Should NATO go to war alongside the United States if China attacks Hawaii over Taiwan?

Russia-Ukraine War and Possible Taiwan-China War Unite Countries in Different Geographies

At a time of growing concern about the threat posed by the People's Republic of China, in short China, to Taiwan's security, NATO is increasingly interested in developments in the Indo-Pacific region. The possibility of a conflict on the Taiwan dimension would not only have a devastating impact on the global economy. It would also have the potential to bring the United States into direct conflict with a rival that is in many ways its equal, and one with a high military capacity, including nuclear weapons. In other words, the possibility of such a crisis could put the risk of a global war on the world agenda. 

I believe that no state in the world can simply turn a blind eye to the possibility of a conflict in Taiwan, as it would have far-reaching consequences. From this perspective, the link and even interdependence between Turkey's security and the security in the Indo-Pacific cannot be ignored. For example, the Development Road Project through Iraq, a development close to Turkey, is related to the security in the Persian Gulf. Basra is linked to the Indian Ocean and at the same time the Belt and Road Initiative's route through Pakistan to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar will trade in Chinese manufactured goods. A Sino-US conflict would mean that this route would suddenly become inoperable, the flow from China would be cut off, the Turkish economy would be affected, and so on. Undoubtedly, similar situations of interdependence that will affect every country to a greater or lesser extent in possible crises can be multiplied with examples to be given in many fields. 

In the context of security, Turkey, as a NATO member, has to closely follow NATO's recent interest in the Indo-Pacific region and read the course of developments. Nowadays, scenarios in which NATO countries could directly intervene in a possible incident in Taiwan are being outlined and discussed on various platforms day by day. Indeed, a possible crisis in Taiwan has the dynamics to mobilise the connective tissue between the US alliances in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. As is well known, the US allies in the Far East, whom the US wants to see on its side in the Indo-Pacific, are not hesitating to take steps to show that they are also staunch supporters of Ukraine and to act together with the US against Russia in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the vast majority of US allies in Eastern Europe are assisting the United States in promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. From this perspective, the prospects of conflict in the Indo-Pacific and any security vulnerability that erupts along the North Atlantic line act as a glue that brings countries from different geographies closer together, united on the axis of alliance across the globe.

NATO emphasised the concept of collective security after the Cold War

Today, NATO, as the world gendarme, continues to seek to make an appearance in areas that go beyond its geographical area (the composite of the geographical borders of the member states) and that, from an external point of view, do not directly concern NATO. In this respect, it can be said that alliance relations or contacts in the context of Ukraine and Taiwan are on the rise.

NATO, which until the end of the Cold War had predominantly devoted its strategic concepts to the protection of its own borders and the construction of a protective shield against the Soviet Bloc, which was declared as a clear threat, has evolved beyond its natural borders with the end of the Cold War, emphasising vague threats and risks such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and the Alliance has evolved to see dealing with security developments all over the world as part of its own security needs. NATO has endeavoured to fill the concept of Collective Security in line with the interests and expectations of the Alliance.

Viewed in this context, NATO is an international organisation that is largely, if not directly, aligned with American policies in political and military terms. To argue otherwise would lead us to arguments that are disconnected from the functioning and realities of NATO. In this sense, it is necessary to consider the scenarios in which a situation in Taiwan could affect the Alliance, both in terms of the legal dimension as an action that would trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in terms of the conditions under which Washington could seek the support of NATO allies in a global campaign against Beijing. 

Could NATO Become a Party to a Conflict in Taiwan?

Considering the dynamics of the Cold War, no one would have even considered the possibility of NATO becoming a party to the developments in Taiwan. This was because the dominant understanding at that time was that NATO ‘closed its eyes’ to developments, risks and threats outside its area of responsibility. After the end of the Cold War, the balance changed. In 1992, the US President ‘Daddy’ Bush, in particular, put forward the ‘New World Order’ argument, underlining that two things would henceforth come to the fore for American and therefore Western interests: Firstly, ‘human rights’ and secondly, ‘free market economy’. 

It should be noted that although both of these are vague concepts, they are known as soft power weapons that the US uses even today to silence its interlocutors. At times, the ‘human rights’ discourse is even used as a weapon not only against China but also against allies such as Turkey. 

