Can Beijing Bring Peace and Stability to the Middle East?

China-Arab States and China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summits held in Riyadh last December suddenly drew the world's attention back to the Middle East as proof that China was maximizing its relations with the Arab and Gulf countries. Undoubtedly, these summits were not meetings that were suddenly decided upon. They were the result of long-term, patient Chinese diplomatic efforts. 

In fact, China summarized its policy towards the Arab world some 6-7 years ago, in a policy document published in 2016, and stated that it planned to develop relations at a strategic level with countries it considered key in the Middle East. Beijing probably considers that the international conjuncture is favorable, and now the current regional conditions are also favorable, to improve its relations with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. China is aware that the leading powers of the Western world, which continue to seek influence over regional governments, are currently dealing with the fallout of the Russia-Ukraine war and the economic crisis. Moscow, on the other hand, is too busy with a war of its own making in Europe. According to Chinese experts, the United States has entered a period of decline. It does not have the capacity to assert its hegemony in many regions at the same time. In a sense, it is experiencing a capacity decline. Even think tanks in Washington are discussing a scenario that would create a real opportunity for China: The US will eventually withdraw from the region and China will fill the vacuum.

And this is exactly what happened last December. China's approach to Saudi Arabia and its neighboring countries is based on a very different roadmap from that of African countries. Unlike the financially bankrupt African states, where it has practiced money printing diplomacy, Beijing's approach to the Arab world is more nuanced. China is a great power that has learned by experience that money cannot buy everything. The policy conducted by its diplomatic missions in the Middle East is more important to Beijing than anything else. To this end, Beijing has offered to contribute to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, aiming to build common ground to get on the same wavelength with the Arabs. 

The choice of Riyadh for last year's summit was a decision of symbolic importance. Beijing appreciates the special role of Saudi Arabia as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam, showing that it understands the special role of this country. That is why it puts Riyadh at the center of its regional policies. China strives to define itself as a world power that practices "pragmatic cooperation" and has no enemies. It seeks to establish trust-based relations, or at least gives the appearance of doing so. The primary objective for any great power approaching the Middle East is to guarantee secure access to fossil fuels. Beijing has the same idea, putting hydrocarbons at the center, but this factor does not explain everything. 

Beijing also knows that the Arab market is dynamic and hungry for consumption. It wants to broaden the ground for further integration of its foreign trade with Arab and Gulf capital. Some 300,000 Chinese citizens currently live in the United Arab Emirates. Some 4,000 Chinese businesses are based in the country. There is already a Chinese diaspora in the UAE. In 2022, the Gulf stood out as one of the few regions in the world where growth accelerated. This trend continued in the first quarter of 2023.

This economic dynamism in the region demonstrates the correctness of Beijing's long-term Middle East strategy. To further improve economic performance, China believes it is necessary to build modern port infrastructure along the sea routes between Asia and the West. Beijing sees it as imperative to develop special relations with the Gulf states to avoid red tape and fragmented supply chains. Currently the largest user of the Suez Canal in the world, Beijing has signed a number of contracts with the Suez Canal Authority, which manages all navigation activities, and China does not hesitate to make local investments, for example in the construction of tugboats to meet regional needs. China's objective is very clear. It does not just want to be seen as a customer in the geographies where it is present. It is also trying to ensure that it is given importance and recognized as a privileged partner in that geography. It aims to achieve this through regional investments and permanent efforts.

Instead of ensuring the security of its commercial ships at sea on its own, China prefers to move forward by establishing 'security cooperation' with port-owning countries. This is because it sees that security investments that it would undertake on its own, as the US does, would be both expensive and it is afraid of becoming an unwanted 'hegemon' like the US. In light of these considerations, China's 40th and 41st naval patrol forces deployed in the Gulf of Aden to protect its trade routes were not renewed last year. Beijing is emphasizing its policy of cooperating with states with port access in securing the high seas, while providing de facto support to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. 

The Arab world is worried about the specter of a new Cold War triggered by the Ukraine crisis. The countries of the region cannot forget that the former Soviet Union abandoned its so-called Arab "brothers" when the Berlin Wall fell. The Arab and Gulf states are also very uncomfortable with the destructive effects of American interventions in the region, and they can also adopt a cold attitude towards US administrations that have left unresolved civil wars. Perhaps for this reason, Gulf countries tend to see China as a more 'manageable' power than the US, EU countries and Russia. 

When China's huge GDP is compared to the economic size of the Gulf states, an asymmetrical economic picture emerges. However, the countries of the Middle East have significant fossil wealth and the financial resources to draw on it. Therefore, they do not see themselves in a weak position vis-à-vis China at the negotiating table. Moreover, Riyadh and Beijing have agreed to jointly invest in a $500 billion high-tech urbanization project (Neom) that is planned to be built in the desert by 2030. Chinese companies are already ready to cooperate in this area.

Arab countries have kept their distance from Beijing's maneuvers in Africa and its control of natural resources. They have always found the Chinese model, which combines the two opposing worlds of communism and capitalism, objectionable. Nevertheless, realistically, Arab countries see engagement with China as necessary and imperative. They believe that they are familiar with China, which has become a global economic power. They believe that they can establish a win-win relationship without surrendering to the Asian dragon.

The Gulf monarchies want to pursue a strategy of balance with Beijing. They are closer to defining themselves as a third party bridging Asia and the West. In recent years they have been moving around this idea. To achieve this, Riyadh has made no secret of its readiness to make strong gestures towards China, even if they are not welcomed in Washington. The November 2022 Sino-Saudi oil agreements caused discomfort in the Biden administration, both because they served Russian policies and because they relieved China in the energy field. Moreover, the decision to use the Chinese yuan, not the US dollar, in bilateral trade within the scope of this agreement between the parties had a cold shower effect in Washington. Emboldened by this agreement, Washington's traditional ally Qatar signed a $60 billion liquefied natural gas deal with China, revealing the extent of the erosion of US influence in the region.

In the near term, China is expected to further deepen its diplomatic strategy in the Arab world. Playing on the Arab countries' exasperation with the Russia-US confrontation, Beijing is successfully playing the role of the "third voice" in the world. Beijing is eager to consolidate its credibility on the Arabian peninsula by investing in vital regional issues such as energy transformation, water access and health issues. If Beijing can assert its status as an economic power as a mediator and "neutral" interlocutor, it could be in a position to intervene in the region's major geopolitical issues. If this happens, China could become a transformative force in the Middle East. As with the March 10 Tehran-Riyadh peace deal, I believe that the Chinese Peace Wind could continue to blow on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, the intractable civil war in Yemen and other issues. 

Perhaps Washington will endeavor to pursue a containment strategy to limit Beijing's presence to economic activities in non-strategic sectors such as consumption, manufactured goods and transportation of goods. In this sense, Washington could be supported by Tel Aviv. This is because, with Beijing settling in the region, Israel's cooperation with some Arab countries (UAE, Bahrain, etc.) is no longer needed. This narrows Israel's playing field in the bigger picture. Tel Aviv will not be able to sustain its 'occupationist' policies in the West Bank in the long term in the face of Beijing, which could become the Palestinians' main hope if it can put its ability to resolve conflicts in the Middle East to work. The regional opportunities offered by an Arab world that is ready to embrace a China that can establish a strategic presence in Palestine and stop Israel are as constraining for Washington as they are expanding Beijing's playing field.