Erdogan and Saudi Salman's Dance of Interests Continues

Deterioration of Saudi Arabia-Turkey Relations

The close relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began to deteriorate after the July 15 coup attempt. Ankara's perception that both countries had indirectly supported the coup attempt led to a radical change in relations. In the aftermath, the Gulf countries joined forces against Qatar under Saudi leadership, but at the same time, they found themselves confronted by Turkey, which did not hesitate to ally itself with Qatar. But this was not the real straw that broke the camel's back!

Suudi Arabistanlı gazeteci Cemal Kaşıkçı'nın 2018 yılında İstanbul’da Suudi “yamyamlar” tarafından paramparça edilmesi, Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan ilişkisinin tamamen askıya alınmasına neden oldu. Bu travmatik durum, iki ülke arasında sert bir siyasi rekabeti ve karşılıklı bölgesel düşmanlığı söylem bazında da olsa, gündeme taşıdı.

Meanwhile, President Trump's occasional anti-Turkey rhetoric has encouraged the Saudi leadership to use aggressive political language against Turkey. In Turkey's deteriorating relationship with Israel, the Saudi leadership adopted increasing contacts with the Israeli side and further isolating Turkey in the region as a foreign policy tool. Thus, Saudi Arabia, which normalized its relations with Israel in addition to Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan and Morocco, wanted to serve Turkey as the only "troublemaker" in the region.

On the other hand, over time, the Arab bloc opposing Qatar melted. A decisive Saudi victory in Yemen never came. Saudi Arabia, which indirectly cooperated with Israel against Iran, saw that Turkey's military options in Syria were working and that Turkey's influence in Syria's future was increasing. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, which could not make the opening it expected with Eastmed, also turned to Turkey, and simultaneously Saudi Arabia contacted Turkey for its own regional interests. After Khashoggi's murder, the ongoing mutual salvos between Riyadh and Ankara came to an end. In fact, Turkey wanted to normalize relations without making a big deal out of it, and to use Arab capital, led by Saudi Arabia, as a lifeline for the deteriorating Turkish economy. 

In early 2021, positive signals were about to bring closer contact between Ankara and Riyadh, but the Saudi-Greek military exercises in March of the same year caused Turkey to distance itself from Saudi Arabia again and the reconciliation did not materialize. 

Ankara-Riyadh Contact

President Erdoğan felt the need to overcome Saudi Arabia's unofficial boycott of Turkish products and take steps to normalize relations. Erdogan began to express a desire to repair Turkey's relations with Egypt and the Gulf states. On his return from a 2021 visit to Abu Dhabi, Erdoğan told reporters on the plane, "We continue our positive dialogue with Saudi Arabia. We want to take concrete steps in the coming period. We want to develop the process in a positive direction." 

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia wanted to thaw the ice between them and strengthen the Sunni bloc against Iran in Syria and in other places where the Shiite bloc was active. Turkey and Saudi Arabia needed to return to realist and pragmatic policies. 

What Ankara Expects from Riyadh?

Politically, Ankara believed that normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia could restore Turkey's capacity in the Middle East, which had declined since the Arab Spring. If Saudi-Turkish political harmony is restored, Ankara could increase its potential in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and Egypt. 

Ankara and Riyadh have similar concerns over Syria. Neither side is favorable to the current Assad regime. Joint action on Syria could be in the interests of both sides. 

With regard to the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara believes that by resuming relations with Riyadh, it can deflect the pro-Greek stance of Saudi Arabia and its allies. At the very least, the complexity of the Egyptian-Turkish dispute makes it necessary for the Saudi leadership to mediate between Ankara and Cairo. The Saudi leadership is apparently willing to facilitate this challenging mission.

On the economic front, Turkey waited for Saudi Arabia to relax its informal boycott of Turkish imports. It wants to replicate its recent swap agreements with the central banks of Qatar and the UAE with Saudi Arabia. Such monetary policy flexibilities could help lower inflation in Turkey and prevent the depreciation of the Turkish lira. There could also be an opportunity for Turkish construction companies to invest in Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 development projects. Such possible steps are seen as moves to strengthen the hand of the Ankara government in domestic politics.

What does Saudi Arabia expect?

On the defense front, Riyadh considers the procurement of weapons, especially armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), important and necessary for its seven-year military campaign in Yemen.

In general, improved relations between the Arab Community and Turkey could also encourage the development of a regional stabilization plan to deal with the crises in Yemen, Libya and Syria. Joint steps could be taken across the region to deter Iranian influence. 

The Saudis and the United Arab Emirates believe that improved relations with Turkey could partially distance Saudi Arabia from its unique ties with Qatar.

Politically, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia are trying to mobilize regional countries in favor of their regional goals. Whatever their regional leadership competition, Turkey would give Saudi Arabia some symbolic weight in its never-ending struggle with Iran. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Turkey is ideal for building a regional bloc that will have some influence on the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran. 

Ankara-Riyadh may cooperate in the defense industry

Riyadh had signed a contract with Vestel Defense in 2017. This contract paved the way for the joint production of Karayel-UAVs under license in Saudi Arabia. This was also a good opening for Karayel, which had been blocked due to the prominence of Bayraktar products in Turkey. It is known that Karayel UAVs are deployed by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and that they have eased Riyadh's hand in the fight against the Houthis.

In the long run, cooperation in the defense industry is seen as beneficial for both sides. Turkey participated in the Saudi Armed Forces Exhibition in 2018, even at a time when relations between the two sides were at rock bottom. 

