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NATO Membership is in Lion's Mouth

In our previous article, the situation of NATO after its establishment on April 4, 1949; As of April 13, 1949, we stated that "Turkey's possible NATO membership is out of the agenda for the United States". As a result of the ratification process of the member states, the NATO alliance agreement, which entered into force on August 24, 1949; Turkey, together with Greece, signed on 18 February 1952. In terms of our Turkish diplomatic history, we consider it important to better understand today's Turkish-American and Turkey-NATO relations,

In our previous article, the situation of NATO after its establishment on April 4, 1949; As of April 13, 1949, we stated that "Turkey's possible NATO membership is out of the agenda for the United States".
As a result of the ratification process of the member states, the NATO alliance agreement, which entered into force on August 24, 1949; Turkey, together with Greece, signed on 18 February 1952. In terms of our Turkish diplomatic history, we consider it important to better understand today's Turkish-American and Turkey-NATO relations, knowing the role played by the Turkish political power and our foreign diplomats, who ensured the successful realization of this membership process.
Turkey, which sees itself as a valuable member of the civilized world and wants to be a part of the NATO alliance structure formed by the Western society in this sense, did not give up its efforts to become a member of NATO after the establishment of the Alliance, despite all the obstacles, it finally managed to pull the tightrope. So how did this happen? How did this first enlargement process of NATO take place? In this article, we would like to clarify these issues.
After 1949, from the contacts of Turkish diplomats with their foreign colleagues, it was revealed that the Westerners wanted to act with a "region"-based approach. Accordingly, NATO was merely a North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 'Neighboring' states in the north of the Atlantic, located on the eastern and western shores of the North Atlantic Ocean and having a common language, culture, civilization and worldview; had come together to defend both themselves and the common moral values ​​to which they adhered. Therefore, it was not appropriate for Turkey, located in the Eastern Mediterranean, to join the Atlantic region according to this tariff. Meanwhile, the situation of Italy, which is a Mediterranean country like Turkey and far from the Atlantic coast, was ignored for some reason.
Turkish diplomats, on the other hand, emphasized that in today's world, no nation can remain unfamiliar even with events in the far corner of the world, and that the concept of the 'region', defined in this way by the Atlantic world, has lost its geographical character in an absolute sense, and that the common interests between the relevant countries have come to a point where they merge and coalesce.
The fact that Italy was included in the Atlantic Pact on April 4 and Turkey was excluded was also an expression that Turkey was not seen as a European state. This discrimination was actually found disturbing by the Western European wing of NATO. As a matter of fact, in August 1949, Ankara was going to receive a call to join the Council of Europe in a way that would distract Turkey from this image. However, Ankara's expectation in this regard was that Turkey be invited to the founding membership of the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, Turkey's accession to the Council of Europe on September 30, 1949 was an important step in President İnönü's eyes, which meant his country's rise from isolation in 1945 to a respected member of the civilized world.
However, Turkey has also entered into other pursuits to obtain NATO membership. Tactically, Ankara wanted to sign a friendship treaty with Italy, which is a relatively powerful country in the Mediterranean and is also a member of NATO. Thus, while laying the foundation of the Mediterranean defense system, it was aimed to draw the attention of the Western states that established NATO to the Mediterranean, and therefore to the realities Turkey is facing. In this context, Ankara signed the Turkish-Italian Friendship, Peace and Judicial Reconciliation Agreement with Rome on March 24, 1950.
Subsequently, the Republican People's Party (CHP) administration took one more step three days before the general elections to be held and conveyed Turkey's request for NATO membership to the United States on May 11, 1950. The Democratic Party (DP), which came to power in line with the result of the 14 May elections, preferred to continue this membership process. As a matter of fact, Celal Bayar, who became the President after the election, II. During their courtesy visit to President İsmet İnönü, they, as former and current presidents, considered it necessary to share with the press the conclusion that Turkey's entry into NATO is necessary for its security. Thus, the government and the opposition showed a will to follow a non-partisan policy regarding NATO membership.
Looking back from today, according to some, this quest for membership; “Accepted as a national foreign policy, it was nothing but a direction that served the aims and expectations of those among us who were foreign-dependent and had common interests with foreigners.” Seeing the efforts to become a member of NATO as a non-partisan national policy and being presented to our people in this way meant that the membership process could not be discussed. This situation was found to be disturbing by those who did not want NATO membership and were therefore opposed to the process.
In this respect, the first step of the new government to ensure Turkey's NATO membership was the decision of Turkey's participation in the Korean War. Turkey's 'Hur It was thought that acting together with the World would provide a favorable environment for NATO membership, therefore the opportunity to participate in the Korean War should not be missed.
Parallel to this, the Turkish Government, under the influence of the American Government, on July 25, 1950, without even taking a parliamentary decision, only with the tripartite decision of the President, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense (a few days later, only the Cabinet decision was taken to make this decision official) to Korea. He decided to send soldiers. Afterwards, it was reported by telegram sent to United Nations (UN) Secretary General Trygve Lie that Turkey would send 4,500 soldiers to Korea. Thus, with this decision, it was thought that Ankara could be more insistent on its demands for NATO membership, it was aimed to create a suitable ground for keeping NATO membership on the agenda and to show Turkey's determination.
Even less than a week after the decision to send troops to Korea was taken, on August 1, 1950, the Turkish Government reiterated Turkey's request for NATO membership to the American, British and French Ambassadors.
