How Russian Influence Increasing in Georgia with the Agent Law Shapes the Future of the South Caucasus?

The efforts of separatist South Ossetia, a Georgian territory, to emerge as an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to tensions and conflicts within the country due to the interventions of the Georgian government, and finally, on 7 August 2008, the Georgian government inserted its troops into South Ossetia and shelled the capital city of Tskhinvali in order to take full control of Georgia. Russia responded to the Georgian government by quickly inserting its forces into Georgian territory. A ceasefire brokered by the European Union brought an end to the five-day war. Russian troops withdrew, but Russia benefited from this crisis by strengthening its military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In fact, Russia had entered Georgian territory to respond to attacks on its own personnel in South Ossetia, and in this respect it had made a legitimate move. However, the Russian force went beyond this region and attempted to ‘occupy’ Georgian territory in a sense and took an action that went far beyond self-defence. At this point, Russia's influence over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has increased and it has declared that it recognises the independence of these regions and that it will respond if necessary if Georgian or any other power enters these two regions. This policy of Moscow, which in a sense means that it does not recognise the territorial integrity of Georgia, has not changed until today and continues to prevent Georgia from developing its regional policies and relations with NATO and the EU. In fact, I believe that Russia's recognition of these regions is not valid in the context of international law and should be seen as a violation of Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moscow continues to ignore the fact that hundreds of thousands of Georgians were exiled from the two regions in question, which declared their unilateral independence from Georgia and supported by Russia, and have not been able to return to their homes until today.

Although Georgia maintains that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been under Russian occupation since 2008 and that it does not recognise the independence of these regions, it is obvious that the Kremlin does not want to listen to Tbilisi and does not want to end the occupation. Similar to Ankara's Crimea policy, I consider Ankara's refusal to recognise the so-called ‘independence’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within the framework of its internationally recognised borders as a proper and consistent policy.

After the 2008 Russian intervention, the balance in Georgian politics has changed and Russia's influence over Tbilisi has tended to increase. However, a full diplomatic relationship between the two countries could not be established. In 2023, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili stated: ‘The liberation of the territories occupied by Russia and the unification of our country remain the main problems of our state and society.’ He also stipulated the resolution of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia problems as the basis for the improvement of relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, recent efforts by the Georgian government to adopt a Kremlin-style law imposing restrictions on civil society are already attracting attention. Tbilisi introduced the controversial Law on Foreign Agents in 2023 but shelved it after protests. Its revival in spring 2024 by the ruling Georgian Dream party sparked new protests on a larger scale. According to the general opinion, the content of this law aims to suppress the opposition and civil society. It is notable for its similarity to the legislation used by Putin to silence his opponents, which is why it is called the ‘Russian law’. The law defines media and civil society organisations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad as ‘Foreign Agents’. The bill positions the government's traditional Western allies, those advocating integration with NATO and the EU, as enemies, while Russia, which occupies about 20 per cent of the country, is seen as a ‘supporter’. Western capitals, which have been pushing for the law, have harshly criticised Tbilisi, while making no secret of their support for the protests. The United States, for its part, has warned that the controversial law could jeopardise the country's path towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili is known to be pro-Western and has stated that she will not approve the law if it comes before her. However, the ruling party, which holds the majority in the parliament, is likely to go to any lengths to get what it wants. As the crisis escalated in the country at the end of April, the efforts of billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and unofficial leader of the Georgian Dream party, to steer Georgia away from the West and turn its course towards Russia continue unabated. Located at a geopolitical crossroads, the mass protests and increasing violence in Georgia have parallels with the Euromaidan events in Ukraine in 2013-2014. In both cases, the street demonstrations against increasingly authoritarian and Kremlin-friendly governments are striking in their similarities. 

The Georgian Dream party, the flagbearer of pro-Moscow policies in Georgia, first came to power in 2012, when the wounds of Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia were still fresh. Over the past 12 years, the party has gradually consolidated its grip on the country, with the current government allegedly becoming increasingly bold in favouring pro-Kremlin and anti-Western positions. Tbilisi's shift towards the Moscow axis has taken place despite the current overwhelming pro-Western mood.

