Is NATO Ready for Simultaneously Conduct Two Great Wars? (5)

The military presence of the USA in Europe, which prefers to give priority to the Indo-Pacific Region over the rising China, is about to become symbolic. Recently, China's rise to become a global dominant power in the Asia-Pacific is perceived as a challenge for the USA. For this reason, the USA, which focuses its power projection on surrounding China with its close allies in this region, leaving Europe alone with the threat of Russia should be seen as a reality from now on.
In our opinion, the possibility of a simultaneous attack from Russia to European countries in a possible US-China war should be considered by NATO as the worst-case scenario. Such an opportunistic attack by the Russians would necessitate European defense of Europe without American combat power and capabilities. In this context, with the most undesirable war scenario for the Western World; It may face a "Two Front War". Considering the possibility of a joint attack by Russia and China at the same time, it is considered that NATO should prepare for a two-front war and undertake serious studies that will shape the future of the Alliance in this direction.
Differences in Common Threat Perception
USA; While he shifted his close attention to the Indo-Pacific region, he also distanced England from Europe. The UK's Brexit exit should not be seen as just a break from the European Union. From now on, it would be more realistic to assume that the military capabilities of NATO's leading members, the USA, Canada and the UK, will be primarily engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. There is the development of capabilities by other members of the Alliance dedicated to the security of Europe. Considering the USA's ability to surround China and/or engage when necessary, it has become clear that Europe will not be able to take advantage of US capabilities in a possible Russian attack. The necessity for Europe to develop a defense capability based on its own weapons stands as an option.
According to Europeans who had to leave Afghanistan as of August 2021, as a result of the US decision to 'withdraw from Afghanistan' without consulting its European allies, this 'maverick attitude' of the US has cast a shadow over the future of transatlantic relations. In addition, as a result of the formation of AUKUS that emerged on September 15, 2021 (Australia reached an agreement with the USA and the UK on nuclear submarines and other technologies), the submarine contract signed between Australia and France for 66 billion dollars was shelved. This situation caused France to show its reaction by withdrawing its ambassadors from the USA and Australia, and more importantly, to question marks regarding the transatlantic link in the Western world.
In addition to France's designs for the future of Europe after AUKUS, the US reservations regarding the activation of the Nord Stream-2 natural gas pipeline extending from Russia to Europe and the deactivation of Ukraine by the Russians in this context. Problems related to this issue have invited heated debates within the European Union.
The era of romantic relations with the Russians in the early 2000s is about to end for Europe. In particular, the continuation of 'moderate' policies towards Russia by the Western European countries, even after the annexation of Crimea, by the Russians in March 2014, contrary to international law, is seen as an obstacle to the establishment of European unity. Moreover, this situation has led Americans to an understanding that Europe cannot be left alone. As a result, all these issues have made Europe's future perspectives on common security "chaotic". The exit from this situation can only be resolved by easing the strategic interests and differences of opinion among NATO allies, and by drawing a common future perspective in the context of NATO and the EU.
European members of NATO, with the exception of the UK, tend to take a 'indifferent' stance towards the Chinese 'threat', especially from a security perspective, as far as we can see. Although it is not as strong militarily as it was during the Cold War, the majority of European countries follow a policy based on 'not angering' Russia. In this context, there are differences of opinion among European countries regarding the Russian threat. The fact that leading Western European countries such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy did not take a sufficiently "vigilant" stance towards the phenomenon of "fear of Russia" carried by the Eastern European countries, especially those who spent the Cold War period under Russian occupation, forced Eastern Europeans to "defense" with the United States under the NATO cap. pushes for cooperation.
In order for Europe to stand on its own feet, it must first embrace Eastern Europe, and go to a force structure that can protect these countries against the Russians, inside or outside NATO. In this context, it is necessary to acquire the necessary capabilities for defense planning. In the coming period, the feasibility of the three core tasks of the 2010 Strategic Concept (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security) from NATO's perspective, based on the European military architecture, depends on Europe's internal stability and its 'future' coherence.
Is a European Military Force Not Dependent on NATO Capabilities Possible?
