The Druze Nexus in Syria’s Geopolitical Chessboard: Israel, Turkey, and the Struggle for Southern Stability

Background of Events and the Situation in Sweida

Five days after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, the predominantly Druze city of Sweida erupted in celebration. While the early days were marked by vibrant public scenes, the euphoria soon gave way to tensions and armed clashes. Since that time, Sweida and the Damascus government have experienced no fewer than five major crises.

The new Syrian leadership has set out to reconstruct the country’s security architecture, aiming for the disarmament of all armed groups operating across different regions. The ultimate objective is to create a unified military structure under a single national army. However, the pace of this process has varied by region, and in Sweida, certain Druze groups have yet to respond positively to these demands.

At the local level, two contrasting approaches have emerged:

● Cautious or Oppositional Actors: Some religious and military leaders have maintained a distance from, or openly rejected, Damascus’s security plans.

● Supportive Actors: Those advocating for the restoration of centralized authority.

The uncertainty over disarmament has periodically heightened tensions between the government and local factions. While Damascus frames the dismantling of armed structures as an issue of national sovereignty, some local groups regard weapons as an indispensable means of ensuring the security of their communities.

Covering an area of 5,500 square kilometers, Sweida remains tense but relatively calm following recent clashes. Its significance extends far beyond internal security, given its proximity to the Golan Heights, its position along the Jordanian border, and its location on key narcotics trafficking routes—particularly the Captagon trade—making it a site of considerable strategic value in both regional and global contexts.

Leadership within Sweida falls into two main categories:

● Religious Leaders: The highest authority within the Druze community, responsible for both religious and social matters.

● Military Leaders: Those controlling local security forces and armed structures.

The highest Druze religious authority is the Cemaat Council, which issues binding decisions on both faith and societal matters. By tradition, the Council is composed of three Sheikh al-Aql figures. In Syria, these positions are held by:

● Sheikh Yusuf Jarbu

● Sheikh Hamoud al-Hannawi

● Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri

Alongside these clerics, there are civilian or semi-political figures who have earned broad public trust. Foremost among these is Leys al-Baous, an individual whose influence extends beyond local politics and occasionally resonates at the national level.

The current crisis in Sweida cannot be understood solely through internal dynamics. In recent years, Israel has significantly expanded its influence within the Druze community through sustained propaganda campaigns, particularly by cultivating ties with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. By 2024, both survey data and anecdotal evidence indicated that support for Israel within Sweida’s Druze population had risen markedly compared to earlier years.

At present, the balance of power in Sweida is fragmented:

● City center, eastern, and southern sectors: Dominated by al-Hijri and allied groups.

● Northern and western sectors: Under the control of the Syrian government.

Although Sweida is effectively divided, its deep economic dependency on Damascus—covering electricity, water, healthcare, and education—makes any formal or de facto autonomy highly unrealistic under the current circumstances.

2. Main Actors and Their Positions

A. Religious Leaders

1. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri

Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri assumed the position of Sheikh al-Aql—the highest Druze religious authority in Syria—in 2012 following the death of his father, Sheikh Ahmed al-Hijri. His appointment, which bypassed certain Druze traditional procedures, was met with controversy within the community.

In his early years, al-Hijri maintained close relations with Damascus, delivering public statements in support of the Assad government and playing a role in the formation of pro-government armed groups.

A turning point came in 2021 when he was reportedly slighted by senior regime figures. From that moment, he intensified his criticism of Damascus. By 2024, he had strengthened his contacts with Western states and Israel, engaging frequently with Muwafaq Tarif, a Druze religious leader in Israel known for his close ties to the Israeli security establishment.

Currently, al-Hijri calls for international protection and autonomy for Sweida. He maintains communication with the YPG/SDG based on shared goals of decentralization, collaborates closely with the Israel-backed Sweida Military Council, and has been repeatedly linked to the narcotics trade—specifically Captagon smuggling operations—a connection corroborated by Jordanian authorities. This involvement in illicit trafficking not only provides him with additional financial resources but also positions him as a central figure in the broader regional Captagon network.