The opinion of the American General Staff, which came to the agenda on September 9, 1950; He stated that instead of Turkey and Greece becoming full members of NATO, it would be more correct to be included in the Alliance as a "partnership". According to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, granting such partnership status would allow them to participate in NATO military planning for the defense of these two countries in the face of Soviet aggression. On the other hand, in the report prepared by the US General Staff, it was claimed that the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the organization would adversely affect the development of the Alliance. Instead of membership, Turkey and Greece were offered to establish direct ties with the Alliance to participate in the defense of the Mediterranean.
The Pentagon report, which caused a negative atmosphere in Turkey at that time, was also expressed as the official view of the United States. As a matter of fact, as an extension of this approach, Turkey's membership application was rejected by the NATO Council of Ministers convened in September.
In addition to the USA, Turkey's entry into NATO; Some of the founding states of NATO, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, opposed the Soviet threat, in particular. The main objections of these countries stemmed from their unwillingness to intervene in a crisis that might arise in the Mediterranean, if NATO had to intervene. The objections of these states were centered on the concerns that if Turkey, which was most and most severely faced with the Soviet threat, joined NATO, the Soviet Union might react violently and this would lead to a war. Scandinavian and Benelux countries were afraid of being dragged into war because of a country like Turkey, which is far from them in many ways.
Some European countries, on the other hand, showed a negative approach to Turkey's membership request, considering that the admission of new members to the Alliance would reduce the US aid already given to them in a relative sense.
In addition to these states, the UK did not initially approach Turkey's entry into NATO positively. The reason for this was that Britain wanted to establish its own spheres of influence in the Middle East again. England; By combining Turkey's security concerns with his own interests in Suez, he wanted to establish a Middle East Defense System in which Turkey would also participate. According to England; Whoever held the Middle East would have access to all three continents. Having influence in this region would ensure the establishment of a free world order. If the Middle East came under Soviet control, the free world would be a very small part. Based on these considerations, Britain found it more appropriate in terms of its own interests and expectations to keep its Middle East policy outside the borders of NATO and therefore not to support Turkey in the membership process.
In any case, British and US policies towards the Middle East began to coincide. England was trying to dictate an inner defense (inner ring) approach to be shaped around the inner ring based on the defense of the Suez Canal. The United States, on the other hand, wanted to proceed in line with the Truman Doctrine, the main unifying document of American foreign policy. The Americans, with the effect of the discussions in the formation phase regarding the containment policy of Soviet Russia, were making efforts to form the outer ring that would include Turkey, Iraq and Iran around the Middle East, and to form an outer defense (outer ring) within this framework. . Containing the Russians was beginning to be seen as an impossible task without Turkey.
In such discussions where Turkey is not directly involved, England; He aimed to use Turkey to prevent the Arab states from being cold towards him and to accept the Pact for the Defense of the Middle East to be formed. NS. In this framework, he wanted Turkey to be a country that only sided with him and supported Britain's Middle East policy. For this reason, considering that a Turkey that would gain NATO membership could not unconditionally support the British's Middle East policy, Britain did not favor Turkey's NATO membership.
The United States, on the other hand, saw the defense of the Middle East (Outer Rim) as a part of its strategy to contain Russia, and in this sense, thought that priority should be given to the containment strategy. For this reason, contrary to his initial views, he favored Turkey's membership in NATO, which would contribute forces to NATO, but he did not consider it necessary at that time to directly support Turkey before these ideas were fully matured.
In the same period, while the technical principles of the West's policy towards the USSR within the scope of the Middle East were discussed, Turkey's main aim was to obtain a security guarantee for itself in any case. For this purpose, Turkey followed a policy focused on obtaining American support against the Soviet threat, which was seen as one of the two superpowers of the world, in the new world order that emerged after the Second World War.
Although Turkey was cold towards proposals such as a "Mediterranean Pact" or "Middle East Command" that could replace NATO membership, it did not want to completely turn its back on such projects. It saw that being in a constructive dialogue was right and necessary for the path to NATO membership.
In the process of obtaining NATO membership, Turkey has given importance to two principles. The first is to meet the technical military needs for membership. Secondly, decisions in NATO should be made in the general interest of the Alliance, not the implementation of decisions within the Alliance that will serve to meet the individual interests of any country (meaning the British Middle East Policy).
In this respect, the USA has started to adopt an attitude that understands Turkey's sensitivities. Over time, he preferred to keep and evaluate Turkey's NATO membership process and the Middle East Command negotiations in separate lanes.
Finally, in order to strengthen the West's image in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it was decided that Turkey should participate in NATO military plans regarding the Mediterranean in the first place. This issue was interpreted by Turkey as an 'advanced step' on the way to NATO membership, although it was not found satisfactory.
From this point on, as a result of the discussions within the Alliance that Turkey was not involved in, a positive understanding began to develop regarding the membership of Turkey and Greece to the Alliance, especially the USA and England. There were several reasons behind this change:
 The need for Allied forward operating bases (mainly airbases) in countries close to Soviet territory, in terms of deterrence against the USSR,
 The USA wants military bases from Turkey within this framework, but Turkey does not allow these bases to be opened in Turkey without being a NATO member,
