What are the Contributions of Potential Members Sweden and Finland to NATO Air Power?

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the intentions and aspirations of Finland and Sweden, two countries with no real interest in NATO, to abandon their historical stance of neutrality and join NATO. Perhaps they were forced to do so. But let's say they join, what combat power will the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces bring to the NATO table? We will only examine air power, not land or naval power.

It is worth noting that both the Swedish and Finnish armed forces have developed a significant level of interoperability over the years through numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises with neighboring NATO countries. This means that the integration of both countries' armed forces, and especially their air forces, into NATO should not be a problem. They are not unfamiliar with NATO procedures and literature.

Also, a key issue that will help integration is the fact that both Sweden and Finland have gradually adopted NATO standards for their weapon systems, i.e. they have armed forces that comply with NATO standards, even though they are not part of NATO.

Another important aspect or achievement is that these Nordic countries and their NATO allies have a common geopolitical vision when it comes to key European security issues, which allows for fluid channels of communication and to some extent good relations between their intelligence agencies and armed forces.

These characteristics could also mean that both Sweden and Finland are "NATO-friendly" countries, with structures that, while clearly independent and neutral, do not always complicate or complicate their integration into NATO's unified command and operational structure.

Today, there seems to be no doubt in the minds of both the US and European NATO members that Sweden and Finland will eventually join NATO, despite the fact that their membership is conditioned by Turkey, NATO's second largest power, and that their membership will not be approved unless these conditions are met. However, the perception and acceptance that the membership of these two countries is "in the bag" is very wrong. 

So, how are Turkey's veto-based conditions perceived by Sweden and Finland, as well as by the countries that wish to see them join NATO, despite Turkey's clear statement and conditions at the NATO Madrid Summit? These countries are of the view that Turkey has invoked the veto card because it allows it to put pressure on the United States to ease economic sanctions on Turkey and regain its participation in the F-35 program. They fail to realize that this view is too shallow and cannot be compared to Turkey's conditions in Finland and especially in Sweden, which demand that Turkey eliminate its support for terrorism, hand over terrorists in their countries, and add clauses to their laws to eliminate their support for terrorism. In any case, they are comfortable that Turkey will not be able to withstand US pressure and will not dare to use its veto. We shall see!

Let's put international relations aside and evaluate what the air power of these two prospective members of NATO, who are trying to present themselves to NATO with a golden saddle, is and what they can really contribute to NATO. 

Swedish Air Force 

The Swedish Air Force deploys around 70 JAS-39 Gripen light fighters as its main defense/attack asset. In other words, the offensive and defensive jet fighter force of the entire Swedish Air Force is equivalent to the air defense and air attack force of a 2.5 squadron main jet base of the Turkish Air Force.

We accept that the main fighter of this air force is a small but competent, easy to operate and inexpensive machine, with the minimum possible logistical footprint, and that it can be deployed on combat missions from internal routes within the country, which gives it considerable flexibility, but we also know that it is nowhere near capable of dealing with a powerful Russian air force that would attack it with all its might. So if Sweden is attacked, the Turkish Air Force will also have to be deployed there to protect it. So these blonde friends need us. 

Despite their advancing airframe life, Gripen aircraft have undergone several model upgrades. This aircraft can use the MBDA Meteor long-range air-to-air missile. It is therefore a good fighter aircraft, but not good enough. At the very least, it is very outnumbered.

The Gripens will undergo further modernization to remain in service until 2035, at which time they will potentially be replaced by the BAE-TEMPEST.

Finnish Air Force

Smaller than Sweden's, but certainly more powerful, the Finnish Air Force's main combat capability is centered around more than 50 F/A-18C Hornets. The Finnish F-18s have undergone several model upgrades over the years to keep them at a level of weapon system effectiveness commensurate with contemporary threats, and are now a very powerful air weapon platform that can be armed with AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM medium-range air-to-air missiles. The AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles in its inventory are also effective. The powerful AGM-158 air-to-ground stand-off missiles it can carry can hit sea and land surfaces up to almost 400 km away. 

However, Finland will have a more powerful air force in the near future, as it has decided to replace its Hornet with +60 F-35A Block 4s, which should start to be delivered from 2025. 

Qualitative Aspects of NATO's Northward Expansion

The qualitative variables are probably the most difficult to assess, but it is worth making an intellectual and educated guess. Strategically, what does Sweden and Finland's inclusion in the Atlantic defense pact represent for NATO and Russia?

Will the Baltic Sea become an Inland Sea?

In principle, the Baltic Sea will become a kind of private NATO inland sea or lake, which the Russian Navy will find very difficult to navigate. 

Vulnerable border?

The inclusion of Finland would mean a major threat to Russia as it would share a border of more than 1300 km with a NATO partner on the Kola peninsula, where Moscow deploys a large part of its strategic nuclear deterrent.

A NATO attack on the Murmansk Corridor (700 km of rail and road) from Finland could cut off communications and logistics between St. Petersburg and Moscow and the important port of Murmansk, as well as communications with all its military bases on the peninsula, including the base of the Northern Fleet and the port of Severomorsk, home to a large part of Russia's ballistic missile submarine force. The rugged, forested terrain characteristic of this region would also be an effective obstacle to the deployment of Russia's helicopter-borne special operations forces. 

In particular, Finland's membership of NATO would have a significant threat impact on Russia.

Reducing the threat?

For the time being, Turkey and Hungary will make it difficult for Greece, Sweden and Finland to join the Atlantic alliance, but it will only be a matter of time, as almost all its members are in favor of membership. Hungary is not in favor of membership of these two countries because of its energy dependence on Russia and its desire to gain some advantages from NATO and especially from the EU, but it is unlikely to veto their membership. Strategists believe that Greece, in order not to lose its "spoiled child" privilege in the eyes of the US, does not favor the membership of these two countries with small populations, but will not dare to veto their membership.

So what will be Turkey's final decision?

Turkey would not have a negative attitude towards the membership of these countries if it were not for their intense support for terrorism and terrorists that affect us. However, it is obvious that Finland and especially Sweden will be subjected to Turkey's veto if they do not stop their support for terrorist organizations that have taken the lives of thousands of our citizens for nearly half a century and worn out our economy and armed forces, and if they do not secure this situation through legislative amendments. The issue has nothing to do with the F-35 and/or F-16 foot-dragging. Will the US (NATO is the US), which imagines that NATO can strike Russia from the Nordic airspace by selling 64 F-35s to Finland, ignore Turkey, which has an F-35 air strike force of +100 aircraft in our region? The US will give us free F-35s, let alone re-include us in the F-35 program, and this will happen in the near future.

As an aviator, I accept the fact that our main deterrent force is our land force. Our naval and air forces are also very strong, but their deterrence against countries hostile to us cannot be compared to the deterrence of our land power. NATO (the US) is obliged to Turkey. Sooner or later it will give us what we deserve.

Conclusion:

For the two small countries Sweden and Finland, the addition of their air forces to NATO is not much of a force multiplier. The NATO air force deployed in their countries to protect them would be stronger than their own forces. Of course, their participation would reduce the Russian threat to NATO from the Nordic region. However, they cannot join NATO unless they fulfill Turkey's conditions.

The question is, are these two countries capable of removing the terrorists they have deployed in their countries even if they wanted to? This is very debatable and I think they do not have the law enforcement and intelligence to clear their homelands of terrorists. Sweden in particular is under the hegemony of the terrorists and I wonder if in a few generations Sweden will still be their homeland. They should sit down and seriously think about that.

Finland maybe, but Sweden will not get into NATO, or will hardly get in.