Why Aren't the Territorial Seas Ceasing Between Greece and Turkey?

United Nations Maritime Convention:

After Greece signed the 1982 UN Maritime Convention on May 31, 1995 (Greece especially signed this convention, which Turkey was not a signatory to, in order to use it for the claim that it has the right to extend the territorial waters of Greece from 6 miles to 12 miles). The tension between the two countries reached the highest level in those years. out. Finally, Greece ratified the Law of the Sea Convention on 21 July 1995.

Before the ratification, Greece declared that it had the right to extend its national territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea by using its contractual rights and would not hesitate to use this right when the time came. However, it is stated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that these rights can never be used in a way that harms the other party. The 12-mile declaration was naturally not accepted by Turkey, as it did not leave a living space for Turkey and harmed its interests.

In terms of Lausanne, the territorial waters are already 3 miles at most as customary. In the Treaty of Lausanne, there is no record that the territorial sea is 3 miles, and only the statement "The islands within the area up to 3 miles from their coasts belong to Turkey".

Greece increased its territorial seas to 6 miles in 1936, Turkey did not object to this and remained silent. For the first time, Turkey preferred to raise its territorial sea to the level of Greece, 6 miles, in 1966, 30 years later. Now Greece has aimed to do the same for 12 miles.

What Happens If The Territorial Waters Are 12 Mile?

The Aegean Sea becomes a Greek lake. Turkey's right of navigation, including the harmless passage of the international waters of the Aegean, will be damaged, and Turkish planes will have difficulty in reaching international airspace. Moreover, Turkey's international airspace, whose maritime usage areas are restricted, is also reduced to almost non-existence. Aegean Sea, Turkish sea and air vehicles can use this sea and the airspace above it, to the extent permitted by Greece. In short, it entails the necessity for Turkey to give up its rights and interests in the context of the Aegean Sea in favor of Greece.

The decision to increase the territorial sea to 12 miles, which will cause new vital problems for Turkey, has come to the agenda of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. As a matter of fact, in response to the parliamentary decision on 1 June 1995 that Greece could extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, on 8 June 1995, the Turkish Grand National Assembly gave the government full authority to take necessary measures (including military ones) if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 miles. . The GNAT drew attention to the fact that a decision taken by Greece in this direction would violate Turkey's vital interests in the Aegean Sea. With a decision it has taken, the Turkish Grand National Assembly has authorized the government to take all necessary measures, including military measures, in such a case.

In a letter sent to the UN on 21 December 1995, Turkey declared to the world public its opinion that it would not legitimize any unilateral action against its rights and interests in the Aegean Sea.

Asymmetric Sharing Problem in the Aegean:

The reason why Turkey said "no" to the possibility of the Greek territorial waters extending to 12 miles was primarily due to geopolitical realities. Turkey, whose consent should not be even 6 miles under normal conditions, will face the situation that if its territorial waters are 12 miles, the share of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea will be 71.5% instead of 43.5%. Turkish territorial waters will be 8.7% instead of the current 7.5%.

According to the current 6 mile situation, the international waters in the Aegean Sea (and therefore the international airspace) will decrease to 19.8% instead of 49%, and more importantly, it will confine Turkish sea and air vehicles to the Anatolian shores. No common Turkish child can accept this, of course, and never did.

In the Aegean, which has the right of free flight over Turkey and the right of Turkish ships to sail freely in international waters, it has been subjected to complaints from the Greek side to NATO authorities that Turkey violated Greece's Airspace, especially regarding flights. These allegations, most of which are baseless, not only occupied the NATO authorities, but also caused the problems of the two countries to be kept on the agenda constantly and caused the indifference of NATO to emerge in such matters. In any case, Greece has included such violation reports in NATO records and has endeavored to erode Turkey's rights to cruise in international waters and to use Aegean airspace.

Why are Kardak and similar islands important?

According to International Law of the Sea, every inhabited island must have territorial waters. For this reason, in recent years, Greece has been inclining towards and encouraging social constructions on islands and islets of uncertain identity. In the third paragraph of Article 121 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is stated that "the rocks that do not allow people to shelter or have no economic life of their own do not have any exclusive economic zone or continental shelf".

Therefore, the reason why Greece tried to include these islands in NATO exercises was to prove that the islands also have a continental shelf by finding a method other than the efforts to create a living area, which is difficult.

After a Turkish ship ran aground near Kardak Island on 25 December 1995, the rescue efforts caused a problem between Turkey and Greece. The country that this rock belongs to, which is 3.2 miles from Turkey and 5.7 miles from the Greek island of Kalymnos, came to the fore and caused a crisis.

In the Kardak Question, which took place on January 30-31, 1996, NATO did nothing more than advise the two countries to resolve their problems through bilateral talks. However, the Kardak issue was only ended when then-US President Bill Clinton stepped in directly on February 1, 1996 and made a phone call to the leaders of the two countries. The two countries withdrew from their islets, and thus, the active role of the USA in Ankara-Athens relations was revealed once again with this crisis.

