The Turkish Axis in the Struggle for Hegemony: Turkey and the Organisation of Turkic States

When assessing the Turkey-Russia-China alliance against the alliance formed by the US, Israel and, in the background, the UK, the fundamental reality that must first be emphasised is this: the Turk has no friend other than the Turk. Consequently, any alliance to be established will possess a character distinct from the organic, identity-based unions that the Turkic States will form amongst themselves.

Given the nature of relations to be established with actors such as Russia—which killed 33 of our soldiers in Idlib on 27 February 2020—and China—which stands out for its repressive policies towards the Uyghur Turks, amounting to oppression—such relations will inevitably be limited when viewed from the perspective of the Turkic world or the Turkic axis, and will be compelled to rely solely on certain pragmatic realities. This situation clearly demonstrates why the principle that ‘a Turk has no friend but another Turk’ still holds true in the geopolitical sphere.

We know very well from our shared historical consciousness that when it comes to Turkic identity and Turkey, there is a reality where even adversaries can become friends. Consequently, a potential Turkey-Russia-China axis could be viewed as a valuable opening for Turkey and the Turkic world, not so much as a classical alliance, but to the extent that it serves as Turkey’s gateway to Turan.

The US, determined to maintain the unipolar world order, will view the establishment of a structure—led by Turkey, comprising Turkic states, and featuring its own armed forces and common currency—similar to the European Union and NATO, as a threat to its own interests. It is to be expected that the powerful Greek and Armenian lobbies in the US will attempt to block the formation of a union that would elevate Turkey and Azerbaijan to a more influential position in global politics. The US will, whilst keeping its external actions concealed, prioritise weakening any potential Pan-Turkist ideas that might emerge within political parties by utilising political interest groups in Turkey.

From China’s perspective; Whilst Beijing may, in one respect, welcome the establishment of stability in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans, it will be concerned that the countries affiliated with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and coming under China’s economic influence might unite to grow stronger and form an alternative pole, viewing this as contrary to its own interests. The success of Pan-Turkist ideology in the form of a Turkish Union could create a pull effect for China in the context of the Uyghur issue. A strengthened and united Turkic world will defend the rights of the Uyghur Turks more vocally. This situation would naturally threaten China’s policy of maintaining its dominance over the East Turkestan region, which it refers to as ‘Xinjiang’. Consequently, it is expected that Chinese authorities will take various steps against the Turkic Union to prevent such a scenario from materialising. Although China lacks the cultural influence in the region that Russia possesses, it is likely to target the member states of the union by utilising its economic power.

The mullah regime in Iran, meanwhile, has never established a genuinely friendly relationship with Turkey from the outset; whilst it may not openly display hostility, it has continued to act as one of the major adversaries pursuing a policy of obstructing the process in this region. In the 1990s, it carried out ideological activities directed against Turkey; defence agreements were concluded with Greece and Armenia to the detriment of Turkey; and an anti-Turkish stance was adopted on foreign policy issues, particularly regarding the TRNC. Efforts were made to block energy and transport projects originating from Turkistan, particularly the Caspian Sea transit route; the demographic structure in Southern Azerbaijan was altered through pressure and forced migration; Armenia was supported during the Karabakh War; and opposition was mounted against the Zangezur Corridor project, which would have established a link with Turkistan.

Furthermore, the Azerbaijani population has been forced to migrate by drying up the water sources of Lake Urmia; opposition has been mounted against Turkey’s GAP project, and Turkey has been accused through water policies. A blind eye has been turned to the activities and movements of terrorist organisations; irregular migration via Afghanistan has been supported; and attempts have been made to obstruct Turkey’s fight against terrorist organisations in Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s operations in northern Syria have been opposed, the Development Corridor project in Iraq has faced resistance, and pressure has been exerted on the Turkmen communities in Iraq and Syria.

Looking at the bigger picture, the anticipated developments in Eurasia could present certain opportunities for the unification of Turkey and the Turkic world ahead of a potential Third World War. These opportunities include the liberation of East Turkestan following a regime change in Iran, the disintegration of Russia, and wars on China’s western borders. Should these opportunities be capitalised upon, the Turkic region of Turkestan—which has been caught between China and Russia for nearly a thousand years—could establish closer ties with Turkey once the Iranian obstacle is removed. In the event of Russia’s disintegration, it may be possible for numerous Turkic communities—such as Tatarstan, Tuva, Bashkortostan, Altai, Sakha (Yakut), Balkar, Karachay, Kumyk, Nogai and Adyghe—to gain independence and join this union.

For this reason, acting in concert with the Turkic world is highly logical for Turkey’s future. Within this framework, the most important strategic dimensions that need to be implemented are as follows:

Political cooperation exists, but a “single voice” is still lacking. TDT members still vote separately in international platforms such as the UN, OIC and OSCE. Although the “TDT+” format has been developed with third countries, there is no mandatory common stance within our own ranks (at least regarding the right of veto or bloc voting on critical issues). Once we address this shortcoming, the Turkic world will emerge as a new centre of gravity in the Global South, and the US and EU’s classic “divide and rule” policy could be rendered ineffective as a result of a joint effort.

Furthermore, the diaspora and demographic power must also be strategically consolidated. A diaspora centre currently exists, but sufficient strategic coordination has not been achieved. A joint lobby representing millions of Turks in Europe, the US and Russia, the reversal of brain drain, and a “strategic population growth” policy (such as free movement and simplified citizenship procedures among the Turkic Republics) have yet to be implemented. Once these steps are taken, demographic superiority will be secured in the long term, and an asymmetric power will emerge against the Greek and Armenian lobbies.

In addition to economic and political cooperation, urgent harmonisation is essential in the legal sphere. There are no established standards regarding citizenship, investment protection, the extradition of criminals, and the joint protection of historical heritage. It is possible to remove internal legal barriers to Pan-Turkist ideas and place the “Turkish identity” under legal protection. This harmonisation will make the union permanent and create a strong legal shield against the assimilation policies of China and Iran.

Finally, a joint resistance mechanism against economic sanctions must be established. Although economic cooperation is deepening, there is as yet no joint reserve fund or barter system to counter Western sanctions. Existing cooperation in the energy and logistics sectors must be made ‘resilient and unaffected by potential sanctions’ within this framework. Thus, the Turkic world will manage to survive should the Russia-China pragmatism come to an end or a US embargo be imposed.

As I have noted, political, economic, cultural and military cooperation within the Organisation of Turkic States must be enhanced, these dynamics accelerated, and a ‘Turkic NATO’ established.

In the global power struggle, the Organisation of Turkic States holds great significance as an emerging power under Turkey’s leadership, countering Chinese, US and Russian hegemony. In the broader picture, within the context of Turkistan, Turkey must not forget that the primary threat to itself is China and should develop its cooperation in this direction.

References:

NATO. Strategic Concept 2022. NATO Official Publications. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/susbed/issue/79611/1219408?utm_source

European Union. EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Official Documents and Declarations. Beijing.

https://dppa.un.org/en/shanghai-cooperation-organization

Organisation of Turkic States. Summit Declarations and Official Documents. Istanbul.