Analysis of the Evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Evaluation from the Perspective of Turkey

1. Introduction

The 'Shanghai Five', which was established with the aim of solving historical border problems with the positive impact of the political and military changes that occurred after the Cold War, later evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to cover border, security and economic cooperation.

Initially downplayed by Western analysts, this model became the subject of intense debate after it was seen as a counter to the hegemonic influence of the United States. Today, the SCO, which is transforming into a global security and energy club, is sometimes referred to as the 'NATO Twin' and 'NATO East'. For this reason, the article will first evaluate the historical development process of the SCO, the expectations of the members from the organization, the level of development it has reached, the possible challenges it will face and its perspective for the future.

The SCO was established centered on Central Asia, encompassing the Turkic Republics with which Turkey had close political, economic and military cooperation after the Cold War. As a regional security organization, the SCO has gained the ability to determine Turkey's relations with the Turkic Republics in some areas. Taking these and other factors into account, Turkey applied to the SCO as an observer, but was granted 'dialogue partnership', which is a lower level membership perspective. In this context, SCO-Turkey relations will be analyzed separately.

2. Strategic Evolution of the SCO

Historical Background

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has evolved into a global security, economic and political entity, came into being as a result of the regional and international military confidence-building organization established to resolve border disputes, first between the People's Republic of China (PRC)[1] and the Russian Federation (RF), and later between the regional countries in Central Asia. This organization has reached its current level as a result of several successive developments.

The two great powers of Asia, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which had a turbulent neighborhood during the Cold War, often confronted each other over border issues, and even a hot clash between the two countries occurred in March 1969 over the Great Usuri island.[2]

Relations between China and the USSR began to normalize in 1989. Accordingly, mutual force reduction negotiations started within the scope of military confidence-building policies. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, the 7000 km border between China and the USSR was divided among the RF, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and China became neighbors with four different countries. Instead of a single state, China is now faced with the situation of solving border problems with four different states.

On the other hand, in the post-1990 period, a political, economic and military global system called the 'New World Order' emerged, synonymous with American supremacy. While this new order emphasized values such as liberalism, freedom, free market, democracy and human rights, it paved the way for the development of regional cooperation. Especially in Europe, models of regional security and economic cooperation became fashionable. For example, the European Community evolved into the European Union (EU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). New security and economic regional organizations such as the South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial Initiative, the South-Eastern Europe Brigade Command (SEEBRIG), the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR), and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization were established. Increasing regional organization and cooperation models in the post-Cold War world have also affected the Asian region. China, influenced by this approach, wanted to increase its influence through regional cooperation in Central Asia, which had been under the de facto influence of Russia for nearly 150 years, but partially liberated after the Cold War.

In this context, 22 meetings were held over a period of seven years in order to solve the border problems between the Central Asian states, China and the RF, and finally five countries (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) signed an agreement called 'Strengthening Military Trust in Border Areas' on April 26, 1996. A year later, the so-called 'Shanghai Five' signed a disarmament agreement in Moscow.[3] With this agreement, they agreed to reduce military forces within 100 km2 of borders, to notify the other side of major military exercises, and to accept observers from the other side to monitor military maneuvers if necessary.

In part, these initiatives can be likened to the 1991 'Conventional Forces Agreement in Europe (CFE)' between NATO member states and Warsaw Pact member states. Thus, it can be said that Moscow, having secured its western borders with the CECA, has secured its borders with China with the agreement with the 'Shanghai Five'. In this way, the agreement can be seen as the CECKA of the East.

6. SCO and Turkey

Recently, there have been discussions about Turkey partially abandoning its Western-oriented foreign policy and turning towards the Middle East and Eurasia. Moreover, its foreign policy with the Middle East and Muslim countries has been characterized by aspirations of "Neo-Ottomanism". In order to become a regional power, to establish closer cooperation with Muslim countries, to gain leverage against the EU and partly the US, to pursue a more independent foreign policy, and to benefit from the economic and military formations in the Eurasian region, the political authority in Turkey can be said to be turning eastward and towards the Middle East.

Turkey's pursuit of a different foreign policy is partly due to the European Union's difficulties in making Turkey a full member, but it is also due to the Turkish political authority's pursuit of a different foreign policy. On the other hand, the conservative/Islamist interpretation, which represents one pillar of Turkish Eurasianism, focuses more on cooperation with Muslim peoples in the former Ottoman geography. This is based on a link between the Ottoman heritage and Eurasianism.[65] The combination of these factors draws the roadmap of the new foreign policy.

