Why can't Putin convince NATO and the USA?
Moscow, which still keeps the Russian soldiers above the Donbas region of Ukraine like the sword of Damocles, continues to keep the Russian military presence of around 100,000, which it has piled up on the Ukrainian border, in order to get the results of its diplomatic efforts.
After the fears that tens of thousands of Russian soldiers will invade Ukraine with the sign of President Vladimir Putin, a serious diplomatic traffic started between the Western world and Russia as of January 10. Moscow, which still keeps the Russian soldiers above the Donbas region of Ukraine like the sword of Damocles, continues to keep the Russian military presence of around 100,000, which it has piled up on the Ukrainian border, in order to get the results of its diplomatic efforts.
On Monday, January 10, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman held an eight-hour meeting with her Kremlin counterpart, Deputy Secretary of State Sergei Ryabkov, in Geneva. Sherman underlined that Russia's demands from the West are not the right starting point for negotiations, and that progress should be made in line with the interests of both sides by talking together on more general issues. Meanwhile, Ryabkov contented himself with keeping the door open for the next negotiations and stated that progress could be made in the negotiations according to the course of action determined by Putin in the coming days. Subsequently, the NATO-Russia Council met in Brussels on Wednesday, January 12th. Similar to the Geneva meeting, no significant progress was achieved in this meeting either. However, the fact that a will has been put forward for the continuation of the negotiation traffic between the parties means that a positive atmosphere is blowing on the way to a solution.
The NATO-Russia Council, which brought together 30 allied countries and Russia on Wednesday, held its meeting to discuss the tension on the Ukraine-Russia border and Russian demands. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg chairing the meeting, in his first statement after the meeting; "This was not an easy discussion, but that's exactly why it was so important," he said. Meanwhile, Stoltenberg noted that NATO Allies are ready to meet again with Russia to discuss a number of issues in more detail and bring concrete proposals to the table, and that there are constructive engagement opportunities that should not be missed for Europe's security, it is clear that the traffic of talks between the parties will continue in the coming days. read as signals.
By December 2021, it should be seen as an achievement of Kremlin diplomacy that Russia made NATO enlargement a central issue for itself, rather than its continued invasion of Crimea and threats to expand the war in Ukraine. Russian diplomatic missions under Foreign Minister Lavrov are struggling to make a profit from their military presence on the ground. A method familiar to traditional Russian diplomacy has been reintroduced. Putin has mobilized Russian diplomacy to achieve a victory against the Western world and is waiting for the results.
The Kremlin has brought to the surface again the disagreements within NATO regarding the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance, which had been on the agenda at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit and had only been dormant since then. The issue of the division of the West; At the end of this crisis, it increases the probability of a positive response to Russian demands (the guarantee of no NATO enlargement and the absence of NATO weapons on the territory of NATO members who joined the Alliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union) and serves a function that strengthens Putin's hand against Biden.
However, the Biden administration, which followed in the footsteps of previous American administrations; It is in favor of preserving the American line on the enlargement of NATO, which has become traditional, that countries wishing to become members have the right to make their own decisions. Considering the Kremlin's complaints about NATO's enlargement from the perspective of international law and sovereign states, it is certainly not possible to accept them as a meaningful argument. However, from a power politics perspective, how accurate is it for NATO and the United States to ignore Russian concerns?
NATO military presence stationed in countries close to the Russian border varies between 5-10 thousand in total. Moscow probably does not expect that these will be used for any offensive purpose or that NATO will get results against the huge Russian army with such a small force! The limited missile defense system that NATO has deployed in this region cannot compete with Russia's arsenal. The reality pales in comparison to the size and scope of NATO's exercises in Eastern Europe, Russia's Zapad-like exercises.
Moreover, Russia does not hesitate to violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. It deployed SSC-8 missiles to its military facilities in Kaliningrad. The presence of these missiles remains a threat in itself, especially for Western Europe, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. While Moscow wants to limit NATO's military exercises, it continues to conduct large-scale exercises.