Strategically, al-Hijri is the most influential channel through which external actors exert influence in the Druze community. His alignment with foreign interests has deepened the rift between himself and pro-government Druze leaders, exacerbating internal divisions.

2. Sheikh Yusuf Jarbu

Sheikh Yusuf Jarbu, whose base of influence lies in Sweida’s city center and southern Damascus neighborhoods, has consistently supported the central government throughout the conflict.

He advocates for direct dialogue with Damascus, the preservation of national unity, and the safeguarding of Sweida’s security under state authority. Jarbu’s proposed solution includes the formation of local security units composed of trusted members of the Druze community.

Strategically, Jarbu is among the most prominent religious figures opposing Israeli intervention and rejecting autonomy demands. His good standing with Damascus positions him as a stabilizing and balancing force within the local power structure.

3. Sheikh Hamoud al-Hannawi

Sheikh Hamoud al-Hannawi holds influence primarily in the northern rural areas of Sweida. Between 2011 and 2024, he maintained a neutral stance, refraining from deep political engagement.

Hannawi opposes separatist initiatives and foreign intervention, emphasizing the importance of keeping communication channels with Damascus open. He also advocates for inclusive decision-making processes that reflect the views of the entire Druze community.

While his political influence is more limited compared to al-Hijri and Jarbu, his calls for social inclusivity make him a key figure in preserving internal cohesion and reducing sectarian polarization.

B. Prominent Civil and Political Figures

Leys al-Baous

Leys al-Baous is among the most respected and popular figures not only within the Druze community but also among other ethnic and religious groups.

Firmly committed to Syria’s territorial integrity, al-Baous openly opposes al-Hijri’s political line and rejects Israeli involvement in Sweida. His demands to Damascus center on ending abuses against civilians and restoring confiscated rights.

Thanks to his broad grassroots support, al-Baous enjoys significant local legitimacy and serves as a rallying point for cross-sectarian unity.

C. Military Structures and External Connections

1. Sweida Military Council

The Sweida Military Council consists largely of former regime officers and militiamen. It receives extensive support from Israel in the form of financing, logistics, training, and propaganda.

Its stated objectives are to establish an autonomous political structure in Sweida, invite foreign intervention, and erode Damascus’s centralized authority.

2. Rijal al-Karama Movement

Founded in 2013 by the late Wahid al-Balous, the Rijal al-Karama (Men of Dignity) Movement was created to defend Sweida from external threats and oppose the compulsory conscription of Druze youth into the Syrian army.

Under its current leader, Yahya al-Hajjar, the movement maintains its loyalty to the Syrian state and rejects both autonomy and foreign intervention.

3. Strategic Analysis and Future Scenarios

A. Current Balance of Power

As of today, Sweida is effectively divided into two zones of control: the central, eastern, and southern parts are dominated by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and his allied armed groups, primarily the Sweida Military Council, while the northern and western areas remain under the firm control of the Syrian government.

Despite this de facto territorial split, Sweida’s economic, administrative, and infrastructural dependence on Damascus renders a complete separation unfeasible. Essential services such as electricity, water supply, healthcare, and education are all provided by the central government, which ensures a persistent connection between Sweida and Damascus. This economic reliance significantly limits the practical scope of autonomy claims within the current context.

B. Role of External Actors

● Israel:

Israel exerts considerable influence in Sweida through its alliance with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and the Sweida Military Council. This support encompasses military aid, financial assistance, logistical backing, and a propaganda campaign aimed at expanding its strategic foothold in southern Syria. By projecting power over the Golan Heights and along the Jordanian border, Israel seeks to weaken Damascus’s control in this sensitive region and foster the fragmentation of Syria.

● Western Countries (especially the United States):

Western actors, while less overtly involved, have engaged with al-Hijri and similar groups to promote alternative centers of power that challenge Damascus’s monopoly on authority. Their policies often align indirectly with Israeli strategic goals, contributing to the complexity of the conflict dynamics.