 Emergence of the need for Turkey to be strengthened as a 'barrier' and to be fully included in the Western military system so that Soviet influence does not spread to the Middle East,
 Increasing the influence of the Alliance on the Balkans with the participation of Turkey and Greece,
 Increased sympathy for Turkey in the US public opinion as a result of the superior performance of the Turkish unit sent to Korea in the Korean War and the saving of an American unit from annihilation.
In this context, tripartite negotiations between the USA, France and the UK for the membership of Turkey and Greece to the Alliance continued. England; He softened his objections and stated that he would support NATO membership on the condition that Turkey join the Middle East Defense System. France has not taken a stance preventing membership. In this direction, the USA; On May 15, 1951, he proposed to his NATO allies that Turkey and Greece should be included in NATO.
As an extension of these developments, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Before the Ambassadors of the USA, England and France in Ankara, he conveyed to these countries that Turkey's application for NATO membership should be reconsidered. Turkey has also ensured the publication of an open letter on this subject to be published in the New York Times. In particular, it was stated in the declaration that Turkey's membership in NATO coincided with the interests of the United States, therefore the United States should support Turkey. It was emphasized that Turkey would not accept a non-membership arrangement. On the other hand, Turkey has declared that it can participate in the Middle East Security Arrangements, that is, the formation of the Middle East Command, in order to receive the support of the United Kingdom, and that it is willing to do so. When this willingness of Turkey coincided with the interests of the USA and the British, the way for membership negotiations was opened in an official format.
Despite the opposition of predominantly northern European countries such as Norway and Denmark, especially with the weight of the USA, it was held on 16-20 September 1951. At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting held between Turkey and Greece, it was decided to invite Turkey and Greece to the Alliance. At this summit, the USA made the following statement in order to eliminate the objections of other countries to Turkey's NATO membership: “If Greece and Turkey become members of the Alliance and an attack occurs on these countries, all the members of the Alliance will not be called to contribute to the war, but within the framework of a strategic plan that will be put forward. They will act in line with the general defense of the This ambiguous statement has largely cleared the question mark in the minds of countries that might prevent Turkey's membership. At the same time, American strategists have argued that if a war breaks out in Europe, bases close to Russia are needed, and for this, it is imperative that Turkey be included in the alliance.
In this context, the atmosphere in NATO softened and Turkey expressed a positive opinion on the official membership invitation of the North Atlantic Council on September 21, 1951. In the membership negotiations, which continued after this date, the issue of which NATO Command would be attached to the new members, which came to the agenda with the initiative of England, created a problem.
Britain and France wanted to make input in the meetings prior to the discussion and approval process of these membership applications in order to strengthen their positions within the Alliance. While France made an attempt to recruit the "Command staff" of the new Mediterranean Naval Command, England wanted to stipulate that Turkish soldiers be placed under the command of the Middle East Command, which will be formed under the leadership of England, in a possible war, in return for Turkey's membership. Since the British proposal concerns the Middle East region, where the United States could not determine its full policy, it was not supported by the United States and was immediately rejected by the Arab countries and Turkey. On the other hand, the USA did not hesitate to convey the message that if the Turks accept your request, we will not object to the British. The same message also included that the USA would not take any initiative to force Turkey to make such a decision, nor would it support such an initiative.
As a result, at the signing stage of the membership protocol, France and England did not bring these issues to the agenda again, and the protocol was signed by all the members. Thus, on October 17, 1951, Denmark signed the protocol regarding the admission of Turkey and Greece to the Alliance, which was signed in mid-October.
Meanwhile, at a stage when it was almost certain that Turkey would become a member of NATO, on November 3, 1951, the Soviets gave a note to the Turkish Government protesting Turkey's accession to NATO. The following statements were included in the note:
“Under these (case and) conditions, the invitation of Turkey, which has no (geographical) ties to the Atlantic, to join the Atlantic Bloc; It has no meaning other than the aim of the imperialist countries to establish military bases for their own aggressive aims in a region (country) close to the borders of the USSR and to use this against the USSR in the middle of the day.”
In the reply note given by Turkey and deliberately delayed;
“If the Soviet Government makes a sincere self-assessment, it will admit that Turkey indeed has good reasons for its own security (joining this Alliance). It should not be forgotten that there are demands that threaten Turkey's national independence and territorial integrity."
Thereupon, although a second Soviet note on this issue reached the Turkish Government on 30 November, this note will have no effect in the course of events.
Finally, Turkey and Greece officially took their places in the ranks of the Alliance at the Lisbon Summit on February 18, 1952.
The Turkish Grand National Assembly also approved the accession of Turkey to NATO on February 19, 1952.
After the 1964 crisis, as problems began to arise in relations with NATO and especially the USA, articles criticizing the USA began to appear in the Turkish press. It was even a policy followed internally for that period.
Journalist Abdi İpekçi made the following comment at that time: “We have resorted to every means to enter NATO, to increase American aid. We showed enthusiasm to send soldiers to Korea. We have signed the bilateral agreements put before us, without seeing the need to examine the text. We were pleased as America sent soldiers, established bases and sent experts to our country. We have enacted laws to attract more American capital to our country. We looked into the eyes of America at international meetings. We raised our hands before the American proposal was put to a vote….”