Putin threatened a massive, conventional military strike in Ukraine. The US is trying to scare NATO, the EU and Ukraine into making concessions. However, everyone knows that if what he wants is accepted, it will result in the surrender of Eastern European countries to Russian influence. Such a thing is considered unacceptable for both the USA and NATO. Finding a middle ground, rather than giving guarantees, may be necessary to reduce the rising tension, but the solution to be found should not start a new discussion that will question NATO's raison d'etre and disrupt its integrity. If this happens, the result that Moscow wants will come true automatically.
Still waiting for Putin's "unacceptable terms" to be accepted! Under the current circumstances, it continues to keep the option of military action on the table and threatens the West with it, but prefers to keep it at a controlled point of tension. In short, Putin controls and directs the crisis. Putin carried out his interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea with good timing and without encountering great resistance. He always looked for the opportunity to do this in Donbas, but the time he expected never came. Moreover, since 2016, NATO has responded to Russian power policy by positioning forces against it. Putin is a leader who is aware that, unlike South Ossetia and Crimea, he cannot take Donbas without incurring a great cost. For this reason, it aimed to get results with diplomacy rather than fighting.
In the final analysis, Putin's outward rhetoric and actions that try to squeeze NATO and cause international tension; Rather than posing a threat to Russia, NATO seems to have no meaning beyond its aim to strengthen its political leadership in its country and ultimately to bring its country to Soviet-era 'greatness'.
In this context, Putin's characterization of NATO forces as a potential threat to Russia's security is not "sincere". It is clear that as NATO accepts new members, the Alliance will grow closer to the Russians. Russia, which suddenly filled the vacuum left by the Germans after the Second World War in Eastern Europe in favor of itself; In December 1991, it was forcibly withdrawn from the European territory it had occupied for 45 years. The vacuum emptied by the Russians, on the other hand, was "filled" by the former Warsaw Pact countries in that geography by moving to the Western camp. In other words, these countries have turned their face to the West. Integrating into the European Union system and becoming a member of NATO has become the common goal of the former Eastern European countries. There is no adverse situation for the Russians in terms of the flow of history here, but these developments in the last thirty years are undoubtedly against the interests of Moscow.
The problem today stems from the desire of the Russians to return to their 'great power' policies. Russia; To protect his own influence in the lands he left in 1991, which are of vital importance for him (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, etc.) and, if possible, to a part of the lands of these countries (Crimea, Donbas, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the north of Kazakhstan, etc.). .) acts with an understanding that aims to seize.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov naturally thinks like Putin. Lavrov stated that he did not see the liberated nations as free and sovereign states with the collapse of communism in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Describing these countries as "territory", Lavrov openly revealed that the Kremlin still characterizes the Eastern European countries with an understanding unique to the Soviet Union era. Today's Russian politicians, especially Putin, are driven by the longing to rebuild the former Soviet Union. Moscow wants its "Europe" back.
Heaping the Russian soldiers on the Ukrainian border, Putin acts or paints a portrait as if he believed that Yeltsin should fight the West in the early 1990s, that he should fight it today. It wants to renegotiate the end of the Cold War and subordinate all Eastern European countries to Moscow's control. This is the meaning of the "US-Russia and NATO-Russia agreement draft" published by Moscow for use in negotiations between the parties.
References:
Jafarov S. (2007). Dünden Bugüne Rusya-NATO İlişkileri, Ezgi Kitabevi, Bursa.
NATO. (2022). NATO-Russia Council meets in Brussels, 12 Ocak, Erişim Adresi: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_190643.htm
New Atlanticist. (2022). “What will Putin do? An expert guide to this week’s high-wire diplomacy with Russia”, Atlantic Council, 11 Ocak, Erişim Adresi: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/what-will-putin-do-a-guide-to-this-weeks-high-wire-diplomacy-with-russia/
Sjursen H. (2004). “On the Identity of NATO”, International Affairs, 80, 4, July.