I expect the current protests to shape the parliamentary elections to be held in October this year. While the fate of the Foreign Agents Law has the potential to shape the country's politics, it also contains elements that disrupt the internal structure and threaten the integrity of this country with a population of approximately 4 million. Even though the Georgian Dream authorities are planning to use the law to silence the opposition, history tells us that no government that cannot embrace the citizens on the streets can last long. On the other hand, if the Georgian Dream Party wins the elections in October, Georgia will irrevocably become a state subordinate to the Kremlin. 

In 2018, Nikol Pashinyan came to power in Armenia in favour of US and Western policies. Pashinyan's policies resulted in Russia's isolation of Armenia against Azerbaijan in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. As a result, there were ruptures in the Yerevan-Moscow axis, and Pashinyan, who wanted to sever his ties with Russia, tended to turn towards the West. Putin, who wants to get his claws into the Georgian opposition, supports the voice of the opposition against the government in Yerevan to be louder. As of 2020, Moscow, which is observed to have relatively good relations with Baku, will not give up the struggle for influence in the South Caucasus and will not hesitate to provide all kinds of support for the governments that will keep Georgia and Armenia under its control. The Western community's use of the anchor of EU and NATO membership, especially in order not to lose Armenia and Georgia, is probably not enough when geopolitical struggle is being waged on the ground. I believe that the political structures of these countries, which have been under Russian domination for almost 100 years, inevitably continue to display a more dependent outlook on Russian policies. In the case of Georgia, I do not think it is possible for the Georgian Dream to end without the disruption of billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili's Moscow-backed world of profit. Under these circumstances, I can already say that the Georgian government, which has an overwhelming superiority in the parliament, will sooner or later get the spy law approved by the President and the dominant structure it will establish based on this will enable it to ‘win’ the October elections.

Conclusion

Georgia traditionally wants to become a member of the European Union, while at the same time refraining from distancing itself from Russia. In 2008, Georgia effectively lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Russia, and is currently in the process of applying for membership of the European Union and negotiating with NATO. Although the current President is pro-Western, the country has been governed by the pro-Moscow party called Georgian Dream since 2012. This party has pioneered the so-called Spy Law, which is likely to be used as a weapon to suppress the pro-Western opposition in the country. In the elections to be held in Georgia in October this year, it is understood that if this law is adopted, the ruling party will further strengthen its position and ‘win’ the elections. There is no need to be a soothsayer to say that the EU and the US will no longer have any influence on Georgian territory afterwards.

Although Turkey is following the developments with caution, it does not recognise the so-called independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Nor does it support the process of building a fully pro-Western politics in these countries. On the other hand, Turkey supports Azerbaijan, which was victorious in the Second Karabakh War against Armenia in 2020, and does not hide its satisfaction with the attitude of Russia, which did not intervene in the war between these two countries. However, I believe that Moscow, which is increasingly likely to take both Armenia and Georgia into its claws, is trying to shape its own policy with the awareness that this policy will harm Turkey's regional policies and interests in the long run.

The escalating crisis in the South Caucasus country also offers some indicators of the end game Russia has in mind if it succeeds in defeating Ukraine. It reveals the ongoing geopolitical struggle to define the future of the country.

References

Davit Kachkachishvili. “Rusya-Gürcistan savaşının 14. yıl dönümü”. AA. 7 Ağustos 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/rusya-gurcistan-savasinin-14-yil-donumu/2655873

Gürcistan’ın Siyasi Görünümü. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/gurcistan-siyasi-gorunumu.tr.mfa

Nicholas Chkhaidze. “Russia’s Georgia strategy offers hints of Kremlin vision for Ukraine”. Atlantic Council. 9 Mayıs 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-georgia-strategy-offers-hints-of-kremlin-vision-for-ukraine/?network_account=Atlantic+Council&utm_campaign=read&utm_content=20240510&utm_medium=organic_social&utm_source=linkedin

İclal Sarıtaş. “Kafkasya Jeopolitiğinde Rusya-Gürcistan İlişkileri”. TUDPAM. 13 Mayıs 2024. https://tudpam.org/kafkasya-jeopolitiginde-rusya-gurcistan-iliskileri/