Greenland, Critical Raw Materials and NATO’s New Geo-economic Front: An Assessment Following the Ankara Summit

The Timing Is No Coincidence

Donald Trump’s decision to raise his claims regarding Greenland once again on the occasion of the NATO Summit held in Ankara on 7–8 July 2026 might, at first glance, be perceived as an isolated diplomatic spat. Indeed, throughout the summit, the US President voiced his dissatisfaction with his allies, citing both a lack of support in operations against Iran and Denmark’s persistent stance on Greenland; recalling the military role the US played on the island during the Second World War, he argued – in his own words – that the island had been returned to Denmark “hastily and by mistake” after the war. Trump stated that Denmark had been occupied by the Nazis in less than a day, and that the US had therefore been asked to keep an eye on Greenland; he claimed that after taking Greenland, the US had acted “foolishly” by returning it [1], [10]. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, meanwhile, reiterated that they were prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory, including their own, thereby confirming once again that the island was not for sale. Frederiksen stated that they were prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory, including their own [1], [10].

However, to interpret this war of words merely as a matter of personal style or election-campaign rhetoric would be to overlook the structural dimension of the issue. For at the same summit, on the very same day, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte announced another development—one that was far more low-key but likely to yield far more lasting results: a twelve-member ‘High-Visibility Project’ focusing on the procurement, stockpiling, transport and management of critical raw materials for the Alliance’s defence industry. On 7 July 2026, Rutte announced the launch of a multinational High-Visibility Project concerning critical raw materials in the defence sector; this project brings together twelve NATO allies to strengthen the resilience of their defence supply chains [2], [3]. The fact that these two developments emerged at the same summit, in the same geographical region and fuelled by the same set of strategic concerns makes it imperative to address the issue within a holistic framework. Although Trump’s remarks on Greenland and NATO’s institutional initiative on critical raw materials may appear to be two seemingly unrelated issues, they are in fact two different manifestations of the same structural concern: the West’s view that its dependence on China for strategic minerals—which have become indispensable to the defence industry—is unsustainable.

Greenland’s Geological Reality: The Gap Between Potential and Capacity

Greenland’s wealth of critical minerals is an indisputable fact; however, the claim that this wealth will translate into a viable production capacity in the near term requires a highly cautious interpretation when tested against geological and engineering data. It is known that the island ranks eighth in the world in terms of rare earth element reserves, with proven and economically viable reserves standing at approximately 1.5 million tonnes; however, the total potential resource points to much higher figures. With its 1.5 million-tonne reserve, Greenland ranks eighth in the world for rare earth reserves and is home to two of the world’s largest deposits, Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez; however, no rare earth mining activity has yet taken place on the island [4]. The primary factor preventing this potential from being realised economically is the low ore grade. Indeed, the grade at the Kvanefjeld deposit lags far behind that of China’s Bayan Obo deposit or the Mountain Pass mine in the US. Although Kvanefjeld, with a grade of 1.43, exceeds that of the Serra Verde project in Brazil and the Round Top project in Texas, it still lags behind the Mt Weld deposit in Australia, the Mountain Pass mine in the US and the Bayan Obo deposit in China [4].

The combination of a lack of infrastructure, low ore grades and climatic constraints points to a conclusion frequently emphasised in expert assessments: even under current conditions, the implementation of any production decision would take more than a decade, even in the most optimistic scenario. Experts note that the ore in Greenland has a very low grade compared to that in other major producing countries; this means that a much greater volume of rock must be processed to yield the same amount of usable material, which exponentially increases costs in a region lacking infrastructure, equipment and labour [5].

Added to this picture is the issue of processing: the separation and refining of rare-earth elements are just as critical a bottleneck as their extraction, and the overwhelming majority of global capacity in this field is currently held by China. Approximately 90 per cent of processed rare earth elements originate from China, a situation that has created a supply chain vulnerability which many countries have sought to avoid following China’s imposition of export restrictions on heavy rare earth elements in April 2025 [6]. Consequently, Greenland must be assessed not only in terms of its extractable reserves but also in light of the absence of a value chain capable of processing these reserves; otherwise, the potential lying beneath the ground will remain in the status of a ‘theoretical reserve’ for decades to come, even if it is highlighted as a strategic asset in political discourse.

The Institutional Legacy of the Ankara Summit: A High-Visibility Project

However controversial Trump’s personal rhetoric may be, the main lasting outcome of the Ankara Summit is the supply security architecture that has become institutionalised at Alliance level. Launched under Rutte’s leadership, this initiative brings together twelve allied countries—including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey, and covers the procurement, stockpiling, transport and management of recycled products for critical raw materials required by the defence industry. The project covers rare earth elements, tungsten, antimony and other defence-critical inputs, reflecting the growing consensus amongst Allies that access to these materials cannot be left solely to market forces and requires a coordinated, sovereign approach [2], [3], [8]. Rutte’s statement at the summit also clearly sets out the framework of this consensus: for the defence industrial base to remain ready and robust, the industrial infrastructure and supply chains must be resilient. Rutte emphasised that the industrial base and supply chains must be resilient for defence to remain ready and robust [2].

