Are Gaza's Natural Gas Fields in the Mediterranean Sea Another Reason for the War?

On Saturday 7 October 2023, Hamas launched "Operation Al-Aqsa". On the same day, Netanyahu called it a "state of combat readiness" and declared war. 

Was "Operation Al-Aqsa" a "surprise attack"? Or was it something that Israel was expecting? 

Was "Operation Al-Aqsa" a carefully formulated plan, of which Israel was aware, to achieve new military and political goals, especially in Gaza? These questions will continue to be asked. Many experts see Netanyahu's declaration of war against Gaza on 7 October 2023 as a continuation of the "Cast Operation" invasion of Gaza in 2008-2009.

The main goal of this latest war is considered to be the open military occupation of Gaza by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland. The extent to which the natural gas reserves in the offshore area of Gaza play a role in determining the objectives is also a matter of debate. In my last book, Fire and Water (4), I discussed how the hydrocarbon reserves discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean unite the destinies of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In this article, I examined the relationship between the developing Israeli occupation and the offshore gas field of Gaza from a chronological perspective and in terms of its consequences. 

Gaza Offshore Gas Field 

This field consists of two natural gas fields located 30 kilometres off the coast of the Gaza Strip. These gas fields, also known as Gaza Marine One and Gaza Marine Two, were discovered in 1999 when the British Gas Group was authorised to explore the area for natural gas fields. The reliable gas reserves discovered in this area were determined to be approximately 38 billion cubic metres. Experts had announced that this natural gas would not only meet Palestine's energy needs for 15 years, but would also allow it to generate income from its sale.

2008-2009 Gaza Operations 

When Israeli forces invaded the Gaza Strip in December 2008, they justified their invasion as "eliminating persistent terrorist activity and a constant missile threat to Israeli civilians from the Gaza Strip". However, the operation also concerned Palestinian natural gas fields offshore from the Gaza Strip. 

Following "Operation Cast LED", Tel Aviv announced the discovery of the Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This gas field was the most productive area discovered in the Levantine Basin, covering approximately 83,000 square kilometres in the Eastern Mediterranean. Taken together with the Tamar field discovered in 2009, it is large enough to make Israel a full energy player together with its US partners (Noble Energy). (Global Research, December 30, 2013)

However, Gaza's gas fields were also located within this large Levant Gas exploration area. Integrating these fields with the other fields would benefit Israel in many ways. 

Development of Gas Fields Offshore Gaza 

A 25-year agreement signed with the Palestinian Authority in November 1999 granted British Gas (BG Group) and its partner, the Athens-based and Lebanese-owned Consolidated Contractors International Company (CCC), oil and gas exploration rights in this area. British Gas' licence covered the entire Gaza Offshore Marine Area, adjacent to several Israeli offshore gas facilities. It was recognised that 60 per cent of the gas reserves off the Gaza coastline belonged to Palestine. In 2000, the British Gas Group drilled two wells, Gaza Marine-1 and Gaza Marine-2. These reserves were estimated to be about 38 billion m3 worth about $4 billion. These are the figures announced by British Gas and some sources have stated that Palestinian gas reserves could be much larger. 

On 5 January 2001, the Middle East Economic Digest reported that the contract covered the development of the gas field and the construction of a pipeline. On 21 October 2007, Israel's Haaretz newspaper reported that the rights to develop this offshore gas field were awarded respectively to a British company (60 per cent); a Lebanese company (30 per cent); and the Palestinian Authority Investment Fund (10 per cent). It was stated as follows. However, with a new agreement in 2015, these proportions were to change.

Who owns the gas fields off Gaza?

From a legal point of view, it was generally accepted that these gas reserves belonged to Palestine. However, the death of Yasser Arafat, the election of a Hamas government in Gaza, and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority have enabled Israel to establish de facto control over Gaza's offshore gas reserves.

The British Gas Group had established links with the Tel Aviv government in relation to this gas field, but the rights of the Hamas government over the gas fields were bypassed. 

The accession of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister in 2001 was a negative turning point for Palestinian Gaza's sovereignty over the offshore gas fields. This issue was argued in the Israeli Supreme Court. Ariel Sharon declared that Gaza's offshore gas reserves belonged to Israel and that "Israel will never buy gas from Palestine". 

On 19 August 2003, The Independent reported that "Ariel Sharon vetoed the first deal to allow the British Gas Group to supply Israel with natural gas from Gaza's offshore wells". 

In 2006, Hamas' electoral victory in the Gaza Strip greatly weakened the hand of Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, whose rule was limited to the West Bank. 