The future of NATO, which is essentially an organization of dialogue and reconciliation, seems to depend on its ability to develop a solution to European security without the United States. Or, the fact that the European countries are on the side of the USA and the UK on the issue of China, and in return, stopping the Russian threat by using the capabilities of the USA appears as the most optimal course of action that will guarantee the continuation of the transatlantic link. For this, all NATO members have to increase their defense expenditures to have the military capabilities required by the "two-front war" strategy.
The continuation of the atmosphere of solidarity and cooperation within NATO requires that the availability of Alliance capabilities for all threats from a single pool should not be hindered, and that a holistic approach to defense and security should be maintained. The principle of the 'single pool of forces' is also at the core of the Alliance's transatlantic bond. In line with this principle, the United States of America; It has traditionally been disapproving of the Alliance's European members' drive towards strategic autonomy in defense and security. The possibility of a "double-front war" brought about by today's conditions; It will test the "sincerity" of the Alliance members to reconsider their old attitudes and stances, especially the US stance towards the application of a single force pool, and the European approach to autonomy.
Are European countries ready to increase their defense spending for a joint capability acquisition independent of NATO? Is it necessary to have different capabilities for both NATO and European security? Questions like these; It is a candidate to shape the future of the Alliance and the European Union and to sit on the agenda of the 2022 concept studies.
In fact, before NATO was established, the Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1948 as a defense organization. With the establishment of NATO in 1949, the first founding countries of the WEU preferred to transfer their defense functions to NATO. The 'strategic autonomy' that Europe talked about but could not implement for various reasons was shelved at that time as a result of the Europeans' own preferences.
In the following years, de Gaulle's France; His exit, which 'defied' US tutelage and aimed to create a new 'European Identity', was not supported by other European member states of the Alliance. After all, France; He left the military wing of NATO in 1966 by his own decision. With the easing environment in the last years of the Cold War, the WEU was reactivated in 1984 by European countries in order to establish a common European security mechanism. While the WEU continued its work, after a short period of relief in Europe, it laid the groundwork for the Washington administration's intervention in the Balkans and Afghanistan after 9/11. The WEU/EU countries, which could not intervene on their own due to the limited ability and power structure they have in the crisis that emerged in the Balkans, brought the search for a force structure to overcome the 'depression' of this to the agenda of the European Union. European countries, which were particularly disturbed by the unilateral military intervention by the USA in Iraq in 2003; In the context of the joint use of military force, they have begun to bring forward that they have different perspectives within NATO than the United States.
As a result of a series of discussions/studies, it was possible for non-EU NATO countries and NATO-EU member countries to meet in the middle. Thus, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has been developed for the military and security areas of the EU, in a way to eliminate the division within the EU. This policy has replaced the formation of the European Security and Defense Identity (AGSK) within NATO. The ESDP has had a different course from the AGSK in that NATO 'approves' the EU to have decision-making autonomy within its own jurisdiction and to cooperate with non-NATO countries when necessary. However, in the context of the ESDP, the European Security Strategy, which was approved at the EU Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, was found remarkable in that it could not present a different perspective from the NATO strategic concept.
While the Europeans were discussing what kind of military power structure they should go to in order to realize the strategies they put forward in support of NATO in the context of the EU, a new strategy was developed by the USA that changed their expectations from NATO and other organizations of which it is a member. The National Security Strategy (Bush Doctrine) is the opera to be implemented against threats to Washington administrations. It has eliminated the necessity of seeking the holistic support of the international organizations of which it is a member. Thus, the principle that the USA can enter into wars by forming a 'coalition of volunteers' willing to take part in the USA's side, whether it is a member of the Alliance or not, has been put into practice. The 2003 Iraq operation was the first example of this.
Meanwhile, between NATO and the EU, the principles of using the capabilities of NATO by the EU were set forth with the "Berlin-plus" arrangement, and a series of related documents were put into practice between NATO and the EU. As a result, although the re-established cooperation mechanism between the two organizations led to a distinction in the sharing of duties and responsibilities in the field of defense, the regulations in general remained on paper. Moreover, there has been no significant progress in the military power and capability building process of NATO's European wing to date.
However, over time, it has been partially possible for NATO and the EU to pursue simultaneous operations on the ground that complement each other. For example, NATO's duties as the Kosovo Force were transferred to the EU force in April 2009. On the other hand, the 'Cyprus Problem' caused a bottleneck in the NATO-EU axis due to the fact that the Greek Cypriot Administration is an EU member, and it was not possible to take additional steps outside the Berlin-plus framework.