The geographical composition of this initiative reveals another dimension worthy of academic consideration. Whilst it is striking that members of the ‘Eastern Wing’—such as Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic, which possess significant mineral reserves—are not included on the list, the inclusion of the Asia-Pacific quartet—comprising Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand—and Ukraine, which stands out for its wealth of critical minerals, in the Ankara negotiations reflects the West’s determination to extend its alliance aimed at breaking China’s monopolistic position beyond geographical boundaries. Although the absence of certain Eastern Flank members—such as Poland, Romania or the Czech Republic—which possess significant mineral reserves is a notable omission, the presence in Ankara of the Asia-Pacific Quartet and Ukraine, which is rich in critical minerals, reflects the West’s determination to forge an alliance aimed at breaking China’s monopoly [3]. This selective participation structure is a concrete indication that critical raw materials security has evolved from being merely a Euro-Atlantic issue into a functional and geographically flexible alliance logic that could be termed “clustered alliance”.

Indeed, positioned as part of a broader rearmament process aiming to increase defence investment to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035, this project is not merely a symbolic announcement; it has been designed as an integral component of a broad industrial mobilisation, which took concrete form at the Industry Forum with new procurement commitments exceeding 50 billion dollars. At the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the Allies announced new procurement agreements worth over 50 billion dollars, covering precision strike capabilities, integrated air and missile defence, unmanned systems, advanced technologies and intelligence capabilities [9].

The Tension Between Trump’s Rhetoric and the Institutional Process

What is particularly interesting from an academic perspective here is the methodological incompatibility between Trump’s personal and unilateral annexation rhetoric and NATO’s multilateral, institutional and consultative framework for critical raw materials. In a statement issued on the occasion of the Ankara Summit, the European Union emphasised that decisions regarding Greenland’s future rest solely with the people of Greenland and Denmark, and that territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the inviolability of borders are fundamental principles of international law. EU Spokesperson Olof Gill stated that decisions regarding Greenland’s future are a matter for the people of Greenland and Denmark, and that territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the inviolability of borders are fundamental principles of international law [1]. However, Rutte himself implied that he agreed to a certain extent with Trump’s observation that China and Russia were seeking to increase their influence in the Arctic region, and argued that the Alliance must act together to prevent this development. Rutte noted that Trump had made a valid point regarding China and Russia’s pursuit of growing influence in the Arctic, and emphasised that it was of vital importance for the Alliance to work together to prevent this [1].

This ambivalent stance demonstrates that the discourse on geo-economic security within NATO is progressing along two distinct strands. On the one hand, there is the classical framework of international law, rooted in the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; on the other, there is geostrategic pragmatism, which prioritises intra-alliance solidarity against Chinese and Russian influence in the Arctic. The unresolved tension between these two layers will persist as a breaking point that tests the Alliance’s internal coherence in the medium term. For the territorial integrity of a founding member such as Denmark to be openly called into question by the Alliance’s leading power—of which that member is itself a part—creates institutional uncertainty regarding the reliability of the collective defence commitment. It should not be overlooked that this uncertainty could also indirectly affect the reliable and predictable functioning of the critical raw materials supply chain; for investor confidence and long-term capital commitments cannot be considered in isolation from the perception of political stability.

The China Factor: An Inevitable Partner or a Strategic Rival?

The underlying structural reality behind the Greenland debate is China’s near-monopolistic position in the processing of rare earth elements. The fact that approximately 90 per cent of global refining capacity is in Chinese hands constitutes a structural constraint that directly affects not only Greenland but also all efforts to seek alternative sources worldwide [6]. China holds the refining lead in 19 out of 20 critical minerals and has an average market share of 70 per cent in the analysed critical mineral supply chains; it controls 99 per cent of gallium refining and over 90 per cent of graphite, manganese and rare earth processing [11]. This situation highlights that the West’s strategy for critical raw materials must address not only the question of ‘from whom shall we source them’, but also – and perhaps even more importantly – the question of ‘where shall we process them’.

In this context, another contradiction emerging specifically in relation to Greenland is the fact that a Chinese entity holds a stake even in one of the island’s most developed reserves. The fact that the China-based Shenghe Resources holds a minority stake in the Kvanefjeld project and, under a 2018 memorandum of understanding, aims to play a leading role in the processing and marketing of the rare earth output to be produced, highlights the inconsistency between the West’s rhetoric of ‘decoupling from China’ and the actual investment structure on the ground. Although the Kvanefjeld project is owned by the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals, China’s Shenghe Resources is the project’s second-largest shareholder; this situation is causing concern in Washington, where the mining sector is viewed as a backdoor means for China to exert influence in the Arctic [7]. The Greenlandic government itself has explicitly stated that, should sufficient investment flows not be secured from Western partners, it may turn to alternative partners, including China; this demonstrates that the West’s rhetoric on supply security could undermine its own objectives if it is not backed by concrete and timely capital commitments on the ground. Greenland’s Minister for Business and Mineral Resources has warned that, by 2025, continued hesitation on the part of the US and the EU could make it necessary to consider Chinese investors [4], [12].

