From Russia's Perspective, What is Russia's Policy on the PKK and Syria?

Russia's State Structure

In order to better understand Russia's Syria policy, I think it would be useful to examine Russia's structure in a few issues.

First of all, I should remind you that Russia is a federal state. Even though it has a centralized administration and a form of government close to autocracy, Russia is a federation. 

Since federations create better conditions for different peoples to live together, the fact that Russia is a federation can be considered as the key formula for Russia's domination of such a large territory until today. 

Although federated governments sometimes face problems such as separatist movements, these problems can be overcome as long as one dominant people has superiority over the others both culturally and in terms of security policies. 

The second issue is, I guess you could say, a form of government that is close to autocracy. I say close to autocracy because Russia actually has a semi-presidential system in appearance. In addition to the President, the Prime Minister also has a say in domestic governance. But the powers of the president are very high, especially due to the power of presidential decrees. 

The parliament is in a sense neutralized, so the form of government is very close to autocracy. Interestingly, Vladimir Putin has a lot of popular support, as the vast majority of the population still dreams of Russia being the world power it once was. I would have to say that the blessings of power and the ability to silence dissenting voices very quickly play a big role in this.

Thirdly, I think we have to take into account the rich underground resources. Russia's self-sufficiency in basic foods as an agricultural country and especially its rich energy resources increase Russia's self-confidence.

Fourthly, and perhaps one or two other factors, Russia's superiority in military technologies, especially nuclear technology, the fact that it has at least some heavy industry even if it cannot produce superior technological products, and its disciplined structure and timely infrastructure investments dating back to the Soviet Union can be counted as other factors.

The Ukraine War from Russia's Perspective

Yes, Russia dreams of becoming the superpower it once was. It is still in a competition with the Americans. It is aware that its financial power is not as great as that of America or China, but it sees the former Soviet-era territories, each of which is now a separate state, as its backyard. 

In fact, it is aware of what might happen to it if it loses control over these former territories. It could lose all its territory and fall apart. There are not a few countries in the world that live with this dream. Therefore, it is useful to look at the Ukraine war from this perspective.

But our topic is Russia's Syria policy. I evaluated Ukraine at the beginning of the war, and I don't think it is necessary to go beyond that evaluation. I think Russia didn't know that the war would last so long. They miscalculated. However, the staff, which applied the wrong tactics at the beginning of the war, was immediately changed and new tactics were developed in a short time. Maybe the staff had unknowingly misled Putin and miscalculated the duration. But in any case, war was a necessity for Russia. I am sure Putin knows this very well. Now the war continues according to the new plan and I guess that when it reaches a certain stage, the war will be suspended for a while. But the intermediate stage I am talking about will only be the complete control of the Black Sea coast.

Russia's Syria Policy

As for the Syria policy, it would be useful to analyze the issue again in bullet points with its reasons.

First of all, Syria was an opportunity for Russia to prove to the world that it is still a superpower. Even if he could not get the world states to adopt this view, at least in domestic politics Putin would have proved it to his own people.

Secondly, it was an opportunity for Russia to reach the warm waters of the Mediterranean despite the geographical obstacle of Turkey. Russia's Mediterranean dominance, which has been one of its main goals throughout its history, was easily achieved in exchange for helping the embattled Assad regime. There was a Latakia base in the time of Baba Assad, but it did not have the necessary facilities at that time. He needed a reason to build the base as it is today, and that reason was handed to Russia on a platter with the stirring up of Syria. In its current form, the necessary arrangements have been made for complete domination of the military base and Russia now has a military base that can say, "Don't forget me, I'm here too". 

The main purpose of this base is to dominate the Suez Canal. A military base in the Eastern Mediterranean is a guarantee that the Suez Canal can be intervened in if necessary. Although direct intervention is not possible, it is very important for Russia in terms of international balance. Latakia is now in a very important position in terms of supply facilities for Russian military ships sailing to the Mediterranean.

The third reason is to put a dent in America's grand plan. America is still trying its best to destabilize Russia by provoking the existing Muslim populations in Russia. To this end, it has been providing covert, if not overt, support to various Islamic countries that support radical Islamic groups in Syria. Among the various radical groups in Syria supported by these various Islamic countries, there are many jihadists of radical Islamic views from Russia fighting against the Assad regime. There is a great risk for Russia that these Russian citizen jihadists will eventually infiltrate Russia and incite the Muslim populations in Russia. For the time being, infiltration attempts have been apprehended with occasional domestic operations, but I think the best solution for Russia is to destroy them on Syrian soil. One of the main reasons for Russia's presence in Syria is that it wants to prevent these jihadists from infiltrating into Russia.

