How Should France's European Political Community Initiative be Understood?

The idea of "integration" in Europe is not a new phenomenon, but has been raised many times in history as a result of wars and divisions. The European Union (EU) became a reality after the devastation and death caused by the Second World War. Today's EU has been transformed into a structure that includes only those European states that can meet the 1993 Maastricht Treaty criteria for candidacy. 

On the initiative of French President Macron, the European Political Community (EPC) held its first meeting with the participation of 44 leaders in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, which holds the rotating presidency of the EU. As a new initiative in the history of European integration, the EPC overlaps with the idea of a European Confederation, previously proposed by former French President Mitterrand in the aftermath of the Cold War. This first idea, which included Russia, failed to materialize due to the opposition of countries advocating European integration within Europe. Unlike Mitterrand, Macron is building a new "political club" by excluding Russia and focusing on Europe's periphery and its long-standing candidate members, as well as a few close economic and military allies.  Similarly, former French President Sarkozy, during his term, created a political structure called "Union for the Mediterranean" to support Europe's Mediterranean neighbors to the south, but its importance and function seems to have weakened considerably in recent years. In other words, there have been similar attempts at semi-integration in the past.   

The main idea of the AST was introduced by French President Macron in his speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on May 9, after the Ukraine war, and then formally endorsed by the 27 leaders of the European Union at the European Council on June 23 and 24, 2022. So, although Macron is the mastermind, it will be the EU that will implement it. 

The composition of the states participating in the first AST meeting is also interesting. The AST, which looks like a mini United Nations (UN), consists of 44 members in total. The 27 members of the European Union, the six countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro), the Associated Trio countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), Armenia and Azerbaijan, the four European Free Trade Association countries (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein), the United Kingdom and Turkey.  The AST is scheduled to meet every six months, balanced between EU and non-EU countries, with the next meetings scheduled to take place in Moldova in spring 2023, Spain in autumn 2023 and the UK in spring 2024.   

The reasons for Macron's efforts to implement a new initiative, the AST, can be summarized as follows. 

Today's EU has significantly lost the capacity to "absorb" a new member. The Balkan countries of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia are waiting in line to become EU members. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia want to secure their sovereignty by joining NATO and the European Union because of Russia's growing expansionist ambitions. Turkey, on the other hand, has been waiting at the door of the EU for sixty years to become a member. With a new initiative, France wants to create a common ground for cooperation outside the EU by establishing a wider international organization that includes these countries and the Black Sea and Caucasus countries outside the European continent. In this way, it wants to integrate these candidate countries, including Turkey, into Europe through an arrangement outside the EU.  

With Brexit, the UK has completely left the EU as of 2020 and pursued an independent foreign policy.  It is clear that Britain, which has a historical role in the defense of Europe and has an important military power including nuclear power, will create a security problem for the EU. The AST cooperation aims to keep it close to the EU.  

The idea of directing the EEAS towards security, defense, energy or research as a way to make the continent safer by keeping Europe away from conflicts was seen as very effective. Russia's aggression in Ukraine clearly disrupted the post-1990 stability in Europe, creating a new unpredictable environment of risks and threats for France, which felt secure with an integrated EU leadership. France, believing that Europe would not have an adequate capacity in the fields of defense, energy and security with only EU member states, put into practice the AST idea, which involves cooperation on a separate political plane outside the EU with countries that it thinks will be useful for Europe in this regard.   

This project would allow France to benefit from the military capacity of countries such as the UK and Turkey, the energy capacity of countries such as Azerbaijan and Norway, as well as the energy and research capacities of non-EU countries[6].

It should not be forgotten that behind this initiative, former French President De Gaulle's policy of European self-determination, which was France's historical ambition, was also included. France's efforts to develop its own nuclear power in the 1960s, its withdrawal from NATO's military wing and the relocation of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels were France's efforts to become a leader in European security. Now, the idea of an AST has been put into practice to transform the EU, which is dependent on Russia for energy and NATO/USA for defense and security, into a strong military, energy and economic structure.  France wants to be the leading country in Europe in this respect. It can be said that the UK's departure from the EU and the new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's abstentionist, ambivalent and risk-averse attitude have made the French leader comfortable in this direction.

