Zangezur, Karabakh, and the Turkic Awakening: Azerbaijan’s Geopolitical Reckoning with Russia

Russia’s Crackdown in Yekaterinburg: A Geopolitical Message from Azerbaijan

On June 27, 2025, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) launched what appeared to be a full-scale military operation in the city of Yekaterinburg, targeting a civilian home. Armed with machine guns, the FSB raided the residence of the Seferov family, ethnic Azerbaijanis. Two brothers, Huseyn and Ziyaeddin Seferov, were killed during the operation, and dozens of others were detained. No official explanation, evidence, or legal warrants were presented.

Autopsy reports were chilling: broken ribs, hemorrhaging in the brain, and shattered chest bones. Despite the clear signs of brutality, Russian authorities attempted to attribute the deaths to "heart failure." Azerbaijan, however, did not remain silent. The Azerbaijani government summoned the Russian ambassador, suspended cultural programs, and carried out an operation against Sputnik Azerbaijan. Moscow responded by calling Azerbaijan’s reaction "overly emotional." But for Baku, this was not diplomacy—it was torture and cold-blooded murder.

This incident should not be seen in isolation but as part of a broader geopolitical dynamic. Tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have been steadily rising. It began with Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft, followed by Moscow's controversial request to open a consulate—widely believed to be an intelligence post—in Khankendi. President Ilham Aliyev’s decision not to attend the May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow made the diplomatic freeze even more evident.

In a bold move, Azerbaijan hosted the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Khankendi, which was attended by Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus President Ersin Tatar. This summit symbolized the Turkish world’s declared presence in Karabakh. Attention has now shifted to the fate of the 355 Russian-language schools operating in Azerbaijan, with debates intensifying over their potential closure.

These schools, while ostensibly educational institutions, have long been suspected by Azerbaijani civil society and intelligence circles of serving dual functions. Several of them are widely believed to operate as informal extensions of Russian intelligence infrastructure—disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives, surveilling ethnic minorities, and shaping elite loyalties among younger generations. Azerbaijan must now consider strategic and sovereign measures, including a phased restructuring or closure of institutions proven to function as intelligence outposts under educational cover.

The Yekaterinburg raid marks a dangerous precedent. Russia’s increasingly racialized conception of "ethnic criminality" is pushing the idea that being Azerbaijani alone is a crime. This is not the first instance of such hostility.

To understand this animosity, we don’t need to look back centuries. It is enough to revisit January 19-20, 1990—a geopolitical turning point. Soviet troops stormed Baku with tanks and armored vehicles. The order was clear: suppress Azerbaijani nationalism by any means. 147 civilians were massacred, and hundreds were wounded. The assault was not merely a show of force but a collective punishment of a nation. Russia has never accepted responsibility or paid compensation. The victims were erased from memory because, in Moscow’s eyes, non-Russian lives are expendable.

The man who ordered the operation, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, was protected and honored for years by the Russian state. Even today, his name is commemorated in Kremlin circles.

This legacy of impunity continues. As the Yekaterinburg raid unfolded, new documents were leaked regarding another tragedy: the downing of an AZAL passenger aircraft over Grozny on December 25, 2024, killing all 38 on board. A letter by Russian army captain Dmitry Paledichuk revealed that the plane had been deliberately targeted despite major technical flaws in the Pantsir-S air defense system. Audio recordings confirmed that the order had come from the 51st Air Defense Division under the Russian Ministry of Defense. Paledichuk, who had previously served in Syria, admitted he couldn’t clearly identify the aircraft and had followed a direct order.

For many in Azerbaijan, this is no coincidence. The Yekaterinburg raid and the downing of the AZAL plane reflect the same strategic mindset: a willingness to use violence and misinformation to punish Azerbaijan.

Russia’s approach is twofold: incite ethnic unrest within Azerbaijan and intimidate the Azerbaijani diaspora abroad. This tactic was used during the Second Chechen War in 1999 when Russia expelled 12,000 Azerbaijani nationals under the guise of security concerns. The goal was clear—create an atmosphere of fear.

Today, this playbook is being used again. The current wave of ethnic targeting is not random but a direct response to Azerbaijan’s shifting foreign policy. Since March 2025, Baku has strengthened ties with the West and Turkey. The absence of President Aliyev from Moscow’s Victory Day and the concurrent trilateral intelligence summit in Baku with Turkish and Israeli officials triggered alarm bells in the Kremlin. Russia feared losing its traditional grip on Azerbaijan.

The Yekaterinburg operation can thus be seen as a preemptive strike—a geopolitical warning aimed at punishing Azerbaijan through its diaspora. Russia seeks to reassert dominance across the former Soviet space, and Azerbaijan’s independence in foreign policy is being met with collective punishment.

Throughout history, Russia has relied on two instruments to maintain hegemony over Azerbaijan: inciting ethnic divisions and targeting the diaspora. A notable example is the SADVAL movement of the early 1990s, which sought to carve out northern Azerbaijani territories to create a unified Lezgistan with Dagestan. Supported by Moscow, SADVAL committed acts of terror, including the 1994 Baku metro bombing that killed 27 civilians.