I do not intend to analyze the jihadists and the support of the Islamic countries influential in Syria for them in great depth here, as the experts who know more about Syria have already described these groups in sufficient detail. But by influential Islamic countries in Syria, I mean Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran. Each of them financially, if not openly, supports radical groups close to them. With this financial support, jihadist groups are able to procure weapons from the world market. Although it is openly stated in the press here that there are radical groups that Turkey indirectly supports due to the wrong policies pursued at the time, and even this information was openly served to the world by the Russians at the time with satellite images, it would be more accurate to state that Turkey's main purpose is to ensure the security of the groups of Turkish origin dating back to the Ottoman times and to address the migrant problem. The consequences of these mistakes are already in our laps today in the form of the refugee problem. I don't need to elaborate further. The war of dominance between the other three Islamic countries I mentioned is still going on in Syria and it seems that it will not end for a long time.

Actually, maybe something can be said about Israel at this point, but I think it is enough to say that Israel is also satisfied with the current situation, except for the Iranian issue. On the Iranian issue, I will not go further into the Israeli issue by saying that Russia's turning a blind eye to some of Israel's operations in Syria from time to time is related to the deep historical ties between Russia and Israel.

The fourth reason is related to the other reasons. Syria has been a good opportunity for Russia as a testing ground for new technologies developed militarily. Sometimes long-range missiles launched from ships from the Caspian Sea were tested, sometimes guided missiles were tested, and sometimes other new technologies were tested.

Russia was also able to get its share of the war economy, but these are secondary reasons.

Russian Policy towards the PYD/PKK Terrorist Organization

As I mentioned at the beginning, since Russia has a federal form of government, it does not actually look coldly at the dreams of these radical terrorist Kurdish minorities in Syria for a separate state. However, it gives light to a federal organization on the condition that they remain within the territorial integrity of Syria. For Turkey, this is a red line. On the one hand, it is uncomfortable with the Kurds being under American guidance. Naturally, it wants to benefit from such a potential opportunity. Therefore, Turkey does not consider these terrorist Kurdish groups as terrorist organizations. I think this is the biggest difference of opinion between us. On the contrary, some radical Islamic groups that we do not consider terrorist organizations are terrorist organizations for Russia. In other words, both countries are pursuing policies against groups that they think are harmful for their own survival.

Up to this point, I think I have been able to analyze the issue clearly enough and I have put everything on the table with all its clarity in an understandable way.

Turkish-Russian Relations in the Context of Syria

At this stage, my main aim is to make some comments on how our relations with Russia should be organized on the basis of Syria.

I think Russia has now achieved its main goals in Syria. It doesn't want to get more involved after that. If it can prevent the infiltration of radical Islamic groups into Russia, there is nothing more it can ask for. It doesn't want Syria's oil fields, it doesn't want to dominate the Syrian government, it doesn't need the role of a big brother in the region. It has been aware all along that this is a quagmire. If possible, it intends to support the Syrian government in destroying on the spot the radical separatist groups that Assad considers terrorists, leaving Assad in charge and concentrating on its bigger problems. Somehow finding a balance in Syria and preserving what it has achieved will be enough for Russia. 

That's why Russia is now saying, don't talk to me about your refugee problem, go and talk to Assad. That's why I don't want you to carry out an operation again, the operation you will carry out in a somewhat stabilized situation will create new turmoil and disrupt the balance. We, on the other hand, want an operation because we are not satisfied with the balance that has been created, perhaps due to domestic political needs. Under these circumstances, it does not seem possible for us to agree with Russia.

In connection with the Ukraine issue, if Russia can extract some concessions from us, maybe it will not object to another operation in Syria, but I don't think it will help. 

In the end, as long as Russia's gains in Syria are not jeopardized, the Syrian issue is over for Russia. From time to time, it will support the Assad regime against the radicals and mind its own business. It is also not very interested in what the US is doing east of the Euphrates. Russia is already used to getting what it wants in such matters and leaving the problem to time. Time is the cure for everything.

I think it would be useful for us to reconsider our Syria policy in line with these views. Russia will no longer be of any use to us. We are now on our own with the troubles we have brought upon ourselves. We have the PKK/PYD in Syria, we have the refugees as a problem, we have all the commercial losses, we have all the anti-Assad people we have fed in the territories we control through operations, and despite all the aid, the flag burned by those who are not satisfied with the situation is also our flag.

I feel like cursing those who brought the Syrian issue upon us, but my late mother told me not to curse anyone, so I'll stick to her words.

Love and respect to everyone from Moscow.