itself through countless military and economic aids, and this support continued throughout the Turkish War of Independence. For this reason, the relations between Greece and Britain must never be sidelined from a historical perspective. The work I shall be examining contains the Annual Reports on Greece issued by the United Kingdom. As the word ‘Confidential’ appears at the top of most documents, these reports should not be confused with the standard reports published in the press for the general public.

The work has been published in three volumes. The first volume contains reports from 1906 to 1913. As it is believed that reports were not processed by the British Foreign Office following the outbreak of the First World War—or, even if they were, were not recorded—the period from 1914 to 1919 is unfortunately missing. The second volume of the work, however, contains reports covering the period from 1920 to 1923. In my personal opinion, the second volume is significant because it coincides with the period of the War of Independence and clearly exposes the civilian massacres committed by Greece. Greece’s withdrawal and the massive devastation it left behind also took place during this period. However, given the volume of the work, I shall address the period between 1920 and 1923 in the second part of this article. Greece was unable to resume its normal life after the war, and between 1923 and 1927, the crises caused by the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ began to surface. These emerging crises have been addressed in the third volume of the work, both politically and economically.

Due to the work’s detailed nature, I shall share with you the key points that are likely to be of particular interest. The information I shall convey will generally concern the policies Greece pursued in relation to Turkey and Bulgaria, and how Greece’s perspective towards Turkey was viewed through the eyes of the British.

The report sent by Sir F. Elliot, the British Ambassador to Athens, to the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey on 21 January 1907 contains a general assessment of the year 1906. The report notes that Greece has expanded progressively through various treaties since its establishment. On 24 May 1881, it was pledged that Greece’s borders would be extended and that the rights of Turks living within those borders would be protected by Greece. The most striking aspect of the report, however, is Greece’s perspective on Turkey. In his report, Sir F. Elliot stated: “All emotional, semi-historical and economic assessments point to a single possible foreign policy: ‘expansion’. Geographical conditions suggest that expansion will occur solely to the detriment of one country, namely Turkey.” In doing so, he signalled that Greek expansion would manifest itself to Turkey’s disadvantage. At that time, the fact that Turkey was the strongest and principal rival standing in the way of Greece’s national ideals (the Megali Idea) explains the background and significance of the actions Greece undertook.

However, Greece was not only in conflict with the Ottomans but also with the Bulgarians. Therefore, it is incorrect to view the Ottomans as the sole natural enemy!

It is quite natural for the reader of this paragraph to draw such a conclusion. However, later in the report, Sir Elliot stated that the Greeks conflated their religious and national identities. The Greeks regard every representative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as Greek, regardless of their language or ethnicity. It is noted that those supporting the Exarchate (supporters of the Bulgarian Government) identified themselves not through religion or national identity, but solely through language and culture, defining themselves as Bulgarians. When assessing the situation in 1906, Elliot forewarned Edward Grey of the annexation of Crete, which was to take place exactly two years later: “Crete is the direction in which the Kingdom of Greece is expected to expand in the near future, despite Turkey.” However, it was said at the time that Greece’s military strength was insufficient to stand up to Turkey, and that in a large-scale war they would be ineffective except through guerrilla tactics. It was also stated that in the event of war they could muster no more than 70,000 troops, and that even this army would not be fully equipped with Mannlicher-Schoenauer rifles (1) until 1907.

The ongoing Bulgarian-Greek dispute during these years was closely scrutinised by the British, and the potential outcome—a possible alliance between Greece and Bulgaria in the 1912 Balkan War—was overlooked. In the forecast of the Military Attaché, whose name is not explicitly mentioned in the reports, it was noted that Greece could not, at present, enter into a war against the Ottomans on its own, and that this could only occur if another country went to war with the Ottomans. Sir F. Elliot, however, fell into an error in this section, giving little credence to the likelihood of such cooperation occurring due to the rivalry between the Greeks and the Bulgarians. (2)

Reports from 1907 noted that Turkey’s efforts to bring bands under control focused primarily on Bulgarian bands, whilst Greek bands were relatively neglected. However, the Turks did not leave the Greek bands entirely unchecked; instead, they conducted effective diplomatic activities in Athens to prevent the formation of bands in the Thessaly region. According to Elliot’s report, the steps taken by Greece against Bulgaria could have given rise to the possibility of cooperation between Turkey and Greece, but this could not have developed into a lasting alliance. This was because the historical animosities between them did not allow for such an outcome. As Elliot predicted, the idea of an alliance arising from a common enemy between the Greek and Turkish governments never materialised. The conflict between these three countries remained confined to them until the Balkan War. During the Balkan War, however, the exact opposite of this notion of partnership emerged. Instead of the Turkish and Greek governments, the Bulgarian and Greek governments came together.

Reports from the early months of 1908 indicated that banditry within the Ottoman borders had increased even further compared to the previous year. However, it was noted that although violent incidents did not cease entirely following the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, they had visibly decreased. It was noted that, particularly as the hostility between Turkey and Bulgaria became clearly evident, some Greek bandits had travelled to Thessaloniki to offer their services. This point is significant as it indicates the balancing policy Greece pursued between its two enemies. The report suggested that Bulgaria’s independence and the subsequent deterioration of Turkish-Bulgarian relations into hostility increased the likelihood of a Greek-Turkish alliance; however, the Greek Prime Minister argued that an alliance could only be considered in exchange for Crete’s separation from the Ottoman Empire. However, the easing of hostilities between Bulgaria and Turkey led to the Greek-Turkish alliance no longer being discussed.

In the full version of the work, you can access information on Greece’s relations with other countries (excluding Turkey and Bulgaria), Greece’s economic situation, its taxation system, trade relations, import and export statistics, the state of agricultural land, transport networks, military situation reports, naval conditions, internal affairs and press sections, and many other topics. For the time being, I have merely provided a brief summary, focusing on Greece’s policy of maintaining a balance between Turkey and Bulgaria. Although the Greeks’ perception of threat was initially concentrated solely on the Ottomans by the British, the possibility of the Greeks forming an alliance with the Turks against the Bulgarians in certain situations remained a constant consideration. Moreover, it is widely known and documented that the Greek occupation following the Armistice of Mudros was an occupation supported by the British. From a military perspective, it is striking that a state which, as recently as 12 years prior, was stated to be capable of deploying no more than 70,000 troops and could not even fully equip its army with Mannlicher-Schoenauer rifles by the end of 1907, should shortly thereafter launch an operation capable of advancing as far as the interior of Anatolia.

(*) Ali Satan - Resul Yavuz, Britain’s Annual Reports on Greece, Volume 1, Turkish Historical Society, https://ttk.gov.tr/ingiltere-nin-yunanistan-yillik-raporlari-cilt-i/

(1) “The Mannlicher-Schoenauer rifle is a firearm developed in the late 19th century by Ferdinand Mannlicher and Otto Schönauer, featuring a rotating magazine system. It attracted considerable interest after being unveiled at the Paris Exhibition in 1900. Despite its high cost, it was adopted for military use by the Greek army in 1903.” Rose and Scroll – The History and Mastery of the Mannlicher, Access Date: 11 June 2026, https://roseandscroll.substack.com/p/the-history-and-mastery-of-the-mannlicher.

(2) “History has always shown us that what is deemed impossible can indeed come to pass. In the political climate of the time, the joint action of Greece and Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire was an unexpected development.”