With the US invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s, anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion reached its peak. The reason behind this was the revival of the terrorist organization operating in Turkey due to the Iraq invasion and its bloody terrorist acts. In addition, China and Russia's search for new partnerships in the Eurasian geography has affected some social strata in Turkey. Especially due to the US invasion of Iraq and the increasing domestic terrorist incidents, these searches have taken on an extreme character, including the exit from NATO and political and security cooperation with Iran, RF and China. There has also been social pressure in Turkey to pursue an intensive foreign policy in the Eurasian region.

As mentioned above, the SCO has become an important center of attraction as an emerging model of security and economic organization in the Eurasian region. As the world's two largest nuclear powers, the organization also accounts for a significant portion of the world's energy capacity. Countries in the region such as India, Pakistan and Iran, which see being outside the SCO as a disadvantage for themselves, want to become members. After the Shanghai Cooperation Organization admitted Pakistan, India and Iran as observers in 2005, the United States and Japan attempted to gain access to the same status,[66] but this proposal was not accepted.[67] Turkey had previously requested observer membership in the SCO, but this request was rejected.

It has been a geopolitical, geostrategic, economic and diplomatic necessity for Turkey to become a member of the SCO, which all global and regional powers want to be a part of. Because being excluded from an organization that includes all powers means that Turkey lacks the power to direct and influence foreign policy and cannot pursue a multi-faceted foreign policy.

Considering all these issues, Turkey requested 'dialogue partnership' membership to the SCO. Turkey's request was approved at the SCO Summit of Heads of State held in Beijing on 11 June 2012. The Memorandum of Understanding on Turkey's Dialogue Partnership status was signed in Almaty on April 26, 2013 between Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and SCO Secretary General Dimitri Mezentsev.

Turkey's presence in the Western Bloc is important for its own security. However, it can pursue different foreign policy pursuits without disrupting its relations with the West. In this context, the dialogue partnership status with the SCO should be seen as a tool of multilateral foreign policy. Moreover, this partnership is important in terms of being active in Central Asia, which it neglected for many years and failed to develop an effective policy after the collapse of the USSR, and developing its potential to become a regional power by utilizing its advantage due to its geopolitical location.[68]

Turkey's status as a 'dialogue partner' with the SCO, which wants to develop its soft power element, will allow Turkey to strengthen its multidimensional foreign policy, as well as to monitor developments within the organization and to convey its views to member countries on issues concerning regional cooperation.[69] Therefore, the creation of a ground for benefiting from the experience and efforts of Turkey, which is gradually making its weight felt with its historical experiences, geographical position and special position in international relations, as well as its balanced relations with the member countries of the organization, can bring a new dynamism to the organization.[70]

As SCO members, China and Russia are also members of the UN Security Council. Cooperation with these two powers within the same organization may create a favorable environment for Turkey to gain the support of these countries in Cyprus, the Aegean and other regional problems. 

On the other hand, the SCO, with its original and observer members, is the world's largest economic power, and close relations with the SCO should be maintained in order not to be left out of future initiatives such as a common customs policy. This is in Turkey's long-term interests. Moreover, the possibility of large-scale trade allows for the long-term development of the Turkish economy. It can create an opportunity for the development of alternative transportation routes that will enable the transportation of energy resources in the region through Turkey to the recipient countries. If Turkey does not take appropriate steps in time, just as it significantly jeopardized its chances of EU membership by not applying for full membership together with Greece at a time when the conditions were very favorable, it may face the risk of being left out of future developments if it stays away from the SCO.

On the other hand, while it is unlikely that the SCO will transform into a NATO-like defense organization in the future, the legal link with the dialogue partner status could provide a link to the SCO's new initiatives in the event of such a possibility. Similarly, Turkey's dialogue partner status could serve as a bridge between the SCO and NATO.[71]

Although there are some interpretations that one of the reasons for Turkey's interest in the SCO is that the organization is composed of authoritarian regimes, the accuracy of these views is questionable.

The SCO Charter sets out the responsibilities and obligations of member states in the security, energy and humanitarian dimensions. The Turkic Republics, as members of the SCO, have partially narrowed the scope of the organization's freedom in the international spheres defined by the treaty. Therefore, the SCO has been able to partially determine the Turkic Republics' relations with Turkey. Turkey's 'dialogue partnership' with the SCO will enable Turkey to cooperate with these countries within the organization.

