Turkey’s Priorities within the Alliance Ahead of the NATO Summit

Turkey’s true alliance is the Turkish nation and its esteemed armed forces. Recognising this is not intended to exclude anyone, but to face the truth: for no other state, no international organisation and no centre of power will prioritise Turkey’s security as much as Turkey itself. States have no permanent friends or permanent enemies; the only thing that is permanent is their interests. Consequently, Turkey’s security must never be entrusted to the good will of other states. International cooperation may be established, agreements may be concluded and joint action may be taken; yet all of these are temporary. The only permanent elements are the will of the Turkish nation and the national power elements of the Republic of Turkey.

The issue today is this: NATO is no longer focusing on Turkey itself, but on the geographical region in which Turkey is situated. In other words, the crux of the matter is not whether they like us; it is the place we occupy, our geopolitical position. For this reason, each of the following headings is not a matter of choice; it is a matter of survival.

The Initiative to Transform the Black Sea into a NATO Security Zone

We can expect NATO to accelerate its efforts in the coming period to transform its temporary military presence in the Black Sea into a permanent security framework. This process will not involve sitting down one day and saying, ‘Let’s amend the Montreux Convention’. Rather, it will proceed step by step, using highly technical and seemingly innocuous justifications such as mine countermeasures, the protection of energy pipelines, critical subsea infrastructure, the security of grain corridors, and ‘shared awareness’ regarding the Russian threat. Today an information-sharing centre, tomorrow a maritime surveillance network, the day after a ‘permanent coordination cell’… When read individually, each of these initiatives appears harmless; yet, when placed chronologically side by side, they constitute a mechanism that is eroding our strategic superiority derived from the Montreux Convention from within. The real aim is not to repeal the Montreux Convention with a single decision; the real aim is to functionally erode Turkey’s decisive role in the Black Sea and, ultimately, to transform the region’s security architecture into a new NATO-centred structure. The consequence of this is not merely a restriction on our freedom of movement in the Black Sea; in the long term, it will erode the leverage we hold across the entire spectrum of issues—from the energy corridor between Russia and the West, to the grain corridor, maritime transport and the security balance. This may appear to be a technical matter, but its strategic consequences could be far more severe than the loss of the century-old gains secured by the Montreux Convention. Should we lose our strategic superiority in the Black Sea, the price we would pay to regain it would be far greater than that of the decisions taken today.

Turkey must make it clear that it will not be a party to any new military structure or political arrangement that would alter the existing security architecture in the Black Sea. Any initiative seeking to create a fait accompli in the Black Sea without our knowledge or consent must be regarded as a direct strategic risk to this country’s national security; within this framework, the military, logistical and diplomatic support we provide must also be immediately reviewed. This stance is not a harsh rejection; it is about setting out a clear framework, because the strongest position in the face of uncertainty is not to say ‘No’, but to have answered the question ‘Under what conditions yes, under what conditions no’ from the outset. With this decision, Turkey maintains its position as a state that does not merely watch events unfold, but one that defines its boundaries in advance.

As Turkey, in order to reinforce the principle that security in the Black Sea is the sole responsibility of the littoral states, we must take the lead in establishing a new regional maritime monitoring mechanism—under the name ‘Black Sea Search and Rescue and Environmental Security’—in collaboration with Russia, Romania and Bulgaria, outside the NATO framework. At first glance, this may seem like a very modest step, so let us elaborate a little. Sitting down at the table as a quartet of littoral states brings us three distinct strategic gains. Firstly, it legally undermines the justifications for Western actors to enter the region; for the security of the Black Sea is now a common concern of the littoral states, not a cause for third-party intervention. Secondly, it brings Romania and Bulgaria into our fold not via NATO, but within the framework of a coastal states’ format; this format creates a channel of cooperation—similar to a direct Ankara–Skopje line—that is independent of directives from Washington or Brussels. Thirdly, and perhaps most critically, it prevents us from becoming trapped in a Turkey–Russia bilateral confrontation in the Black Sea. The West’s strategy of ‘uniting the littoral states against Russia’ would thus be rendered ineffective, as the issue is no longer a front against Russia but a shared responsibility amongst the littoral states. This threefold benefit reveals the strategic depth underlying what appears to be a seemingly innocuous technical proposal.

WHAT STEPS SHOULD TURKEY TAKE IN THE FACE OF POSSIBLE RESISTANCE TO THE MECHANISM?

Resistance to the establishment of the Black Sea Coastal States Mechanism could come from four different fronts. Each has its own specific rationale, a red line and a lever of influence over Turkey. The correct strategy is to anticipate in advance which front will exert what kind of pressure and to prepare a different response for each.