In 2008, a conference in Moscow openly discussed incorporating Azerbaijani regions into Dagestan. This shows how deeply rooted and strategic these efforts have been. Russia continues to view Azerbaijani identity as a threat to its influence in the South Caucasus.

One of the most recent provocations is Russia’s plan to open a consulate in Khankendi. Legally and diplomatically, the move is unwarranted. There are no Russian citizens or businesses in the region, and Russian troops have already withdrawn. Azerbaijan maintains consulates in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, while Russia has only one mission in Baku. What then is the motive?

The answer is geopolitical. Moscow is attempting to reestablish a presence in Karabakh under the guise of diplomacy. This is not a consular office; it is an intelligence outpost. The timing coincides with Turkey’s plans to open a consulate in Shusha—a legitimate move given Turkey’s reconstruction efforts and citizens working in the area. Russia’s motives, by contrast, are purely strategic.

Karabakh is sovereign Azerbaijani territory. Any diplomatic mission must be approved by Baku. Russia must come to terms with the fact that Karabakh is no longer one of its geopolitical levers in the South Caucasus.

Further compounding the issue, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's visit to Turkey on June 20, 2025, marked a historic thaw in Ankara-Yerevan relations. The trip—the first by an Armenian leader to Turkish soil since the border closure—signaled a potential regional transformation. This development likely intensified Moscow's discomfort, particularly as Azerbaijan saw this as an opportunity to reinforce regional peace through diplomatic architecture.

The Zangezur Corridor, the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, and the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border are all interconnected. Russia fears this integration because it sidelines Moscow from regional leadership.

Azerbaijan has responded not with tanks but with diplomacy. The ECO summit in Khankendi, held under President Aliyev’s leadership, was a clear statement: Azerbaijan is not alone. Ten countries from the Turkic world, the Middle East, and Central Asia participated, showcasing a coordinated and united front.

The summit was not just an economic forum; it was a powerful response to the violence in Yekaterinburg and a declaration that Azerbaijan will not be intimidated. Azerbaijan even hosted Syrian leader Ahmed al-Shara, discussing energy cooperation and bringing him together with Israeli officials. This displayed Baku’s rising geopolitical influence across both the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Russia’s longstanding methods of coercion, violence, and division are increasingly being met by regional unity, strategy, and cooperation. The message from Karabakh is clear: the Turkic world is no longer fragmented. It is now a coordinated force, one that will no longer accept the interventions of the past.

Conclusion: The Philosophical Anatomy of Power and Territory

To understand the broader significance of these developments, one must also engage with the theoretical underpinnings of geopolitical thought. The ideas of Halford Mackinder, who conceptualized the "Heartland Theory," emphasized the strategic centrality of Eurasia in global power politics. According to Mackinder, whoever controls the Heartland (of which the South Caucasus is a vital gate) commands the world. Russia, conscious of its diminishing grasp over this pivotal zone, is reacting with desperation.

Nicholas Spykman, offering a counter-perspective through the "Rimland Theory," argued that dominance along the coastal fringes—where Turkey and Azerbaijan operate—is what ultimately shapes global influence. Azerbaijan’s growing alignment with Turkey and the West signals a shift toward Rimland consolidation, diminishing Russia’s leverage.

Carl Schmitt’s notion of "space as order" (Raumordnung) suggests that geopolitical space is never neutral; it is always contested, organized, and dominated by sovereign decision-makers. The South Caucasus, as a geopolitical fault line, is being reordered—no longer in accordance with Russian imperial designs but through new regional alignments based on cooperation, sovereignty, and integration.

The Zangezur Corridor, in this context, is not merely a transport route—it is a corridor of transformation. It aligns with Mackinder’s gateway logic, undermines Russia’s Heartland grip, strengthens Turkey’s Rimland presence, and asserts Azerbaijan’s sovereign role in shaping regional architecture. It also serves as a material and symbolic bridge uniting Karabakh with the rest of the Turkic and Islamic world, reshaping spatial and economic connectivity across the Caucasus.

Thus, the clash between Russia and Azerbaijan is more than a bilateral confrontation. It is a vivid example of what Friedrich Ratzel once called "Lebensraum"—the political struggle over space, survival, and identity. But unlike the colonial past, Azerbaijan is now no longer a passive object of great-power politics. It is a sovereign actor, reshaping its own geopolitical destiny.

Strategically, Azerbaijan should accelerate efforts to close down or reform Russian-language institutions that function as soft power instruments or intelligence outposts. Simultaneously, Baku must deepen defense and intelligence ties with Turkey, Israel, and Western partners to deter hybrid threats. Economically, it should turn the Zangezur Corridor into a model of regional integration, inviting multinational investment and leveraging it to build alliances across Central Asia and the Middle East.

The future of the South Caucasus, therefore, lies not in domination but in a balance of respect, diplomacy, and regional interdependence—a principle that echoes the ethical vision of Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.”