The New World Order, which imposed on the whole humanity such views as not disrupting world trade, making all people live equally, freely and fraternally, establishing the rule of law, believing in democratic values, in short, the ‘American dream’ must prevail all over the world in order to live humanely, was essentially designed to establish the continuation of American hegemony. Moreover, the anti-thesis that the collapse of the Soviet system proved to all humanity that the Americans were on the right track in this sense was put forward in abundance. 

NATO was identified as the main actor of this new world order imposed by the USA in the context of international organisations, and the allies began to be dictated that the alliance should roll up its sleeves for collective security as well as collective defence. Countries such as Turkey, Germany, France, Belgium, etc. began to argue that NATO was essentially a defence pact, that NATO's turning towards areas outside its responsibility and becoming the world gendarme would take the alliance beyond its founding purpose, and that it would not be right to demand NATO's intervention in global threats, since not every member had similar interests with the USA in risks developing outside the alliance, and that not every member might want to act together with the USA in out-of-area operations for various reasons, and that this could disrupt the overall integrity of the alliance. 

As a matter of fact, the biggest disagreement on this issue occurred during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. France, Germany and Belgium openly opposed the invasion, while the UK, Poland, etc. sided with the US. As a result, an ‘occupation force’ was organised by a coalition of willing NATO members and NATO was in a way excluded from the occupation. Turkey, on the one hand, asked for missile defence system support from NATO on 10 February 2003 against possible missile attacks from Iraq, and on the other hand, by saying ‘no’ to the March 1 manifesto, Turkey decided to prevent American troops from opening a front in the north of Iraq from the southeast of Turkey. The USA's use of its influence within NATO to get alliance members to send missile systems to Turkey in order to use Turkish territory provoked an open reaction from France, Germany and Belgium on the grounds that ‘sending a missile system to Turkey would involve NATO in the Iraq conflict’. While the necessary air defence systems were transferred to Turkey after the decision was finally taken on 16 February, Turkey preferred to act indirectly with France, Germany and Belgium by not allowing American troops to use its territory. 

After the Cold War, NATO's out-of-area operations, including Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993-1995 and Kosovo in 1999, were always on the agenda. While NATO as a whole was expected to side with the US in Iraq, the developments within the Alliance at the time did not make this possible.

Nowadays, the Taiwan issue is back on the agenda in this sense, leading to the questioning of the functioning of the NATO mechanism in terms of US interests and expectations. In this context, Western capitals are debating ‘what is the legal scope of NATO's intervention in a possible situation in Taiwan?’. Possible answers to questions such as ‘Would it be possible to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in a possible Taiwan crisis?’ are flying in the air.

I find evaluations and discussions such as whether the geographical boundaries of a possible Taiwan Crisis will extend to North America, to what extent the issue will or will not concern NATO useful. In this context, I bring to your attention a prominent war game simulation. According to some American studies and evaluations, the findings of a recent war game simulating the possibility of Taiwan by the Centre for New American Studies are highlighted. Accordingly, it is claimed that ‘the Red [China] wants to target military installations in the continental United States, but does not have the power to do so’. In a concluding summary prepared for NBC News' Meet the Press programme, it is argued that China is considering missile strikes against Hawaii, Alaska and California (and that China's detonation of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere off the coast of California is evidence of the threat it poses to the United States). The war game is said to show that a possible Taiwan crisis could last much longer and lead to a much greater escalation than either the United States or China expected. 

I find what is emphasised in this simulation dangerous but worth pondering. The simulation overemphasises that China could launch limited strikes against Hawaii and the west coast of the United States in order to deter the United States and prevent it from supporting Taiwan, should a Taiwan crisis erupt. Based on China's recent joint exercise with Russia off the coast of Alaska, the claim that this exercise is sufficient evidence to portray China as an ‘imminent threat’ has been widely covered. 

Should NATO go to war on the side of the United States over Taiwan?

