How can Netanyahu be so reckless?
Domestic political factors also influence Netanyahu to be so disproportionate in his attacks on Gaza's perceived enemies.
During Netanyahu's visit to the United States in July 2024, his speech to a joint session of the House of Representatives and the Senate often received a standing ovation. This was perceived by the US representatives, and therefore by the American public, as an endorsement of Israel's aggression in Gaza, which has so far killed more than 40,000 people, and drew the reaction of the international community, mainly in the Muslim world. At the end of July, there were reports of Israeli attacks against important political and military leaders of hostile elements. First, the Israeli authorities announced that Muhammad Deif, the leader of the military wing of Hamas, was killed in Gaza in July. Then, Fuad Shukur, a senior Hezbollah commander, was killed in Beirut in an airstrike, and Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas' political bureau, was assassinated in Tehran. Israel claimed responsibility for the attack on Fuad Shukur, but did not make any statement about Ismail Haniyeh. In April, Israel killed two Iranian generals in an attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. These successive attacks have increased the political tension in the region, and the possibility of military conflicts turning into a regional war has been increasingly discussed. This article will review the factors that are considered to have contributed to creating favourable conditions for Israel to carry out these attacks.
In recent years, US policies towards the Middle East and Israel have moved away from its traditional line. Due to the influence of the Jewish lobby and its own regional interests, supporting Israel's security has always been a priority of US foreign policy. However, until the Trump era, support for Israel and efforts to find a solution to the Palestinian problem were pursued simultaneously. While the US did not recognise the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war, it supported efforts to bring a two-state solution to the problem and led the finalisation of the Oslo process. With Trump, however, there has been a change in this strategic direction. After recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Trump moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem and announced that he also recognised Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. Biden, who became president after Trump, did not adopt an attitude that would change Trump's policies. Whereas the previous Democratic President Obama was known for his distant approach towards Netanyahu. On the contrary, Biden personally went to Israel immediately after 07 October and embraced Netanyahu, showing his personal support with sincere poses and has continued this attitude until now. Although US Secretary of State Blinken frequently visits the region and attempts to achieve a ceasefire, he does not refrain from expressing the unconditional US support for Israel's security at every opportunity. On the other hand, the US administration ensured the passage of the UNSC ceasefire resolution on 25 March by abstaining. However, this resolution had no impact on Israel's military offensive against Gaza. The demonstrations that started in US universities in protest against Israel's attacks failed to change the US administration's policy towards Israel and were quickly taken under control due to allegations of antisemitism.
This situation, which contradicts Biden's discourse of a rule-based international relations based on human rights, democracy, rule of law, international co-operation and partnerships, calls into question the credibility and leadership of the US among the world states. Support for Israel, which harms the international reputation of the US, may have domestic political reasons. As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to guess that the US administration intends to win the votes of Jewish voters in the upcoming presidential elections. However, it would be misleading to think that the entire US public supports the Israeli attacks. This is because there is a significant Muslim segment in the US that supports the Palestinian people, as well as a significant group of voters who oppose Israeli policy for reasons such as human rights, political attitudes and so on. Considering the general lack of interest of ordinary citizens in the US in foreign policy issues, it can be said that the impact of domestic political concerns on the US administration's policy towards Israel will be limited. However, the efforts to obtain the financial support of financially powerful Jewish lobby organisations should be taken into account as an important factor. Again, Zionist and Evangalist politicians with an ideological and religion-oriented mindset are thought to have a significant influence on the US policy towards Israel. To these two known facts of the US political structure, it is necessary to add the incompetence of the current US President's leadership. It can be said that Biden's physical and cognitive weaknesses, which led to his withdrawal from the presidential race, are among the most important reasons for the failure to show the necessary leadership in stopping the greatest human tragedy of recent years in Gaza.
