Afghanistan's New Visitor to the Cemetery of Empires : China

Whenever the security environment in Afghanistan improves, China has taken steps to develop and consolidate its economic presence in this country. However, after the US and its allies' decision to withdraw, which is, in a way, the guarantor of security and stability in Afghanistan, China sought to put its relationship with Afghanistan on a new ground. In this context, China; He has linked the future of the investments and commercial activities he plans to make in Afghanistan to the course of the relations he intends to develop with the Taliban.

Considering Beijing's contacts with the Taliban since 2015, we can say that two expectations of this country from a security perspective will come to the fore in Afghanistan:

The first is the establishment of a safe and stable investment environment in Afghanistan.

The second is to prevent the activities of "jihadi groups", which are likely to benefit from the possible power vacuum that may arise in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the USA and its allies, from spreading to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In this sense, China's expectation from the Taliban is that Afghanistan is not allowed to be a safe haven for the East Turkestan Independence Movement.

The last meeting between the parties was held face to face on 28 July 2021. In the meeting between the second man of the Taliban, Brother Brother and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, which provided "legitimacy and recognition" to the Taliban, the issue of "not supporting the East Turkestan Independence Movement (Taliban and jihadi organizations based in Afghanistan)" was discussed by China. especially emphasized.

Expected Reflections of China's Traditional Policies on Afghanistan

We know that in China's traditional foreign policy, the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of any country it is in contact with" is valid. According to Beijing, “Afghanistan should be ruled by the Afghans.” The administration of Afghanistan by the Taliban or any other entity does not pose a problem for China-Afghanistan relations. Rather than who governs Afghanistan, it is sufficient for the ruling party to support the creation of an environment suitable for China's interests.

Although the British, who tried to settle in Afghanistan in the middle of the 19th century, had implemented policies that shaped the future of Afghanistan until the end of the Second World War, their attempts to invade this country were always doomed to failure. He had to accept that the Afghan lands, which he could not put his troops in, remained as a buffer zone against the Russians.

During the Brezhnev era, the Russians, who entered Afghanistan in 1979 to "open a living space for communism", occupied most of this country's lands for 10 years. The Russians, who had to leave Afghanistan in 1989, left behind a country that was destroyed and dragged into civil war.

The Americans, who entered this country to punish the al-Qaeda organization after September 11 and to bring freedom and democracy to the Afghans, fought with the Taliban for 20 years on the territory of Afghanistan, together with their allies. In the end, he left the country in a ruined state without any solution other than entrusting it to the Taliban.

As a country that used to be a "grave" for three empires in the past, Afghanistan is reluctantly opening its doors to a new empire today. The course of history offers the Chinese an opportunity to settle in Afghanistan and have a say in its future. It seems that in the near future of Afghanistan, military boots will be 'out' and lotus feet will be 'in'. After the Soviets and the Americans, who brought nothing but destruction to Afghans, not only Afghans but also the rest of the world have high expectations from China.

Chinese international relations theorists argue that if China adheres to its social constructivist and structural interventionist identity, China's peaceful rise will eventually be accepted by the international community. We are witnessing that China's foreign policy, to a large extent, follows this direction. the Chinese; has a respectful approach to national identities and differences in relations with other countries. Beijing, while acting in accordance with international norms, continues to give positive messages to the outside world at this point. The foreign policy stalemate that puts China's hand in trouble is that the domestic policy it pursues in East Turkestan gives the opposite image of its foreign policy.

As a matter of fact, Beijing has developed a different global identity from the Russian Federation and the USA, with its recent international political economy practices. China, which enters the target countries with foreign trade and infrastructure investments, prioritizes the continuation of its existence without posing a threat to the rulers of that country, with its policy of not interfering in its internal affairs. Therefore, we can say that Afghanistan will not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, as it does in other countries, but only in the context of economic relations. In this case, it would be possible for Afghans to accept China easily.

Chinese, international We expect them to make room for themselves in Afghanistan with the philosophy of "constructive intervention" or "soft power" practices in the literature. The dynamics that stand out in the future of the Afghanistan-China relationship are the development of Afghanistan's infrastructure and economic life. Indeed, in the field of economy, we understand that China is interested in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It is known that China has the necessary capacity and experience in this regard.