REFERENCES

Fahir Armaoglu. (1995). 20th Century Political History, Ankara, 1995, p.520.
Faruk Sonmezoglu. (2000). Turkey-Greece Relations and Great Powers, Der Publishing, Istanbul, p.8.
FRUS. (1950). British -American Chiefs of Staff Meeting in Washington, 26 October 1950, vol.3, 1693.
George McGhee. (1990). The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, St. Martin's Press, New York, US, p.78.
Halford J. Mackinder. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History, Geographical Journal, Vol. XXII, p. 421-444.
Mehmet Gonlubol. (1993). Turkish Foreign Policy with Events, Eighth Edition, Ankara, Political Book House, p. 311.
Nuri Karakas. (2013). Turkish-American Political Relations (1939-1952). Ataturk Research Center, Istanbul.
Popular History Magazine. (2004). June Issue, p.52.
Rifat Ucarol. (1992). Political History II, Air Force Academy Publications, Istanbul. p.511
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures, NATO Information Office, Brussels, p.487.
Turkkaya Ataov. (2006). America, NATO and Turkey, Advanced Publications, 2nd Edition, p.193.
Veli Yilmaz. (1998). Political History, War Academies Press, Istanbul, p.432. 

Nasuh Uslu (2000). Türk Amerikan İlişkileri. 21. yüzyıl yayınları, Ankar, s.27.

Dr. Hüseyin FAZLA
Ph.D Hüseyin FAZLA
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  • 17.11.2021
  • Time : 5 min
  • 2301 Read

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