international-relations

Why Tensions in Kosovo Won't End? What is Serbia Waiting for from Russians?

In October last year, in a ceremony at his headquarters in Pristina at a time of high tension in Kosovo, Italian Major General Angelo Michele RISTUCCIA handed over the post of KFOR Commander of the NATO-led KFOR mission to Major General Özkan ULUTAŞ.

Turkey takes command of KFOR this year

About 15 years ago, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Of the 193 member states of the United Nations, 115 recognized Kosovo's independence. Among them are all 7 member states of the G7. However, the status of the Republic of Kosovo under international law has not been fully clarified. On the other hand, the fact that some European Union member states (Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) do not recognize Kosovo as an independent country contrasts politically with the European Union's general policies on this issue. In the global context, the fact that eight G20 countries, including the five founding members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as Argentina, Indonesia and Mexico, have not yet recognized Kosovo continues to pose a problem for Kosovo. In international academic literature, such disputed geographical areas are referred to as "de facto states". Refusal to recognize as a state often occurs when political borders do not correspond to ethnic boundaries and the resulting 'would-be' states are mobilized against separatist tendencies.

Kosovo as a historical and ethnic crossroads

Kosovo's ethnic majority is Albanian, with Kosovo Serbs living predominantly in the northern region of Mitrovica. Other minorities include Turks, Bosniaks, Roma and Balkan Gypsies. Various regional powers (Naples, Venice, the Ottoman Empire) ruled the territory of Kosovo throughout history. After 1918, today's Kosovo found itself part of Yugoslavia.

It was only during the Italian occupation of Albania (1939-1943) that the borders were drawn in such a way that the Albanian areas of Kosovo and Macedonia became part of the Albanian state. However, these borders were only recognized by the Axis powers and were no longer valid after the Second World War.

After the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992, Kosovo remained part of Serbia, but in 1998 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic abolished Kosovo's autonomy, which led to the outbreak of war in Kosovo. The resistance led by Kosovo Albanians (Kosovo Liberation Army) turned into a war between Serbs and Kosovars in the middle of Europe. The war ended in March 1999 with the Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo as a result of NATO air strikes on Serbian positions.

In June 1999, the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to place Kosovo under the control of a UN transitional government. On 9 June 1999, Resolution 1244 provided for the existence of a civilian and military structure in Kosovo with comprehensive political and military powers. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) initially deployed more than 48,000 troops from 30 countries (including Turkey) to Kosovo.

The complicated situation of the Republic of Kosovo

After NATO, the United Nations launched the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was initially responsible for almost all civilian tasks, from human rights protection and reconstruction to court operations, policing and administration. Meanwhile, in Kosovo, in addition to existing feelings of revenge against Kosovars of Serbian origin, tribal disputes often led to violence.

However, after the ceasefire and the establishment of the UN mission and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), there was a mass expulsion of non-Albanians from Kosovo territory. According to one study, about 230,000 people had to flee Kosovo.

However, using checkpoints and house searches, KFOR managed to confiscate large quantities of weapons and explosives that were still present in Kosovo. These weapons had come to Kosovo from the Yugoslav army and even from Wehrmacht stockpiles. The confiscations led to a rapid decline in illegal armed violence.

The entrenched tribal structures in Kosovo also posed a danger. In addition to feelings of revenge against Kosovars of Serbian origin, disputes between tribes often led to armed violence. In addition, organized crime quickly took root in Kosovo. Large-scale trafficking in arms, drugs and people had to be curbed. Various actors on the ground - and since 2008 the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), a more technical mission dealing with the police, judiciary and administration in Kosovo - supported many projects, but their effectiveness was still limited in the country.

Although the International Court of Justice has ruled that Kosovo's secession did not violate international law, the status of the republic remains disputed. Kosovo is a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group. However, Kosovo's UN membership has not yet materialized due to the veto of Russia and China.

Recognized by the International Olympic Committee and leading sports federations such as FIFA and UEFA in football, Kosovo has the opportunity to participate as a nation in international sports tournaments and competitions.

Serbian oppression still continues

The sovereignty of the Kosovo state has so far not extended to its entire territory. The predominantly Serbian north refuses to be fully integrated into the republic. The fact that Serbian license plates are still in use shows how the Kosovo government has failed to extend its authority to the region.

The Kosovo Police have almost no control over the north of Mitrovica. Kosovo Serbs there have no tolerance for Kosovars of Albanian origin. The persistent refusal of the Serb minority living in this region to participate in Kosovo's elections makes it difficult for candidates to win. Candidates of Albanian origin are sometimes elected and put into office with very few votes, leading to a lack of popular support. In some cases, elected officials need protection to reach their workplaces.

Most recently, on September 23, 2023, there was a Serbian army build-up along the Kosovo border, with heavy equipment deployed on a scale not seen since the end of the Kosovo War. At one point during the escalation, 30 Serbian soldiers entered a Kosovo village. Serbian soldiers killed several Kosovars.

According to the personal testimony of a senior KFOR officer who recently returned from deployment, the instructions on how peacekeepers should behave in northern Kosovo are generally vague. In addition, all combat units and heavy equipment have been withdrawn over the years, calling into question what KFOR's influence could be in the event of a more serious crisis. Nevertheless, since the escalation in September, NATO countries have increased the number of troops in KFOR from 3,700 to 5,200.

Serbia prefers EU membership but is 'waiting' for Russia

Full international acceptance of Kosovo's independence would require a significant improvement and stabilization of the unstable post-war situation in Kosovo and relations with Belgrade. But there is little in Serbia's behavior to suggest that it wants this scenario. Nor does the official recognition of Kosovo by Serbia - Brussels' sine qua non condition for Serbia's EU integration - still seem to be on the cards.

Serbia seems to be waiting to see the outcome of the war in Ukraine and Russia's position in post-war Europe. If Russia emerges stronger from this war, Belgrade might be inclined to increase its pressure on Kosovo and take a strong step towards the abolition of Kosovo's independence. Of course, in this case, it would have to take into account what NATO, which stands behind KFOR, would do. In this case, a return to the conditions of 1999 could be another NATO bombardment.

Conclusion

In February 2023, Serbia and Kosovo agreed 'kerosene' on a plan for mutual recognition of identity cards, diplomatic representations, education certificates, national emblems and some other practical matters. I say 'perfunctory' because it was a plan imposed on both sides by the EU and the US, rather than the will of Belgrade and Pristina. Despite this plan to normalize relations between the parties, we know that Serbia is not inclined to recognize the Republic of Kosovo.

I consider the possibility of Serbia reintegrating Kosovo as its province without using military force to be extremely unlikely. The question is whether Serbia's strategic goal is to integrate into the EU, as it claims, or is it based on the assumption that Russia, a resurgent power, will shape Serbia's future as a sister nation? I believe that the outcome of the war in Ukraine and Russia's position in post-war Europe could activate a potential that could play a decisive role for the future of this part of the Western Balkans. In any case, the fate of Kosovo largely depends on Serbia's behavior.