The Belt-Road initiative, which encompasses Eurasia from east to west, continues. In fact, Afghanistan's neighboring door, Pakistan, is one of the countries to which China allocates resources within the scope of this initiative. More than 60 billion dollars have been spent on belt-road infrastructure investments in Pakistani territory. China, which did not put its belt-road infrastructure investments into action in Afghanistan because of the lack of a suitable investment environment before, may consider changes in the project and alternative routes that add Afghanistan to the game, thus shortening the roads, in the newly developing conditions. In proportion to the success of his investments in Afghanistan, it may be possible for him to gain a permanent place in these lands, which he could not enter after the defeat of the Talas War in AD 751. Such investments can play a supporting role in China's geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic interests and goals for countries in this region.

In addition to Belt-Road infrastructure investments, Afghanistan has rich natural resources that attract China. In the 2000s, Chinese companies were involved in copper mining in Logar Province, road construction and oil exploration in the north, and invested a certain amount. During times of security weakness, projects such as oil exploration and copper mining in the north were slowed down by Beijing. We know that Chinese companies are willing to invest in the energy sector on a global scale. In this context, the thermal power plants proposed to be built by China can save Afghanistan from its dependence on electricity imports.

The construction of the 50-kilometer section in the Pamir region of the highway project that will connect Afghanistan and China through the Vahan (Wakhan) Corridor, which is of great geostrategic importance, has not been completed yet. In today's conditions, it may be possible to accelerate this highway project.

China-Afghanistan New Transport Line: Vahan Corridor

Vahan stretching from Afghanistan to China in a narrow strip in the northeast; It is a narrow corridor between the Pamir Mountains and the Hindu Kush Mountains that separates the Kashmir region administration of Pakistan from Tajikistan. This corridor region covered with high mountains; The Panj gives passage to the waters of the Pamir Rivers and the Amu Darya. Its length is about 350 kilometers. The widest part of the corridor is 65 kilometers and the narrowest is 13 kilometers. Vahan valley is known for being a place that passes through the historical silk road consisting of camel and horse caravans since ancient times.

Today, this corridor, which remains within the borders of Afghanistan; As a result of the negotiations under the Great Game, with the 1893 Durand arrangement, the positioning of a buffer zone between the British and the Russians in the form of a narrow strip of land was left to the Afghans. The struggle for division of empires led to the division of the inhabitants of Vahan into three (Kyrgyz, Tajik and Afghan). On the Afghan side of the Vahan Corridor, which has difficult terrain and climatic conditions, around 15 000 Afghans live today, most of whom live on livestock.

Although China considers this corridor important in terms of the foreign trade connection it wants to develop with Afghanistan and other countries in the West, it has preferred to follow a policy in the past to keep this corridor 'inactive' and not to be used as a gateway to China. In the 2000s, Afghanistan repeatedly requested the Chinese government to open the border crossing on the Chinese side of the Vahan Corridor for commercial reasons, but did not receive a positive response. Since the corridor is a direct gateway to East Turkestan, China did not take kindly to these demands. Beijing; It acted with the desire to prevent the possibility of Taliban and al-Qaeda-supported jihadi groups using this corridor to support 'separatist' groups in Uyghur.

This corridor, which is approximately 350 kilometers long and extended from Afghanistan to China like a wedge as a buffer zone between the Russians and British India in the past, has become famous as a basin closed to civilization with its harsh geographical conditions and impassable mountainous places. Now, for the first time in history, Chinese technology has attempted to construct a transportation network stretching from Kabul to Beijing in this geography. When it is finished, it will enable China to easily access the Afghanistan mines, and it will play a role in increasing its export capacity. As a result, land transportation in Central Asia will be facilitated, the interaction between the peoples living in the countries of the region will increase, and it will allow Afghans, who are predominantly dependent on airlines, to expand to Far East countries, including China.

On the one hand, the Vahan Corridor is vertical as the most suitable place to open a strategic route between China and Afghanistan.

On the other hand, it can solve the transportation problem between Pakistan and Tajikistan. Today, the trade and transportation needs of both Pakistan and Tajikistan towards this region have increased. With the viaducts and bridges integrated into the Vahan highway, it can enable the transitions between Pakistan and Tajikistan in the north-south direction.

