The Future of the Rules-Based International Order and the Changing Nature of Security

The concept of the rules-based international order (RBIO) refers to the system established after the Second World War through institutions, rules, and accepted agreements developed over time. This term has been used more frequently since the 1990s, particularly following the end of the bipolar system and the acceleration of globalisation. The concept refers to the management of international relations through rules, laws and accepted practices.

This order was based on the economic, technological and institutional superiority of the West; security was defined primarily by military power, deterrence and a state-centred understanding of threats. However, today the pillars supporting this order are being seriously shaken. The reason for this is not a crisis in a single area; it is the simultaneous transformation of technology, the economy, security and geopolitical competition.

The international system is no longer one-dimensional; it has transformed into a multi-layered, fragile and rapidly changing structure defined by data, finance, cultural communication, production chains and digital infrastructure. Therefore, the sustainability of the WPS is now directly linked not only to military power or diplomatic capacity, but also to resilience against invisible threats.

This article first examines why the fundamental institutions of the system in question have become fragile, then discusses how the understanding of security has transformed and what areas of cooperation may exist in the future. It has been prepared to contribute to the ongoing debate on whether a new order should be established, the existing system should be improved, or it should be transformed to meet the needs of the era, from a security perspective.

The fundamental institutions that constitute the rules-based international order

The RIO still rests on five main institutional pillars that remain active:

· The UN and its affiliated organisations (global security and diplomacy),

· Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD (economic cooperation and development),

· NATO and regional security organisations (defence),

· Arms control regimes,

· Specialised organisations such as the WTO, WHO, ICAO, and regional organisations such as the EU, OIC, and GCC.

A common feature of these structures is that they were designed with the historical power superiority of the West in mind. Although the Cold War created a bipolar world view, productive power and capital accumulation remained in the hands of the West for a long time. The advantage gained from production ensured that the financial system was also shaped in favour of the West; shifting production to the global South was not seen as a problem because it was thought that this could be controlled through financial instruments. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the rapid rise of China and the global South in production, innovation and technology has exposed the inequalities of this institutional architecture. The West's resistance to sharing its representative power has led to the emergence of parallel institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

As the West began to lose its production superiority, it started to use its most powerful tool, financial sanctions, more frequently. Moreover, the vast majority of these sanctions are not based on UN resolutions; they are applied unilaterally or by bloc decisions. Almost all of these sanctions originate in the West. Sanctions, which serve both protectionist and rival-weakening purposes, have become a significant factor eroding the legitimacy of the UN. This raises the question of why the West has begun to use this weapon so frequently in recent years. The answer lies in the fact that the real backbone of the UN is the established financial architecture.

The most critical element sustaining today's international order is not military power but the global financial architecture. The fundamental components of this architecture are

· The dollar's status as a reserve currency

· Petroleum trade being conducted in dollars

· The SWIFT payment system

· Western-centred financial markets and the sanctions implemented through them.

A large part of the West's sanctions capacity relies on these infrastructures. Therefore, it can be said that developments threatening the financial order carry a greater potential for global disruption than regional military conflicts. Attempts to change this system are perceived by the West as the greatest source of threat. In this context, alternative structures such as China's digital Yuan and BRICS payment systems are seen as existential threats with the potential to jeopardise the established Western order.

The changing nature of security

The rules-based order has historically not been neutral. It is a system that prioritises Western-centric interests. The understanding of security has been shaped accordingly. Security has traditionally been a concept used in the sense of protecting borders, sovereignty and national interests. The most visible and easily definable tool for ensuring security is military power. The party that sets the rules is also responsible for protecting them. Military power has also served this function in this order. One of the purposes of the US's global military presence is to protect this order.

According to classical security theories, threats in a chaotic international environment are largely state-centred and military-focused, hence the importance placed on developing military power to counter them. In order for the development and use of military power to be convincing, a basis of legitimacy also had to be created. The West needed an enemy that could be defined as the “other” in order to preserve its own identity. As the source of threats was states, the enemy was defined as states or members of opposing alliances, and the ideology of the USSR was presented as a threat to the free world. As a result, alongside military competition, the main subject of conflict became the struggle for ideological legitimacy. ‘Othering’ was used both to universalise Western values and to preserve the internal cohesion of Western societies. From a military perspective, collective defence and deterrence formed the basis of the security concept.

The differentiation of the other

Today, the concept of the other has begun to differentiate. The ‘other’ now encompasses not only enemy states and terrorist organisations, but also global technology companies, artificial intelligence models, uncontrolled algorithms, and addictive platforms. Critical infrastructure facilities, digital networks and space-based systems have become both indispensable elements of global dependency and its most fragile components. These actors can operate independently of states, affect critical infrastructure and transform social perception.

Most new threats are invisible, difficult to detect, of unknown origin, digital rather than physical, and sometimes pose dangers originating from companies and autonomous systems rather than states. For example, a cyberattack can shut down a banking system with a single line of code. Damage to satellites in orbit can collapse the GPS network, paralysing logistics systems, trade, and communications. In short, although these threats are no longer visible, their effects have reached a level of destructive capacity almost comparable to that of war.

Countries that could protect themselves against traditional threats with physical security systems and military capabilities at their borders have become more vulnerable to these new threats. These emerging threats have also given a new dimension to the concept of “the other”. This is because they operate in a world without borders.

The globalisation of trade and the dependency provided by digital networks have also changed the traditional view of security based on geographical borders. In the digital age, the production and sharing of information, cultural interaction and financial applications can be carried out rapidly without being subject to physical limitations. Globalisation has increased permeability. However, behind this apparent freedom, new digital walls are being erected to maintain control over information. For example, Western states have banned artificial intelligence models and critical infrastructure hardware developed by China, while China has placed the development and use of these technologies entirely under state control.

