What is NATO's Enlargement Process, which angers the Russians? (2)

What happened in Bosnia (ethnic cleansing) has been, as Richard Holbrooke put it, "the biggest obstacle to the operation of collective security since the 1930s". The escalation of events in the autumn of 1992 brought the US administration to the point of 'something must be done'. Thus, from 1 May 1993, the West tried to stop Serbian aggression by using only partial air power. Meanwhile, armament of Bosnians within the scope of self-defense was welcomed. The Alliance's delayed stance on Bosnia has also brought with it doubts about the Alliance's integrity and future. In such an environment, the enlargement process was suspended for a while. However, the US administration considered that enlargement could be a tool for the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of aged Europe. For this reason, it has also started to strengthen its bilateral relations with Central and Eastern European countries (Asmus, 2002, p.26-28).

Clinton and her team had a great role in shaping NATO's enlargement process and determining new NATO functions. Clinton, who initially gave priority to supporting reforms in Russia; Afterwards, it focused on the restructuring of Europe, and in this context, taking steps to ensure the change and transformation of the Alliance.

On the other hand, there has been a serious opposition to the enlargement process of NATO from within NATO, the Russian Federation and the USA, within the Pentagon. In the same way, France, England and Germany, NATO's key country members, opposed NATO's enlargement with their own reasons.

France argued that it is not understandable for Central and Eastern European countries to knock on the door of the USA instead of NATO for security guarantees, and that Europe's security should be discussed within Europe. Paris thought that European institutions, in which the USA was not included, rather than the Atlantic institutions, would be sufficient to ensure integration for these countries. In this direction, it has made an effort to pioneer the implementation of a European enlargement process without the United States. The general attitude of France in NATO's enlargement was that, in mid-October 1994, "although it is not very eager for enlargement, if enlargement is to be enlarged, it will go in parallel with the enlargement of the European Union and Washington will have a crisis that may cause a crisis between Russia and NATO in this process. not showing an approach” (Asmus, 2002, p.91).

On the other hand, London could not be sure of the support of the British people in the defense of new countries that will come under the roof of Article 5, in an environment where mutual trust with the Russian Federation has not yet been fully established, for example, in the conflict that will arise as a result of a disagreement between Poland and the RF, whether Britain will fight for Poland or not. Over time, Britain, which was warm to NATO enlargement, however, wanted the United States to remain in an integrated command structure and not ignore the defense of Europe (Asmus, 2002, p.102).

Germany, on the other hand, advocated giving priority to the restructuring of NATO and bringing enlargement to the agenda in the next stages. Ultimately, Germany; It has taken a position in favor of “following a NATO enlargement policy that does not endanger the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship and reinforces security and stability in the whole of Europe” (Asmus, 2002, p.91). In his bilateral meeting with Clinton on February 9, 1995, Kohl declared that his aim was to expand the scope of transatlantic relations, and that he was against an approach that excluded the USA from Europe. Kohl, who wanted Poland to be included in this process within the scope of NATO's enlargement, underlined that NATO should expand without following an anti-Russian policy (Asmus, 2002, p.102).

Senator Lugar's Washington speech at the end of June 1993 was found to be important in removing the doubts of NATO members about enlargement. According to Lugar, the most important problem for the United States and its allies is to establish the security environment that will enable the creation of a 'free and whole' Europe, otherwise we may face the burden of a disintegrated Europe.

According to Lugar, the Alliance needed to bring stability beyond NATO's current borders to the east and south to regions that harbor areas of conflict to which the Continent may be exposed in the future. For the stability of the whole of Europe, new members had to be recruited and the Alliance had to adapt itself to the new tasks. “If NATO is to survive, then the Alliance must be transformed from a collective defense mission structure formed around a specific threat into an Alliance that serves common strategic interests and shared values.” In short, “The Alliance will either move out of the field or be doomed to be wiped out.” This approach is supported by the US administration. 

By adopting this moment, it started to work towards accelerating the NATO enlargement process again (Jafarov, 2007).

The United States initially followed an approach that dealt with Russia and NATO's development of cooperation separately within the scope of NATO enlargement. It has developed its policy within the framework of this understanding. However, the close relationship between these two issues has led to the adoption of the US's dual-track strategy since 1995, that is, an approach that follows the enlargement and Russia's relationship together. It has been undertaken by the USA to respond to the opposition voices rising from within the Alliance to these formations led by the USA and to show approaches that appease Russia. However, within the United States, three views opposed to NATO enlargement have been raised, particularly by Republicans:

The enlargement of NATO would cause Moscow to distance itself from the West and become resentful, which would jeopardize the success of the US-Russia cooperation policy, which should have been a top priority for the US.
Enlargement could undermine the political cohesion and cohesion of the Alliance and reduce its military effectiveness.
There were views that the expansion of NATO would not be able to be supported by the American people, as it would require commitments to new countries located in an unstable region, which the United States is trying to implement for a region in which it has little national interest.

In the official American view, expansion should have continued. In his speech to the Foreign Relations Committee on January 8, 1997, US Secretary of State Albright said that “the aim of enlargement is to transform Eastern Europe the way NATO did for Western Europe 50 years ago: integration of new democracies, elimination of old hostilities, confidence for economic development. environment and the prevention of conflicts”. On April 30, 1997, in the US Senate session, with 80-19 votes, US support for NATO's enlargement process was approved (Sloan, 2002, p.240), so that it was possible for the administration to lead the NATO enlargement process more strongly.

After the 1994 December NATO Summit, the writing of the guide document that will be valid for the Alliance membership process has begun. 1995-97 was the period of defining a consultation and enlargement process on the way to the realization of the membership of three new members in 1999. In this period, the need to make progress on three main issues emerged (Mattox and Rachwald, 2001, p.21):

1) Achieving consensus among Allies for the launch of NATO Enlargement.

2) Interviews with potential members.

3) The need to persuade members (including Russia) who oppose enlargement.

By the middle of 1995, while the activities for NATO's enlargement were continuing, it was not clear which enlargement would include Central and Eastern European countries, and how the enlargement would be. While the conflicts in Bosnia continued, the Alliance's inability to implement policies to stop the bloodshed in this region spoiled the harmony in the US-Europe relationship. Ethnic cleansing in the heart of Europe has reached a level that threatens the security of Europe. Meanwhile, NATO gave the appearance of being unable to do anything in the face of the maneuvers of the Bosnian Serbs, which destroyed the vision of "free and whole Europe". According to the Clinton Administration, Bosnia emerged like a cancer that was eating away at America's reputation. It has been understood that NATO's new security commitments to Central and Eastern Europe will not be credible until the conflict in Bosnia is stopped (Jafarov, 2007).

Therefore, the Clinton Administration reconsidered its Bosnia policy in the summer of 1995 and decided to suppress this bloodiest conflict in Europe after the Second World War. With the coming to power of Jacques Chirac in France in May 1995, the signals of the formation of a desire in this direction in Europe began to come to America. With the US-Europe initiative, NATO weighed in in Bosnia. Thus, the Dayton agreement was signed in the fall of 1995. This again served to create a positive ground for the work on NATO enlargement to be carried out.

The NATO enlargement plan was again opened for discussion. The issue quickly shifted to the point of which countries should be taken first. In the discussions within the alliance, the question of whether NATO should be enlarged or not has been shelved. For NATO, which countries will become members in the first stage has become the agenda that determines the agenda. With the open support of the USA and Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have started to be mentioned among those who will be admitted to membership in the first place (Türkeş, 2003, p.395).

(To be continued)