Turkey's relations with the SCO, although not explicitly stated, are viewed negatively by NATO and the West. It is argued that a state's membership in both NATO and the SCO, which is perceived as an anti-NATO organization, in the form of a dialogue partnership points to a contradictory situation. In fact, some Western writers have criticized that Turkey's SCO membership will not improve its global reputation or teach the West a lesson[72]. However, one should not forget the fact that in the past, the US, NATO's main power, has requested observer membership in this organization. Turkey's future cooperation with the SCO should be conducted in a way that does not prevent it from fulfilling its 'obligations and responsibilities' with NATO and does not break its relations with the West.

7. Conclusion

The aim of the article is to examine the development process of the SCO in particular and its interaction with Turkey. The conclusions can be summarized as follows.

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey entered into close cooperation with the Turkic Republics in Central Asia and this policy was supported by US approaches. Through Turkey's dialogue partnership with the SCO, its relations with the Turkic Republics can be carried out on an institutional basis in line with common interests. Moreover, in Afghanistan, Turkey is providing military and political support that will contribute significantly to peace.

The 'Shanghai Five' Central Asian Republics and China and Russia, which came together to solve border problems, established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 with different objectives such as creating a reaction and alternative to the emerging global hegemony of the United States, creating a balance between small states and big states in the region and benefiting from their partnerships, and Moscow and Beijing controlling the energy resources in Central Asia and balancing the United States. It can be said that the regional cooperation trends that became widespread after the Cold War also created a favorable environment for the establishment of the organization. The SCO, which has undergone development phases since its establishment, has made significant progress in regional relations. In this process, the SCO has completed its institutional identity, developed its conceptual work, and made significant progress in security, economic and humanitarian dimensions. Moreover, the East's balancing of the West in terms of economic power has increased the SCO's international prestige and perception of acceptance. Therefore, the organization has turned into a military and economic security phenomenon that has to be taken into account in Eurasia. The SCO has become a broader organization that encompasses not only security but also border, economic and energy issues.

Despite these positive developments, the SCO is still not a fully developed organizational model. In particular, it has limited capabilities in terms of resources, economic cooperation among member states is limited, its international status is in the process of development, and its non-governmental structure has yet to be defined. There is no centrally authorized decision-making body that can resolve issues among the members. The fact that China and the Russian Federation are giant powers alongside other members makes it difficult to implement the principle of equality within the organization. Moscow and China's different expectations from the organization make it difficult to formulate and implement coherent policies. The fact that the members have very different cultures, have problems with each other and within their own internal structures, have different levels of economic development, and that all full members are ruled by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes constitute the vulnerable sides of the SCO. Despite all these drawbacks, the SCO has been able to withstand the challenges of a rapidly evolving security environment.

It should not be forgotten that the SCO was formed in a global environment resulting from the political and military successes of the Western world led by the US/NATO. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the SCO represents a status quo approach that favors the maintenance of authoritarian forms of governance and global US/NATO opposition.

Although the SCO is similar to NATO in its security dimension, it can also be compared to the 1996 border security agreement ratified by the 'Shanghai Five' and the AKKA signed between the Western and Eastern Blocs, and to the EU due to its economic, energy and partly political cooperation activities. However, the current organizational structure of the SCO is more similar to the OSCE in terms of its security, economic and humanitarian dimensions.

In order to become a regional power, to establish closer cooperation with Muslim countries, to pursue a balancing foreign policy against the EU and partly the US, and not to be left out of the economic and military formations in the Eurasian region, it can be said that the political authority in Turkey has turned its foreign policy towards the east and the Middle East. The rapprochement with the SCO is a result of these policies. However, cooperation with a global security organization that has become active in the Eurasian region should be perceived as a requirement of a multilateral foreign policy. Considering factors such as the possibility of the organization turning into a NATO-like defense organization, the fact that all important states in the Eurasian region are somehow related to the SCO, four of them are nuclear powers, two of them are members of the UN Security Council, the possibility of the organization turning into an energy cartel, the fact that Iran, our neighboring country, is an observer member of the SCO, etc., it is important for Turkey to be in close cooperation with the SCO. The SCO has also gained the ability to determine Turkey's relations with the Turkic Republics. Therefore, membership of a 'dialogue partnership' with the SCO is a positive geopolitical and geostrategic initiative. Turkey can act as a bridge between NATO and the SCO. However, relations with the SCO should be conducted in a way that does not break Turkey's relations with the West and does not bring Turkey's NATO membership into question.