Turkey’s Position: From Hosting to Active Participation

Within this multi-layered landscape, Turkey’s position extends far beyond that of a mere summit host. Ankara’s role as a direct participant in the critical raw materials project amongst the twelve allies redefines Turkey’s positioning within defence industry supply chains as an area of geo-economic responsibility and opportunity. This participation is not merely a symbolic gesture of alliance solidarity; it is also a development that highlights Turkey’s potential role as an industrial anchor for Central Asia’s critical mineral supply chains. Indeed, the fact that Ankara hosted the MINEX Asia 2026 forum just one month ago demonstrates that this strategic positioning is by no means coincidental. The announcement was made in Ankara, the city that hosted the MINEX Asia 2026 forum the previous month, where Turkey’s potential role as an industrial anchor for Central Asia’s critical mineral supply chains was a central theme [8].

Turkey’s involvement in this project demonstrates a consistency that aligns with its existing production capacity in the defence industry. The announcement of investments in ATMACA long-range cruise missiles demonstrates that Ankara has integrated itself into this framework not merely as a passive recipient of critical raw materials, but also as a manufacturer of end products. Turkey has announced that it will invest in ATMACA long-range cruise missiles [8]. In this context, it would be appropriate to interpret Turkey’s position in conjunction with the ‘production continuity’-based deterrence approach previously developed on various occasions: securing access to critical raw materials only holds strategic value when combined with a production capacity capable of transforming that access into a final defence industry product. Turkey’s geographical location and defence industry infrastructure make it one of the few allies capable of combining these two elements; this quality lays the groundwork for Turkey to assume a more prominent role in critical raw materials diplomacy in the period following the Ankara Summit.

Conclusion: Between Symbolic Rhetoric and Structural Transformation

The media visibility of the Greenland debate could easily overshadow the far more lasting steps taken by NATO at the Ankara Summit. However, upon closer analysis, it becomes apparent that whilst Trump’s personal rhetoric on annexation is destined to remain a short-term source of political tension, the institutionalised framework for cooperation established by the twelve allies regarding the supply of critical raw materials marks the beginning of a structural transformation that will shape the architecture of the defence industry over the next decade. Greenland itself, even in the most optimistic scenario, is far from having the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the global supply of rare earths over the next decade; therefore, the island should be assessed not as a ‘solution’, but at best as a long-term diversification option.

However, the rhetoric surrounding Greenland also serves a strategic function: it mobilises Western public opinion and decision-makers regarding the urgency of critical raw material dependency, whilst providing political legitimacy and public support for the steps taken by NATO at an institutional level. In this respect, Trump’s rhetoric and Rutte’s institutional initiative, despite their apparent contradictions, actually fulfil two complementary functions: whilst one mobilises the public agenda and political will, the other transforms this will into a concrete, multilateral and sustainable institutional framework. The critical issue for Turkey is to position itself not merely as an observer of this process, but as an active architect, leveraging both its geographical location and its defence industry capabilities. The true legacy of the Ankara Summit will likely be measured, in the coming years, not so much by Greenland’s final status as by the tangible outcomes of the institutional resilience that the twelve allies will build within the critical raw materials supply chain.

References

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[2] NATO. (2026). NATO Allies launch new project on critical raw materials for defence. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/07/07/nato-allies-launch-new-project-on-critical-raw-materials-for-defence

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[5] CNBC. (2026). U.S. Greenland rare earth bet is “absurd” as hurdles loom, warn experts. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/07/greenland-rare-earths-us-china-processing-reality-mining-arctic-shipping-lanes-route-critical-minerals.html

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[7] Atlantic Council. (2026). Greenland’s critical minerals require patient statecraft. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/greenlands-critical-minerals-require-patient-statecraft/

[8] MINEX Forum. (2026). NATO launches 12-nation critical raw materials project for defence supply chains at Ankara Summit. https://minexforum.com/nato-launches-12-nation-critical-raw-materials-project-for-defence-supply-chains-at-ankara-summit/

[9] NATO. (2026). Overview – 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/2026/07/overview---2026-nato-summit-in-ankara-

[10] Jamasmie, C. (2026). Trump puts Greenland’s rare earths back on the table for NATO. MINING.COM. https://www.mining.com/trump-puts-greenlands-rare-earths-back-on-the-table-for-nato/

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