There is no doubt that an attack on any part of the continental United States would clearly be an attack on North America and would therefore inevitably trigger NATO's invocation of Article 5. Any attack on the United States, whether on Hawaii, Guam or any other US state or territory, could be part of a major conflict. From this point of view, if, for example, there is a missile attack on a US air base in Japan by North Korea or China, is this an act of war for NATO? In such a case, either NATO Article 4 (consultation or consultation provisions) or Article 5 (collective defence) would be invoked. Ultimately, the final decision of the North Atlantic Council will determine whether the Alliance will use force against the country that launched the missile. 

However, I believe that in a possible Taiwan crisis, in the event of an ‘attack on American territory’ as I have tried to explain above, it is not so easy for the allies to take a joint decision, provided that NATO stays within the wording of its original founding charter. Moreover, in 1965, the NATO Secretariat issued a legal opinion stating that Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty could not be applied to Hawaii. Of course, I do not find this opinion binding for today, but I find it important in terms of pointing out that similar opinions may come to the agenda within the Alliance.

Again, I believe that even if a possible Chinese attack on Hawaii triggers Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it does not lead the allies to unquestioningly side with the US and does not require them to take immediate action. 

According to Article 5, the main objective is to ‘restore and protect the security of the North Atlantic region’. This means that in the event of an armed attack on North America, the parties would not be obliged to assist the United States in the Indo-Pacific. 

Instead, to ensure the security of the North Atlantic region, it would be sufficient for them to act within the NATO area of responsibility, without going beyond it. However, these are all interpretations that make sense in line with the classical view of collective defence. But if NATO, which has changed in the context of collective security since the 1990s, starts to interpret the articles of its founding charter from a collective security perspective instead of a collective defence perspective, what should be NATO's attitude towards, for example, global crises that directly concern and involve the United States? Should Allies be part of every crisis in which the United States is involved? 

Conclusion

NATO is, first and foremost, an international organisation founded on the understanding that in the event of an attack on the geographical area within the borders (including territorial waters and airspace) of the member states, the threat should be stopped and deterred through collective defence. However, post-Cold War developments have deeply shaken this classical approach, security and defence paradigm of the Alliance. Especially when the US started to use NATO platforms as a tool to support its global interests and the process of building its hegemony, the acceptance of Bush's 1992 New World Order approach by the Alliance members started to become Washington's main alliance criterion. In this context, by using ‘human rights’ violations and ‘free market’ dynamics, the New World Order became a global norm, forming a unity with the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s.

Under these circumstances, NATO has started to assume the responsibility of ‘collective security’ in addition to collective defence, and has tended to include out-of-area operations beyond the borders of the alliance. In this respect, in some cases, the interests and expectations of Western European countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, and the United States, and occasionally Turkey, have overlapped, leading to exits that disrupted the integrity of the Alliance. 

Today, NATO is still far from reaching a fully shared understanding on out-of-area operations. In this respect, the Russia-Ukraine war, both as a NATO security problem and as a non-NATO war, keeps the Alliance in a dilemma. Unable to intervene in this war as a whole, NATO's political and military stance is largely fulfilled in the context of arms aid to Ukraine within the framework of the ‘coalition of the willing’. Although there are allies (Britain, France, etc.) who want to go beyond this, it is observed that they have not yet done anything more than rhetoric.

While the Ukraine problem continues, a second crisis that could test NATO's holistic approach in the near term is expected to be Taiwan. In the Taiwan dimension, all allies are interested in what NATO's role would be, or should be, in the event of a Chinese attack, for example on Hawaii, against the United States, which wants to act together with its allies in the Far East to prevent China's attempt to invade Taiwan under the rhetoric of ‘one China’ and thus play a stopping role against China. I believe that Washington and Tokyo are slowly dragging NATO, which has already begun to maintain close contact with Japan, a Far Eastern country, through various NATO platforms, into the Far Eastern ‘quagmire’. I am worried that the war, which seems to be small, may involve the whole world on a scale not unlike the Korean War of 1950-1953. I hope that my concern will be unfounded.

References

James Lee, “NATO and a Taiwan contingency”, NDC Outlook, 15 Nisan 2024, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1921

Hüseyin Fazla. (2022). 1952’den 2022’ye NATO ve Türkiye, Nobel Yayınevi. Ankara.