China-Iran Strategic Cooperation in the Context of Afghanistan

Expansions towards transportation in the context of Afghanistan, such as China's Vahan corridor, can fulfill a supporting function for China-Iran strategic cooperation. The size of the strategic and economic partnership agreement signed between the two countries for 25 years on May 7, 2021 was announced as $400 billion. This agreement, which China signed with Iran, is expected to play a supporting role in the long-term energy security policies that Beijing wants to establish. China, which guaranteed to buy natural gas and oil from Iran, may have guaranteed to support Iran, which, as a result of the sanctions imposed by the West under the leadership of the USA, fell into a bottleneck especially in the field of nuclear weapons development and defense industry. Iranian; In order to overcome the sanctions imposed by the USA against him, he always follows a policy that keeps his contacts with the Russian Federation and China strong. In this sense, China's global policies relieve Iran's hand. As it is known, China follows a policy that does not recognize the "Western sanctions" applied to countries like Iran as a requirement of American interests. China aims to contact the country it wants in line with its own interests and to implement its own policies. In this framework, Beijing's opening to Afghanistan may also serve as an accelerant to the China-Iran relations.

In the past, due to the unstable and insecure environment in Afghanistan, China has prioritized its connection with the Middle East through Pakistan. In this context, the highway, which is planned to reach the south from Pakistan, will be connected to the Gwadar (Guvader) port at the extreme point. Reconstruction of this port on the territory of Pakistan according to the needs of China, 80% of it has been completed. Connecting the Pakistani highway to Kabul and opening the Kashgar-Gilgit-Peshevar-Jalalabad-Kabil line can be considered from now on. Afterwards, the highway to be built in the Vahan Corridor can be used for a variety of routes. In addition, Chabahar Port, located off the Gulf of Oman in Iran's southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan, to provide Afghanistan's access to the sea, can play a role in reinforcing China's energy security as an alternative to Gwadar. Subsequently, it may be considered to include Pakistan and Afghanistan in the Iran-China strategic partnership in the future. Such an approach could activate a restraining mechanism for India, which is likely to covet the US ranks.

Chinese; It wants to take advantage of the new situation in Afghanistan in the last months of 2021 in line with its commercial interests and regional policies. Since this potential was foreseen, bilateral talks between the Chinese Government and the Taliban have continued uninterrupted since 2015. The most recent meeting was held on July 28, 2021 between the Taliban's second man, Brother, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

The Temporary Taliban Government, which was established at the beginning of September, declared that it wanted to establish contact with three countries as a priority, and in this context, it put China (the other two are Turkey and Qatar). China is not in a position to seize this opportunity. In order to settle in the heart of Eurasia, 1270 years after Talas, a historical opportunity came to him again. In the face of the USA, which has squeezed China together with its allies in the Pacific with the containment policy it has followed recently, the geography of Afghanistan; If the territory of this country can be rapidly integrated into the belt-road project, it will have undertaken a mission that will relieve China's hand. In this respect, the Vahan Corridor, which is at the shortest connection point between the two countries; It has the potential to be an important exit door to the west for China.

Conclusion

China's policy of influence in Afghanistan, in addition to its gains in the belt-road project, will also enable Chinese companies to access the underground riches of this country (especially in terms of rare metals). It is expected that China will make progress in three areas, act in cooperation and support the Taliban in this sense, in order for this approach, which will give Afghanistan the opportunity to benefit from and export its rich natural resource potential, which it also has but is largely idle, to be successful.

Developing the transportation infrastructure in Afghanistan,

Transforming Afghanistan into a plateau of stability and trust,

Establishing a favorable environment for the development of trade and industry in Afghanistan.

In return, the fact that the Taliban prevented the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and al-Qaeda from contacting the Turkestan-based jihadi groups seems to be sufficient for China for now. Amnesty for Uyghur separatists and elements of the East Turkestan Movement (ETM) during the times when the Taliban clashed with the United States and its allies. the mountains of ganistan have functioned as a safe haven. China's expectation is that the new Afghanistan under the Taliban will guarantee that it will no longer welcome the Uighurs.

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