The US’s Open Objection from the ‘NATO Unity’ Front

The first front from which the US will object to this mechanism will be the argument that ‘the security of the Black Sea is a common concern for NATO allies; a littoral format would undermine the unity of the alliance’. Behind this argument lies the concern to preserve the legitimacy of NATO’s permanent presence in the Black Sea. In response, Turkey will clearly state that the mechanism has nothing to do with military command or defence planning, but rather constitutes a technical cooperation between littoral states regarding search and rescue, environmental security and navigational safety. The message to the US is this: Turkey is not leaving NATO; it is establishing an additional and complementary coastal state framework outside NATO. Moreover, this is precisely the right granted by the Montreux Convention since 1936; the primary stakeholders in the security of the Black Sea are the coastal states, not third parties.

Nevertheless, should US pressure turn into concrete sanctions, Turkey has leverage. Turkey is the operator of TurkStream, the main partner in TANAP, the guarantor of the global grain corridor, and a critical transit country for Russian gas reaching Europe. All these roles are dependent on the political architecture the US seeks in the Black Sea. Turkey can remind the US of these dependencies not subtly, but explicitly; it can state in diplomatic terms that if the US wishes to establish a permanent ‘non-Montreux’ military structure in the Black Sea, this is conditional upon the US respecting Turkey’s coastal state mechanism. This is by no means a threat, but rather a pre-emptive clarification: ‘There cannot be two different security architectures in the same sea; one replaces the other; the two cannot coexist.’ When this statement is placed firmly on the table, the US will either abandon its non-NATO structure or accept the coastal states’ mechanism.

Indirect US Pressure via Romania and Bulgaria

The second front of this scenario is more insidious and more toxic: the US will not object directly, but will lobby behind the scenes with Romania and Bulgaria to ensure these two NATO members stay away from the table, thereby causing the mechanism to lose two of its three pillars. Turkey must work on two fronts to thwart this scenario. Firstly, it must state clearly to Romania and Bulgaria: “You are littoral states; NATO does not bind you in the Black Sea, and you do not require Washington’s permission in the littoral format.” Secondly, it must highlight its commercial interests in the Black Sea; the benefits of ‘coastal state status’ must be made concrete through issues such as the security of Romania’s oil platforms, Bulgaria’s work on the Black Sea gas pipeline, and the export corridor to Moldova. Once Romania and Bulgaria realise the cost of a phone call from Washington – and what they stand to lose should they withdraw from the littoral partnership – they will learn to distinguish their own interests from the agendas of other actors.

Should Romania or Bulgaria back out at the last minute, Turkey must have a Plan B ready. The mechanism could be structured in bilateral or trilateral formats rather than a four-party one; intermediate formats such as Turkey–Bulgaria maritime cooperation, a Turkey–Romania maritime security dialogue, or a Turkey–Russia coastal navigation safety dialogue could be sustained as smaller modules to replace the coastal state mechanism. In other words, even if three or four neighbouring states are not all involved, bilateral neighbourly relations can be established, and the neighbouring states’ framework will function as a whole.

Avoiding Russia’s ‘We Were Not Consulted’ Stance

The third scenario involves Russia demonstrating clear reluctance to participate in the mechanism. In this case, Turkey must clearly state that the mechanism is not a tool directed against Russia. The functioning of the coastal state format should focus on joint search-and-rescue exercises, environmental pollution monitoring, the sharing of information on navigational safety, and fisheries control. Implementing the Montreux Convention is also in Russia’s interest; opposing the Black Sea’s transformation into a ‘NATO lake’ is also in Russia’s interest. These two parallel realities place Russia, to a certain extent, on the same side as Turkey. Rather than tying Russia’s participation to a written agreement, it should be drawn into the ‘practice of coastal statehood’ through practical steps of cooperation, such as participation in joint exercises, joint environmental monitoring operations and joint discussions on navigational safety. Even if Russia does not sit at the negotiating table, its participation in joint operations will effectively bind it to the mechanism.

The EU’s Efforts to Isolate Turkey in the Black Sea

The fourth scenario originates from the European Union; the EU will seek to view the Black Sea as a natural extension of its own South-East European policy, and member states, via Romania and Bulgaria, will attempt to keep Turkey outside the framework. In this scenario, Turkey’s stance will be to provide an answer to the question: “Does the EU have a security architecture in the Black Sea?” The EU’s Black Sea strategy consists solely of energy corridors and environmental issues; military and maritime security remain the national responsibility of member states. Turkey will encourage Romania and Bulgaria to sit down at the negotiating table with Turkey based on their direct national preferences, by ensuring that the EU member states’ national interests are separated from the EU’s strategic documents.

There is a single overarching principle to be applied against all four of these fronts. The mechanism is not a decision, but a process. Turkey must take concrete steps from day one: it should launch the initiative with a joint declaration, expand it through bilateral memoranda of understanding, and consolidate it with the first joint exercise. In other words, the political announcement of the mechanism must not lag behind the operational reality. A joint environmental monitoring operation, a joint search-and-rescue exercise or a coastal states maritime council must have been carried out prior to the political announcement. If this sequence is reversed, the mechanism will once again remain an abstract proposal, leaving it vulnerable to pressure from rivals. This decision undermines not only the legal and political foundations of the current NATO initiative but also those of all future similar initiatives serving the same strategic objective. Any new security structure established in the Black Sea will inevitably become dependent on Turkey’s approval. Turkey maintains its position not merely as a state safeguarding the Montreux Convention, but as the country that determines which military structures may or may not be established.