The European Union's Biased Attitude:

On the other hand, with its approaches to Cyprus and Aegean problems, the EU had to be a "party" in the relations between Turkey and Greece. This bias was seen in the decisions taken by the EU during the Kardak cliffs crisis in 1996, as well as its stance on the Cyprus problem. The European Parliament, in its decision on February 15, 1996, described Turkey's landing of soldiers on the second rock after Greece as a provocative operation. He claimed that the Kardak cliffs belonged to Greece and could argue that he saw Turkey's official statements as territorial claims that questioned the sovereign rights of an EU member state.

NATO Madrid Declaration and Confidence Building Measures:

During the NATO summit held in Madrid in July 1997, a six-point agreement (Madrid Declaration-July 08, 1997) was formed between the two countries, with the initiatives of the United States and the NATO secretary general, and aimed to resolve the problems between the two countries through peaceful means based on mutual consent. security and confidence building measures were decided.

The Madrid Declaration was evaluated as a reconciliation effort aimed at reinforcing the status quo, which is necessary for the establishment of a relationship based on trust between the parties. The most important aspect of the treaty was that it imposed an obligation on Greece not to take any unilateral action, and on Turkey not to threaten to use military force.

Thus, Greece gave up its claim to unilaterally extend its territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean. On the other hand, Turkey has eliminated the threat of using force in such a situation. It has been observed that the EU does not provide a suitable environment in search of a solution that considers the balances in the process. It has been clearly understood that the mechanism to ensure the balance will depend on Turkey's participation in the EU decision-making process. As this could not be achieved, an asymmetrical situation continued to exist in attempts to resolve disputes between Turkey and Greece.

Based on this asymmetry, the most important factor hindering the attempts of Greece, which aims to reach a unilateral solution to the Aegean problems, was the "reason of war" decision, which Turkey put forward within the cause-effect relationship. This cause-effect relationship, which was repeated once again within the framework of the Madrid Declaration, showed that the balance between the parties was kept at a sensitive point.

Positive Results of Confidence Building Measures:

Confidence-building measures have been supported by both the rulers of the two countries and the alliances within the framework of conflict resolution methods. The USA, NATO and the EU supported the parties that the confrontational nature of the relations between the two countries should be settled on a reconciliation ground as soon as possible.

However, during the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Luxembourg between 28-29 May 1998, “Confidence Building Measures (GAO)” were discussed between the two countries under the leadership of NATO Secretary General J. Solana. After the GAO, the prime ministers of both countries, who met in mid-October 1998, stated that NATO military platforms provided a very favorable environment due to its contribution to keeping the channels of dialogue between the two countries open. In October 2000, it was decided to discuss various measures regarding the issues that might emerge as a crisis between the two countries, both bilaterally and within the framework of NATO. In this context, measures aimed at reducing tension (joint exercises, mutual visits of warships, transparent and open conduct of military exercises, etc.) were among the positive developments.

Joint Exercises in the Aegean:

Meanwhile, the establishment of NATO command headquarters in Izmir and Larissa brought about a softening in the NATO exercises on the Greek side, and Dynamic Mix-98 Wargame (October 1998), one of the NATO Southern Region exercises in which both countries participated, was carried out. Thus, NATO exercises, which could not be held in the Aegean for 13 years, were resumed.

The softening between the two countries continued in other exercises as well. For the first time after the Cyprus Operation, in another NATO Dynamic Mix exercise, 12 F-16 aircraft and approximately 100 Turkish Air Force personnel were transferred to the Nea Anghialos Square in Greece and NATO Headquarters in Larissa between May-June 2000. and contributed to the softening between the two countries. Within the scope of the same exercise, the landing operation carried out by Turkish troops in the Peloponnese under the command of a Greek General also drew attention.

Subsequently, within the scope of NATO exercises, in the Destined Glory-2000 exercise, another Southern Region exercise carried out in October 2000, 6 F-16 warplanes from Greece were transferred to Turkey's Air Base in Balikesir this time. However, NATO has always had enough material to interrupt its planning activities and exercises, as such exercises, in all its parts, from the planning phase to the execution, have brought the problems between Turkey and Greece to the surface.

As a matter of fact, this was also the case in the Destined Glory-2000 exercise. Since the exercises, in a sense, provide an environment in which the two countries protect their rights and interests and act accordingly, when the Greek Air Force tried to fly the Greek warplanes in Balikesir in line with their national interests, there were problems in the exercise. In this context, as a result of the Greek planes' desire to fly over the islands-islands of uncertain affiliation and their passing over Bozbaba and the island of Lemnos, which were not included in the exercise and should have been in disarmed status, on 18, 19, 20 and 21 October, despite the warnings of NATO and Turkey, the Turkish-Greek The exercise-dimensional tension between the armed forces resulted in the Greek Air Force planes leaving Turkey a few days earlier than planned. Since this date, the Aegean has ceased to be used in a "live" NATO exercise in which the two countries participated together.

Conclusion:

Today, we see that the 'disease' of including the islands that should have non-military status in the Greek exercises that will start on 16 June continues. Greece, which continues its understanding of including the island of Bozbaba in a NATO exercise in 2000, persists in its attitudes and behaviors against international law and continues its policy of feeding from tension. Undoubtedly, the jug breaks in the way of the water. In the relations between the two countries, especially in times of high tension, the water should not be muddy. Because, the course of history has a habit of paying the bill for those who muddy the water sooner or later.

References:

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