Is Washington behind Yerevan in the September 13 Azeri-Armenian Conflict?

The First Karabakh War and Its Effects on Today

Among the various "frozen conflicts or problems" spread across the post-Soviet space, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has always retained its importance. The First Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which lasted 44 days in 1994, ended in Armenia's victory. Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence as the Republic of Artsakh. To date, however, Artsakh has not been recognized by any UN member state, including Armenia. The international community has not abandoned its insistence that Armenian forces are illegally occupying Azeri territory. This has contributed to Azerbaijan's moral weakness vis-à-vis Armenia.

Despite this fact, Armenia, which continued its occupation of Karabakh under Moscow's patronage after 1994, could not avoid defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020, which lasted for 6 weeks. Thus, the Azeri-Armenian balance in the region changed in favor of the Azeris. 

Second Karabakh War and its consequences

Azerbaijan, which has prospered faster than Armenia thanks to its oil revenues, has equipped its army with high-tech weapons and equipment after the First Karabakh defeat. Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs carrying laser-guided bombs, Israeli-made Heron and Hermes UAVs, and Orbiter "kamikaze" drones were introduced. Thus, Azerbaijan, which put its technical warfare capabilities on the field, achieved a decisive victory over Armenia. With the help of Turkey, Azerbaijan regained control of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the size of the Artsakh Republic shrunk. By November 10, when Russia succeeded in halting the fighting, Azerbaijan had managed to retake about 80 percent of the total area left under Armenian control by the 1994 ceasefire.

Before the war, Armenians saw the Russian military base in Gyumri as a sign that Moscow would protect them against a possible Azeri attack. However, the Kremlin's obligations as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization did not extend to Armenian forces in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was able to use this situation to its advantage politically and militarily and regained the majority of its territory in Karabakh without provoking a Russian reaction. 

The End of the War necessitated the opening of two corridors

The Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement may have saved Artsakh, or Nagorno-Karabakh, from being completely overrun, but it has created new problems for Yerevan. As part of the agreement, two corridors were opened, further increasing Armenia's vulnerability. 

The first of these is the Nakhchivan (Zengesur) corridor. This corridor runs from Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the Syunik province in southern Armenia. With this new arrangement, Baku has gained direct access to Nakhchivan without being dependent on Iran for transportation and trade. 

The second corridor is the Lachin corridor. According to the November 10, 2020 agreement, the corridor in Kalbajar was fully under Azerbaijani control, while the Lachin corridor was included in Azerbaijani territory, but under the supervision of Russian peacekeepers.

On September 13, Azeri-Armenian clashes resumed

On the night of September 12, Armenia allegedly fired on Azerbaijani positions, provoking the Azerbaijani leadership to provoke the Azerbaijani army to respond strongly to the attack. Baku claimed that Armenian troops and militias had systematically opened fire on the border line in the Lachin, Kalbajar, Dashkesen and Gadabey regions in recent weeks. Responding to the Armenian offensive, the Azerbaijani army eliminated all Armenian positions on the border in Lachin and Kalbajar. 

Azerbaijan is understood to have launched military operations against Armenia in order to force it to make concessions on a possible peace agreement. Azerbaijan is shelling several towns deep inside Armenia. There are sporadic fierce clashes between the two sides. 

The Russian garrison in the South Caucasus (2,000 troops) has been reluctant to intervene. As the Kremlin keeps most of its military forces in Ukraine, its military involvement in this region has been declining. Azerbaijan may have sought to exploit this military and geopolitical vacuum. 

Attitudes of Russia and Western Countries towards the Conflict

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has stated that 49 Armenian soldiers have been killed so far (the number could be as high as 200) and that this number could rise further, and has formally appealed to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for help. The CSTO could have responded, as it did in Kazakhstan in January on Putin's orders. But so far it has not reacted, it has remained silent. It has only called for a ceasefire. 

On the other hand, Western capitals have also started diplomatic contacts to try to stop the conflict between the two South Caucasus republics. 

Azerbaijan, whose 50 soldiers were killed in the clashes, is at a conjunctural moment of strengthening its hand in terms of sanctions against Russia and the supply of natural gas to Europe. It serves as a land bridge to Iran, through which the International North-South Transport Corridor is planned to connect India and Iran to Russian ports. In light of the Armenian aggression, the Aliyev administration may have deemed it necessary to deploy its superior forces. Taking advantage of this, it may be said that it is forcing Armenia to sign the November 10 agreement.

Is Washington behind Armenia, which launched the latest attacks?

Meanwhile, there are indications that Washington is behind Armenia. The US, which has been squeezing Russia with sanctions, seems to have rolled up its sleeves to take the Azerbaijan card from the hands of the Putin administration, which can weaken the sanctions to a certain extent by opening overland routes to Iran and Asia through Azerbaijan. Armenia may have felt it necessary to approach the US instead of the Russians, whose support it did not receive in the Second Karabakh War. Indeed, Armenia is maneuvering to side with the West in the current Russian-American geopolitical conflict. 

Before the latest conflict, the Armenian Defense Minister paid an official visit to the United States. In the event of a conflict with Azerbaijan, Washington expressed its support. "We are ready to provide Armenia with a valuable alternative to the Russian military presence," the Pentagon said. Then Philip Reeker, US Secretary of State Blinken's Caucasus negotiator, led a delegation to the South Caucasus. He stayed in Yerevan for 3 days and held critical meetings. He returned without visiting Tbilisi and Baku.

The Russians claim that Washington (and even the EU) is aware of the impending attack and that with his visit to Armenia, Reeker coordinated with Pashinyan the conditions that would strengthen the political basis for a new conflict.

Conclusion

Meanwhile, given Turkey's relations with Russia and its close ties with Azerbaijan, which amount to a strategic partnership and "one nation, two states" unity, Turkey inevitably becomes a party to Azeri-Armenian conflicts. 

Conflicts on the border, coupled with Turkey's active arms support to Azerbaijan in 2020, could strain Ankara's ties with Washington, which is currently closer to the Armenian side. 

Standing by the brotherly Azeri community in any situation will remain the Turkish people's unchanging stance and expectation from the Government.