The Ukrainian war, the fact that the war and the decisions are taken in Russia and America, despite the fact that Europe is the main one affected by the war, has led Macron, the leader of France, to the necessity of such a project,[7] who thinks that Europe is faced with the risk of losing control of its destiny in the 21st century and, in his own words, becoming a spectator to history. This is because Europe is bearing the brunt of the war due to rising energy prices and the burden of migrants. However, Europe appeared to be watching its own historical development through the looking glass.

French officials state that the AST will work with an organizational structure that does not have an institutional organization (such as a general secretariat, etc.) like the G7 or G20, rather than organizations such as the Council of Europe, which focuses on human rights, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which focuses on human rights and European security.[8] It is clear that this will not satisfy the candidate countries that expect a lot from Europe.

Germany was very uncomfortable with France playing a leading role in Europe and before the meeting, German Chancellor Scholz stated that they would not give up on the goal of integrating Eastern Europe into the EU and showed that he was cold towards the AST initiative.

It is still unclear how decisions will be taken in the EEAS. It is not yet clear whether it will be decided by unanimity, majority or qualified majority. Moreover, the financial burden, i.e. budget sharing, has not yet been determined. These issues will be clarified in the process, but unanimous decision-making is a necessity for Turkey's national interests.

On the other hand, it appears that the new initiative will be an alliance based on geopolitical needs rather than a democratic alliance. This is because the invitation of the UK and Turkey to join is based on Europe's need for the military power of these countries. Therefore, there has been a development that the focus of the AST could be a geopolitical alliance rather than a democratic alliance. However, it is understood that the AST will not include binding principles such as mutual defense or security guarantees. In this respect, it would not be an alternative to the security and defense roles of NATO and the EU. The exclusion of Russia and Belarus can be seen as a reflection of the EU's prioritization of its own security. In case Russia becomes a member, this initiative may turn into a passive structure like the OSCE. The fact that the US is not a member of this initiative, or even invited, can be interpreted in two ways. It is a reflection of the declining decisive power of the US over Europe. It is only through the UK that the US can assert its position against any political, security and energy development that is not in its interests. Another implication is that the US may support such a project underhandedly, seeing it as a positive opening for its own interests.  

In a way, the ETS should be seen as part of an effort to integrate the countries that are aspiring to become full EU candidates into the EU in a different way. It has been confronted with alternative unacceptable solutions such as "open-ended negotiations", which explicitly state that no final decisions will be taken during the candidacy process, or the sometimes proposed "extended associate membership" or "privileged partnership". In a sense, the EEAS should not be a "waiting room" for countries wishing to become candidates for the EU.

The EEAS is also a useful initiative to bring together countries that are at odds with each other. For example, it has been useful in creating an atmosphere of reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At least the leaders of both countries and Turkey were able to come together and discuss their problems. The same cannot be said for Turkey and Greece. The AST appeared to be an initiative that led to more tension between the leaders of the two countries.

The Summit Declaration could not be issued due to the UK's opposition. This gave the impression that the countries had clear reservations about the AST, that they did not want to attach too much meaning to this initiative, but that by being involved in it, they could play a preventive role against it becoming too meaningful.  

The AST can be seen as a positive development for Turkey. The meeting is important in terms of showing that Turkey is part of the European states. It cannot be denied that its military power played an important role behind its invitation to this meeting. With Turkey's participation, it can be said that Turkey has an important political power against the efforts of anti-Turkey countries to transform the AST against Turkey. 

Above all, for Turkey, the AST can never be a substitute for the EU. It cannot be a means of delaying Turkey's EU membership, transforming it into a minor model (such as a privileged partnership) or abolishing it altogether. Turkey should look at the EEAS in this light.

In conclusion, the AST should be seen as a geopolitical initiative of French leader Macron, a new alternative solution to the security and energy challenges that have emerged in Europe after the Russia-Ukraine War. At the same time, this initiative can also be seen as a means for France to consolidate the notion of European leadership and as a project in the context of Europe being led by Europeans. Given Germany's reluctance to give explicit support for the success of this project and Britain's tacit support, it is difficult to predict the future of the AST.