● Jordan:

Concerned about the spillover effects of instability and particularly the trafficking of Captagon—an amphetamine widely smuggled through Sweida—Jordan has closed border crossings and tightened security. The Jordanian government remains wary of the growing lawlessness and its implications for regional security.

C. Conflict Axis Among Internal Actors

● Pro-State Factions:

These include Sheikh Yusuf Jarbu, Sheikh Hamoud al-Hannawi, Leys al-Baous, and the Rijal al-Karama Movement. Their rhetoric emphasizes national unity, the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity, and opposition to foreign intervention.

● Externally-Aligned Groups:

Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and the Sweida Military Council fall into this category. They seek autonomy and international protection, maintaining direct contacts with Israel and Western countries.

The profound divide between these two camps prevents the emergence of a cohesive political platform within the Druze community, perpetuating instability and uncertainty in the region.

D. Possible Future Scenarios

1. Status Quo Scenario (Short-Term Probability):

Sweida remains divided along current lines, with Damascus maintaining control over the north and west, and al-Hijri’s forces holding sway in the central, eastern, and southern districts. Economic dependence on Damascus continues to prevent formal separation. Sporadic low-intensity clashes persist.

1. Strengthening of Central Control (Medium-Term Possibility):

Damascus consolidates its influence by forging stronger alliances with pro-state Druze leaders such as Jarbu, Hannawi, and al-Baous. Implementation of local security forces drawn from loyal community members weakens al-Hijri’s operational space, diminishing Israeli and Western influence in the process. This outcome would align with Turkey’s regional security interests and Syria’s territorial unity.

1. Autonomy Declaration and Foreign Intervention (High-Risk Scenario):

Al-Hijri, bolstered by Israeli and Western backing, escalates military capabilities and declares a form of de facto autonomy in Sweida. This move invites foreign intervention and likely provokes a severe military response from Damascus. The region would become increasingly integrated into Israel’s sphere of influence via the Golan Heights, further destabilizing southern Syria

E. Strategic Priorities

● From Damascus’s Perspective:

Prioritize breaking external actors’ influence by strengthening ties with loyal Druze leaders, improving public services, and integrating local armed groups into official state security frameworks.

● From Pro-State Druze Leaders’ Perspective:

Develop inclusive narratives that counteract sectarian fragmentation, and present credible security and welfare alternatives to those offered by Israel-backed factions.

● From Al-Hijri and Allies’ Perspective:

Sustain international support while crafting autonomy plans that include economic self-sufficiency—although such conditions remain unrealistic in the current environment.

Sweida’s Geopolitical Importance

Sweida’s strategic significance transcends internal security concerns. Its proximity to the Golan Heights, its position along key narcotics trafficking routes—especially the Captagon trade—and its location on the Jordanian border make it a critical point of interest for regional and global powers. Israel’s systematic propaganda and direct engagement with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri have increased its influence among the Druze community. By 2024, pro-Israeli sentiment in Sweida has risen markedly, signaling a shift in local allegiances that may reshape power dynamics in southern Syria.

The contest over Sweida reflects broader geopolitical fault lines in the Levant, where local actors serve as proxies for competing external forces. Al-Hijri’s close relationship with Israel and Western countries, combined with his involvement in the Captagon narcotics trade, has provided him with financial and strategic leverage, yet also deepened internal community divisions and opposition from Damascus-aligned figures such as Jarbu, Hannawi, and al-Baous.

Implications for Turkey

For Turkey, the situation in Sweida represents a strategically significant dossier that links internal Syrian dynamics to broader regional security frameworks. Ankara is firmly opposed to the entrenchment of any destabilizing entities along its southern border and remains committed to the preservation of Syria’s territorial integrity.

The expansion of Israeli influence in Sweida poses a potential threat to Turkey’s security perception along the Golan axis. Furthermore, the possible establishment of a logistical corridor between YPG/SDG-controlled areas in northeastern Syria and Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s sphere in Sweida could directly undermine Turkey’s counterterrorism operations east of the Euphrates River.

