Turkey's Responses to Greek Claims: Part-5
It is clearly stated in Annex 15 to the Chicago Convention on which flights to provide flight information and traffic information. Accordingly, there is no relation between the FIR line and the concepts of sovereign airspace.
3) Airspace Issues
FIR Line (Flight Information Region)
Today's Istanbul-Athens FIR; As a result of the meetings duly held in 1952, it was made a part of the regional plans by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and put into practice. FIR is an airspace within which flight information and warning services are provided and its borders are registered by ICAO (Chicago Convention, Annex-11, Section-1). FIR lines provide technical and air traffic services (ATS-Air Traffic Services) to parties all over the world.
Greece has also made an effort to show the borders of the FIR Line as its own national border. In fact, government aircraft (including military traffic) tried to apply the ICAO rules, which are valid only for civil aircraft. It claims that every aircraft, except for the civil aircraft that passed the Athens FIR without providing flight plan information, "violated the Athens FIR" and claimed that they also requested the flight plan information for security reasons.
In order to eliminate the problems experienced, Turkey; In 1966, 1968, 1971 and 1974 attempts were made at ICAO to change this line. However, none of them achieved the desired result.
Greek Claim:
The current FIR line is determined according to international rules. Under no circumstances should it be negotiated or quarreled. In accordance with ICAO rules, flight plans and flight information for civil aircraft that change regions are transmitted to the air traffic control (ATC) elements of the region they enter. The purpose of this is to ensure the safety of flights by conducting air traffic, search and rescue services in flight information zones (FIR). Since the same services are in question for state planes, military planes should not be excluded from this application.
Invalidity of Claim:
ICAO is a non-governmental organization. Its rules cover civil traffic, military traffic is out of scope. The FIR line cannot be treated like the Turkish-Greek border. It does not give sovereignty to Greece. Moreover, ICAO does not have such a mandate and role. FIR management cannot limit Turkey's right to use its movement on the high seas equally and freely. The Athens FIR cannot be dictated to Turkey as a Greek sovereign territory. No restrictions can be placed on the flights of Turkish military aircraft in the international airspace within the Athens FIR.
It is clearly stated in Annex 15 to the Chicago Convention on which flights to provide flight information and traffic information. Accordingly, there is no relation between the FIR line and the concepts of sovereign airspace. Again, when the 1st and 2nd articles of the convention are examined, the sovereignty of a state is limited to the ground bounded by the land parts and territorial waters and the airspace above it. This issue also indirectly reveals the principle that no state can claim sovereignty outside the borders of its country, for whatever purpose, or engage in such behavior.
Istanbul-Athens FIR line is an application accepted by Turkey as per the Chicago Convention. However, showing the same line as the Turkish-Greek border is never acceptable.
Turkey does not accept the Greek approach that the ICAO practices applicable to civil aircraft also apply to government aircraft. This claim is against ICAO. Only the state that owns those planes has the authority to set rules for state planes.
With a clause in the Flight Information Publication (AIP-Air Informatino Publication), Greece has brought "an obligation to fill in a flight plan for all flights within the Athens FIR". Based on this, Athens requests flight plans for all categories of flights operated within the FIR, including the international airspace of the Aegean. However, this is an amendment of Greece's domestic law. Because Greece does not have the authority to set such a rule. For this reason, Greece's request to fill in the flight plan does not bind any country and therefore Turkey.
Civil aircraft must comply with the standards and procedures stipulated by ICAO in matters related to the flight plan. This is an opinion and practice accepted by Turkey.
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 is the only provision dealing with government aircraft, and it very clearly excluded government aircraft from the scope of the convention. Continuing to leave no room for doubt, 3.b. of the same article. State aircraft are clearly defined as “aircraft used in military, customs and police services”. Therefore, the provisions regarding the flight plan in the convention and its annexes cannot be applied for military flights.
In this context, already in NATO and/or national exercises, the parties duly NOTAM (Notices to Airmen) their exercise areas before the exercise. They see the exercise planes and perform their flights under the conditions. They also serve in the control of radars (on the ground and/or in the air). There is no obligation to provide flight plan information or report for a military flight to be made under positive radar control as military traffic in international airspaces. However, requiring flight plan information or reporting on flights of state/military aircraft is against both Article 3 of the Chicago Convention and international law and practices that ensure freedom to fly in the high seas. Insisting on providing flight plan information regarding the military flights to be made in the international airspace in the Aegean, requesting the technical responsibility given to Greece due to FIR responsibility as part of its air defense or security needs, is contrary to the convention and freedom of flight over international waters. It is not possible to be accepted by Turkey.
On the other hand, Greece continues to monitor Turkish military aircraft remotely, and to carry out diagnostic measures when necessary, on the grounds that the Turkish military aircraft performing exercise flights in the international airspace in the Aegean Sea did not fill out their flight plans and/or were not given the information of these flights. If prevention is carried out as a security requirement for diagnosis in the international airspace of the region, Turkey has the right as well as Greece to do this. Since Turkish military planes are flying in international airspace that does not belong to any country, it should also be considered normal that Greek military planes approaching Turkish planes will result in the detection of interception for diagnostic purposes.