In the Obama era, the US had put forward the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy in the face of China's rise. One of the priorities of this policy was to reduce the US military power in Afghanistan and the Middle East, to focus on diplomacy while conducting the conflicts there through proxies, and to increase its commercial, political and military presence in Far Asia and South East Asia. In fact, in a speech at West Point in 2014, Obama summarised his approach to conflict resolution by saying, ‘Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.’ After Trump became president, although he continued his support for Israel, he pursued a policy of reducing his military presence in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world, in line with his slogan ‘America First’ and his policy of isolationism. So much so that it expressed its intention to withdraw its troops from Syria, but the attitude of the security bureaucracy in the face of conjunctural developments prevented it from realising this idea. For a while, Russia tried to take advantage of the growing US indifference towards the Middle East with its political and military support to Syria. However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a decline in its interest in the region. China, on the other hand, is increasing its diplomatic efforts to be active in the Middle East. In this context, it mediated the normalisation of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, and in July 2024, it gathered 14 Palestinian factions in Beijing and hosted talks in which they eventually announced their reconciliation. However, it is very difficult to say that these diplomatic initiatives by China have had an impact on changing the regional balance. There is no indication yet that China has given any support to any group or state supporting Palestine in a way that would balance the political and military support of the US to Israel. Moreover, the US does not hold back from efforts to limit China's growing diplomatic, political and military power. The India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor announced by the Biden administration at the G20 summit in September 2023 is one of the latest examples of this. In this framework, it is seen that the increasing rivalry between the great powers is far from bringing a balance that will stop or resolve the conflicts in the Middle East.
The inability of the countries in the region, which have common sensitivities on the Palestinian issue, to develop a common stance due to their own political, military and economic reasons creates a favourable conjuncture for Netanyahu. In this context, it would be enlightening to review the attitudes of these states. Iran has a significant presence in the region with its proxy wars. Although it has recently tried to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and does not hide its support for Hamas, it is trying to expand its sphere of influence, especially with the military and political support it provides to Shiite groups. To what extent this policy of Iran contributes to the stabilisation of the region is questionable. On the other hand, the resources and energy it allocates to external conflict areas prevent it from strengthening its internal front. Since the Iraq war, Iran has not been able to risk a direct conflict. As a matter of fact, its attacks, both after the US assassination of Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 and after the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April 2024, which resulted in the death of two of its generals, have been very weak and ineffective. Among the other states in the region, Syria and Iraq are preoccupied with their internal problems. Jordan and Egypt are the only two states in the region that have previously signed a peace treaty with Israel. Neither of them has the economic, political or military power to risk another conflict with Israel. The UAE and Bahrain signed the Ibrahim Accords in September 2020, demonstrating their willingness to mend their long-term economic and diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia is conducting normalisation talks with Israel, while at the same time improving its relations with Iran. In the US-brokered talks, which were interrupted by the Gaza War, it is claimed that the US will provide certain guarantees for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in exchange for certain security guarantees and technology transfer in the field of civilian nuclear energy. Although the missile threat posed by Hezbollah to Israel from the north occasionally exceeds Israel's layered air defence system, it does not have a deterrent effect on Israel unless it is supported by manoeuvring elements. Turkey is one of the largest political supporters of the Palestinian issue, but its national interests and the current threat to the country make it difficult for it to respond to Israel with hard power. Qatar is unable to go beyond political and economic support for Palestinian elements.
Domestic political factors also influence Netanyahu to be so disproportionate in his attacks on Gaza's perceived enemies. Netanyahu assumed his sixth term as prime minister at the end of 2022. This government, which consists of six parties together with Likud, is known as the most right-wing government in Israeli history. The far-right views of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir are particularly influential in the Netanyahu government. Netanyahu needs the continuation of the current government in order to pass legal regulations that could affect the ongoing court proceedings in his favour. So much so that even the resignation of Benny Gantz, Minister of the War Cabinet of the national unity government, former Chief of General Staff Benny Gantz and former Chief of General Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who served as an observer in the same cabinet, who were uncomfortable with Netanyahu's policies regarding the war and its aftermath, from the government in June did not lead to a softening in Netanyahu's aggressive policy.
It is seen that many factors at the international, national and individual levels are effective behind Israel's recent actions that have increased regional tension and raised expectations of war. In this framework, the change in the strategic direction of the US policy towards Palestine after Trump became president in 2016 has had a shaking effect on the balance in the Palestinian issue. This balance, which has deteriorated in favour of Israel, has worsened due to the weak leadership of Biden, who failed to show the necessary resilience in the face of the Jewish lobby in the US. Although the US has partially moved away from the policy of isolationism during the Biden era after Trump, its inability to have a sufficient presence in the region, Russia's preoccupation with the Ukranian war, and China's refraining from using the resources that could be effective in the region have opened a space for Israel to act comfortably. On the other hand, the regional powers, which would fill this vacuum created by the great powers, have not been able to show the partial unity they have shown in the past period. As a result, Netanyahu, with the support of the US and his ideological supporters, sees no harm in exploiting the unstable situation of the international structure and the political disarray of the regional powers in order to realise his personal interests and political ambitions, while causing irreparable damage to regional stability and peace.