Consequently, Turkey must enhance its diplomatic engagement both with the Damascus government and with pro-state Druze leaders to preempt separatist tendencies. Ankara’s strategic objective should be to support the development of an administrative and security framework in southern Syria that aligns with the central government, resists foreign intervention, and ensures local stability.

Theoretical Framework: Geopolitics and the Balance of Power Perspective

Understanding the dynamics in Sweida requires an analysis grounded not only in field data but also in geopolitical theory and balance-of-power concepts. Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory” emphasizes the primacy of land power in global politics, whereas Nicholas Spykman’s “Rimland Theory” highlights the strategic importance of coastal and peripheral zones in determining global power balances.

Sweida, as Syria’s southern gateway, constitutes a critical node in Damascus’s terrestrial control chain. Situated within the Rimland zone that stretches across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Gulf, it occupies a pivotal position in the regional security architecture.

Balance-of-power theory posits that regional stability emerges from an equilibrium among competing actors. In Sweida, this is reflected in the contest between externally supported pro-autonomy factions, backed by Israel and Western powers, and the pro-government Druze factions allied with Damascus. Regional stakeholders such as Turkey and Jordan act as stabilizing forces, using diplomatic and intelligence tools to influence the balance.

Historically, externally supported separatist movements in the Middle East have rarely achieved sustainable autonomy. Examples range from sectarian militias in Lebanon’s civil war, Kurdish groups in post-1991 Iraq, to YPG/SDG forces in Syria’s ongoing conflict. These actors often make temporary gains while receiving foreign support but tend to be marginalized or abandoned once geopolitical conditions shift.

In Sweida’s context, autonomy initiatives reliant on external backing are unlikely to endure. The lack of economic self-sufficiency, military capacity, and permanent patronage renders such projects inherently fragile. From a balance-of-power standpoint, durable stability in Sweida depends on reintegration within the Syrian state framework, underpinned by effective governance and security provisions.

For Turkey, strengthening Damascus’s authority in southern Syria, curbing foreign interference, and promoting regional stability are strategic imperatives. By leveraging its diplomatic, military, and intelligence capabilities, Ankara can influence the balance toward a political settlement that preserves Syria’s territorial integrity and secures the security corridor from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Jordanian border.

In the Sweida dossier, not only military and political parameters but also energy geopolitics have emerged as critical variables. Within the framework of a diplomatic initiative spearheaded by Turkey, Syrian Leader Ahmed al-Shara was invited to Baku to meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. This meeting represented not only political solidarity but also a strategic move in terms of regional energy security. The transfer of Baku gas to Syria via Turkey has the potential to strengthen Syria’s energy supply security, enhance the central government’s economic maneuverability, and improve living standards for local communities—particularly the Druze.

However, shortly after al-Shara returned to Damascus, his palace was bombed by Israel under the pretext of targeting Druze-related activities. This event can be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the emerging energy and diplomacy corridor. Here, the classical power projection theory is relevant: rival powers employ military and psychological pressure to disrupt potential strategic alignments formed through energy and diplomatic cooperation. Such attacks serve not only as a physical threat but also as a geopolitical message aimed at deterring local leaders.

From the perspective of Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Syria energy corridor reinforces a strategic control chain established over land, and its potential extension to the Eastern Mediterranean directly impacts Israel’s perception of regional balance. Conversely, within Spykman’s Rimland Theory, energy and trade integration along the Eastern Mediterranean’s coastal belt could grant influence superiority across the Rimland region. As such, the extension of the energy corridor to southern Syria and Damascus is considered not merely an economic gain but also a strategic one.

In the context of balance of power theory, Turkey’s energy-based bridge with both the central government and the Druze community positions it as a “balancing” actor against Israel- and Western-backed separatist tendencies. Thus, economic integration reinforced by military deterrence emerges as a key component of long-term stability.

These developments demonstrate that the equation in Sweida is shaped not only by ethnic and sectarian dynamics but also by energy security, regional alliances, and international power competition. If preserved and sustained effectively, energy diplomacy and policies aimed at improving local welfare will strengthen the central government’s authority over southern Syria and enhance its resilience against foreign intervention.