Power Building Based on the Strategic Autonomy of NATO's European Wing
The NATO-EU axis, due to the constraints in the use of the common talent pool, necessitates Europe to build its strategic autonomy in a different structure from NATO. This situation pushes non-EU NATO countries (USA, Canada, England, Turkey, etc.) to take more responsibility on the NATO wing, and NATO-EU member countries to use more resources in both NATO and EU wings, in two separate lanes. It is not yet clear whether the European wing is ready to take on such a responsibility.
If there is to be a European military power structure compatible with NATO, this power must have the competence and competence to counter the Russian threat in Europe. In particular, a European structure that will guarantee the security of Eastern European countries has to be built. For this, it is considered necessary as a 'pre-condition' that the US and other members who are not members of the EU should drop their objections.
There is an imperative to reach a Berlin-plus-like cooperation agreement between European allies and other non-EU NATO allies who will recognize that strategic autonomy entails greater strategic responsibilities. If such an agreement is reached between NATO and the EU, the fundamental principles should be incorporated into the new strategic concepts of both organisations.
In fact, the need for a European approach in this context is mostly expressed by France within the union. Instead of 'brain-dead NATO', as Macron puts it; The construction of a strong Europe is considered important for France, which does not want to be dependent on the USA and wants to have a military say in Europe by "offering" the French defense industry products to the use of all of Europe. In other words, France acts with the desire to take the place of the USA in Europe, to sell its weapons industry products to European countries, to increase its influence in Europe, and to become the leader country of Europe in the field of defense, if possible.
In this vein, Europeans have also begun to express a greater need for European strategic autonomy due to tensions within the Alliance under former President Trump, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and the recent flawed American consultations regarding the Australian submarine deal.
The willingness to develop capabilities on the European side of NATO may come to the fore in the new circumstances from now on. Because the US has to shift its military capabilities to the Indo-Pacific region in order to deter an aggressive China in Asia. If the European side is ready to take responsibility for the Russians and meet the required capabilities, it will be the United States itself that will benefit the most. Thus, the USA; Instead of dealing with both Russia and China at the same time, it will be able to devote all its strength to keeping China under control, together with its close allies based in AUKUS.
On the other hand, even if the US approval is obtained in the NATO-EU capability development axis, NATO's future visions in this context will ultimately determine the position and attitude of NATO members, such as Turkey, who have no interests in the Indo-Pacific region and are not included in the European Wing because they are not members of the EU.
Conclusion
After the Cold War, NATO restructured itself to conduct out-of-area operations. In this context, NATO countries are heavily dependent on American military capabilities. Without the USA, the EU cannot currently undertake a major operation on its own. In other words, without U.S. military power, European countries have the military capability to counter the Russians or a similar threat to this country. does not yet have.
Europe has never needed such a force structure until now. Countries in the European wing of the Alliance; In order to get rid of their dependence on the USA, they first need strategic transportation, strategic bombing, aerial refueling, etc. must have skills.
When 2030 is targeted, it is about to bring the synchronized and coordinated progress of NATO and the EU in two directions as a mandatory choice to the two international organizations. It may be possible that the EU wing will turn to a defense planning for the Russians on the Eastern European front under the leadership of France-Germany. Other members may need to focus on the Indo-Pacific front, led by the US-UK. Thus, NATO-EU can become a common alliance or maintain their existence in the global balance of power as two different alliances acting together. As a result, NATO and the EU can implement new strategic concepts capable of waging a simultaneous two-front war. The European wing may necessarily choose to acquire new concept-based talents.
This new approach requires Europeans to take steps towards “getting rid of US dependency”, which they have not been able to implement for various reasons for half a century. New strategic concepts to be developed depending on the two-front war scenario; It obliges European countries to take on new responsibilities and increase their defense expenditures. If Europe takes this path, the security dilemma syndrome that already exists between China and the USA will also occur between the EU and Russia. Such approaches and military power formations that will pave the way for the third world war will continue to occupy the world agenda for the next few years.
Every step that NATO and the EU will take, individually or together, towards the "two-front war" scenario will serve to make the footsteps of the Third World War heard more by all humanity.

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