In 2006, British Gas "was trying to sign a deal to pump gas to Egypt" (Times, 23 May 2007). However, British Prime Minister Tony Blair intervened in Israel's interests to block this deal with Egypt.

The following year, in May 2007, the Israeli cabinet approved Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's proposal to "buy gas from the Palestinian Authority". The proposed contract was for $4 billion, with one billion of the $2 billion profit going to Palestine. However, Tel Aviv had no intention of sharing this revenue with Palestine. A new Israeli team was set up by the Israeli cabinet to negotiate a new deal with the British Gas group, bypassing both the Hamas government and the Palestinian authority:

"Israeli defence officials insisted that no cash payments be made to the Hamas-controlled government and that the money be paid to the Palestinians in goods and services. The aim was in fact to nullify the contract signed in 1999 between the BG Group and the Palestinian Authority during the Yasser Arafat administration.

Under the proposed 2007 agreement with the BG Group, Palestinian gas from Gaza's offshore wells would have been diverted by a submarine pipeline to the Israeli port of Ashkelon, thus preventing Palestinian control over the sale of this gas to Israel. 

The deal fell through. The negotiations were suspended: 

"Mossad chief Meir Dagan opposed the deal on the grounds that these revenues would fund terrorism". Israel's aim was to prevent the payment of royalties from these gas fields to Palestine. In December 2007, BG Group withdrew from negotiations with Israel and closed its office in Israel in January 2008.

Gaza invasion plan on the table

According to Israeli military sources, the plan to invade the Gaza Strip was put into practice in June 2008.

"Defence Minister Ehud Barak allegedly instructed the Israel Defence Forces to prepare for the operation six months ago (Haaretz, 27 December 2008). The same month, the Israeli authorities contacted the BG group to continue negotiations on the purchase of Gaza's natural gas. The decision to accelerate negotiations with the British Gas (BG) Group coincided chronologically with the planning of the invasion of Gaza, launched in June. Israel was apparently anxious to reach an agreement with the BG group before the invasion, which was already at an advanced planning stage.

Moreover, these negotiations with the BG group took place with the knowledge that a military invasion was on the table by Ehud Olmert's government. The negotiations between the BG Group and the Israeli authorities were ongoing in October 2008, 2-3 months before the start of the bombings on 27 December. At that time, the Israeli government was already considering a new "post-war" political-territorial arrangement for the Gaza Strip. 

In November 2008, the Israeli Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of National Infrastructures instructed the Israel Electricity Company (IEC) to start negotiations with BG Group for the purchase of natural gas from BG's offshore concession in Gaza (Globes, 13 November 2008). The negotiations continued, but no progress was made. 

Israel carried out another operation in Gaza in 2011. Although the Gaza Marine Gas Field had been discovered in 1999, the gas had not been extracted for twelve years. Israel has consistently prevented the development of Palestinian natural gas fields and Palestinian energy security. 

In 2014, Israel carried out its fifth Gaza operation against Hamas. 

In early 2015, sixteen years after its discovery, the Gaza Marine Gas Field was still undeveloped. In mid-2015, the Palestinian Authority resumed negotiations with British Gas to develop the Gaza Marine Gas Field and cancelled the exclusive rights granted to the company. The Palestine Investment Fund increased its stake in the gas fields from 10 per cent to 17.5 per cent. The Consolidated Contracting Company held a 27.5 per cent stake in the gas fields. In April 2016, Shell acquired British Gas, taking over British Gas' 55 per cent stake in the Gaza gas fields.  

In other words, British Gas sold its stake in the field to Shell in 2016 after Israel refused to allow and obstructed the development of gas in the Gaza offshore field. Later, in 2017, Shell submitted a request to the Palestinian side to withdraw from the consortium due to the uncertainty between the Palestinian and Israeli governments over the utilisation of the field and the lack of clarity on the development of the field.

Since Shell relinquished its stake in the field in 2018, the Palestine Investment Fund has been looking for a new foreign group to take over the shares, and in 2021 began negotiations with Egypt's state-owned gas company EGAS.

During this period, Israeli officials announced that the government would block the development of the gas field until progress is made on Hamas' return of two Israeli civilians and the bodies of two Israel Defence Forces soldiers held by Hamas since 2014/2015. 

In February 2021, both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority (PA) signed a memorandum of understanding on the development of the Gaza Sea field off the Gaza Strip. According to the memorandum, the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) was to work with the PA on an agreement to extract natural gas from the Mediterranean Sea and transport it to the Palestinian territories. However, no progress was made because Israel was not a party to the agreement. 

Egypt's peaceful role in trying to help Palestine by breaking Israel's 21-year embargo on Gaza gas has also failed.  