NATO’s Initiative to Establish a Permanent Command Structure in Turkey

Proposals to establish multinational command centres or joint operational structures in Turkey may initially be presented to us using extremely vague phrases such as ‘the need for operational coordination’ or ‘accelerating information sharing’. The real risk hidden beneath these phrases is not a single headquarters or a single centre. The real risk lies in the foreign military presence on Turkish soil becoming permanent and “indispensable” not through a single decision, but by gradually becoming institutionalised over time. For once established, whatever its name, such a structure generates its own justification for existence; personnel numbers increase, its remit expands, budget items multiply, and its dismantling is increasingly deemed “risky”. The institutional influence of foreign actors thus seeps into Turkey’s military decision-making processes without any overt intrusion or the opening of a back door; the integrity of our national command structure erodes without us even realising it. This is not a threat that will materialise overnight; the true power of the threat lies in its ability to advance unnoticed.

No new structures that would grant foreign states or multinational military organisations permanent authority over command, planning or operational coordination within the borders of the Republic of Turkey should under any circumstances be permitted. Existing military cooperation mechanisms must also be reassessed from the outset, based on the principles of national sovereignty and full command authority; a comprehensive restructuring process to eliminate practices incompatible with these principles must be initiated without delay. Every day that a decision is delayed is a day on which the risk of institutionalisation grows slightly further. When Turkey’s full sovereignty over military decision-making processes is strengthened, the door to potential areas of institutional dependency that may arise in the coming years will be shut from the outset; once dependency on such structures has been established, reversing it will be far more costly than preventing it in the first place.

The Transformation of Turkey’s Areas of Internal Sovereignty into a Subject of International Bargaining

In the coming period, the possibility that certain issues concerning Turkey’s domestic law may be presented to us as a precondition for military and political negotiations or as a clause in a ‘confidence-building measure’ package must also be taken seriously. The aim here is not merely to reach a conclusion on a single issue; the real objective is far more insidious and far more enduring: to present matters falling within Turkey’s sphere of sovereignty as a natural part of international negotiations and to gradually erode its freedom of decision-making. Once this threshold is accepted, similar demands will be constantly reproduced under different headings; moreover, each time they will appear slightly more ‘reasonable’ than the last. Over time, domestic policy issues are transferred to the agenda of international negotiations; Turkey ceases to be an actor making decisions within its own constitutional sphere and instead becomes an actor whose sphere is “shaped by negotiation”. This drift does not occur through a single demand, but through the accumulation of demands one upon another; and the later it is recognised, the more difficult it becomes to reverse.

The Republic of Turkey must clearly declare that no matter concerning its constitutional order, sovereign powers or domestic law shall be made a bargaining chip within the framework of military alliances or international political negotiations. Negotiations with states that undertake initiatives contrary to this principle must be suspended until the relevant agenda item is withdrawn. This is not merely a diplomatic gesture; it is a line drawn to safeguard sovereignty against all future similar initiatives.

Attempts to Transform the Turkish Armed Forces into a Proxy Force in Regional Power Rivalry

The high level of Turkey’s military capability may be highlighted as a new agenda item in the coming period by allied countries under the pretext that ‘Turkey should assume greater regional responsibility’. Let us not be misled: this approach is not intended to strengthen Turkey, but to shift the security costs of other countries (e.g. the US) onto us. There is one fact we all know: it is becoming increasingly difficult for any NATO member to answer the question posed by its own public: ‘Why are we sending our troops to another continent?’ The most practical way to overcome this difficulty is to expect a regional power such as Turkey to shoulder that military cost. Such a development would erode the Turkish Armed Forces’ core mission priorities from within, divert their scarce resources towards long-term external crises, and, when the time comes, weaken the preparedness that Turkey must maintain for its own security. It is one thing to be a great army; it is quite another to be a great army serving someone else’s agenda. Unless this distinction is clarified, Turkey may find itself, within a decade, with an army that has squandered the resources necessary for its own security in other parts of the world.

Turkey must state that the Turkish Armed Forces will be deployed solely for missions directly linked to Turkey’s national security and national interests. Turkey must not enter into any security arrangements that are incompatible with this principle and that would turn it into a permanent military contractor for third-party crises; existing commitments must also be reassessed in line with this principle. This principle does not diminish Turkey’s effectiveness within the alliance; on the contrary, it makes Turkey a respected partner that acts only on terms it itself determines and in accordance with its own interests.

References

https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/9a7a1f4c4cf7451c9a4e7759bfa1ee13