What is the Effect of the 1956 Suez Crisis on Turkey?

After the Second World War, the most important factor affecting the political developments in the Middle East was the establishment of the State of Israel. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has intensified since 1945, has played a decisive role in the relations between the countries of the region and with other countries.

In 1945, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen formed the "Arab League" with its headquarters in Cairo. The Baath Party, which was founded in Syria in 1947 to strengthen the solidarity between the Arab League and the Arabs, nurtured the idea of ​​a "Great Arab State". Nasser, from the Necip-Nasır duo, who assumed the leadership of this ideology in Egypt, where the Kingdom regime was destroyed on 23 July 1952, became the President in 1956. Jamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 and destroyed the bridges between it and the Western states, especially England and France.

After the Second World War, Egypt-Britain relations deteriorated due to the fact that Britain did not want to sell Suez. In the spring of 1956, American financial assistance to Egypt in the construction of the Asuan dam, a preliminary policy of Egypt prior to the nationalization of the Suez Canal (July 26, 1956), was a precedent for the United States in the face of Egyptian insistence to evacuate the British bases previously stationed in the region to protect the canal. 's neutrality infuriated the British.

While diplomatic initiatives continue, England and France; Ignoring the 'moderate' policy that the US is trying to implement towards the Middle East, they have united at the point of organizing an operation against Egypt in order to correct their deteriorating interests. As of July 28, Anglo-French operation planning for the occupation of Egypt was started. the British and the French; They started to work on the thesis that if the canal is not seized, the prestige of the West on world politics will decrease and NATO will lose its influence. France and England, who became allies for the operation, acted with the awareness that a joint movement was formed at the point of merging the national interests of both countries rather than a rapprochement between them.

Thus, England and France joined forces in the region and attacked Egypt together with Israel, which they took with them. However, the USA and the Soviet Union did not approve of this attack and prevented the Israel-England and France trio from continuing the war.

The USA evaluated that an operation to be carried out against Egypt would not benefit NATO and the security of the region, and tried to make the French and the British accept that sanctions against Egypt should be applied through peaceful means in the trilateral meetings held in this period. In fact, a meeting was held to take the NAC decision on 6 August 1956 for the solution of the Suez Canal problem. In addition to these three countries, NATO members Denmark, Federal Germany, Greece (which did not attend the meeting), Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey were also invited to the meeting. However, during the meeting, as Britain and France did not want their policies and practices related to the Middle East to be limited by a NATO decision to be taken, there was no positive result from the meeting to solve the crisis.

As a result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which was previously managed as a Franco-British partnership, England and France, affected by the cessation of oil transportation between the Persian Gulf and Western Europe, strongly reacted to the nationalization decision; In the meantime, when they could not achieve the desired result from their attempts in NATO, they organized a conference in London on 24 August 1956 with the participation of a total of 22 countries benefiting from the channel.

Turkey supported the views of England and France, which held most of the shares of the Canal Company at the beginning of the Suez crisis, that wanted the canal to be placed under an international control and operation order. However, Turkey, acting together with the Baghdad Pact, took Iraq, Iran and Pakistan with it and signed the Tehran declaration on 7 November 1956. In the declaration, it was requested that Israel, England and France withdraw their forces from the occupied Egyptian lands, and that Egypt's sovereign rights, territorial integrity and independence should be respected.

In this period, the USA tried to follow a policy that embraced all the countries of the Middle East, aimed to ensure the security and flow of oil routes and to prevent the Soviets from establishing influence over the Middle East countries. Despite this, the USA, which supported the aforementioned conference, tried to reach a consensus between the parties by preparing the "American Plan".

Since it is among the countries that use the Suez Canal the most, Turkey also participated in the conference, which started on August 24. Turkey agrees that the establishment of an impartial and international administration and control in the Channel 

He defended that he would not offend the independence and dignity of . On the other hand, towards the end of the conference, Turkey also presented a proposal amending the "America Plan" or the "Dulles Plan" of the Western states. According to this proposal, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt's payment of compensation to the canal company was no longer an obligation, and it was requested to be placed at the entrance of the plan in case of a request, and also to clearly state that the new canal order and management would be established in a way that "will not harm the sovereign rights of Egypt". . This change was adopted by the majority of the members attending the conference, and the Dulles Plan was amended.

Afterwards, no progress could be made from the Second London Conference held between 19-22 September. Turkey announced that it would become a member of the "Union of Users of the Suez Canal" established at the second meeting and that it would try to realize the Union's goals, with a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 27, 1956.