Visible weapon systems against invisible threats

The security paradigm shaped during the Cold War era by visible actors such as military forces, alliances, and ideological blocs in specific regions is inadequate to address today's invisible threats. Nevertheless, states still under the influence of the old security paradigm continue to invest heavily in weapon systems developed against traditional threats. The four main reasons for this contradiction are outlined below.

Psychologically, societies' perception of threats is still shaped by the destruction caused by visible physical conflicts. For politicians, investments in these weapons are highly visible and yield high political returns. National and international security institutions are still largely designed according to lessons learned from 20th-century wars. Another factor that is just as important is that invisible threats have not yet created a collective memory of horror comparable to the effects of nuclear weapons. Developments during the pandemic and the effects of the climate crisis have not yet created such horror and fear, so armament continues according to the old understanding of security. The real issue we need to focus on is our perception, which is based on established paradigms and accepted concepts.

The developments described above create incompatibilities with the traditional state-centred security structure of the UN. This is because the authority of international institutions is still organised according to 20th-century actors. The rules apply to states, but today non-state actors are able to make some of the critical decisions.

The need for a new understanding of security

The international order, once based on universally accepted rules, is now generating increasing tension between the rule-makers and those expected to comply with the rules. Although the system still espouses equality, in practice justice has weakened and rules determined by the powerful have come to the fore. This order, which claims universality, was actually a reflection of the unipolar era; however, today the world order is shifting towards a multipolar structure.

New technologies and the tools they produce necessitate a redefinition of the concept of deterrence based on military power. While new centres of power are emerging on one hand, global supply chains and energy dependencies are creating new vulnerabilities that affect all actors on the other. As societies become more interdependent, feelings of insecurity deepen. The fundamental cause of this insecurity is the inadequacy and mismanagement of existing institutions. The gap between our capacity for technological change and our ability to regulate the consequences of that change is widening.

The problem is not merely the obsolescence of institutions; the real issue is that concepts are also losing their function. The old security approach, centred on military deterrence, is giving way to the concept of digital resilience. If international regulations cannot be established in this area, it will not be possible to ensure security. The complete transformation of institutions may take a long time; however, agreements in the areas outlined below could pave the way for broader cooperation.

In this context, the concept of security must first be redefined. Security should encompass not only the survival of states, but also the protection of societies, economies, information and technologies. The security, sustainability and digital sovereignty of borderless digital infrastructures must become an integral part of the definition of security. For example, there is a need for regulations to be made, considering the management and operation of infrastructures such as fibre optic submarine internet cables and global positioning satellites, which are owned by certain states and large companies but serve the whole world, as the common property of humanity. Even if they are outside their own borders, institutions that formulate countries' security policies must also take their security into account.

Just like the universality of a rule-based order, the claim of universality in Western culture also creates obstacles to achieving a common understanding. For example, it is noteworthy how the concepts of security and its opposite, threat, are approached in two different cultures. In Western thought, threat is an element that must be suppressed and neutralised to ensure security. This leads to an adversarial, zero-sum structure in inter-state relations. Consequently, policies such as deterrence, power development, and the formation of military alliances are pursued.

In Eastern thought, however, it is not the elimination of opposites that is important, but their balancing and the prevention of excesses. Threat is not a destructive element, but an element whose excesses must be eliminated and transformed for the system to be sustained. These different ways of thinking directly influence security policies. Therefore, rather than one side viewing its own cultural approach as superior, efforts to understand the other side's way of thinking will facilitate cooperation. Artificial intelligence applications, which have entered our lives in recent years, can be an effective tool for increasing cross-cultural interaction. However, states impose restrictions on the use of these applications in different cultures. Constructive regulations are needed regarding digital barriers and media restrictions that hinder cultural interaction.

An event that would create a ‘memory of horror’ similar to that created by nuclear weapons, stemming from the new threats to the digital infrastructure mentioned above, has not yet occurred. However, there are many technologies with the potential to cause this level of destruction. As the effects of the climate crisis are spread over time, the perception of danger varies across different societies. The recent pandemic is one concrete manifestation of this fragility. Even more dangerous is the possibility of the destruction of critical infrastructure that connects all systems around the world. A situation similar to the mutually assured destruction (MAD) principle used for nuclear weapons applies to these threats. This is because it is impossible for the party initiating such an attack to remain unaffected.

Therefore, rapid regulations are needed in areas such as space security, the principles of developing artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, biosecurity and pandemic preparedness, and the protection of financial systems. In particular:

• Human control (human-in-the-loop) in autonomous weapon systems,

• The principle of ‘no first use’ in cyber operations,

• The establishment of norms such as global principles and red lines for artificial intelligence are urgently needed.

The UN system, with its current structure, finds it difficult to take binding decisions in these areas. Similar to the backdoor policies and secret dialogues conducted by the two superpowers during the Cold War regarding nuclear weapons, today, countries with technological capacity coming together to conduct technical negotiations could yield faster and more effective results.

In conclusion, a multipolar world is emerging. The nature of multipolarity is competitive and conflictual. However, in terms of global security, solutions should be developed by identifying areas of cooperation rather than conflict. The answer to the question posed at the outset is that it is more sensible to change the existing order according to the needs of our time rather than establish a new order. This is because, throughout history, the establishment of new orders has always followed major destruction and wars. The search for solutions for a more equitable order should not be limited to just two or three superpowers; regional powers should also be involved.