However, on 16 June 2023, four months ago, the Israeli government announced that it had given preliminary approval to its relevant ministries to cooperate with Egypt and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to develop the Gaza Marine offshore gas field.

Some experts interpreted this development as follows. "These are the kind of major projects that could provide long-term economic support to the Palestinians and increase the likelihood of expanding regional normalisation. However, as Egypt should remind all parties, the success of the project will depend on the actions of Iranian-backed Gaza-based terrorists."

However, this announcement, like the previous ones, was cancelled due to the war, which started without producing any results. 

Gaza and Energy Geopolitics 

The occupation of Gaza is aimed, among other military and political objectives, at bringing Israel under full control of the gas fields in this area. 

Even if Israel's military and political objectives in the Gaza Strip are not fully realised, these developments will have consequences for the natural gas reserves not only in the Gaza Strip but also in Palestine as a whole. 

At the end of this war, Israel could create a new territorial administrative organisation in the Gaza Strip. It may also use this opportunity to take the entire Gaza coastline under its military control.  Therefore, it could end its sovereignty in the offshore areas of Gaza, seize Palestinian gas fields and merge these reserves with its own gas fields. 

The offshore facilities in this area are connected to the port of Eilat, an oil pipeline terminal in the Red Sea, and to Israel's energy transport corridor to be negotiated with Turkey via the ports of Ashkelon and Haifa. What is envisaged here is to connect Israel's Trans-Israeli Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline to the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline via the Ceyhan terminal.

Conclusion and Evaluation 

Since 2007, after Hamas came to power in Gaza in 2006, Israel tightened the blockade of Gaza and launched five repeated military operations. During this period, the political isolation of the Gaza Strip increased, thus preventing the production of natural gas on the Gaza coast and preventing Palestine from benefiting from it. In addition, Palestine's sovereignty over the natural gas was rendered controversial during this period.  

With its policy since the discovery of the gas in 1999, Israel has prevented Palestine from utilising its natural gas rights offshore Gaza by spreading the time. However, in order to keep these rights on the agenda, Palestinians have participated in various international events and actions such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. Most recently, in September 2022, an event was organised in Gaza Port to protest the usurpation of natural gas rights. 

The efforts made by the Palestinian side in the last 24 years have not been sufficient to develop their own natural gas in the Palestinian-Gaza offshore. In other words, Israel has not looked favourably on the development of Gaza offshore natural gas deposits, especially after Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip. It has conditioned the achievement of results in this regard on many conditions, prolonged it over time and ensured the continuation of the energy and therefore water blockade in the Gaza Strip.

The natural gas in Gaza's offshore gas field is not such a large reserve that Israel would definitely want to own it economically. However, Israel's opposition here has been mainly aimed at preventing the embargo imposed on Gaza from reducing the region's dependence on it for water and energy. This has deprived Palestine of natural gas, which is an international right of Palestine, and condemned it to misery and misery and to the help from Qatar in terms of water and energy. 

The prevention of the development of natural gas offshore Gaza for nearly a quarter of a century is the result of Israel's policy of isolation and control of Palestine. This is because the Gaza Strip, apart from the water supplied to it by Israel, obtains water from its own groundwater and seawater treatment plants. Both of these water sources need energy. Israel, which controls and restricts energy, also restricts water supply.

Therefore, if an Israeli decision is taken to invade the Gaza Strip, and this invasion operation will begin, it can be said that Gaza has a strategic purpose of depriving Palestine of the benefits of this gas rather than capturing this natural gas reserve and gaining economic benefits. This situation can also be considered as Israel's condemnation of Palestine to the position of a powerless administration that has no rights based on international law or is far from obtaining them, as it has done in many areas. The current question that needs to be asked now is whether the water and energy problems will end after the Palestinians are relocated to the Gaza valley or to another area in the south. It is seen that this problem and the misery experienced for years will continue to increase. 

In fact, no matter what is said about the future of the region, whether economically or strategically, it is clear that the cards will be reshuffled for the future of the Gaza Strip and the region and the security architecture of the region will be reconstructed. In the process of reshuffling these cards, the control of water and energy resources and the control of their transmission routes to foreign markets will again play a very important role.

References

[1] Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, October 8, 2023

[2] Gaza Marine https://www.massader.ps/en/project/1518343423

[3] Israel Green-Lights Gaza Offshore Gas Development June 18 2023. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/06/18/israel-green-lights-gaza-offshore-gas-development/

[4] Yıldız Dursun 2017 Fire and Water from Northern Iraq to Cyprus. New Middle East Mediterranean. Bizim Books. Istanbul 2017.