In the meantime, the British, using the Nasser-Hitler analogy in order to attract the support of the USA, began to process that the West threatened the interests and interests of the West in the Middle East by combining the interests of Egypt with the theme of great Arab nationalism of Nasser. The British argued that Britain's vital interests were in danger, and therefore the vital interests of the entire Alliance were also in danger. At a later NAC meeting, as a result of British suppression and the United States' silence, NATO made a decision that the international status of the channel should continue. This decision also showed that when the vital interests of one or more of the Alliance's leading countries are affected by a region outside the Alliance's area of ​​responsibility, NATO; These countries may be forced to support their out-of-area interests and commitments.

As a result of the secret negotiations, Israel launched a British-French-supported operation against Egypt on 29 October 1956. After this attack and the Anglo-French joint operation, Turkey changed its policy towards the canal. However, Turkey's new stance on the Suez issue was not enough to win over the Arabs, and the withdrawal of its ambassador from Israel also offended Israel.

At the same time, British and French forces entered Egypt to ensure the security of the canal area. Before the developments, the UN called on the parties to ceasefire and withdraw to the pre-conflict borders. On the other hand, the Soviet Union harshly warned Britain and France. When the USA did not approve of this operation, which developed out of its own initiative, the triple alliance had to withdraw. Thereupon, the British and French soldiers in Egypt left Egypt on 22 December under the supervision of the UN. Israeli troops withdrew from the region in March 1957.

As in the example of the Suez Canal crisis, the United States has distanced itself from a practice that would support the policies of its NATO member allies outside Europe in situations that did not match its interests and political agenda. As a result of this policy of the USA, France and England, who were about to land in Egypt, left the region without being able to take action as a result of the USA's pressure. Thus, while the influence of England and France in the Middle East decreased, the United States became the party that gained respect in the eyes of the Arabs in general. This war also marked the end of the French and British influence in the Middle East and the USA's weight in the region.

In this event, the USA showed its priority in international decisions and policy making by putting pressure on England, France and Israel, which were challenging the balances of the structures it was trying to establish in the global and regional sense, to the point of conflict. The USA acted by calculating the possibility of endangerment of the world order under its permanent domination rather than the interests of these countries.

On the other hand, the Suez Crisis has already led to the emergence of an anti-Western and anti-American psychology and anti-NATO in the Arab world. The USSR, which gave great support to this country during the establishment process of Israel, could not develop its bilateral relations with this country to the desired level due to the influence of the West on Israel. This is why the sympathy of the Arabs towards the Soviets, which displayed a 'detached' stance from Israel, increased, and the process of breaking off the Arab administrations from the Western world in favor of the USSR began with the Suez Crisis. The artificial kingdoms established in the Middle East during the reign of England and France began to fall over time and republics were established in their place. The new rulers were generally anti-Western and pro-Soviet administrators who tried to develop good relations with Moscow.

As a result, after the establishment of Israel in 1948, while there was a great reaction against the Jews in the Arab world, it also led to the emergence of a militant anti-Western Arab nationalism in Arab countries. 

caused. While the Arabs attributed their defeat to the Jews to the old-fashioned weapon in their hands, they also argued that the western states helped this country. In 1952, Turkey, while solving the Soviet-related security problems by becoming a member of NATO, also gave the appearance of a country that is progressing towards becoming an important member of the Western camp. While the hostility towards the West increased in Arab countries, Ankara started to follow different policies that did not meet the expectations of Muslim Arabs, since Turkey is a partner of the West. Meanwhile, Turkey; As an important actor of the cold war, it tried to turn to a more active policy in the Middle East. However, only Iraq, as the only Arab state, participated in the Baghdad Pact, which was established with the active participation of Turkey.

In this context, Iraq wanted to take the leadership of the Arab world by obtaining the indirect support of Turkey and the western world, and Egypt opposed this. In this period, the popularity of Nasser, who made an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, increased rapidly among the Arabs. His nationalization of Suez elevated Nasser to the position of natural leader of the Arabs, despite the emerging crisis. The penetration of the Soviet Union into the Middle East after these crises caused tension in the Western world. Parallel to this, Turkish-Syrian relations have also become tense. As a result of all these, Turkey moved away from the Middle East in the 1955-1964 period. Turkey's orientation to this region again was thanks to the "multilateralism" introduced with the change in foreign policy after the famous Johnson letter of 1964.

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