Defense contacts have helped mitigate political disagreements between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey's ability to showcase an emerging defense industry model in its region has also made Turkey a good model for Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian market is important for Turkey, which is rapidly moving towards becoming an arms exporter. Turkey can develop relations with Saudi Arabia not only in the field of UAVs, but also in missile and radar technologies, electronic warfare and air defense systems.

Israel's View on Riyadh-Ankara Rapprochement

Israel finds the political normalization between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE acceptable and believes that it will not harm the famous Ibrahim Accords, which allowed Israel to establish friendly relations with some Arab countries after decades of hostility. For Tel Aviv, the political rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Turkey represents a major step towards a broader anti-Iranian bloc.

Indeed, the Israelis understand Turkey's desire to improve relations with the Arabs and with them simultaneously for two reasons. First, Erdogan has indicated that he will restore relations with Israel as part of a regional reconciliation package. Herzog's visit in March 2022 opened the door. There is now talk of opening mutual embassies. Second, Turkey can no longer afford to ignore Israel, with which some Gulf Arab states and Egypt in particular have established diplomatic relations. Ankara's normalization of its relations with Israel may lead Turkey to shelve its open support for Hamas and end its anti-Israel rhetoric, even if it takes a different stance politically.

Iran's Approach

It should be considered normal for Tehran to perceive the revived Turkish-Arab-Israeli normalization initiative and Israel's Ibrahim Accords with Arab countries as a regional bloc against it. 

Given the recent confrontations between Turkey-Israel, Turkey-Egypt, Turkey-UAE, Turkey-Saudi Arabia, Turkey-Syria, Iran has found itself some space to play from Syria to Yemen. Therefore, the rapprochement of the four major countries in the region (Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) leads to the isolation of Iran, which Israel has repeatedly threatened to attack militarily. In fact, considering that Israel, which believes that Iran is far advanced in building nuclear weapons, is currently trying to get approval from Washington with the visit of Defense Minister Gantz, it can be said that the more isolated Iran becomes in the region, the better it will be for Israel.

Saudi Crown Prince Salman's Visit to Turkey

Erdogan was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz in February 2022, but this visit was subsequently canceled and finally took place in May. 

Then, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Turkey on June 22, 2022, as the last leg of his regional tour to Egypt and Jordan, unveiled a new paradigm for "winning back" Turkey in the Gulf. The visit was of great importance for the Turkish economy, which was struggling with devaluation against the US dollar. One of the expectations from the visit was to support investments, especially in the defense sector, and to re-establish strong ties between the two countries.

In a joint statement issued after the Crown Prince's visit to Turkey, Saudi and Turkish officials underlined their determination to cooperate in the political, economic, military, energy, technology and security fields on the basis of "historical brotherhood" to consolidate regional peace. The bilateral visit was therefore seen to have ended the rupture in the Saudi-Turkish dialogue on the need for compromise on both sides to negotiate the possibility of damage to bilateral relations.

In fact, during his visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, President Erdogan emphasized the opening of a "new era" in bilateral relations and the strengthening of ties in many areas. However, Saudi newspapers ignored Erdoğan's previous visit to Riyadh. They preferred to emphasize the prince's visit to Turkey as the beginning of this "new era". Ankara seemed to accept this opportunist approach.

As an extension of this approach, officials from both sides did not issue a joint statement after Erdoğan's visit to the Saudi Kingdom. However, the closure of the Muslim Brotherhood's Mekameleen TV channel in Turkey signaled at least one of the priorities set by the Saudis.

As the Muslim Brotherhood issue is taken off the table, Saudi policymakers' concerns diminish and diplomatic channels can be reopened. In fact, Turkish foreign policy makers have always tended to avoid irreparably jeopardizing bilateral relations and have always adopted a "close" discourse towards Saudi Arabia's rulers. Shortly after the prince's visit, Erdogan announced the Saudis' intention to purchase from Turkey the combat-proven Bayraktar drones, which have participated in successful wars in Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. 

The Saudis' ambitious rhetoric towards Turkey was essentially based on the discomfort generated by the Khashoggi affair in 2018 and the subsequent campaign targeting Prince Salman's persona both in Turkey and on the international stage. In April 2022, the transfer of the Khashoggi case to the Saudi authorities on Ankara's initiative calmed tensions and mitigated the damage. Turkish policymakers appeared more willing to accelerate rapprochement with the Kingdom.

In this context, hosting the Crown Prince in Turkey means that Turkey recognizes the Prince's authority and the Prince's representation of Saudi Arabia internationally. While Turkey needs Saudi investments for its struggling economy, Saudi Arabia needs Turkey to repair the damaged Saudi image (Khashoggi incident, human rights violations, Yemen, etc.).

The prince has initiated rhetoric of peace and normalization. These days, he is trying to project the image of a young statesman trying to consolidate Saudi Arabia's position as a regional stabilizer and peacemaker in the Arab world. Meanwhile, he is rebuilding his image as the man behind an unprecedented internal reform process that has never happened before in Saudi politics.

Conclusion

Turkey's isolation in the energy competition in the Eastern Mediterranean due to Saudi Arabia's siding with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel showed that Turkey should deal with Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia at the same time. Siding with the Saudis, taking some normalization steps with Egypt and establishing a dialogue with Israel would serve to put Turkey back at the table as an effective power, especially for regional security needs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

While Turkey and Israel restored their relations at a high level after 15 years with the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Turkey in March 2022, an official dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Israel is likely to start in the coming days, which could have positive implications for Turkish foreign policy.